In the general propositional form propositions occur in other propositios only as bases of truth-functions. At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in another in a different way. Particular with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as "A believes that p is the case" and "A has the thought p", etc. For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an object A. (And in modern theory of knowledge(Russell,,Moore etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way).
It is clear, however, that "A believes that p", "A has the thought p", and "A says p" are of the form '"p" says p': and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlatio of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.
This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul(or mind)--the subject, etc.--as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day.
The correct explanation of the form of the proposition,"A makes the judgement p", must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)
