各位看看便罷,別問我知識上的問題. 留言板畢竟不是黑板.
P.S.: 實在很沒意義,沒有人會比我更厭惡自己所寫的一切,就像用過的衛生紙, 就像鸚鵡支支唔唔, 毫無價值.
XX 叫我給巴勒網貼一些文字, 給一些 "正經" 刊物寫些稿,不要只會寫報紙或寫留言板等等這些迅即消失的版面, 但每一個印刷出版的白紙黑字,都讓我感到挫折,我看不出自己寫的一切文字有何刊登價值.
一個把一生都獻給文字的人卻覺得自己的文字低劣庸俗,我真是不知道這輩子除了自言自語然後消失在土壤裏之外, 還能做些什麼.
這二十幾年來,已經寫了上千萬字,卻無一字值得留存, 履歷表著作欄永遠掛零. 我該怎麼跟人解釋我每天浸淫書海,究竟都在忙些什麼?
一個沒有才華的人, 卻日以繼夜想寫一本好書,這書已耗掉我大半青春,但它依然停留在第一章第一個句子,彷彿必須把千萬字濃縮成一句話時,方才成書. 難道我是在尋找一種在文字中根本找不到的東西? 一種嘆息? 一種像 "家" 那樣的東西? (怪人夜裏說怪話,別回應.)
秋 日
By R. M. Rilke
北島譯 (我改了幾個字)
主啊，是時候了。夏日盛極一時。
把你的陰影置於日晷上，
讓風吹過牧場。
讓枝頭最後的果實飽滿；
再給兩天南方的好天氣，
催它們成熟，把
最後的甘甜壓進濃酒。
誰此時沒有房子，就不必建造，
誰此時孤獨，就永遠孤獨，
就醒來，讀書，寫長長的信，
在林蔭路上不停地
徘徊，落葉紛飛。
陳真
............
(續之前寫的 “污名化種種”）
34. 污名化的對象經常是弱勢或少數（諸如肥胖、離婚、未婚、同性戀、外籍新娘新郎或異議份子等）；污名化不但針對人，也包括動物，比方說「豬狗不如」、「人面獸心」、「獸性大發」、「禽獸不如」、「髒得跟豬一樣」、「其笨如豬」、「狼心狗肺」、「色狼」等等，但根據種種研究，豬並不笨，甚至比狗聰明；豬更不髒，甚至還有點潔癖。可見污名化往往出於一種無知與強勢。
35.舉個例：記得十八年前（1989年）在彰基實習，輪派到精神科時，科內剛好請來一位「大老」每周來教學。有一回case conference，我有個黨外的朋友患有癲癇及失眠剛好來住院，他並無伴隨其它精神病症狀，但卻因癲癇及身為民進黨而屢屢失業，為此而有憂鬱症狀。當護士報告到他的身份是民進黨時，全場爆出鄙夷笑聲（註：敝人是民進黨建黨黨員，1987年第一次退黨被慰留，1994年退黨成功，因為那時已經沒幾個人在乎我退不
退黨了）。
36. 當時我身上正揹著一個有期徒刑七年以上的涉嫌叛亂罪名，太太當時才剛唸高二，因為刊登我的鼓吹兒童人權文章在高中校刊而被退學，父母更是飽受情治單位威脅恐嚇，家破人散，百般委屈。看大家笑，我啞巴吃黃蓮，心裏有說不出的悲傷。那位大老卻有模有樣地止住大家的笑聲說：「你們不要笑，這正是要特別小心的地方，精神科要細心，要學會觀察，像這樣的人（加重語調！！），我們就要注意看他是否有什麼人格問題，比方說有沒有反社會人格或躁症或甚至被害妄想，以為國民黨要迫害他啦什麼的…」不可思議的是，大老一邊講解，許多同事一邊猛點頭表示對這位精神科大老「細心觀察人性」的佩服。
37.更不可思議的是，這位大老幾年後變得很「愛台灣」，整天喊著「咱台灣郎」及獨立建國等等，仇視大陸人，變成民進黨的死忠。我在想，他現在如果遇到一個統派或大陸新娘來掛號，是不是也要冠給對方一些根本莫須有的病名？
38.這真實故事告訴我們：當某種條件或特質成為一種主流強勢時，便很容易對少數或弱勢進行污名化。在一種不良文化體質下，往昔被污名化者，一旦取得優勢，便也往往同樣氣燄高張糟蹋異己。
39.政治如此，疾病也一樣。回到疾病本身：同樣都是疾病，為什麼糖尿病沒有污名化，精神病或愛滋病卻被污名化？Goffman認為，被污名化的疾病，往往有一些共同特質，比方說，人們認為當事人應該為自己的病負責，是你自己害的；比方說疾病的真相不為人所知；比方說該病是無法痊癒的。
40.但這些說法其實都可以找出反例，比方說癌症不但無法痊癒，而且經常是因為不當飲食或抽煙嚼檳榔造成，卻沒有被污名化；肝病常與飲酒或過度勞累有關，而且也無法痊癒，但肝病卻也沒有被污名化。
41.相反地，精神病越來越被認為是一種生物因素造成，而不是什麼精神打擊或心結，也不是一種個人所應負責的道德缺陷或不當生活型態所致，但它依然持續被污名化。
42.阿吉問說，污名化既然是一種不當的概念分類造成，難道我們就應該停止對人事物進行概念化？如此推論是錯的，因為有問題的不是概念化，而是道德化；把中性事物給添上道德色彩。比方說，喜歡同性或異性，或是要不要結婚要不要生小孩要不要離婚等等，純屬價值中立，卻被抹上敗德或病態的道德陰影，或是製造一種影射，彷彿當事人有著某種人格或能力或道德缺陷。
43.當一個人要結婚，我們不會污名化之，我們不會用驚訝遺憾的口吻問說：“天啊，你為什麼要結婚？” 但是當一個人選擇單身時，人們卻污名化之，彷彿他之不結婚是一種遺憾或缺陷，甚至進一步影射背後是不是有著某種人格或道德缺陷。
44. 但事實上，結婚與不結婚，在道德意義上是完全平等的。如果我們對未婚感到驚訝，那我們其實也該對結婚感到驚訝才對，因為兩者的道德地位平等。
45. 有問題的不是概念化，而是賦予不相干的道德色彩。就如康德所說，概念化是進行理解所必要的，否則我們對世界將一無所知。但是，概念化的對象是物不是人；而道德的主體卻是人而非物。
46. 我們常聽到一句老掉牙的話說：「醫生不是治病，而是治療病人。」這話很對。但它究竟是什麼意思？簡單說，病只有一種，但病人卻千千萬萬。
47. 科學史學家 Francois Delaporte 寫了一本《Disease and Civilization》，談十九世紀巴黎霍亂史，書中開宗明義說：「疾病不存在，存在的只是操作（及其概念）。」許多醫生聽了恐怕要跳腳，但他們其實無需生氣。這話的意思並不是說細菌不存在，而是說我們無法不透過概念來理解世界。
48. 問題是：對於疾病，我們進行概念化與分類；但生命卻各有差異而無法等同與分類。精神分裂就是精神分裂，但張三的精神分裂和李四的精神分裂卻大不同；同樣的病，卻有不同表現，因為當事人對它必然有不同反應。任何疾病都是如此。就好像一樣是偷東西，一樣是殺人，一樣是強暴，但內涵卻不同。
49. 甚至我們可以說，疾病根本不存在，存在的只是病人。就好像愛情如果不是依附在一個人或一個生命身上，愛情是無法理解的。
50. 基於上面這兩點，當我們企圖把一組道德概念以一種違反美學的粗糙方式給套在某一族群或社群上時，那往往只是在製造更多誤解，而不是增進理解。當然，做為一種政治目的，污名化將很有效，可它卻傷害了詩歌，傷害了感情，傷害了我們對生命、對世界的真實理解。
51. 於是更大的一個問題來了。既然我們是治療病人而不是治病，而病人卻千千萬萬、個個不同，我如何可能對「個別人事物」（the individual）產生知識？我如何可能去理解（更不用說治療）一個個完全不同的個人或生命？
52. 最早提出這個問題的人叫做W. Windelband，他在一百多年前（1894）的一個著名演講中提出這樣一個問題。他給知識或科學做了一個區分，一個是nomothetic（我不會翻譯），指的是對於 “一般性事物” 的一種知識，另一種科學是idiographic （我也不會翻），指的是對於個別人事物的知識。前者毫無問題，一加一在台灣等於二，到了英國還是等於二。但後者卻有問題，世上有這樣一種知識嗎？這問題其實等於是在問說：「我有可能了解你嗎？」我又不是你肚子裏的蛔蟲，我如何可能了解你？
53. 這問題對於其他科的人或許比較不嚴重，但是對於精神科，卻是這科的知識的一個知識論基礎；除非有人真的笨到以為所有心靈都一樣，彷彿只要貼上一個DSM-IV的精神醫學診斷，某人心靈的真相便已昭然若揭。
54. 關於這一點，請參看底下我幾個月前寫給住院醫師看的上課講義（2007. 6. 5.）。我說明為什麼這樣的知識是可能的，並提其歷史淵源及對心理學及精神醫學的影響，並說明這樣的知識如何獲得。不過要了解這些東西，可能就需要一點必要的相關人文學科基礎。
55. What does it mean to have a“science of the individual”? （ 擁有“對於某個人事物的科學”是什麼意思？） by 陳真 2007. 6. 5.
56. To have a ‘science of the individual’ is to claim a scientific study of ‘particular or private’ things, striving for direct insight into their unique nature.
57. In a famous address in 1894, W. Windelband (1980) introduced the terms ‘nomothetic’ to refer to the kind of science that dealt with the general and ‘idiographic’to refer to the one that dealt with the particular. These two ways of acquiring scientific knowledge differ not only in their objects of study but also in aims and methods. The former seeks to establish general laws by using ana1ysis, quantification and explanation, while the latter is concerned with the uniqueness of individual things by ‘understanding.’This methodological dichotomy has often been discussed in the study of personality, history and social psychology.
58. The origins of idiographic psychology lie in 19th century Germany, as part of a general swing away from classicism (represented by objectivity, positivism, materialism and mechanism) towards romanticism (represented by subjectivity, intuitionism, and vitalism) A central theme was the claim that the social sciences were distinct from the natural sciences and demanded different methods, notably that of Verstehen (understanding).
59. The scientific study of the individual has been thought problematical on the grounds that the individual constitutes a unique pattern which is more than the sum of component parts and not fully represented by scores on dimensional tests. see Valentine, 1982, p. 164.
60. We explain nature but we understand human beings.----W. Dilthey (1937), Historik.
61. Knowledge involves life, not only reason.---- M. J. Inwood (1995).
62. Traditionally, an individual cannot be the object of scientific study because of its uniqueness, which is considered by many as elusive, unsystematic and hence incapable of investigation. On the other hand, whether the “general laws” are ever relevant to the individual remains dubious.
63. Wittgenstein’s “private language” argument: Is private language possible?
64. To make the ‘idiographic approach’ possible, we need to presuppose that human beings can empathize with each other (Ebmeier, 1987). In other word, we should have a special ability to “share people’s state of mind” and hence understand their behavior. This special ability is at the basis of the method of Verstehen.
65. Verstehen is a kind of hermeneutic understanding, involving intuition, empathic feeling and direct non-intellectual knowing. Holt puts it thus: Verstehen, i.e., “an artist’s quest for truth, differs from a scientist’s being a striving not for strict verisimilitude but for allusive illumination (Valentine, 1982: 178).”
66. Verstehen demands empathic, intuitive, interpretative understanding while nomothetic approach is preoccupied with prediction and explanation based on general causal statements
(Valentine, 1982, p. 165). That is, we use empathic understanding to identify the motives
and interpret the social significance of human behavior. Its power is much dependent on the
amount and quality of interpreters’ experience and their introspective capacity.
67. Comte was the first to establish what may be termed “the postulate of Verstehen” for sociological research. According to him, empirical generalizations about human behaviour are not valid unless they are in accord with our knowledge of human nature. His theory is that we can understand the behaviour of human beings by being able to share their “state of mind”. See Abel, 1953, p. 677.
68. Maclver 也認為我們必須有一套有別於自然科學的方法來研究 social causation or human behaviour. He calls this process “imaginative reconstruction”.
69. Verstehen is a hermeneutic tool and source of intuition for the formation of causal hypotheses in social and human sciences.
70. Bhaskar has argued that social explanation is both causal and interpretative. He accepts “hermeneutic understanding” as a legitimate method for arriving at “causal generative mechanism” in human sciences (Collier, 1994: 167). However, the logical relationship between causal explanation and the testing of hypotheses still remains controversial.
71. A science of the individual should not be mistaken as a “methodological individualism,"
which stems from a general assumption that the wholes must be resolved into simple units to be
understood (Collier, 1994).
72. It is not a branch of the science of “whole”. Actually, as Windelband pointed out, these two cognitive methods remain independent and juxtaposed in the total synthesis of knowledge (Windelband, 1980: 183). The world is stratified. Science within this world is hence divided into different kinds which are mutually irreducible (Bhaskar, 1997).
73. It is plausible to say that the science of the individual is one of the two faces of the world. Without this, science is nothing more than a technique. A scientist needs to be an artist in theory construction and making discoveries because science involves life not only reason (Inwood, 1995: 201).
74. 讀小說比唸心理學更能了解人性？
75. psychoana1ytic methodology has been described as causal explanation or hermeneutic understanding. This methodological dichotomy has been introduced into psychopathology by Karl Jaspers.
76. For Jaspers, psychoana1ysis is an hermeneutic discipline mistaking itself for a causal science. (But is presented by Freud as a causal science similar to the natural sciences.)
77. Empathetic understanding (“as if” understanding) is a method modeled by Jaspers on
the hermeneutic disciplines, philosophy and history. Such a kind of understanding can never be complete or final. Consequently, contrary interpretations are often equally plausible.
78. 相對於 hermeneutic understanding, causal explanation 需要一種外來的觀察以避免循環論證。
79. Llewelyn & Kelly (1980) have also argued the case for a “new paradigm” in psychology, i.e., a non-essentialist psychology, which will account adequately for the social construction of individuality. They criticize contemporary psychology for relying on a biological conception of the individual as an organism physically separated from its environment. This view is essentialist in that it takes for granted the pre-social existence of the individual. See Clifford & Frosh (1982), p. 267.
80. Clifford & Frosh (1982), believes that psychology must begin neither with the individual nor with society, but with their interface, language. The construction of the individual is seen as a gradual process of differentiation and organization in which the production of meaning is central. pp. 267, 269.
81. Clifford & Frosh (1982): the meaning of a signifier is not defined by its relation to a real object or to an idea in the mind of the speaker, but by its relation to other signifiers. They believe that their “new paradigm” transcends the long and bitter opposition between “interpretative” and “experimental” psychologies. See p. 268.
82. Verstehen is not a method of verification. It starts with some hunch or intuition. See Abel, 1953, p. 685.
83. In every concrete individual, there is a uniqueness that defies all formulation. We can feel the touch of it and recognize its taste, so to speak, relishing or disliking, as the case may be, but we can give no ultimate account of it, and have in the end simply to admire the Creator. Willam James 1912
written by 陳真 2007. 10 . 10.
陳真
發佈日期: 2007.10.14
發佈時間:
上午 2:10