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巴勒網後院貼這些稀奇古怪的東西，也不知道和巴勒斯坦有沒有關。應該有吧。這事那事之間，生生滅滅像個網，怎會無關。一直以為，如果能把《冷暖人生》這樣的節目播給全世界，和平還會遠嗎？
這幾期冷暖講一窮學生藉著乞討上大學的經歷。熟悉的身影，就像許多人的故事。饑餓者跟吃飽飽的人，世界長得不一樣，各有各的氣味和通關密碼。沒有饑餓過的人，不知道饑餓的恐怖和痛苦。人再剛強，也抵擋不了那一點饑餓感以及茫茫的恐懼。
饑餓本身不可怕—如果知道何時可以止饑，知道饑餓何時可以終了。可怕的是吃過這餐，卻根本不知道下一餐在哪。甭說尊嚴，連器官、鮮血都可以賣，還有什麼能擁在身邊？有些事，說來簡單，做起來難。收養了狗，一起吃喝拉撒，結局卻是小的忍不住饑餓，吃掉老的，拖出個胃來啃。
災難過後，很難講什麼美麗，但人很奇怪，忘不掉的是歡樂，而歡樂卻總連結著同樣深沉的痛苦，彷彿這才是心靈的開端、美麗的根源。當你有了一些什麼，帶來的反倒是醜陋和失落。你勢必懷念一種過去，渴望一個什麼都沒有的將來，彷彿那才是你真正的來處和歸宿。
生命如斯，飛逝而去，你怎麼可能不愛畫不愛音樂不愛繁星不愛童顏不愛風和雨？這些無言之物，像一種證詞，一種淚痕，見證古往今來許多事，說出人們永遠的夢。
陳真 2004. 9. 11.
===============
鳳凰衛視《冷暖人生》
http://www.phoenixtv.com/home/phoenixtv/200408/04/305623.html
編導手記：我眼中的大學生“乞丐”
2004年08月04日
朱衛民
坐在去南陽的火車上，我心裏還是沒譜，電話裏的李新堅決不同意採訪。說實在的，一個大學生去乞討，其間肯定有很多讓人無法想象的事情。職業的敏感讓我們欲罷不能，哪怕只是去見上他一面。一路上我們猜測著，討論著。感覺好像顛簸了很長時間，火車才在淩晨兩點的時候停在南陽車站。他會接受我們採訪嗎？
按照約好的時間，我們提前來到了李新的的學校門口。曉楠、我、駢庶，都沒有見過李新，甚至是他的照片，更糟糕的是在電話裏我們忘記了與他相約見面的方式。於是我們幾個只好打趣說看誰能先認出他。
十一點整，一個穿著樸素的男孩出現在校門口。我們三個不約而同的說：就是他！雖然沒有言語，但是他的舉止神態還是讓人一下就能感覺到他與周圍人群的那種距離感。
李新很內向，說不了兩句臉就會紅。就是這樣一個文縐縐的男孩子，怎麼走上街頭，向路人伸出乞討的手呢？李新燃起了我們每個人想要瞭解他的衝動。時間已近午餐時刻，我們就一起走進了一個看上去中檔一點的餐廳。李新顯得有些手足無措，可能他從來都沒有來過這樣的地方。為了打消他的顧慮，我們點了一些李新的家鄉菜，是那種帶辣的貴州菜。
我們種種細節上的考慮都是想盡可能從心靈上來接近李新。我們沒有輕易去觸及那段讓他倍感屈辱的乞討生涯，我們知道乞討給他心靈上帶來的撕扯，他幾乎不能再次承受。小時候、家鄉、上學，我們甚至談起了我們非常不熟悉而又是李新現在專攻的數控專業。
起初的李新還是緘默寡言，不過慢慢的，他也開始講一些，而後話就越來越多，間或他還會像孩子一樣笑起來，笑得是那樣的單純。
李新乞討的事情學校知道後，給他的壓力非常大，我們能感覺到他內心的矛盾、痛苦還有那種撕裂，我們知道他想傾訴。曉楠說：“你可以把你的委屈、痛苦說出來，你可以利用這個機會為你的行為辯解，讓你的內心得到解脫，你要知道你所面對的不是你個人的事情，是很多人正在面臨或將要面臨的故事。還有多少像你這樣的窮孩子想要上大學啊，知不知道你的故事對他們有著什麼樣的意義嗎？”
也許是他心靈深處最脆弱的部分被觸動了吧，三個小時後，他同意接受採訪。我們答應不出現他的正面像，不在他的學校裏拍任何一個鏡頭。
考慮到不影響他的上課，而且他的時間我們一分鐘也不願意耽誤。我們當天沒有採訪，而是安排在第二天，真的很幸運，因為那天他只有一、二節有課。
下午我們就在這個中原小城尋找合適的拍攝場地，離李新學校約十公里的地方，我們找到了一片安靜的小樹林，樹林邊有一個很少人光顧的湖。雖說過了驚蟄，但在閏月時節，萬物還顯得有些蕭瑟。在好似冬日的陽光照耀下，眼前的應景倒更像一副美麗的水墨畫了。我想這就是我們要找的地方。
第二天李新下課之後，我們就來到了這個風景如畫的小樹林。採訪剛開始，他似乎是在盡力的壓抑著自己內心情感的東西，一切的講述都很平淡，就像他一直盯著的那面湖水，波瀾不驚。尤其講到母親去世的時候，他竟然是出乎我們所有人意料的平靜。但所有人都能看出來，他在壓抑自己，他在拼命壓抑自己，他不讓自己流淚，他不停地喝水，以至於採訪中間留下了一段很大的空白。
不過，直到講述母親出外打工之前來見他的最後一面，李新的壓抑終於徹底崩潰了，他的極力克制變成了失聲抽泣，我們知道他思念母親，我們也知道李新為我們打開了他的心門。
整個採訪過程中，我們能感受到李新內心那種始終不停地戰爭，上不上大學，乞討或者不乞討，他對一切都在尋找著理性的解釋，這些解釋一次次的建立起來，又一次次地被他自己無情擊破。
直到採訪結束，或許直到目前，他內心的戰爭還沒有結束，因為他自己都不知道明天還能不能繼續上學，上學到底值得不值得他那樣的放下尊嚴，就像他自己說的，他好像在很深的海底裏掙扎，而這種掙扎不知道什麼時候才能結束。
說完這些，李新就會自覺不自覺地來上一聲完全不應該屬於他這個年紀的那種很老成的歎息，沈重而滄桑。在我們後期編輯整個節目的時候，我才愈發清晰的感覺到他的這種歎息幾乎是貫穿採訪的始終，這不能不讓我對李新的未來
生深深的憂慮，在這樣沈重的十字架下，李新何時才能擺脫心靈的枷鎖，何時才能徹底走向社會，尋找到真正屬於他的新生活？
也不知道從何時起，湖邊已是蛙聲一片，此起彼伏，好不熱鬧。也許和李新相比，生活對它們來說是太過愜意了。它們的歡唱一次次地壓過李新的訴說，於是我不得不、不止一次地走到湖邊去打斷它們的快樂，讓它們安靜下來與我們、與這片冬日下的湖光林影一起傾聽李新的故事。
李新一直都沒有怎麼正視曉楠，他對著如鏡的湖面，給我們講述了他的童年、少年和現在的故事，他似乎是在講給自己聽，給自己一種理由、一種證據、一種釋放。我們慶幸我們找到了一個能讓李新吐訴心靈的地方。
原本打算三個小時的採訪一直延續到了五個小時，採訪結束時，殘陽如血，已近黃昏，一輪彎月早就掛在了天上。時間過得如此之快是我們大家都沒有想到的，天色已經暗了下來，我們起先約好的計程車並沒有如約而至，我們這時才想到一個很現實的問題，在離城十公里外的地方，我們怎麼回去？
李新說沒關係，走上一個小時就能打到車。看來我們只有扛著機器步行了，連曉楠都沒閒著，雙手也拎滿了東西。李新主動上來扛了最重的腳架，我們一群人在這夜色漸濃的初春黃昏邊走邊聊，儼然沒有了先前那種陌生與隔閡，倒更像朋友。
幾個小時的採訪，可能李新很久以來壓抑的痛苦沈澱了些許，他似乎輕鬆了很多，笑聲也漸漸多了起來，甚至還能跟我們開些小玩笑，如果真的這樣，我們就很欣慰了。
因為回程的車票已經買好，本來打算和李新再一起吃頓晚飯，但因為趕車的緣故，我們只得放棄。李新說沒關係，後來我們想到了中午我們買來當午餐的餅乾，於是就讓他帶著吃。
李新起初堅持著不要，但後來他好像想到了什麼，有點孩子氣的說，好吧，宿舍裏每次都是同學們買零食，會分給我吃，這回我終於也可以拿回去點，分給他們吃了。
於是，李新就是這樣和我們分了手。在李新的學校門口，我們看著他拎著那包餅乾，消失在夜色裏。
這幾期冷暖講一窮學生藉著乞討上大學的經歷。熟悉的身影，就像許多人的故事。饑餓者跟吃飽飽的人，世界長得不一樣，各有各的氣味和通關密碼。沒有饑餓過的人，不知道饑餓的恐怖和痛苦。人再剛強，也抵擋不了那一點饑餓感以及茫茫的恐懼。
饑餓本身不可怕—如果知道何時可以止饑，知道饑餓何時可以終了。可怕的是吃過這餐，卻根本不知道下一餐在哪。甭說尊嚴，連器官、鮮血都可以賣，還有什麼能擁在身邊？有些事，說來簡單，做起來難。收養了狗，一起吃喝拉撒，結局卻是小的忍不住饑餓，吃掉老的，拖出個胃來啃。
災難過後，很難講什麼美麗，但人很奇怪，忘不掉的是歡樂，而歡樂卻總連結著同樣深沉的痛苦，彷彿這才是心靈的開端、美麗的根源。當你有了一些什麼，帶來的反倒是醜陋和失落。你勢必懷念一種過去，渴望一個什麼都沒有的將來，彷彿那才是你真正的來處和歸宿。
生命如斯，飛逝而去，你怎麼可能不愛畫不愛音樂不愛繁星不愛童顏不愛風和雨？這些無言之物，像一種證詞，一種淚痕，見證古往今來許多事，說出人們永遠的夢。
陳真 2004. 9. 11.
===============
鳳凰衛視《冷暖人生》
http://www.phoenixtv.com/home/phoenixtv/200408/04/305623.html
編導手記：我眼中的大學生“乞丐”
2004年08月04日
朱衛民
坐在去南陽的火車上，我心裏還是沒譜，電話裏的李新堅決不同意採訪。說實在的，一個大學生去乞討，其間肯定有很多讓人無法想象的事情。職業的敏感讓我們欲罷不能，哪怕只是去見上他一面。一路上我們猜測著，討論著。感覺好像顛簸了很長時間，火車才在淩晨兩點的時候停在南陽車站。他會接受我們採訪嗎？
按照約好的時間，我們提前來到了李新的的學校門口。曉楠、我、駢庶，都沒有見過李新，甚至是他的照片，更糟糕的是在電話裏我們忘記了與他相約見面的方式。於是我們幾個只好打趣說看誰能先認出他。
十一點整，一個穿著樸素的男孩出現在校門口。我們三個不約而同的說：就是他！雖然沒有言語，但是他的舉止神態還是讓人一下就能感覺到他與周圍人群的那種距離感。
李新很內向，說不了兩句臉就會紅。就是這樣一個文縐縐的男孩子，怎麼走上街頭，向路人伸出乞討的手呢？李新燃起了我們每個人想要瞭解他的衝動。時間已近午餐時刻，我們就一起走進了一個看上去中檔一點的餐廳。李新顯得有些手足無措，可能他從來都沒有來過這樣的地方。為了打消他的顧慮，我們點了一些李新的家鄉菜，是那種帶辣的貴州菜。
我們種種細節上的考慮都是想盡可能從心靈上來接近李新。我們沒有輕易去觸及那段讓他倍感屈辱的乞討生涯，我們知道乞討給他心靈上帶來的撕扯，他幾乎不能再次承受。小時候、家鄉、上學，我們甚至談起了我們非常不熟悉而又是李新現在專攻的數控專業。
起初的李新還是緘默寡言，不過慢慢的，他也開始講一些，而後話就越來越多，間或他還會像孩子一樣笑起來，笑得是那樣的單純。
李新乞討的事情學校知道後，給他的壓力非常大，我們能感覺到他內心的矛盾、痛苦還有那種撕裂，我們知道他想傾訴。曉楠說：“你可以把你的委屈、痛苦說出來，你可以利用這個機會為你的行為辯解，讓你的內心得到解脫，你要知道你所面對的不是你個人的事情，是很多人正在面臨或將要面臨的故事。還有多少像你這樣的窮孩子想要上大學啊，知不知道你的故事對他們有著什麼樣的意義嗎？”
也許是他心靈深處最脆弱的部分被觸動了吧，三個小時後，他同意接受採訪。我們答應不出現他的正面像，不在他的學校裏拍任何一個鏡頭。
考慮到不影響他的上課，而且他的時間我們一分鐘也不願意耽誤。我們當天沒有採訪，而是安排在第二天，真的很幸運，因為那天他只有一、二節有課。
下午我們就在這個中原小城尋找合適的拍攝場地，離李新學校約十公里的地方，我們找到了一片安靜的小樹林，樹林邊有一個很少人光顧的湖。雖說過了驚蟄，但在閏月時節，萬物還顯得有些蕭瑟。在好似冬日的陽光照耀下，眼前的應景倒更像一副美麗的水墨畫了。我想這就是我們要找的地方。
第二天李新下課之後，我們就來到了這個風景如畫的小樹林。採訪剛開始，他似乎是在盡力的壓抑著自己內心情感的東西，一切的講述都很平淡，就像他一直盯著的那面湖水，波瀾不驚。尤其講到母親去世的時候，他竟然是出乎我們所有人意料的平靜。但所有人都能看出來，他在壓抑自己，他在拼命壓抑自己，他不讓自己流淚，他不停地喝水，以至於採訪中間留下了一段很大的空白。
不過，直到講述母親出外打工之前來見他的最後一面，李新的壓抑終於徹底崩潰了，他的極力克制變成了失聲抽泣，我們知道他思念母親，我們也知道李新為我們打開了他的心門。
整個採訪過程中，我們能感受到李新內心那種始終不停地戰爭，上不上大學，乞討或者不乞討，他對一切都在尋找著理性的解釋，這些解釋一次次的建立起來，又一次次地被他自己無情擊破。
直到採訪結束，或許直到目前，他內心的戰爭還沒有結束，因為他自己都不知道明天還能不能繼續上學，上學到底值得不值得他那樣的放下尊嚴，就像他自己說的，他好像在很深的海底裏掙扎，而這種掙扎不知道什麼時候才能結束。
說完這些，李新就會自覺不自覺地來上一聲完全不應該屬於他這個年紀的那種很老成的歎息，沈重而滄桑。在我們後期編輯整個節目的時候，我才愈發清晰的感覺到他的這種歎息幾乎是貫穿採訪的始終，這不能不讓我對李新的未來
生深深的憂慮，在這樣沈重的十字架下，李新何時才能擺脫心靈的枷鎖，何時才能徹底走向社會，尋找到真正屬於他的新生活？
也不知道從何時起，湖邊已是蛙聲一片，此起彼伏，好不熱鬧。也許和李新相比，生活對它們來說是太過愜意了。它們的歡唱一次次地壓過李新的訴說，於是我不得不、不止一次地走到湖邊去打斷它們的快樂，讓它們安靜下來與我們、與這片冬日下的湖光林影一起傾聽李新的故事。
李新一直都沒有怎麼正視曉楠，他對著如鏡的湖面，給我們講述了他的童年、少年和現在的故事，他似乎是在講給自己聽，給自己一種理由、一種證據、一種釋放。我們慶幸我們找到了一個能讓李新吐訴心靈的地方。
原本打算三個小時的採訪一直延續到了五個小時，採訪結束時，殘陽如血，已近黃昏，一輪彎月早就掛在了天上。時間過得如此之快是我們大家都沒有想到的，天色已經暗了下來，我們起先約好的計程車並沒有如約而至，我們這時才想到一個很現實的問題，在離城十公里外的地方，我們怎麼回去？
李新說沒關係，走上一個小時就能打到車。看來我們只有扛著機器步行了，連曉楠都沒閒著，雙手也拎滿了東西。李新主動上來扛了最重的腳架，我們一群人在這夜色漸濃的初春黃昏邊走邊聊，儼然沒有了先前那種陌生與隔閡，倒更像朋友。
幾個小時的採訪，可能李新很久以來壓抑的痛苦沈澱了些許，他似乎輕鬆了很多，笑聲也漸漸多了起來，甚至還能跟我們開些小玩笑，如果真的這樣，我們就很欣慰了。
因為回程的車票已經買好，本來打算和李新再一起吃頓晚飯，但因為趕車的緣故，我們只得放棄。李新說沒關係，後來我們想到了中午我們買來當午餐的餅乾，於是就讓他帶著吃。
李新起初堅持著不要，但後來他好像想到了什麼，有點孩子氣的說，好吧，宿舍裏每次都是同學們買零食，會分給我吃，這回我終於也可以拿回去點，分給他們吃了。
於是，李新就是這樣和我們分了手。在李新的學校門口，我們看著他拎著那包餅乾，消失在夜色裏。
呼叫駐紐約代表, 有事請問.
有朋友問, 妳寫的致命一擊裏頭那部 one shot, 何處可以看到?
我想, 應該可遇不可求了吧?! 除非妳剛好有把它錄下來.
陳真
有朋友問, 妳寫的致命一擊裏頭那部 one shot, 何處可以看到?
我想, 應該可遇不可求了吧?! 除非妳剛好有把它錄下來.
陳真
不可能有人能學好邏輯，除非⋯
陳真 2004. 9. 9.
李家同教授今天又寫了篇文章在聯合報。他對台灣學生「國際觀」和「競爭力」的「憂心」，其實也相當程度代表了一種所謂「有識之士」的看法。但是，這樣的一種「願景」（如該文結尾），總讓人感覺不對勁。不知道他們把教育當成什麼？
台灣學生程度普遍都很差沒錯，但是，難道那些功課好或英文好的學生就更高明？也沒有吧，還不都一樣。即便留洋唸博士，程度又好到哪？說不定更是爛中之爛。他們只是有錢而已，其它沒有任何高明之處。不管知識或人品、氣質，往往爛到讓人難以置信。就算唸十個博士學位也一樣，馬文才不會因此就變成唐伯虎。
台灣的博士人口比例，恐怕世界名列前矛，但這有什麼意義？就算不談文明價值上的層次，這些人，就算對技術面上的學術或什麼國際觀，又有什麼高明之處？也許論文發表一堆，但這些東西，能有多久保存期限？十之八九只是在「做業績」。
其他國家我不知道，在英國的台灣留學生，感覺就像什麼禁不起風吹雨打的「小寶貝」一樣，窩窩囊囊的，脾氣驕縱，品性猥瑣，從知識到人品，簡直一無是處。要不是親身體驗，還真難以想像。
我以前總以為留洋拿學位的人，好歹在學識或見識上有令人景仰之處。老一輩的，的確如此，但至少這一代，已經面目全非。留洋，只是一些驕縱的公子哥兒或小公主來鍍金、「買」文憑的一個過程。
極少數人或許技術面上「程度」不錯，很會依樣畫葫蘆，但其所謂學術，就像一種仿造技術那樣，沒有生命。自然科學或許比較沒有這種問題，但文史哲或社會科學，卻需要一種「生命」，一種「個性」和「氣質」。就像侯孝賢說的，「人先要大，作品才會大。」一個窩囊的人，不可能產生什麼深刻的作品，即便他有十個博士學位也一樣。
有句話說，「不以人廢言」。這話肯定是錯的。「言」本身是沒有生命的，它得連結到一個「人」的身上，方才獲得生命。要是這個人是個窩窩囊囊的阿西或甚至混蛋，他有可能講出什麼值得一聽的「言」嗎？
我是絕對以人廢言的，不但廢言，而且廢行。那些在我看來不值得尊敬的人，不管他寫了些什麼或甚至做了些什麼「好事」，都不具絲毫價值，我根本不會去留意或去讀（除非拿它當負面教材）。
即便他講的某種意見，表面上跟我完全一致（比方說反資本主義），依然沒有任何閱讀價值；因為那種所謂「一致」，毫無意義。我絕不相信一個猥瑣的人，能夠擁有什麼深刻的見解，那是不可能的事，不管他唸了多少書，不管他英文法文或什麼文有多好，不管他有什麼國 際觀或宇宙觀，統統沒有意義。
也許你會問，我們又不認識對方，怎麼知道他這個人好不好。事實上，一個人是個什麼樣的人，完全顯現在他所寫的東西或他做事的態度上，絲毫無法掩飾，只是看你看不看得出來而已。不可能有人能藉著所謂做「好事」或講些什麼漂亮話來偽裝成某種人品或個性。所以我們儘可自然地講話，因為你根本不可能偽裝自己。
英美分析哲學在西方哲學上，獨領風騷數十年。這種哲學特徵就是「非人」（impersonal） ，也就是說，它談的是一些跟「人」或跟「誰」或跟「現實」完全無關的東西。比方說邏輯或概念分析等等這些「純粹客觀」之物。一加一等於多少，並不會因為「誰」或哪個國家而有不同答案。
維根斯坦被認為是分析哲學的主要創始人之一；他的作品幾乎沒有「我」的存在，全是抽象概念或邏輯符號或論理分析等等這些東西，幾乎沒有一個字跟「我」有關，沒有絲毫「主觀」成份。
奇怪的是，他卻堅持說他的作品是一種「自我告白」，是一種「根本不適合出版或發表的『私人日記』」，一種「只能在作者和讀者之間『一對一』或甚至『面對面』進行的『竊竊私語』」。最後，他決定不在生前發表任何作品，甚至一度打算銷毀所有手稿。
他對自己的作品，做了許許多多這樣的一種性質描述。但是，過去半個世紀來，絕大部份研究者卻完全忽略這樣的一些宣稱。因為他寫的東西，再怎麼讀還是純粹抽象的客觀討論，再怎麼讀，不外就是邏輯、概念、數學的基礎等等，跟「人」或是跟「現實」一個字也不相干。這些純粹抽象的客觀思維，怎麼可能是一種「私人日記」或「告白」或甚至「詩」？！
一直到最近兩三年，人們似乎才逐漸對維根斯坦的自我評語當真，開始有人認真地思考他為什麼他如此定位自己的作品，為什麼他說他的作品什麼也不是，只是展現一種「個性」，一種「態度」，一種「熱情」。他說，他的作品裏頭，「什麼都沒有，除了一種好的態度」。
接下來很難用通俗的話來談比方說，何以厚厚兩本《論數學的基礎》，只是一種「私人日記」，一種不宜出版的「私人告白」，或甚至是一種根本沒有一個字談到宗教的「宗教作品」。
但是，他常講的那些怪話（有些是寫給羅素的信），的確非常有道理，深得我心。比方他說：「不可能有人能學好邏輯，除非他先成為一個好人。」、「哲學問題只能藉著改變人的生活方式來解決。」、「我寫的東西，絕不願意讓那些在哲學期刊上發表文章的人閱讀。」
連學好邏輯和數學，都得先成為一個好人，何況其它知識。把知識和生命分開看待，是很不對勁的。除非我們不是在談知識，而只是在談一種生意或公司業務。
p.s. ：我很害怕「讀者」的閱讀能力，因此得補充一句，把話講白。我不認識李家同教授，但欣賞他的為人。我講的想法，表面上好像與他講的有所衝突，但我想，那只是一種瑣碎的差異，骨子裏應該挺一致。
================
英文糟 大學教授也救不了
李家同／暨南國際大學資工系教授
教育部長杜正勝對大學生英文程度作了一種願望性的宣示，他希望在民國九十六年，百分之五十的大學生會通過全民英檢的中級程度；同年，百分之五十的技術學院學生可以通過全民英檢的初級程度，我雖然歡迎杜部長對於英語能力的重視，我仍然希望部長從另一個角度來看這個問題。
首先，我認為大學生（包含技術學院的學生），如果英文程度非常不好，大學教授是無技可施的。因為大學教授的專長，並不是教普通的英文。
大學生英文有多差？我建議政府做一個簡單的測驗，請同學們翻譯一些簡單的中文句子，或將一些不太難的文章翻譯成中文，我敢擔保，只有極少數的同學可以在中翻英時，不犯文法上的基本錯誤。至於閱讀的能力，不要說看紐約時報了，就看國內英文報紙，絕大多數的學生都有困難。我們理工科教授最近發現很多大學生，根本無法看英文的教科書，更無法看英文的學術論文。有一位明星大學的畢業生，居然不認識university，同一學校的畢業生，不會念engineering。
問題在⋯ 國高中英文教育
問題不在大學教育，在於國中和高中，部長應該知道有四分之一的國中畢業生，基本學力測驗的分數不到八十八分。試問，這些同學的英文程度夠好嗎？這些學生一定有高中、高職可念，他們也都可能進入大學或技術學院，在這種情況之下，大學以及技術學院之中，當然會有很多英文程度不好的同學。
菁英教育 又要放棄他們
我們討論大學生的英文程度，而一字不提國中生的英文程度，大概是將注意力集中到那些英文程度還不太差的同學那裡去，至於程度太差的，教育部好像要放棄他們。我知道這是必然的結果，整個國家就是只注意菁英教育。教改就是由菁英份子替菁英份子設計出來的。
下有對策 仍然人人畢業
我更希望教育部知道，教育部一旦宣示了對英文的重視，各級學校校長們的反應，一定是宣佈一些華而不實的政策，某某大學會說學生一定要通過某某英文檢定，才能畢業；但是他們心知肚明，他們大多數的學生是不可能通過這種檢定考試的，因此他們在辦法上留有但書，也就是這種學生必須選修某種高階英文課，校長們都知道，這種課，絕大多數的學生都會及格的，所以這種政策之下，最後人人仍然都畢業了，好者恆好，壞者恆壞。
技術學院 課本會變得很難
技術學院的校長們也會忽然將英文課本變得很難。他們認為將來萬一有人來參觀，一看到如此難的英文課本，立刻佩服得五體投地，至於學生懂不懂呢？他們也管不了。我常碰到一些技術學院的老師們向我抱怨英文課本太難，根本忽視學生程度差的事實，學生們學不會，老師們有無力感，但是至少這所學校給了外界一個重視英文的印象。
務實做法 打好學生基礎
當務之急乃是在於各校發展出一種「務實」的英文教學辦法，即注意學生的程度。前些日子，我注意到在信義鄉的一所小學，那裡的校長選了一批英文句子，每一周學生都要背一些英文句子，這些句子每周會公佈出來，如此一年，這些孩子至少在畢業之前，能夠背出相當多的生字，也能背很多的英文句子，這種做法，就是我所謂的務實做法：注意學生的程度，打好學生的基礎。
三年以後 差的可能更差
如果我是教育部長，我不會在乎一所學校有多少英文好的學生，而會在乎一所學校有多少英文奇差的學生。好的教育家，永遠是要將最低程度拉起來的，只會教好天才的人，根本不配被稱為是教育家。目前，很多學校，雖然有大批同學程度奇差，校長也不在乎，因為他只要有少數頂尖的畢業生能考上明星學校，他就可以向社會大眾交差。
所以，也許在三年以後，的確有更多的學生英文進步了，但是由於校方傾全力教那些有潛力的學生，那些英文程度不好的學生可能程度更加低落了。
我的願景 提高最低程度
我還是要老調重談，頂尖學生的英文程度不夠好，也許值得我們重視；但是英文的最低程度，才是一切問題之所在，也是我們最該注意的事，他們將來不要談是否有國際觀，因為英文差，一路都跟不上，變成了毫無競爭力的一群，收入一定會低。他們的潛力也永遠不能發揮，永遠是弱勢，這才是教育部長該注意的事。也許部長應該定出一個願景，將我們學生的英文最低程度，能夠逐年的提高。
【2004/09/09 聯合報】
陳真 2004. 9. 9.
李家同教授今天又寫了篇文章在聯合報。他對台灣學生「國際觀」和「競爭力」的「憂心」，其實也相當程度代表了一種所謂「有識之士」的看法。但是，這樣的一種「願景」（如該文結尾），總讓人感覺不對勁。不知道他們把教育當成什麼？
台灣學生程度普遍都很差沒錯，但是，難道那些功課好或英文好的學生就更高明？也沒有吧，還不都一樣。即便留洋唸博士，程度又好到哪？說不定更是爛中之爛。他們只是有錢而已，其它沒有任何高明之處。不管知識或人品、氣質，往往爛到讓人難以置信。就算唸十個博士學位也一樣，馬文才不會因此就變成唐伯虎。
台灣的博士人口比例，恐怕世界名列前矛，但這有什麼意義？就算不談文明價值上的層次，這些人，就算對技術面上的學術或什麼國際觀，又有什麼高明之處？也許論文發表一堆，但這些東西，能有多久保存期限？十之八九只是在「做業績」。
其他國家我不知道，在英國的台灣留學生，感覺就像什麼禁不起風吹雨打的「小寶貝」一樣，窩窩囊囊的，脾氣驕縱，品性猥瑣，從知識到人品，簡直一無是處。要不是親身體驗，還真難以想像。
我以前總以為留洋拿學位的人，好歹在學識或見識上有令人景仰之處。老一輩的，的確如此，但至少這一代，已經面目全非。留洋，只是一些驕縱的公子哥兒或小公主來鍍金、「買」文憑的一個過程。
極少數人或許技術面上「程度」不錯，很會依樣畫葫蘆，但其所謂學術，就像一種仿造技術那樣，沒有生命。自然科學或許比較沒有這種問題，但文史哲或社會科學，卻需要一種「生命」，一種「個性」和「氣質」。就像侯孝賢說的，「人先要大，作品才會大。」一個窩囊的人，不可能產生什麼深刻的作品，即便他有十個博士學位也一樣。
有句話說，「不以人廢言」。這話肯定是錯的。「言」本身是沒有生命的，它得連結到一個「人」的身上，方才獲得生命。要是這個人是個窩窩囊囊的阿西或甚至混蛋，他有可能講出什麼值得一聽的「言」嗎？
我是絕對以人廢言的，不但廢言，而且廢行。那些在我看來不值得尊敬的人，不管他寫了些什麼或甚至做了些什麼「好事」，都不具絲毫價值，我根本不會去留意或去讀（除非拿它當負面教材）。
即便他講的某種意見，表面上跟我完全一致（比方說反資本主義），依然沒有任何閱讀價值；因為那種所謂「一致」，毫無意義。我絕不相信一個猥瑣的人，能夠擁有什麼深刻的見解，那是不可能的事，不管他唸了多少書，不管他英文法文或什麼文有多好，不管他有什麼國 際觀或宇宙觀，統統沒有意義。
也許你會問，我們又不認識對方，怎麼知道他這個人好不好。事實上，一個人是個什麼樣的人，完全顯現在他所寫的東西或他做事的態度上，絲毫無法掩飾，只是看你看不看得出來而已。不可能有人能藉著所謂做「好事」或講些什麼漂亮話來偽裝成某種人品或個性。所以我們儘可自然地講話，因為你根本不可能偽裝自己。
英美分析哲學在西方哲學上，獨領風騷數十年。這種哲學特徵就是「非人」（impersonal） ，也就是說，它談的是一些跟「人」或跟「誰」或跟「現實」完全無關的東西。比方說邏輯或概念分析等等這些「純粹客觀」之物。一加一等於多少，並不會因為「誰」或哪個國家而有不同答案。
維根斯坦被認為是分析哲學的主要創始人之一；他的作品幾乎沒有「我」的存在，全是抽象概念或邏輯符號或論理分析等等這些東西，幾乎沒有一個字跟「我」有關，沒有絲毫「主觀」成份。
奇怪的是，他卻堅持說他的作品是一種「自我告白」，是一種「根本不適合出版或發表的『私人日記』」，一種「只能在作者和讀者之間『一對一』或甚至『面對面』進行的『竊竊私語』」。最後，他決定不在生前發表任何作品，甚至一度打算銷毀所有手稿。
他對自己的作品，做了許許多多這樣的一種性質描述。但是，過去半個世紀來，絕大部份研究者卻完全忽略這樣的一些宣稱。因為他寫的東西，再怎麼讀還是純粹抽象的客觀討論，再怎麼讀，不外就是邏輯、概念、數學的基礎等等，跟「人」或是跟「現實」一個字也不相干。這些純粹抽象的客觀思維，怎麼可能是一種「私人日記」或「告白」或甚至「詩」？！
一直到最近兩三年，人們似乎才逐漸對維根斯坦的自我評語當真，開始有人認真地思考他為什麼他如此定位自己的作品，為什麼他說他的作品什麼也不是，只是展現一種「個性」，一種「態度」，一種「熱情」。他說，他的作品裏頭，「什麼都沒有，除了一種好的態度」。
接下來很難用通俗的話來談比方說，何以厚厚兩本《論數學的基礎》，只是一種「私人日記」，一種不宜出版的「私人告白」，或甚至是一種根本沒有一個字談到宗教的「宗教作品」。
但是，他常講的那些怪話（有些是寫給羅素的信），的確非常有道理，深得我心。比方他說：「不可能有人能學好邏輯，除非他先成為一個好人。」、「哲學問題只能藉著改變人的生活方式來解決。」、「我寫的東西，絕不願意讓那些在哲學期刊上發表文章的人閱讀。」
連學好邏輯和數學，都得先成為一個好人，何況其它知識。把知識和生命分開看待，是很不對勁的。除非我們不是在談知識，而只是在談一種生意或公司業務。
p.s. ：我很害怕「讀者」的閱讀能力，因此得補充一句，把話講白。我不認識李家同教授，但欣賞他的為人。我講的想法，表面上好像與他講的有所衝突，但我想，那只是一種瑣碎的差異，骨子裏應該挺一致。
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英文糟 大學教授也救不了
李家同／暨南國際大學資工系教授
教育部長杜正勝對大學生英文程度作了一種願望性的宣示，他希望在民國九十六年，百分之五十的大學生會通過全民英檢的中級程度；同年，百分之五十的技術學院學生可以通過全民英檢的初級程度，我雖然歡迎杜部長對於英語能力的重視，我仍然希望部長從另一個角度來看這個問題。
首先，我認為大學生（包含技術學院的學生），如果英文程度非常不好，大學教授是無技可施的。因為大學教授的專長，並不是教普通的英文。
大學生英文有多差？我建議政府做一個簡單的測驗，請同學們翻譯一些簡單的中文句子，或將一些不太難的文章翻譯成中文，我敢擔保，只有極少數的同學可以在中翻英時，不犯文法上的基本錯誤。至於閱讀的能力，不要說看紐約時報了，就看國內英文報紙，絕大多數的學生都有困難。我們理工科教授最近發現很多大學生，根本無法看英文的教科書，更無法看英文的學術論文。有一位明星大學的畢業生，居然不認識university，同一學校的畢業生，不會念engineering。
問題在⋯ 國高中英文教育
問題不在大學教育，在於國中和高中，部長應該知道有四分之一的國中畢業生，基本學力測驗的分數不到八十八分。試問，這些同學的英文程度夠好嗎？這些學生一定有高中、高職可念，他們也都可能進入大學或技術學院，在這種情況之下，大學以及技術學院之中，當然會有很多英文程度不好的同學。
菁英教育 又要放棄他們
我們討論大學生的英文程度，而一字不提國中生的英文程度，大概是將注意力集中到那些英文程度還不太差的同學那裡去，至於程度太差的，教育部好像要放棄他們。我知道這是必然的結果，整個國家就是只注意菁英教育。教改就是由菁英份子替菁英份子設計出來的。
下有對策 仍然人人畢業
我更希望教育部知道，教育部一旦宣示了對英文的重視，各級學校校長們的反應，一定是宣佈一些華而不實的政策，某某大學會說學生一定要通過某某英文檢定，才能畢業；但是他們心知肚明，他們大多數的學生是不可能通過這種檢定考試的，因此他們在辦法上留有但書，也就是這種學生必須選修某種高階英文課，校長們都知道，這種課，絕大多數的學生都會及格的，所以這種政策之下，最後人人仍然都畢業了，好者恆好，壞者恆壞。
技術學院 課本會變得很難
技術學院的校長們也會忽然將英文課本變得很難。他們認為將來萬一有人來參觀，一看到如此難的英文課本，立刻佩服得五體投地，至於學生懂不懂呢？他們也管不了。我常碰到一些技術學院的老師們向我抱怨英文課本太難，根本忽視學生程度差的事實，學生們學不會，老師們有無力感，但是至少這所學校給了外界一個重視英文的印象。
務實做法 打好學生基礎
當務之急乃是在於各校發展出一種「務實」的英文教學辦法，即注意學生的程度。前些日子，我注意到在信義鄉的一所小學，那裡的校長選了一批英文句子，每一周學生都要背一些英文句子，這些句子每周會公佈出來，如此一年，這些孩子至少在畢業之前，能夠背出相當多的生字，也能背很多的英文句子，這種做法，就是我所謂的務實做法：注意學生的程度，打好學生的基礎。
三年以後 差的可能更差
如果我是教育部長，我不會在乎一所學校有多少英文好的學生，而會在乎一所學校有多少英文奇差的學生。好的教育家，永遠是要將最低程度拉起來的，只會教好天才的人，根本不配被稱為是教育家。目前，很多學校，雖然有大批同學程度奇差，校長也不在乎，因為他只要有少數頂尖的畢業生能考上明星學校，他就可以向社會大眾交差。
所以，也許在三年以後，的確有更多的學生英文進步了，但是由於校方傾全力教那些有潛力的學生，那些英文程度不好的學生可能程度更加低落了。
我的願景 提高最低程度
我還是要老調重談，頂尖學生的英文程度不夠好，也許值得我們重視；但是英文的最低程度，才是一切問題之所在，也是我們最該注意的事，他們將來不要談是否有國際觀，因為英文差，一路都跟不上，變成了毫無競爭力的一群，收入一定會低。他們的潛力也永遠不能發揮，永遠是弱勢，這才是教育部長該注意的事。也許部長應該定出一個願景，將我們學生的英文最低程度，能夠逐年的提高。
【2004/09/09 聯合報】
之前幾次提到的那位勇敢的女記者安娜（Anna Politkovskaia）。根據法國費加洛日報報導，她在此次人質事件發生後，立即搭機前往現場，結果在飛機上喝了一杯水後，竟然中毒，症狀十分嚴重，經緊急送往Rostov醫院急救，然後再轉院回到莫斯科，目前健康狀況不明。院方發現，可能有人在安娜所喝的茶水中下毒。報導指出，安娜所屬的一家報社總編，就是被同樣的毒給毒死。
與她同行的另一位Radio Liberty男記者 Andrei Babitski，則在機場被攔阻，理由是說警犬聞到他身上「有異味」，必須接受檢查。過程中，遭受兩名情治人員毆打，並被逮捕，目前已被囚禁，罪名是「耍流氓」（hooliganism）。
俄羅斯當局滿口謊言，不過，布丁有句話倒是說得很正確。他痛罵說，車臣反抗勢力是受到英美等國的暗中支持。車臣或俄羅斯越亂，最高興的當然就是美國。國際政治是毫無人性可言的，而且極端複雜，不可能用單一因素（比方說什麼車臣獨立）來解釋這一切；那樣的解釋是三歲小孩的解釋，跟現實差距太遠。最主要的衝突所在，仍是列強利益。
就好像當初蘇聯侵略阿富汗，美國當然大力幫忙阿富汗反抗軍，給他們各種武器和訓練，其中就包括賓拉登。那時候，賓拉登不叫「恐怖份子」，美國叫他「自由的鬥士」。海珊也是，美國為了對付伊朗，就幫海珊發展軍事力量和生化武器，培植他來對付伊朗人以及企圖獨立的庫德族。
美國所指控海珊的一切罪名，全是美國當初幫他幹或叫他幹的。那時候和美國狼狽為奸的海珊，才他媽的真的恐怖，但是，美國雷根那時候不叫他獨裁者，也不喊他是「恐怖份子」，而是稱讚他是民主世界的「忠實盟友」。
哪一天，如果中國和台灣打仗或事後鎮壓和反抗，搞得中國焦頭爛額，最高興的當然也是美國。最主要的衝突所在，仍是列強利益。所謂國際情勢，不外就是沿著同樣的一套列強鬥爭邏輯在進行。哀哀無告的一般人民，則夾在各方勢力之間，經由殺與被殺，挑起更多仇恨和衝突。
二二八死了兩萬人，所謂仇恨，一直延續或刻意炒作到現在；車臣死了十幾萬，其中更有四五萬的兒童，而車臣人口不過一百萬（甚至更少），悽慘若此，車臣人有可能不恨嗎？就像巴勒斯坦，當你把對方逼到絕路，趕盡殺絕，而且還抹黑成恐怖份子時，他能不拿僅剩的一條命跟你拼嗎？
面對所謂恐怖攻擊，人民不該說自己無辜。小孩當然無辜，但大人不是，因為那些害人的恐怖政府是你直接或間接支持的。你的政府所幹的好事，當然得由你來承擔那個後果。
我現在連在歐洲境內搭飛機都常會想到是不是會被劫機或炸掉。萬一遇上，我也認了，因為這個主流世界的惡，我仍然脫離不了關係；除了小孩，我也不認為有多少人稱得上無辜。
譴責所謂恐怖份子，只是倒因為果，自欺欺人。螻蟻尚且偷生，何況是人；若非逼到絕路，人家吃飽飯沒事幹，身上綁炸藥來炸你做什麼？
陳真 2004. 9. 8.
與她同行的另一位Radio Liberty男記者 Andrei Babitski，則在機場被攔阻，理由是說警犬聞到他身上「有異味」，必須接受檢查。過程中，遭受兩名情治人員毆打，並被逮捕，目前已被囚禁，罪名是「耍流氓」（hooliganism）。
俄羅斯當局滿口謊言，不過，布丁有句話倒是說得很正確。他痛罵說，車臣反抗勢力是受到英美等國的暗中支持。車臣或俄羅斯越亂，最高興的當然就是美國。國際政治是毫無人性可言的，而且極端複雜，不可能用單一因素（比方說什麼車臣獨立）來解釋這一切；那樣的解釋是三歲小孩的解釋，跟現實差距太遠。最主要的衝突所在，仍是列強利益。
就好像當初蘇聯侵略阿富汗，美國當然大力幫忙阿富汗反抗軍，給他們各種武器和訓練，其中就包括賓拉登。那時候，賓拉登不叫「恐怖份子」，美國叫他「自由的鬥士」。海珊也是，美國為了對付伊朗，就幫海珊發展軍事力量和生化武器，培植他來對付伊朗人以及企圖獨立的庫德族。
美國所指控海珊的一切罪名，全是美國當初幫他幹或叫他幹的。那時候和美國狼狽為奸的海珊，才他媽的真的恐怖，但是，美國雷根那時候不叫他獨裁者，也不喊他是「恐怖份子」，而是稱讚他是民主世界的「忠實盟友」。
哪一天，如果中國和台灣打仗或事後鎮壓和反抗，搞得中國焦頭爛額，最高興的當然也是美國。最主要的衝突所在，仍是列強利益。所謂國際情勢，不外就是沿著同樣的一套列強鬥爭邏輯在進行。哀哀無告的一般人民，則夾在各方勢力之間，經由殺與被殺，挑起更多仇恨和衝突。
二二八死了兩萬人，所謂仇恨，一直延續或刻意炒作到現在；車臣死了十幾萬，其中更有四五萬的兒童，而車臣人口不過一百萬（甚至更少），悽慘若此，車臣人有可能不恨嗎？就像巴勒斯坦，當你把對方逼到絕路，趕盡殺絕，而且還抹黑成恐怖份子時，他能不拿僅剩的一條命跟你拼嗎？
面對所謂恐怖攻擊，人民不該說自己無辜。小孩當然無辜，但大人不是，因為那些害人的恐怖政府是你直接或間接支持的。你的政府所幹的好事，當然得由你來承擔那個後果。
我現在連在歐洲境內搭飛機都常會想到是不是會被劫機或炸掉。萬一遇上，我也認了，因為這個主流世界的惡，我仍然脫離不了關係；除了小孩，我也不認為有多少人稱得上無辜。
譴責所謂恐怖份子，只是倒因為果，自欺欺人。螻蟻尚且偷生，何況是人；若非逼到絕路，人家吃飽飯沒事幹，身上綁炸藥來炸你做什麼？
陳真 2004. 9. 8.
以下是當時體育館裡的景象，有影片檔可下載，聊備參考。
http://www.ogrish.com/index/Images-From-Inside-The-School-of-a-Video-Shown-By-NTV-television-Of-Beslan-Hostage-Drama/
http://www.ogrish.com/index/Images-From-Inside-The-School-of-a-Video-Shown-By-NTV-television-Of-Beslan-Hostage-Drama/
剛又寫了篇文章批評國際觀. 不過, 不打算投稿. 有福氣的巴勒網讀者才看得到.
陳真
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請你告訴我，我昨晚的夢
陳真 2004. 9. 8.
自認為比別人多知道一些什麼的人，常忍不住就要誇大他所知道的這些東西的重要性。可是，究竟有些什麼重要性，其實也說不上來。
有的會說，知道這些事很重要，因為它意味著一種競爭力。可是，它為什麼跟競爭力有關，其實還是說不上來。再說，競爭些什麼，也不知所云。更重要的是，競爭不見得是什麼好事。
我們所面對的問題或所承受的種種痛苦，跟競爭力大小，似乎更沒有什麼關係。若有關係的話，恐怕也是一種極其負面的關係。愛因斯坦不就很反對競爭嗎？！他認為，教育就是要去除這東西，但我們卻反其道而行。他認為，合作才是我們該追求的，不是競爭，競爭只會使我們走向痛苦和毀滅。
競爭力如果很重要，那似乎等於說那些知識水平低或經濟能力差的人，就是一種包袱或累贅，只有有錢的菁英才是重要的。可是，事實上，痛苦的主要來源卻似乎就來自見識豐富的「菁英」們，而不是來自「一般人」。
沒有人會否認知識的基本價值。但是，「不否認」和「誇大」，卻是兩回事。問題就出在誇大；彷彿只要這個社會的菁英階層具有了某種豐富知識（謂之國際觀），許多問題或甚至一切問題，就能迎刃而解似的。反之，若無豐富國際觀，則是一種可怕災難。
這種誇大本身，其實就是一種災難。把那些不重要或甚至與問題不相干的東西，比方說知識或學歷或社經地位等等，抬舉得跟什麼一樣，正是諸多痛苦和壓迫的根本來源。
再說，如果有一種東西，叫做國際，那麼，我們對它自然不會只有一種「觀點」；事實上，我們對它有著無數的觀點。你有你的認知方式，我有我的認知方式；動輒以一己之認知模式，視為唯一典範，那是很愚蠢的。
國際這麼龐大，就跟一座圖書館一樣，我們一生能有多少精力能從中吸收多少資訊？既不可能多，也不必要多。事實上，我所知的，跟你所知的，肯定差距不大，所知均微乎其微。一個人如果真的以為他對這世界比別人知道更多東西，那真的是沒有比這更無知的了。
Karl Popper說得對：「在那極其有限的事物上，我們或許觀點有異，但在那無限的未知事物上，我們卻是平等的。」誰也沒有比誰知道更多東西，就好像不會有誰比誰記住更多記憶或吃下更多食物一樣。在這些瑣碎而根本微不足道的差異上強做比較，或甚至視為解決問題的靈丹妙藥，是很愚昧而膚淺的。正是這樣的一種愚昧和膚淺，帶給我們心靈上和生活上的許多折磨和痛苦。
蘇格拉底被後人視為某種智慧的象徵，並不是因為他知道很多知識或國際觀，更不是因為他真的很有智慧，而是因為他確實體會到自己之一無所知。但是，那些與他同時代的菁英們，卻以「智者」互相標榜或洋洋自許。
維根斯坦說，「古人要比今人要高明一些，高明之處就在於：古人知道凡事有個極限」。古人明白人類所知極為有限；而那不可知的部份，才真正具有重要性。維根斯坦說：科學卻自我抬舉了人類的知識能力，「使我們對自己產生一種膨風的錯覺」，彷彿那些未知的東西，總有一天會被我們給挖掘出來似的。
有人這麼說，「那些繞在柱子前膜拜天神的野蠻人，比羅素或愛因斯坦都更有智慧。」維根斯坦如果聽過這句話，肯定也會贊成。他就曾批評那位寫《Golden Bough》的Frazer，說Frazer比他自己所批評為野蠻的野蠻人還更野蠻，因為Frazer以為知識可以解釋那些事實上知識無法解釋的現象，以為野蠻人之拜火只是因為知識不足所致。
我們所犯的錯誤，跟 Frazer 其實很像；太過誇大認知的重要性，以為認知的加強，可以驅散什麼迷信，以為所謂迷信只是一種知識欠缺的症狀；彷彿只要知識加強了，我們的問題就能迎刃而解。
但事實上，我們的痛苦，並不是因為我們缺少某種知識，而是因為其它一些與知識無關的東西。因此，不管是加強國際觀或宇宙觀，都不會因此而解決那根本的痛苦。
別再抬舉知識了。即便是以人權或人類某種珍貴價值為取向的任何一種國際觀，in an important sense,也都不是那麼重要。那些什麼「觀」都沒有，甚至一輩子從沒想過「國際」的人，他們或許比什麼世界大師或人權專家都更有「智慧」。少知道這些知識，並不是什麼可怕的事。
也別再說什麼國際觀了。每個人就算他不願意，也必然都會對這「世界」有著一種觀感或觀點。換句話說，每個人都必然有著屬於他自己的一種「看世界的方式」或「看事情的方式」。是這樣的一種與認知無關的價值觀，決定了事物發展的善與惡或好與壞。
更別再誇耀你的豐富知識了，沒有人會比別人知道更多東西。就如 Kurnberger所說，「一個人所能知道的一切，不消三句話就可以全部講完。」比較誰知道更多資訊，那是很愚昧的；正是這樣的愚昧，帶給我們最大的不幸和心靈壓制。
十七世紀初英國詩人George Herbert有句詩這麼說，聰明人啊！「若你真以為你知道一切，而我一無所知，那麼，請你告訴我，我昨晚的夢。」
陳真
=======
請你告訴我，我昨晚的夢
陳真 2004. 9. 8.
自認為比別人多知道一些什麼的人，常忍不住就要誇大他所知道的這些東西的重要性。可是，究竟有些什麼重要性，其實也說不上來。
有的會說，知道這些事很重要，因為它意味著一種競爭力。可是，它為什麼跟競爭力有關，其實還是說不上來。再說，競爭些什麼，也不知所云。更重要的是，競爭不見得是什麼好事。
我們所面對的問題或所承受的種種痛苦，跟競爭力大小，似乎更沒有什麼關係。若有關係的話，恐怕也是一種極其負面的關係。愛因斯坦不就很反對競爭嗎？！他認為，教育就是要去除這東西，但我們卻反其道而行。他認為，合作才是我們該追求的，不是競爭，競爭只會使我們走向痛苦和毀滅。
競爭力如果很重要，那似乎等於說那些知識水平低或經濟能力差的人，就是一種包袱或累贅，只有有錢的菁英才是重要的。可是，事實上，痛苦的主要來源卻似乎就來自見識豐富的「菁英」們，而不是來自「一般人」。
沒有人會否認知識的基本價值。但是，「不否認」和「誇大」，卻是兩回事。問題就出在誇大；彷彿只要這個社會的菁英階層具有了某種豐富知識（謂之國際觀），許多問題或甚至一切問題，就能迎刃而解似的。反之，若無豐富國際觀，則是一種可怕災難。
這種誇大本身，其實就是一種災難。把那些不重要或甚至與問題不相干的東西，比方說知識或學歷或社經地位等等，抬舉得跟什麼一樣，正是諸多痛苦和壓迫的根本來源。
再說，如果有一種東西，叫做國際，那麼，我們對它自然不會只有一種「觀點」；事實上，我們對它有著無數的觀點。你有你的認知方式，我有我的認知方式；動輒以一己之認知模式，視為唯一典範，那是很愚蠢的。
國際這麼龐大，就跟一座圖書館一樣，我們一生能有多少精力能從中吸收多少資訊？既不可能多，也不必要多。事實上，我所知的，跟你所知的，肯定差距不大，所知均微乎其微。一個人如果真的以為他對這世界比別人知道更多東西，那真的是沒有比這更無知的了。
Karl Popper說得對：「在那極其有限的事物上，我們或許觀點有異，但在那無限的未知事物上，我們卻是平等的。」誰也沒有比誰知道更多東西，就好像不會有誰比誰記住更多記憶或吃下更多食物一樣。在這些瑣碎而根本微不足道的差異上強做比較，或甚至視為解決問題的靈丹妙藥，是很愚昧而膚淺的。正是這樣的一種愚昧和膚淺，帶給我們心靈上和生活上的許多折磨和痛苦。
蘇格拉底被後人視為某種智慧的象徵，並不是因為他知道很多知識或國際觀，更不是因為他真的很有智慧，而是因為他確實體會到自己之一無所知。但是，那些與他同時代的菁英們，卻以「智者」互相標榜或洋洋自許。
維根斯坦說，「古人要比今人要高明一些，高明之處就在於：古人知道凡事有個極限」。古人明白人類所知極為有限；而那不可知的部份，才真正具有重要性。維根斯坦說：科學卻自我抬舉了人類的知識能力，「使我們對自己產生一種膨風的錯覺」，彷彿那些未知的東西，總有一天會被我們給挖掘出來似的。
有人這麼說，「那些繞在柱子前膜拜天神的野蠻人，比羅素或愛因斯坦都更有智慧。」維根斯坦如果聽過這句話，肯定也會贊成。他就曾批評那位寫《Golden Bough》的Frazer，說Frazer比他自己所批評為野蠻的野蠻人還更野蠻，因為Frazer以為知識可以解釋那些事實上知識無法解釋的現象，以為野蠻人之拜火只是因為知識不足所致。
我們所犯的錯誤，跟 Frazer 其實很像；太過誇大認知的重要性，以為認知的加強，可以驅散什麼迷信，以為所謂迷信只是一種知識欠缺的症狀；彷彿只要知識加強了，我們的問題就能迎刃而解。
但事實上，我們的痛苦，並不是因為我們缺少某種知識，而是因為其它一些與知識無關的東西。因此，不管是加強國際觀或宇宙觀，都不會因此而解決那根本的痛苦。
別再抬舉知識了。即便是以人權或人類某種珍貴價值為取向的任何一種國際觀，in an important sense,也都不是那麼重要。那些什麼「觀」都沒有，甚至一輩子從沒想過「國際」的人，他們或許比什麼世界大師或人權專家都更有「智慧」。少知道這些知識，並不是什麼可怕的事。
也別再說什麼國際觀了。每個人就算他不願意，也必然都會對這「世界」有著一種觀感或觀點。換句話說，每個人都必然有著屬於他自己的一種「看世界的方式」或「看事情的方式」。是這樣的一種與認知無關的價值觀，決定了事物發展的善與惡或好與壞。
更別再誇耀你的豐富知識了，沒有人會比別人知道更多東西。就如 Kurnberger所說，「一個人所能知道的一切，不消三句話就可以全部講完。」比較誰知道更多資訊，那是很愚昧的；正是這樣的愚昧，帶給我們最大的不幸和心靈壓制。
十七世紀初英國詩人George Herbert有句詩這麼說，聰明人啊！「若你真以為你知道一切，而我一無所知，那麼，請你告訴我，我昨晚的夢。」
對啊!得鴨蛋沒關係,起碼要有一點基本常識和人性就好了.不要一副別人家的孩子死不完,黑的硬要說成白的,殺人的喊救命.這位大鴨蛋,那我考你一題,GOOGLE,YAHOO 是什麼,這個你再拿鴨蛋我也沒辦法啦!因為你一定是在開玩笑
聽說台灣的幼稚園小朋友流行上雙語的,最好還全美語(啊!聽說政府要取締,被家長抗議),因為培養國際觀要趁早,而且還不能輸在起跑點上喔!所以我打算把這些題目拿給這些上雙語幼 稚園的小朋友回答.
怡靜
聽說台灣的幼稚園小朋友流行上雙語的,最好還全美語(啊!聽說政府要取締,被家長抗議),因為培養國際觀要趁早,而且還不能輸在起跑點上喔!所以我打算把這些題目拿給這些上雙語幼 稚園的小朋友回答.
怡靜
不會吧！？大鴨蛋。ISM 是送分題，專門圖利本台讀者。若雪就是 ISM 的啊。冷靜先生不是說 ISM是要消滅以色列的恐怖組織嗎？
不過，得鴨蛋也沒關係啦。本來就不應該期待大家都有同樣的什麼國際觀。什麼美國首都在哪，連這麼簡單的也在考。美國首都不就是好萊塢嗎。貝理斯？貝理斯不就在高雄，高雄市七賢路二段，記得是一家女子美容店吧，對面是一家打電動的。我今年五月時還去過那邊打水果盤，損失了將近兩百元。
不知道有沒有人考滿分？考滿分的，可以得到具有宇宙觀的陳教授親筆簽名玉照一張。
陳教授
不過，得鴨蛋也沒關係啦。本來就不應該期待大家都有同樣的什麼國際觀。什麼美國首都在哪，連這麼簡單的也在考。美國首都不就是好萊塢嗎。貝理斯？貝理斯不就在高雄，高雄市七賢路二段，記得是一家女子美容店吧，對面是一家打電動的。我今年五月時還去過那邊打水果盤，損失了將近兩百元。
不知道有沒有人考滿分？考滿分的，可以得到具有宇宙觀的陳教授親筆簽名玉照一張。
陳教授
PHR、ICBL、ISM、CAAT、WSPA、RAWA、CASI、MSF、Yesh Gvul、CND。
...............................................
考試結果，我得了一個大鴨蛋。
...............................................
考試結果，我得了一個大鴨蛋。
一群窩囊的人民
陳真 2004. 9. 7.
那則骯髒的報導，有個斗大的骯髒標題，叫做「禽獸車游姦少女」。車游大概指的是車臣游擊隊。如果他們是禽獸，那麼，美軍俄軍英軍是什麼？像這樣一種污名化，表面上好像義憤填膺，其實不是，他只是漫不經心地扣你一頂帽子，他根本才不會關心這些事。如果他真的關心，那他就不會這樣講話了。如果他真的關心，台灣幾乎每個人都將是人權鬥士了。諸如這種偽君子或真小人，台灣多得是。
台灣人有錢，大多數人認為自己是「中產階級」。特別是過去，比現在有錢，總以為自己很高尚、很文明、很典雅，因此很看不起比他窮的人，比如印尼泰國中國大陸等，歧視得不得了，非常鄙夷。
一個會有這種歧視心態的人，就不可能有自尊，因為當他面對比他富有的人時，比如歐美，馬上就會立刻縮小一公尺，並且自動伸出舌頭，看要舔哪裡都行，十分窩囊猥瑣。
看過、聽過世界這麼多人種，去哪裡找比台灣人更野蠻落後、更窩囊的人民呢？如果他有一點自知之明，應該趕緊努力向對岸學習才對；兩地文化水平和內涵，實在差距太大，簡直雲泥有別，淵壤之隔。
但台灣人卻反倒以為自己比對岸華人高一等，動不動就要侮辱他們，實在很沒有病識感。除了有錢，哪一點比得上別人的一點零頭？就算 “有錢”這一點，不出十年也會遠遠落後，到時候，難道一見到大陸同胞，也要自動伸出舌頭？
每一個政治問題，都是文化問題，有它的文化根源，簡單說就是背後反映出一套價值觀。不是別的，正是這套價值思維有問題。在這套思維底下，幾乎一切現象就照著它所賦予的評價標準來呈現。媒體就是一例。有什麼樣的人民，就會有什麼樣的媒體。與其罵媒體低能腐敗，不如罵它的觀眾，因為媒體只是反映出觀眾的品味。
住在台灣，你很容易產生一種誤解，以為全世界的政治人物都是混蛋，以為全世界的讀書人都窩囊猥瑣，以為全世界的媒體都一樣敗德低能，以為全世界的人都一樣虛榮沒品，以為全世界的進步界都一樣封建反動。可是，只要踏出這個島，你就會發現，這不是「全世界」的問題，許多時候，它甚至只是「台灣人」的問題。
我收看香港和大陸的鳳凰衛視已經兩年了，一直到現在，仍然深深訝異它的善和內涵。在這之前，我根本不相信看電視會有什麼深刻的意義，根本不相信電視講的每一句話，包括什麼「公視」我也不信，我不信它會誠實講話；它頂多只是無害而已，卻沒有內涵。畢竟在這島上，誠實發言不是一種美德，卻反而是一種病，讓人當成怪物。
暫時脫離這個島後，我才相信，原來電視也能像藝術或教育那樣，讓人心靈得到滿足和養份。我才相信，原來世界上真的有人能正直地做任何一種工作。但是，以前在台灣，我根本不信有誰能正直地工作，那是根本不可能的事—除非你不想活了，除非你心臟很強壯、個性很剛烈，或許才有可能做出一點點抵抗。
但即便反抗，也依然微不足道，在這島上，你依然不可能正直。不管你做什麼自由業都好，比方說當醫生，你都得窩囊猥瑣、很不正直地幹活；窩囊到連自己都要鄙視起自己來了。
在英國，各行各業，都彷彿那麼聖潔。每個人認認真真、正正直直、快快樂樂地幹活，誰也不輕視誰，誰也不需出賣靈魂，只為謀一口飯吃。每次看那些在大馬路上辛苦幹活的工人，就覺得很訝異，他們為什麼充滿如許的尊嚴和快樂？
但台灣不是這樣，不管你是大老闆或小職員，不管你是醫生、護士、教授或工人，你每天得努力使自己心靈麻木，使自己墮落再墮落，努力擠壓出最大的邪惡，培養出最大的忍耐屈辱能力，否則根本無法在這個社會生存。
像鳳凰衛視，論財力，比不上台灣吧？！但是，那樣的節目，那樣的內涵，台灣就算砸下億萬重金也做不出來。比方說《唐人街》，比方說《鳳凰大視野》，比方說《冷暖人生》，比方說它經常在談的《愛滋病實錄》等話題或甚至最平常的《時事開講》或《風雲對話》等等，在在使人訝異於它的善跟內涵以及高度的藝術性或教育意義。
曾湊巧看到唐人街有一集，只看到尾巴大約十分鐘而已，講到好像是烏克蘭吧，一位來自四川還是哪裏的華人，很老了，但常吟詩作詞。對於這短短十分鐘的訪談，那種藝術水平，那種沉穩和內斂，那種動人的力量和聲音旁白，真是讓我嘆為觀止。
最近冷暖人生有一集，講到一個同性戀舞者的處境，更令人感到不可思議，沒有某種深厚的 文化內涵和以及深刻理解他人心靈的能力和尊重，不可能做出這樣的深度來。
可是台灣呢，有人曾經被台灣哪個節目感動過嗎？極少數例外當然有，比方說有人拍流浪狗，聽說拍得很好。但我要談的，正是這樣的例外。為什麼在它國顯得稀鬆平常的事，在台灣卻總是成為一種例外？為什麼在國外大家肯定都會這麼做的一種工作態度，到了台灣，你若秉持這樣的態度，反而會變成異類或怪物或聖人，甚至讓你痛不欲生或根本無法存活？
台灣沒有政治問題，只有文化問題。文化素質不改，光是有錢，或光是做些所謂典章制度面的改革，只是毫無意義的修改，就好像一個人以為改變了髮型就是改邪歸正、重新做人一樣。
文化雖然看不見，但它卻是一切，就好像靈魂或個性雖然看不見，但它卻是一個人的一切一樣。
台灣主流文化就是沒有文化，或者說一種好萊塢文化，很躁動，很低能，很粗糙，十分嗜血，充滿消費性格。就好像一具活死人一樣，身體會動，但沒有腦子，也沒有心靈。
最近大家煞有介事在談台灣人沒有國際觀的問題，什麼不知道美國首都在哪，不知道貝里斯在哪個洲，不知道古巴講什麼語言，這些我也都不知道，但是，這跟國際觀有啥關係？這就像一種低能的地理科目考試，考些記憶性的死資料。這只是反映出出題者僵硬的理解能力而已。
再說，何必講什麼國際觀，我看台灣人連鄰居觀、同事觀也沒有，他只關心自己眼前的利害，根本對別人的死活一點也不會在乎，何必講什麼國際觀。講那些，不會太不對勁了一點嗎？
前一陣子有部電影叫芝加哥，英國這邊的報紙進行調查發現，六成的英國人不知道芝加哥在哪個國家。像這一題，舔美的台灣人，肯定統統答對。很多英國人甚至以為台灣是一家大工廠的名稱，甚至還有英國小孩問台灣人說：你們那邊有沒有冰箱。
別講什麼國際觀的，這只是更進一步反映出這島上居民一種膨風心態，總是喜歡把問題講得好像很難、很深奧，彷彿需要什麼高深的知識或能力，而國際觀這幾個字，聽起來很炫、很酷，好像很厲害的樣子。可是，這哪裡是問題所在。如果它是一種問題，那麼，我的屏東鹽埔老家那些整天只知道種荔枝、種芒果的老鄉，難道都是劣質國民？
義大利昨天有十五萬人上街，悼念死去的俄羅斯人質。這在台灣絕不可能，不要說十五萬人，要找十五人恐怕都不容易。台灣人只有在某種虛榮的誘因下，才會一窩蜂去幹某些事。平常關心的話題，不外就是一些名人或政客八卦，看這個鬥那個，在他們的一些毫無意義的鬥爭或屁話上打轉，整天從這些腐爛的東西裏頭謀取趣味，把自己的存在價值貶得很低很低，很沒有尊嚴，但卻又總是一副得意洋洋、做威做福、趾高氣昂的樣子。
你看，台灣根本不存在所謂學運，但卻有一堆不要臉的什麼學運份子，姿態十足，十分做作，惡心得不得了。如果這就是學運，那麼，李丹他們或韓國學生或英國學生或美國學生等等等，該怎麼形容其偉大？豈非聖運？（聖人運動）
英國人大概可以說是最自大的民族了，但卻很少看到擺架子的英國教授或學者，幾乎沒有這樣的人，至少我從沒見過。但在台灣卻剛好相反。就連一般研究生或大學生，也很難找到幾個平實自然不驕傲的人，動不動就是論述論述論述，一副蠢樣，真的很低能。要是讓他給當上教授，那副嘴臉、那種酸腐氣和做作姿態，就更難看了，簡直不像個人，而像個人渣了。
底下是一份被聯合報退稿的文章。我也有把它寄給李家同教授，請他作答。之前也寄過另外一篇給他，可是他並不鳥我，大概是不屑作答吧。但我挺好奇他能考幾分。
底下這文章，特別歡迎轉寄或轉貼。因為我也很好奇，一般學生大概會考幾分。我自己是考了一百分，因為題目是我出的。
不過，記得轉寄或轉貼前，只剪下《給李家同教授的一份考題》這文章即可，上面那些千萬不要貼，我沒有膽子招惹台灣人。台灣已經沒有言論自由了。黨外時期，只需對付疾風雜誌社那一類的 “愛國人士” 即可，數目非常少，而且一次算總帳，積分夠了才會倒楣。現在不但人數滿坑滿谷，根本不能惹，而且罵一次算一次帳，敵暗我明，馬上會讓你付出代價。
民進黨等極右勢力，刻意培養出這樣的反動愚昧新一代人種，做為一種紅衛兵來奪取政權、鞏固個人權位利益。就像文革一樣，凡事因之迅速倒退。我敢說，遲早會惹來毀滅性的大災禍，萬劫不復。
沒辦法，自作孽，不可活。
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給李家同教授的一份考題
陳真 2004. 6. 28.
李家同教授幾度為文批評大學生對國際情勢之漠不關心，還曾出過考題，「證明」大學生之無知。對此頗有同感，但我不認同李教授推論。同時我也相信，用同樣考題來考教授，照樣得低分。也就是說，這不只是大學生的問題，也是老師的問題，更是整個社會長久以來的問題。台灣就像個封閉小島，浸淫在扁連宋和諸明星名人八卦是非裏，除此之外，一片空白。
我更不認同李教授的進一步評價，他說：「膚淺的人，何來國際觀？」但這跟膚淺與否有什麼關連？我認識許多進步型的台灣師生，他們對國際情勢耳熟能詳，津津樂道。但若要論心靈深淺，倒是更為淺薄的一群；與之接觸，常讓人訝異，一個人竟然可以庸俗、虛榮到這種地步。反倒我認識一些對國內外情勢十分無知的人，他們的心智氣質，卻讓我由衷欽佩仰慕。
李教授的不當推論，讓我想起蕭伯納一句話。他說：「我認識許多保護動物者，他們大多野蠻，但我也認識許多獵人，他們卻都很善良。」把某種知識或作為，等同於心靈膚淺與否，這是很膚淺的。
另外，從李教授的出題方式更看得出來，他似乎是個勤快的閱報者，但是否是個真正的關心者，這我就有所保留了。因為他的考題只是反映一種時事認知，而他所謂重要時事，不過就是西方主流媒體所報導的事。
這些所謂重要的事，其實大多不重要；再說，一個人只要有使用英文或其它強勢語言閱報的習慣，就算他不想關心，照樣耳熟能詳。就好像我並不想關心林志玲，但我或多或少也知道她的一些家務事一樣；我甚至還知道她喜歡吃些什麼。
我倒有一份也許更好的考題，也是「解釋名詞」，希望李教授作答，一題十分，看看得幾分。請簡單解釋底下縮寫或名稱的意義。（提示：這是一些關注國際議題的著名團體，其中幾個得過諾貝爾獎，或長達半世紀的老牌子社運團體，或最近幾年頻頻上報，所以，這不是一份故意要刁難考生的試題。）
PHR、ICBL、ISM、CAAT、WSPA、RAWA、CASI、MSF、Yesh Gvul、CND。
這個考試結果，沒有什麼推論意義。正常狀況應該得六十分以上，但如果有人考零分，我不會說他心靈膚淺，我只能說這個社會實在應該加強這方面的資訊。
陳真 2004. 9. 7.
那則骯髒的報導，有個斗大的骯髒標題，叫做「禽獸車游姦少女」。車游大概指的是車臣游擊隊。如果他們是禽獸，那麼，美軍俄軍英軍是什麼？像這樣一種污名化，表面上好像義憤填膺，其實不是，他只是漫不經心地扣你一頂帽子，他根本才不會關心這些事。如果他真的關心，那他就不會這樣講話了。如果他真的關心，台灣幾乎每個人都將是人權鬥士了。諸如這種偽君子或真小人，台灣多得是。
台灣人有錢，大多數人認為自己是「中產階級」。特別是過去，比現在有錢，總以為自己很高尚、很文明、很典雅，因此很看不起比他窮的人，比如印尼泰國中國大陸等，歧視得不得了，非常鄙夷。
一個會有這種歧視心態的人，就不可能有自尊，因為當他面對比他富有的人時，比如歐美，馬上就會立刻縮小一公尺，並且自動伸出舌頭，看要舔哪裡都行，十分窩囊猥瑣。
看過、聽過世界這麼多人種，去哪裡找比台灣人更野蠻落後、更窩囊的人民呢？如果他有一點自知之明，應該趕緊努力向對岸學習才對；兩地文化水平和內涵，實在差距太大，簡直雲泥有別，淵壤之隔。
但台灣人卻反倒以為自己比對岸華人高一等，動不動就要侮辱他們，實在很沒有病識感。除了有錢，哪一點比得上別人的一點零頭？就算 “有錢”這一點，不出十年也會遠遠落後，到時候，難道一見到大陸同胞，也要自動伸出舌頭？
每一個政治問題，都是文化問題，有它的文化根源，簡單說就是背後反映出一套價值觀。不是別的，正是這套價值思維有問題。在這套思維底下，幾乎一切現象就照著它所賦予的評價標準來呈現。媒體就是一例。有什麼樣的人民，就會有什麼樣的媒體。與其罵媒體低能腐敗，不如罵它的觀眾，因為媒體只是反映出觀眾的品味。
住在台灣，你很容易產生一種誤解，以為全世界的政治人物都是混蛋，以為全世界的讀書人都窩囊猥瑣，以為全世界的媒體都一樣敗德低能，以為全世界的人都一樣虛榮沒品，以為全世界的進步界都一樣封建反動。可是，只要踏出這個島，你就會發現，這不是「全世界」的問題，許多時候，它甚至只是「台灣人」的問題。
我收看香港和大陸的鳳凰衛視已經兩年了，一直到現在，仍然深深訝異它的善和內涵。在這之前，我根本不相信看電視會有什麼深刻的意義，根本不相信電視講的每一句話，包括什麼「公視」我也不信，我不信它會誠實講話；它頂多只是無害而已，卻沒有內涵。畢竟在這島上，誠實發言不是一種美德，卻反而是一種病，讓人當成怪物。
暫時脫離這個島後，我才相信，原來電視也能像藝術或教育那樣，讓人心靈得到滿足和養份。我才相信，原來世界上真的有人能正直地做任何一種工作。但是，以前在台灣，我根本不信有誰能正直地工作，那是根本不可能的事—除非你不想活了，除非你心臟很強壯、個性很剛烈，或許才有可能做出一點點抵抗。
但即便反抗，也依然微不足道，在這島上，你依然不可能正直。不管你做什麼自由業都好，比方說當醫生，你都得窩囊猥瑣、很不正直地幹活；窩囊到連自己都要鄙視起自己來了。
在英國，各行各業，都彷彿那麼聖潔。每個人認認真真、正正直直、快快樂樂地幹活，誰也不輕視誰，誰也不需出賣靈魂，只為謀一口飯吃。每次看那些在大馬路上辛苦幹活的工人，就覺得很訝異，他們為什麼充滿如許的尊嚴和快樂？
但台灣不是這樣，不管你是大老闆或小職員，不管你是醫生、護士、教授或工人，你每天得努力使自己心靈麻木，使自己墮落再墮落，努力擠壓出最大的邪惡，培養出最大的忍耐屈辱能力，否則根本無法在這個社會生存。
像鳳凰衛視，論財力，比不上台灣吧？！但是，那樣的節目，那樣的內涵，台灣就算砸下億萬重金也做不出來。比方說《唐人街》，比方說《鳳凰大視野》，比方說《冷暖人生》，比方說它經常在談的《愛滋病實錄》等話題或甚至最平常的《時事開講》或《風雲對話》等等，在在使人訝異於它的善跟內涵以及高度的藝術性或教育意義。
曾湊巧看到唐人街有一集，只看到尾巴大約十分鐘而已，講到好像是烏克蘭吧，一位來自四川還是哪裏的華人，很老了，但常吟詩作詞。對於這短短十分鐘的訪談，那種藝術水平，那種沉穩和內斂，那種動人的力量和聲音旁白，真是讓我嘆為觀止。
最近冷暖人生有一集，講到一個同性戀舞者的處境，更令人感到不可思議，沒有某種深厚的 文化內涵和以及深刻理解他人心靈的能力和尊重，不可能做出這樣的深度來。
可是台灣呢，有人曾經被台灣哪個節目感動過嗎？極少數例外當然有，比方說有人拍流浪狗，聽說拍得很好。但我要談的，正是這樣的例外。為什麼在它國顯得稀鬆平常的事，在台灣卻總是成為一種例外？為什麼在國外大家肯定都會這麼做的一種工作態度，到了台灣，你若秉持這樣的態度，反而會變成異類或怪物或聖人，甚至讓你痛不欲生或根本無法存活？
台灣沒有政治問題，只有文化問題。文化素質不改，光是有錢，或光是做些所謂典章制度面的改革，只是毫無意義的修改，就好像一個人以為改變了髮型就是改邪歸正、重新做人一樣。
文化雖然看不見，但它卻是一切，就好像靈魂或個性雖然看不見，但它卻是一個人的一切一樣。
台灣主流文化就是沒有文化，或者說一種好萊塢文化，很躁動，很低能，很粗糙，十分嗜血，充滿消費性格。就好像一具活死人一樣，身體會動，但沒有腦子，也沒有心靈。
最近大家煞有介事在談台灣人沒有國際觀的問題，什麼不知道美國首都在哪，不知道貝里斯在哪個洲，不知道古巴講什麼語言，這些我也都不知道，但是，這跟國際觀有啥關係？這就像一種低能的地理科目考試，考些記憶性的死資料。這只是反映出出題者僵硬的理解能力而已。
再說，何必講什麼國際觀，我看台灣人連鄰居觀、同事觀也沒有，他只關心自己眼前的利害，根本對別人的死活一點也不會在乎，何必講什麼國際觀。講那些，不會太不對勁了一點嗎？
前一陣子有部電影叫芝加哥，英國這邊的報紙進行調查發現，六成的英國人不知道芝加哥在哪個國家。像這一題，舔美的台灣人，肯定統統答對。很多英國人甚至以為台灣是一家大工廠的名稱，甚至還有英國小孩問台灣人說：你們那邊有沒有冰箱。
別講什麼國際觀的，這只是更進一步反映出這島上居民一種膨風心態，總是喜歡把問題講得好像很難、很深奧，彷彿需要什麼高深的知識或能力，而國際觀這幾個字，聽起來很炫、很酷，好像很厲害的樣子。可是，這哪裡是問題所在。如果它是一種問題，那麼，我的屏東鹽埔老家那些整天只知道種荔枝、種芒果的老鄉，難道都是劣質國民？
義大利昨天有十五萬人上街，悼念死去的俄羅斯人質。這在台灣絕不可能，不要說十五萬人，要找十五人恐怕都不容易。台灣人只有在某種虛榮的誘因下，才會一窩蜂去幹某些事。平常關心的話題，不外就是一些名人或政客八卦，看這個鬥那個，在他們的一些毫無意義的鬥爭或屁話上打轉，整天從這些腐爛的東西裏頭謀取趣味，把自己的存在價值貶得很低很低，很沒有尊嚴，但卻又總是一副得意洋洋、做威做福、趾高氣昂的樣子。
你看，台灣根本不存在所謂學運，但卻有一堆不要臉的什麼學運份子，姿態十足，十分做作，惡心得不得了。如果這就是學運，那麼，李丹他們或韓國學生或英國學生或美國學生等等等，該怎麼形容其偉大？豈非聖運？（聖人運動）
英國人大概可以說是最自大的民族了，但卻很少看到擺架子的英國教授或學者，幾乎沒有這樣的人，至少我從沒見過。但在台灣卻剛好相反。就連一般研究生或大學生，也很難找到幾個平實自然不驕傲的人，動不動就是論述論述論述，一副蠢樣，真的很低能。要是讓他給當上教授，那副嘴臉、那種酸腐氣和做作姿態，就更難看了，簡直不像個人，而像個人渣了。
底下是一份被聯合報退稿的文章。我也有把它寄給李家同教授，請他作答。之前也寄過另外一篇給他，可是他並不鳥我，大概是不屑作答吧。但我挺好奇他能考幾分。
底下這文章，特別歡迎轉寄或轉貼。因為我也很好奇，一般學生大概會考幾分。我自己是考了一百分，因為題目是我出的。
不過，記得轉寄或轉貼前，只剪下《給李家同教授的一份考題》這文章即可，上面那些千萬不要貼，我沒有膽子招惹台灣人。台灣已經沒有言論自由了。黨外時期，只需對付疾風雜誌社那一類的 “愛國人士” 即可，數目非常少，而且一次算總帳，積分夠了才會倒楣。現在不但人數滿坑滿谷，根本不能惹，而且罵一次算一次帳，敵暗我明，馬上會讓你付出代價。
民進黨等極右勢力，刻意培養出這樣的反動愚昧新一代人種，做為一種紅衛兵來奪取政權、鞏固個人權位利益。就像文革一樣，凡事因之迅速倒退。我敢說，遲早會惹來毀滅性的大災禍，萬劫不復。
沒辦法，自作孽，不可活。
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給李家同教授的一份考題
陳真 2004. 6. 28.
李家同教授幾度為文批評大學生對國際情勢之漠不關心，還曾出過考題，「證明」大學生之無知。對此頗有同感，但我不認同李教授推論。同時我也相信，用同樣考題來考教授，照樣得低分。也就是說，這不只是大學生的問題，也是老師的問題，更是整個社會長久以來的問題。台灣就像個封閉小島，浸淫在扁連宋和諸明星名人八卦是非裏，除此之外，一片空白。
我更不認同李教授的進一步評價，他說：「膚淺的人，何來國際觀？」但這跟膚淺與否有什麼關連？我認識許多進步型的台灣師生，他們對國際情勢耳熟能詳，津津樂道。但若要論心靈深淺，倒是更為淺薄的一群；與之接觸，常讓人訝異，一個人竟然可以庸俗、虛榮到這種地步。反倒我認識一些對國內外情勢十分無知的人，他們的心智氣質，卻讓我由衷欽佩仰慕。
李教授的不當推論，讓我想起蕭伯納一句話。他說：「我認識許多保護動物者，他們大多野蠻，但我也認識許多獵人，他們卻都很善良。」把某種知識或作為，等同於心靈膚淺與否，這是很膚淺的。
另外，從李教授的出題方式更看得出來，他似乎是個勤快的閱報者，但是否是個真正的關心者，這我就有所保留了。因為他的考題只是反映一種時事認知，而他所謂重要時事，不過就是西方主流媒體所報導的事。
這些所謂重要的事，其實大多不重要；再說，一個人只要有使用英文或其它強勢語言閱報的習慣，就算他不想關心，照樣耳熟能詳。就好像我並不想關心林志玲，但我或多或少也知道她的一些家務事一樣；我甚至還知道她喜歡吃些什麼。
我倒有一份也許更好的考題，也是「解釋名詞」，希望李教授作答，一題十分，看看得幾分。請簡單解釋底下縮寫或名稱的意義。（提示：這是一些關注國際議題的著名團體，其中幾個得過諾貝爾獎，或長達半世紀的老牌子社運團體，或最近幾年頻頻上報，所以，這不是一份故意要刁難考生的試題。）
PHR、ICBL、ISM、CAAT、WSPA、RAWA、CASI、MSF、Yesh Gvul、CND。
這個考試結果，沒有什麼推論意義。正常狀況應該得六十分以上，但如果有人考零分，我不會說他心靈膚淺，我只能說這個社會實在應該加強這方面的資訊。
一個骯髒的政府
陳真 2004. 9. 6.
維根斯坦常勸他認為優秀的學生放棄哲學，叫他們去工廠工作，最好是去當礦工。那些據說優秀的學生，有些聽從建議，真的棄哲從工，變成工人，從此埋沒。
有一回，他勸一個快畢業的學生，叫他連文憑也不要拿。但這學生說不拿不行啊，不拿娘會罵人。維根斯坦說，「可是，沒有人能為了文憑而從事哲學思考。」
後來，那個學生畢業了。維根斯坦不死心，怕他墮落，於是又找他去喝茶，企圖勸他，希望他千萬不要跑去教哲學；維根斯坦說，「不可能有人能一方面當個正直的人，一方面又在大學教哲學。」
這回，那個學生答應不去教哲學，維根斯坦聽了粉開心。後來兩人說再見時，維根斯坦問他，那麼，你打算將來做什麼？那個學生說，他想去當記者。
幾十年後，這個學生寫起這段回憶。他後來依然成為一名哲學教授，但他說，當他跟維根斯坦說他準備去當記者時，維根斯坦的臉色彷彿是聽到他要去當賊一樣難看。
另外還有一位學生，後來也成為著名哲學家，叫做 Malcolm。當他找到耶魯大學教職時，維根斯坦寫了封信給他，叫他千萬不要去幹這種事，]為他還沒學會安靜，還沒學會老實講話；叫他不要跟記者一樣，只會胡說八道。
除了記者和教授討人厭之外，維根斯坦最討厭的還包括政客。記者、教授、政客三位一體，都是最會胡說八道、最不老實、最言不由衷的一群人。
我看不只記者，很多名人或座談會專家更討人厭。他們總是講一些他們一點也不在乎的話。
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以上是剛剛閱報的感想。
看一些人，談到車臣的事，或是談到這個那個，實在很討人厭，因為他們往往只是在做一種文字表演，根本不在乎或甚至不知道自己在說什麼。比方說，「痛罵」恐怖份子，或提出某種「道德教誨」，或「表痛心」等等，可是，他們真的在「痛罵」、真的感到什麼「痛心」嗎？他們真的在乎那些動聽的「道德教誨」嗎？我大多感受不到。文字市場上，往往只感受到一種冷漠和表演，一種「與我無關」、「隨口說說」的態度。
一個人，如果真的對什麼感到「痛心」，那麼，他的人生絕不會像今天那樣；他肯定會有另外一種人生。
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看過哈巴狗電台的人，或許記得我曾談過兩件事：
一是發生在去年五月的事，英國情治單位內部狗咬狗，抖出大黑幕：原來英國過去二、三十幾年來 IRA 所幹下的所謂恐怖事件，其中一大半是英國政府自己幹的；而所謂殺人不眨眼的 IRA 恐怖份子首領，竟然是英國情治人員。
這不希奇，因為自導自演恐怖事件，好處多多。第一，有利選情，第二，抹黑對手，第三，提供大力鎮壓的理由；第四，策畫並執行恐怖事件，是滲透過程中取得對方信任，進而在敵營中步步高昇的必要手段。
第二件事就是 911。這我寫過幾個長篇，也提出過無數證據。以我一人調查之力，所得「情報」，都要比美國國會後來裝模作樣的所謂調查，還要早了將近一年，而且內容要更精準確實許多。他們有可能那麼無能嗎？不會吧？！那只是在演戲。
911 的調查結論很簡單。第一種可能，可以說是毫無疑問了，那就是美國政府事先完全知情；他根本就是「樂觀其成」。第二種可能，可能性約八成，那就是自導自演，要不然，不太可能在事件一兩年前就滿心期望來個「珍珠港事件」，以便執行反恐大業，而且老天爺還果真十分配合，馬上就給他一個「珍珠港事件」，讓他大展鴻圖。我不信天底下會有這麼巧的事。
事實上，第一種可能就已經包括了第二種可能。因為，知情之後的一連串袖手旁觀，就是一種促成和參與。
政治裏沒有偶然這回事。我研究過一些所謂恐怖事件或意外事件，到頭來，幾乎都和那些事件的受益者—也就是當權者—脫離不了關係，或者根本就是他自己幹的。
早上跟反戰專家說，我懷疑這次的校園綁架學童事件，恐怕也是俄國當局自己幹的。她不信。我也沒辦法。因為事情才剛發生，我也只能預言，毫無證據。
但是，對此事雖無證據。對之前的所謂恐怖事件，證據倒是一大堆，根本講不完，幾乎都是俄國當局自己幹的。
要講完這一切，恐怕得寫成一本書。所以我就只能長話短說了。1994-1996 年間，車臣一些動亂，常被葉爾欽拿來做為政治和選舉操弄，但這些暴力事件，成因費解，似乎是當局有意造成。1996 年，葉爾欽成功再度當選總統之後，暴亂反而隨之平息，十分詭異。
1999 年，換基旦布丁要選總統時，奇怪，馬上又天下大亂，恐怖份子又來幫布丁助選了。WSWS (節錄一段如下) 說，克里姆林宮裏一群政客(主要是某個媒體大亨 Boris Berezovsky)，組織了一群“車獨份子”，進攻 Dagestan，幹了一連串爆炸，一共奪走三百條人命。
全國於是陷入一片恐慌和氣憤，有魄力的布丁於是成為救星，只有選他，才有辦法打擊車獨這些恐怖份子。於是基旦布丁就高票凍蒜了。
WSWS 說，俄國前前後後用過多次這種手段。詳情略過。我直接講歌劇院人質事件好了。底下英文《附件一》，取自WSWS。懶得看的，可以直接跳過去。後面是講歌劇院事件。但是，跳過去之前，不妨看看底下英文中有關Berezovsky的部份，這是俄羅斯一位一度呼風喚雨的有錢政客。他因為和布丁不合，被迫流亡英國，抖出了這些選舉骯髒步。
他指證歷歷說，1997 年，他策動暴亂，給了車獨領袖之一 Shamil Basaiev 三百萬美元。1999年秋天，在莫斯科和 Volgodonsk的幾次大爆炸，全是由俄國情治單位 FSB 所主導，而他就是這幾次所謂 “恐怖事件” 的策劃者。
在講歌劇院事件前，得先認識一個頗受各方尊崇的女記者，也就是我在黑寡婦那篇文章中所提到的Anna Politkovskaia(以下簡稱安娜)。她很勇敢，在國外曾多次得過新聞獎章，表彰他在俄國高壓統治下的勇氣。她曾被捕，但在國際壓力下，旋即被釋放，經常遭受來自軍方或官方的暴力威脅，甚至威脅要取她的性命。
底下《附件二》和《附件三》是兩篇簡介。講這個只是要說，這個記者的人品和報導水平都無庸置疑，是個很難得一見的好記者。除報導外，並且經常以實際行動救援難民。也因此，不管在車臣或俄羅斯，都受到兩邊人民以及車臣反抗軍的尊敬。
歌劇院事件發生時，她正要前往美國領獎。但綁架者要求她代表俄羅斯出面談判；於是立即從美國趕回俄國。
兩年前的歌劇院事件中，俄國媒體說恐怖份子有 41 人，大多查出姓名，全數死亡。事件後，人質也死了126個，除了一名是被俄軍誤殺之外，其它全部死於俄軍所施放的毒氣。
奇怪的是，恐怖份子的屍體卻只有 40 具。有一個不見了。後來被安娜查出這個漏網之魚，並且找到了他，叫做Khanpash Nurdyevich Terkibayev。這個恐怖份子是個車臣人，卻隸屬俄國情治單位，並且和布丁總統府有直接連繫。他同意接受安娜採訪，並承認自己長年滲透在敵人陣營，負責策畫此次歌劇院事件。
他很得意地出示安娜一些相關文件，以及一個由情治單位 FSB 所發出的刑事豁免令，以證實自己的身份。
安娜把這段採訪，寫成一篇文章，如下《附件四》，叫做《有一名恐怖份子還活著：我們找到了他》，發表在俄國報紙 Novaya Gazeta，日期是去年 4 月 28 日。
這位特務說，歌劇院事件最初是敵人所發起，但卻是由他所鼓動，他跟對方說，“一切都在掌握之中”，“到處都有腐敗的人”，“要收買很容易”。於是，就由他負責策畫和帶路，在俄國情治單位之刻意配合掩護下，把這四十名車獨人士給祕密送進莫斯科，並且賄賂打通關節，進入歌劇院。
在施放毒氣前幾個小時，他在俄國情治人員協助下，偷偷從後門跑了。安娜問他說：你的意思是說所謂拯救行動純粹只是在演一齣愚弄人民的大戲？他說不是。他說，當場只有極少數高階人員知道這只是一齣戲，其他人則完全不知情，他們的確以為自己在拼命。但他拒絕透露他的直屬上司究竟是誰。
這個臥底的情治人員還說，他故意找來很多黑寡婦，原因是「女生比較多愁善感」，很容易煽動她們犧牲生命，而且，他說，找女殺手來，對社會大眾「更有恐怖效果」。
在這篇報導底下，則是一篇更完整的文章《附件五》，是史丹佛大學 Hoover Institution一位資深研究員對歌劇院事件的詳細報告。很長，大約兩萬字，有 145 個footnotes。《附件六》則是一篇車臣本身對此事的報導。接下來《附件七》是車臣外交部公文，抗議俄羅斯之自導自演，嫁禍於車臣。
另外，安娜寫了一本書，Amazon 買得到，叫做《一個骯髒的戰爭—一個俄國記者在車臣》（ADirty War: A Russian Reporter inChechnya），記錄俄國之種種血腥殺戮和違反人權事件，以及一些自導自演的所謂恐怖事件。
2001 年，軍方曾揚言取安娜性命，安娜認為此項威脅極其真實，因此逃到維也納，直到歌劇院事件，才應 “恐怖份子” 要求，回到俄國，做為政府談判代表，此後一直住在莫斯科。
另外，光是在2002年，俄羅斯就有三名記者因為報導言論不當，得罪當局而遇害，全是 “意外”事件，查無犯罪成份。
至於這位自己爆料的情治人員，在爆料後接到死亡警告。安娜說，在她把文章登出後不久，包括車臣和俄羅斯方面，都有人傳話說，這個洩密的臥底人員：「沒有多少日子可活」。幾個月後，他果然死於一宗車禍 “意外” 事件。
另外，一位現居倫敦的前俄國情治高階人員 Aleksandr Litvinenko，對媒體揭露：1999
年幾次住宅區大爆炸，正是俄國情治單位自導自演，目的是嫁禍車獨人士，進而做為發動第二次車臣戰爭的藉口。
故事講完了。人們喜歡談政治，但卻總是被政治玩弄而不自知。政治的複雜和醜陋，似乎每一次都遠遠超出我們的想像。對照起這種國際水平，台灣政治顯然還挺乾淨，至少槍傷是製造在自己身上，而不是以千百萬人性命做為一種選舉籌碼或政治動員藉口。
但台灣似乎正努力迎頭趕上國際水平；我總覺得，大家似乎都有機會親身體會戰爭的滋味；這當然得感謝民進黨囉。
==============
《附件一》WSWS談俄羅斯對恐怖事件的操弄與製造
What lies behind the recent explosions in Chechnya?
By Vladimir Volkov
29 May 2003
A series of powerful explosions in Chechnya earlier this month gave the lie to claims by the Russian government of Vladimir Putin and by the pro-Russian local administration of Ahmad Kadyrov that the present situation in the republic is leading to peace and the restoration of normality.
Only a few months ago, at the end of December 2002, there occurred another powerful explosion. Two trucks packed with explosives were blown up near a complex of administration buildings in Grozny. Over 80 people died and more than 300 were hurt in that incident.
Just two months ago, at the end of March, the Russian government conducted a referendum aimed at legitimising the structures of neocolonial control established during the second Chechen war. The citizens of Chechnya elected to remain within the Russian Federation in return for nominal autonomy. Not a single one of the regional problems was or could have been solved by this vote. The recent explosions have served as a reminder that the emergency regime, the general mood of hostility, and the generalised chaos within Chechnya have not diminished by comparison with the 1999-2002 period, when “constitutional peace was being reestablished.”
The first of the two explosions occurred on Monday morning, May 12, in the Nadterechny region of Chechnya situated in the north of the republic and long considered a more pro-Russian region. A large truck loaded with tons of trinitrotoluene and masked with sacks of cement approached a group of administrative buildings in the regional center of Znamenskoie. The truck attempted to crash through the metal barrier blocking the roadway, but the shock detonated the explosives. Although more than
30 metres still separated the truck from the buildings, the consequences of the explosion were quite serious. Nine buildings, seven of them inhabited houses, plus buildings housing the local administration and the local security office, were damaged. Fifty-nine people were killed, and at least 200 were hurt.
Three people were in the cab of this truck, which was presumably driven from the neighbouring republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, successfully negotiating a number of roadblocks. There is continuing reconstruction in Chechnya due to its wartime devastation, and many cement trucks drive into the region from neighbouring areas. It is not impossible to either fake travel permits or bribe the soldiers at control posts.
The second explosion occurred two days later, on Wednesday morning local time. A Moslem religious service was taking place in the village of Ilaskhan-Iurt, devoted to the Prophet Muhammad and one of the Moslem preachers active during the 19th century. Over 10,000 people from Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia gathered for the ceremony. The head of the Chechen administration, Ahmad Kadyrov, who is himself a bona fide Moslem cleri,c was leading the prayer. As the service was finishing, a female suicide bomber approached the group of people around Kadyrov and triggered her bomb.
Eighteen people, four of them Kadyrov’s bodyguards, were killed, and more than 150 people were wounded. Kadyrov himself was not hurt.
Actually, there were two women suicide bombers: the 46-year-old Shahidat Baimuradova, who exploded her bomb, and 52-year-old Zulai Abdulzakova. They introduced themselves as journalists, and the bomb was hidden inside their movie camera. Shrapnel from the first explosion fatally wounded the second woman; hence, there was only one explosion.
The first question to arise from such horrible news: What leads an average inhabitant of Chechnya to resort to such desperate actions? It is clear that, as with the situation in Palestine, the answer lies in the profound disappointment with the existing political parties and movements and the absence of any progressive social perspective.
All of this takes place within the context of continuing violence and terror by the Russian military against the civilian population. Since the end of March (i.e., after the conclusion of the referendum), over 70 abductions were committed in Chechnya, all of them attributed to the Russian military. According to one Chechen official, more than 245 Chechen citizens had disappeared since the beginning of this year.
The fact that women took part in the latest terror actions shows the breadth of dissatisfaction and the degree of desperation that pushes such varied elements of Chechen society to acts of suicidal terror.
“Arab connection”
Russian President Putin hurried to connect these Chechen explosions to the recent bombings in Saudi Arabia during Colin Powell’s visit there. Putin proclaimed that both the Chechen and the Saudi attacks were the work of a single Islamic terrorist organization headed by Al-Qaeda. Russian officials simultaneously reported that about $1 million were transferred to Chechnya before the explosions.
The Kremlin’s propaganda machine is trying to suggest that this money was provided by international Islamic organisations to fund the explosions in Znamenskoie and in Ilaskhan-Iurt.
We cannot, of course, exclude this possibility. Connections between the armed Chechen separatists
and various international Islamic institutions have been fairly well established in the past few years.
The problem lies in establishing whether such ties are strong enough to support the sort of long-range
planning and organisation of these widespread operations. On the other hand, there must exist
significant political motives for actions of this nature.
The more significant question is this: Does Al-Qaeda or any other Islamic fundamentalist movement require these Chechen outrages at this time?
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Russian president Putin decided to support the Bush administration’s war on “international terrorism.” The radical Islamic groups, therefore, could justifiably view the Russian regime as one of their enemies.
However, the US war on Iraq has altered the political landscape. This war significantly damaged Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Putin’s administration is very frightened by the outcome of the military campaign in Iraq. Compared to France and Germany, Russia has been more reluctant to accept the American administration’s demand for the complete removal of international sanctions on Iraq, which would legitimise the US neocolonial occupation of this country, and its control of the country’s oil reserves, the second largest in the world.
The recent explosions in Chechnya served to alleviate tensions in the US-Russian relationship. To some extent, Putin has rehabilitated himself in the eyes of Bush Jr. as a strategic partner. If Islamists abroad wanted to take revenge on Putin or harm his interests, they failed miserably and achieved just the reverse.
At the same time, if we take into account the role played by Chechnya in domestic Russian policies throughout the 1990s, the methods of provocations, conspiracies, and criminal combinations utilised by the Kremlin, and the geopolitical significance of Chechnya for the Russian government, then we can reasonably suppose that various influential forces within the ruling Russian elite groupings might have had an interest in seeing a new wave of bloody violence in Chechnya.
Kremlin’s methods and interests
First, a new outbreak of violence in the northern Caucasus could further a long-range strategy to secure Putin’s reelection in the presidential elections next year. Revelations during the last few years have established that the crisis in Chechnya was frequently utilised by the Moscow regime to impose political decisions that could not be forced upon the society in any other way.
The first Chechen campaign was started in late 1994 to organise a “small victorious war” and prop up the shaky authority of the Yeltsin government. As soon as Yeltsin was reelected in the summer of 1996, the war was stopped, even though the generals were loath to admit a military defeat, and although it seemed demeaning to the Great Russian mindset of a section of the population (the peace of Khasaviurt in August 1996).
This scenario was played out in an even more cynical and reckless manner during the opening of the Second Chechen war in the fall of 1999. In order to secure the transfer of power from Yeltsin to Putin, the Kremlin politicians (specifically, the then all-powerful oligarch and media magnate Boris Berezovsky) organised an invasion by groups of Chechen separatists into Dagestan followed by a series of bombings of houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk, costing the lives of 300 people. The atmosphere of fear created by these actions was used to channel popular opinion behind Putin. In March 2000, Vladimir Putin was swept into office as Russia’s president on a wave of nationalist hysteria.
Additionally, suspicions about the “Kremlin’s hand” are aroused by the events of last fall in Moscow, when a group of armed Chechens took about 800 people hostage in a theater. According to the story published by Anna Politkovskaia, a journalist of Novaia Gazeta, an agent of the Russian FSB, the secret police, infiltrated this group headed by Movsar Baraiev. This agent, according to the story, succeeded in escaping the building and surviving the government rescue assault, as a result of which 129 hostages and the whole group of about 50 Chechen militants were killed.
If this report is true (Politkovskaia published an interview with the unnamed agent, who had admitted his role in these events), then Putin’s government is guilty not only of a cruel and merciless overreaction to the hostage crisis, but also of directly organising the greatest armed provocation in contemporary Russian history.
Considering these recent experiences, we cannot but conclude that if such provocations advance its fundamental interests, the Kremlin is quite capable of launching fresh acts of bloody violence and sacrificing tens and hundreds of new lives. The state of acute crisis, which had in the recent past pushed the Russian government into similar ventures, has in no sense dissipated. Any idea that under Putin the level of moral responsibility of those who make such decisions has grown would be highly superficial and naive.
Factors both foreign and domestic
Two crucial factors, one of an international and the second of a domestic nature, have combined recently to sharpen the crisis of the Putin regime. First, the war in Iraq served to further polarise the various political forces in Russia. While one group of politicians and mainstream journalists is advocating a quick restoration of partnership with the US, another group, perhaps more numerous and influential, thinks that the conflict of interests between Russia and the US is bound to grow. This second group calls for a fundamental change in global Russian policy to give it an anti-American character, to strengthen an alliance with Europe and only pay lip service to the idea of partnership with the leader of world imperialism.
Putin is conducting a balancing act between these two forces, utilising methods of Bonapartism to preserve a semblance of consensus within the new Russian ruling elite. A rise in the tensions related to Chechnya, combined with the renewal of friendly relations with the Bush administration, would also place Putin “above” the sharpening conflict of these domestic constituencies, and would dampen the internal opposition to his foreign policy of empirical zigzags and hesitant half measures.
The other important factor has to do with the opening of the electoral campaign for the Russian parliament. The outcome of the December parliamentary election will largely determine whether Putin succeeds in getting reelected president next year. Despite the absence of any open opposition from among the influential political forces inside the country, he has no defined social or political base of support. His main supporters come from within the state bureaucracy itself, from the military and the special and secret services, as well as from sections of big business. However, all these elements are disunited, tied together only by their personal loyalty to Putin, not by any common political program.
According to numerous opinion polls, there is a huge gulf between Putin’s nominally high popularity rating and the actual popular moods of the Russian electorate. For a time, this gulf was bridged by hopes that Putin would be able to overcome the worst legacies of Yeltsin’s social and political regime, and that he might improve the lot of the tens of millions of average citizens. But the absence of any positive changes for the masses and the deepening of the tendencies of social breakdown, which grow organically out of the policy of restoring capitalism, make the connection between the masses of toilers and Putin ever more fragile and ephemeral. The optimistic hopes are dissipating, giving way to a frightening vision of growing social and economic catastrophe and the absence of any perspective for the majority of workers, youth and intellectuals.
Despite Putin’s frequent protestations of opposition to the war in Iraq, in the eyes of Russia’s toilers his regime is increasingly seen as completely dependent upon the leading world powers, and subservient first of all to the US. Putin’s government is unable to stand up to the imperialist and domineering pretensions of the American ruling elite; Putin’s policies objectively lead to a further weakening of the country’s economy and its defence capabilities.
These conditions create the possibility for a new political force to arise quickly and fill the abyss between the ruling regime and popular aspirations. We are not discussing now the question of the political nature of this political force; what we must note is that it might wrest control of events out of the hands of the present cliques in the political oligarchy. It is to prevent such a scenario that the Kremlin strategists may have decided that a new armed outrage in Chechnya is just the thing to consolidate the nation around the existing government and its present leader.
The Kremlin’s political scene, however, consists not merely of a tableau of unified and homogeneous elements supporting Putin. Rather, a number of internally warring combinations compete for influence. If one might suppose that certain groups in the top echelons of Putin’s regime might resort to extensive destabilisation in Chechnya to save the authority of the current president, then other layers of the ruling elite might use the facts of such destabilisation to discredit Putin and promote their own representatives to Moscow’s “throne.”
The “Berezovsky factor”
First and foremost in this regard, there is the “Berezovsky factor.” Everyone is aware that this former oligarch and media magnate rose during Yeltsin’s years to become one of the leading political figures in Russia, although he never occupied any truly influential post himself. Not only did he become one of the main protagonists in the creation of a political entity that was later dubbed the “Yeltsin family”—that is, the assembly of economic and political structures that was most closely tied to Yeltsin and his immediate circle. Berezovsky also holds the title for introducing into the Russian body politic the most odious and dirty political technologies. These dirty tricks secured Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996 and promoted Putin in late 1999-early 2000.
It is well known that Berezovsky maintained contacts with leaders of the armed Chechen separatists, even during the periods of military action by the Russian army. It is a well-established fact that in 1997 he transferred $3 million to Shamil Basaiev, one of the leading Chechen separatist field commanders, supposedly for the building of a hospital. In a recent interview, Berezovsky as much as admitted that he personally thought up the idea of organising the invasion by Basaiev’s and Khattab’s detachments into Dagestan in August 1999.
Lately, having been forced into an exile in England, Berezovsky is conducting a campaign to discredit Putin, and he is asserting that the explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk in the fall of 1999 were organised by the FSB. However, he was at that time very close to these services and to a large extent directed their activities.
Apparently, no one knows as much about the autumn 1999 explosions as Berezovsky. Continuing to exert a great deal of influence in Russia through his agents, he can once again resort to techniques that were developed under his leadership over the course of years with the aim of regaining for himself and his associates the influence that he lost under Putin.
Putin’s entourage has already accused Berezovsky of trying to provoke mass unrest in Russia. A couple of weeks before the recent explosions, Russian newspapers published transcripts of telephone conversations that Berezovsky supposedly conducted with a number of influential leaders. In a supposed talk with the Communist Party leader Ziuganov (an alliance with the CP was proclaimed by Berezovsky as the necessary precondition for the liberals to succeed in the upcoming parliamentary elections), the exiled oligarch called on the “communist” leader to organise anti-Semitic pogroms, so as to accuse the current government of incompetence and failure to protect the citizens and preserve civic order.
Berezovsky denies any such attempts or provocations. However, the very fact that Russia’s mass media airs such scenarios and accuses certain politicians and groups of readiness to organise public riots, and that the “talking heads” on TV view such suggestions as believable, signifies that similar scenarios are indeed being hatched in some brains.
Regardless of who stands behind this latest series of explosions in Chechnya, they serve as a clear warning: Again, as in the days of Stalin, within the Kremlin there are many people ready to prepare “spicy dishes.”
============
《附件二》安娜介紹
Anna Politkovskaia
Anna Politkovskaia was born in 1958. After studying at the Moscow State University, she received a diploma in journalism. Anna Politkovskaia has worked for various newspapers and collaborated with TV and radio stations.
While working for Obshchaya Gazeta, she visited Chechnya for the first time in 1998 to conduct an interview with President Maskhadov. Already working for the Novaya Gazeta, the independent democratic newspaper, she concentrated on the second Chechnyan war and has visited Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia over fifty times.
Her works include Russia Under Putin and A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya (2001), a compilation of dispatches written between 1999 and 2000. A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya was published in 2003.
In February 2001 Anna Politkovskaia was arrested while in southern Chechnya. She was formally accused of violating the strict laws controlling media coverage of the conflict and was ordered out of the enclave.
In October 2001, after receiving death threats related to her reporting in Chechnya, Anna Politkovskaia relocated to Vienna for a time. Supported by the Vienna Institute for Human Sciences, she was able to write her new book. During the hostage drama at the Nordost Theatre in 2002, Anna Politkovskaia agreed to the hostagetakers’ request to assist during negotiations.
Anna Politkovskaia was decorated with the Participant in Battles Medal for her work in the field. In addition to other awards, Anna Politkovskaia received the 2000 Golden Pen Award from the Russian Union of Journalists, the Freedom of Expression Award of the Index on Censorship, the IWMF Courage in Journalism Award, and the OSCE Prize for Journalism and Democracy.
Anna Politkovskaia is currently writing her fourth non-fiction book entitled Putin’s Russia. She writes for the Muscovite Novaya Gazeta and holds lectures in Great Britain, France, Holland, Germany and other Western European countries.
Anna Politkovskaia lives with her family in Moscow.
=============
《附件三》也是安娜介紹
Anna Politkovskaia Honored by the Club of American Journalists
Anna Stepanovna Politkovskaia, Waging member from Russia, was honored for exemplary reporting on events in Russia at the annual awards ceremony held by the Club of American Journalists. She is the first recipient of the "Artem Borovik" award, which was initiated by a number of American media outlets and will be awarded annually to journalists whose work sheds light on events in Russia.
Anna Politkovskaia is a reporter for Novaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper. Over the past two years, she has covered events in refugee camps in Dagestan, as well as reported on events in Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic, which she visited numerous times last year. Anna is also the author of the book Travel to Hell: The Chechen Diary.
In addition to her work as a journalist, Anna has organized the relocation of 89 homes for the elderly from Grozny to Russia to escape the effects of war. Last summer, 22 elderly men were returned to Grozny. However, they were left without water, medicine, food, or clothing. In August 2000, under Anna's leadership, Novaya Gazeta began an initiative entitled "Grozny: a house for the elderly," and collected 5.5 tons of cargo and approximately $5,000.
Aside from her most recent award, Anna was awarded the "Golden Nib of Russia" in January 2000 for a series of reports about the situation in the Chechen Republic. Anna's other awards include the "Kind Act - Kind Heart" award given to her by the Union of Journalists in the Russian Federation, an award for articles exposing corruption, and the "Golden Gong - 2000" certificate for a series of reports about the Chechen Republic.
On February 20, 2001 Anna was arrested in the Chechen Republic. Thanks to public support, she was released in a week. According to her colleagues from Novaya Gazeta, "Anna Politkovskaia works under dangerous conditions connected with transitional borders and overcomes the infinite number of obstacles created by federal armies. In the face of information blockade, Anna Politkovskaia always shows high professionalism and courage."
==========
《附件四》，安娜揭露此事的報導，叫做《有一名恐怖份子還活著：我們找到了他》，發表在俄國報紙 Novaya Gazeta，日期是去年 4 月 28 日。
One of the terrorists survived. We found him.
http://eng.terror99.ru/publications/096.htm
by Anna Politkovskaya
Novaya Gazeta
April 28, 2003
Six months ago there was a terrorist act on Dubrovka. During these months, we have asked the same questions many times: how could this have happened? How were they allowed to enter Moscow? Who allowed them to do so? And why? As it turns out, there is a witness. He is also a participant.
At first there was only scarce information: one of the terrorists, who took hostage the "Nord Ost" theatre on Dubrovka, is alive.
We checked this information, repeatedly analyzed the list of names of Barayev's group, which was printed in the press. We made many inquiries. And we found him. The man, whose last name was published on an official list of the terrorists' names, those who took hostage the people who attended the musical.
"Were you in Barayev's group when "Nord-Ost" was taken hostage?"
"I was."
"Did you enter with them?"
"Yes."
"-Khanpash Nurdyevich Terkibayev. (Further the name of a government newspaper follows). Special correspondent⋯" – I read the card with the capital letters "PRESS" on a dark margin. Document number 1165. Signed – Yu. Gorbenko. It's true, there is such a director at this newspaper.
"What subjects do you write about? About Chechnya?"
-Silence.
"Do you show up for work? Which department do you work at? Who is your Editor-in-Chief?"
- Silence again. He pretends that he doesn't understand Russian well. But is it possible that a special correspondent of the main government paper of a country does not know Russian?
Khanpash's eyes, Mongoloid-like, not very similar to Chechen eyes, look perplexed. And he does not pretend, he honestly does not understand what I'm talking about – he is very far from journalism.
"Did someone give you this document to serve as a cover for your real work?"
He smiles slyly:
"I wouldn't mind writing⋯ I just haven't had the time to figure things out. I just received this document – on April 7th. Do you see the date? I don't have to go there. I work in the President's Information Office."
"You work under Porshnev? What's your position?" (Ref.: Igor Porshnev is the director of the Information Department of President Putin's Administration. So he is a "direct boss" of 30-year old Khanpash Terkibayev, a native of a Chechen village called Mesker-Yurt.)
But Porshnev's last name puzzles this "special correspondent." Khanpash simply does not know who Porshnev is.
"When I need to, I meet with Yastrzhembsky. I work for him. Here we are in a photograph together."
True, the photograph is of him with Sergei Vladimirovich (Yastrzhembsky). Sergei Vladimirovich is not looking at the camera and seems quite dissatisfied. But it is indeed Khanpash on that photo - the same man who sits in front of me know, in the "Sputnik" hotel on Leninsky Prospekt – Khanpash is looking directly at the camera: here we are, together. The photograph tells a story - it is evident that it was unwelcome by Sergei Vladimirovich, and, evidently, it was Khanpash who insisted on it, and now he tells me of his difficult life journey, accompanying the story with a demonstration of numerous photos that he pulls out of his briefcase.
"Maskhadov and I, Arsanov and I, myself in Kremlin, Saidulayev and I, Gil-Robles and I⋯" (Editor's note: Gil-Robles is the European Commissioner on Human Rights)."
I look closer at the photos – a significant number of them seem to be crude forgeries. (Editor's note: later checked with the specialist- and they confirmed the forgeries.) Why? Khanpash pretends that he doesn't understand, rummages about in his briefcase, and then pulls out a photo of him with Margaret Thatcher and Maskhadov - to prove that he has close connections to London.
The year is 1998, Maskhadov is in a papakha, Thatcher is in the middle, and on the other side of her is Khanpash. Meanwhile, Maskhadov looks like he did before the war, but Khanpash looks the same as he does now- Why? But he is already pulling out another photo. Maskhadov is dressed in camouflage, his beard has a significant amount of gray hair, he looks awful - and Khanpash does not look so well either. This one is genuine.
"Aren't you afraid to walk around Moscow with these photos? In Chechnya you could get shot immediately⋯ For this, here – firearms would be planted on you and you'd be locked up in jail for many years⋯"
This is how he answers:
"I also know Surkov." His tone becomes boastful. "After "Nord-Ost" I've met with Surkov. Twice." (Ref: Vladislav Surkov is an influential Deputy Head of the President's Administration.)
"Why?"
"I helped develop Putin's policy for Chechnya. The post-"Nord-Ost" policy."
"And how did it go? Did you help?"
"We need peace."
"What an original thought."
"I'm currently working on peace negotiations under the orders of Yastrzhembsky and Surkov. The idea is to conduct negotiations with those who are in the mountains.
"Is this idea yours or the Kremlin's?"
"It's mine, but it is supported by the Kremlin."
"These talks- will they be with Maskhadov?"
"No. The Kremlin does not agree with Maskhadov."
"Then with whom?"
"With Vakha Arsanov. I've just met with him."
"Where?"
"In Chechnya."
"Then what's going to happen to Maskhadov?"
"We have to convince him to give up his authority until the Presidential election in Chechnya."
"Are you involved in that, too?"
"Yes, but for this I have no authority. I am acting on my own. Regardless, there can't possibly be an election."
"And if they do take place, who would you, personally, place your bet on?"
"Khasbulatov and Saidulayev. They are the third force. Not Maskhadov, not Kadyrov. That is the way I am. After "Nord-Ost", it was I who organized the negotiations of the Chechen parliament's deputies with the Administration, with Yastrzhembsky."
"Yes, and that surprised many," I say. "When Isa Temirov together with the other deputies openly appeared in Moscow, spoke at the famous press-conference at the Interfax news agency and called for a referendum vote, which means the vote against Maskhadov, even though they had supported him before⋯ So you were behind this?"
"Yes," he says proudly.
"Did you vote at the referendum?"
"Me? No." He laughs. "I come from the "Charto" clan, we are called "Jews" in Chechnya."
"Is it possible to say the outcome of the "Nord Ost" tragedy was going to be the same as for Budennovsk, the end the second Chechen War?"
This question is not accidental. We are at the main point. Khanpash has participated in absolutely everything. He is the man for all occasions of our politics. He knows everyone, he has access to everything, he can handle anything having to do with the North Caucasus. If someone needs to meet with Maskhadov – he will find him. If without Maskhadov – he can organize that too. Or so he tells us, at least⋯ He is an actor by profession, he says; he graduated from Grozny University with a theatre major. It does not matter that there was no theatre department at that university and that he himself cannot remember who his professors where.
More importantly, he claims that "Zakayev and I - we are friends, we worked in the theatre together." During the first war he took a video camera into his hands and worked for television. He accompanied Basayev in the Budennovsk raid, but was not convicted for it, on the contrary- he received amnesty for it in April of 2000.
"Where were the papers about the amnesty given out?"
"In the Chechen Federal Security Service (FSB) department of the city of Argun."
This is a very serious detail. All throughout this war, the Argun FSB have been one of the most brutal. During the time when Khanpash was amnestied, no one came out of the Argun FSB alive. Khanpash is the first to make it out alive, and with an official document of amnesty for Budennovsk.
Between the two wars, Khanpash, as the "hero of Budennovsk", becomes the leading specialist of the press service⋯ of President Maskhadov. He had his own program on Maskhadov's television channel called "The President's Heart", later renamed as "The President's Path". Later, however, before the second war, he was replaced and forced to leave Maskhadov's inner circle; but when the armed conflict started, he returned and again became a "vehement Jihad fighter".
Surprisingly, right under the nose of federal forces and all kinds of special services, in the midst of heavy fighting, when everyone ran for their life, Khanpash still managed to produce his television program, the title of which can be translated from Chechen approximately like this: "My motherland is where there is Jihad."
"Really, I didn't believe in that then, and I don't believe in it now."
"What do you mean? Your motherland is not where there is Jihad?"
"I just had a television program like this."
"It seems that Maskhadov expelled you from his inner circle again recently?"
"Not Maskhadov, his representatives abroad did. But I don't believe them. Rakhman Dushuyev in Turkey told me that he received a videotape from President Maskhadov, who says that he no longer wants me to call myself his representative, but I have not seen this videotape and have not talked with Maskhadov- And recently I've met with Kusama and Anzor in Dubai. They were my hosts. I ate and slept there-" (Editor's note: Kusama is Maskhadov's wife, Anzor is his son.)
"Dubai, Turkey, Jordan, Strasbourg⋯ Do you travel all the time? Do you get visas everywhere?"
"I know all of the Chechens. That is why I travel in many countries and call all Chechens to unite."
"Did you come to Dubai from Baku?"
"Yes."
"And there you appeared after the October terrorist act in Moscow, right? And asked the Chechens
living there to help you, told them that you are one of the surviving hostage takers of the "Nord-Ost",
and that you urgently need contacts in the Arab world, in order to escape the persecution?"
"How do you know this?"
"From the Chechens in Baku. And from the papers. You know, your last name was published in the list of terrorists who seized "Nord Ost". By the way, did you sue this publication?"
"No. Why would I? I just asked Yastrzhembsky: ‘How could this happen?'"
"And what did he say?"
"He said, ‘Don't pay any attention to this.'"
The most recent take-off in Khanpash Terkibayev's political carrier corresponds with our common tragedy – the events on October 23-26, 2002. With the terrorist act, which left behind numerous victims, when a detachment under the leadership of Barayev's nephew⋯ took hostage almost 800 people in the building of the House of Culture on Melnikov street and the whole country did not know how to save them, tossed and turned, wailed, waiting for an explosion at any moment.
"By the way, have you known Barayev Junior long?"
"I've known him for a long time. I know everyone in Chechnya."
"Where there explosives there?"
"No, there weren't. There weren't any."
It is precisely after "Nord Ost" that Khanpash's career took off. He did indeed become "a supporter" of President Putin's Administration. He was given the necessary documents, which guaranteed him freedom to go everywhere he needed to go, maneuvering from Maskhadov to Yastrzhembsky.
He headed the negotiations on the behalf of Putin's Administration with the deputies of the Chechen parliament- they were needed for support of the referendum. He fought for the guarantees of immunity for these deputies, should they come to Moscow. He won.
It was Khanpash, and not anyone else, took those deputies, and acted as the leader of their group, to Strasbourg, to high cabinets of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly, and there the deputies conducted themselves correctly – under the direction of Rogozin, chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs.
Naturally, a question arises: Why? Why ? Khanpash. For what? How did he do to prove his loyalty? It is clear that without such proof nothing of the sort could have happened to him⋯
Now, the most important part. The essential part of our long conversation.
In all likelihood Khanpash is exactly the man who everyone involved in the "Nord Ost" tragedy looked so hard for. The man, who ensured the terrorist act from the inside. According to the information in our newspaper's possession (and himself does not deny it – what a vain man!), Khanpash is an agent planted there by the special forces.
He entered the building with the terrorists.
As one of them.
According to his own words, he secretly arranged for them to get into Moscow, and into "Nord Ost" itself.
It was he who convinced the terrorists that everything is "under control", that there are plenty of corrupt people everywhere", that "the Russians again were bribed", as they were before to allow people to leave the besieged cities of Grozny and Komsomolsk, all they had to do was "make noise", and a "second Budennovsk" would take place, and thus peace would be reached, and later, after the task has been completed, "we would be allowed to leave alive" – though not everyone.
It turns out that he was the only one to leave alive.
He left the building before it was stormed. Furthermore, he had a plan of the theatre building on Dubrovka, the plan which neither Barayev's nephew, the leader of the terrorists, nor, at first, the special services unit, preparing to storm the building, had in their possession.
Why? Because he was a part of those forces, who are much higher in the special services hierarchy then "Vityaz" and "Alfa", who were going in to face death.
Regardless, whether he had the plan or not – in the big picture it does not matter, just a minor detail.
As a matter of fact, Khanpash has no problem lying – remember the fake photographs? And those who could have either confirmed or denied certain details- for example, where his position was – they, it seems, all died. Or just aren't as talkative. Do I allow the idea that he was not the only special forces agent in there? I do. If there was at least one, why couldn't there be two?
The heart of the matter, for us, is in another point – if there was an agent sent by the special forces into "Nord Ost", that means that the authorities knew that the terrorist act was being prepared. The authorities thus participated in its preparation, and it doesn't even matter with what purpose.
The most important thing – the authorities (which ones?) knew what was going on long before all of us knew about it, and therefore have put their people under the heaviest blow, while knowing that the blow is coming, knowing, that thousands will not be able to recover, and that hundreds will die. The authorities were going to pull off another Kursk. (Do you remember the signals given by those poor people in the seized theater? "We are the second Kursk⋯ Our country forgot about us⋯ Our country does not need us⋯ Our country wants for us to die⋯" Many outside the theatre then became indignant – the hostages have gone too far⋯ However, that is exactly how it turned out...)
And then, it means, the question remains: What for? Six months ago, what did the people die for?
And here, before we attempt to answer this question, we have to figure out: who are these authorities, who knew? The Kremlin? Putin? The FSB? The usual suspects?
Our authorities are not a monolith. Neither are the special forces. And it is not true that the majority of officers, who worked in those days in the headquarters near the building on Dubrovka only pretended to fight the tragedy, knowing that it is a hoax. Most of their struggle was genuine. As was "Alfa's" and "Vityaz". As was ours-
But! If there was a Khanpash – that means, we have no choice, and some part of the authorities, which knew, which only pretended to sympathize during our 72 hour insanity, our tears, heart attacks, screams, heroic deeds, deaths?
And this- this changes the entire chain of events six months ago.
Who are the special forces who knew?
Of course, it is not the special forces teams who stormed the building. If those fighters understood the complexity of the hoax, then, possibly, there would be a repetition of the events in 1993 with their refusal to storm, and the story today would be different.
And it was not the officers of the FSB and the MVD (the Ministry of Internal Affairs), who in all seriousness planned the operation to free the hostages. They did not infiltrate Khanpash. And then give him a job. But who was it?
Terkibayev himself did not answer that question.
So it seems, the FSB and the MVD just trying to solve and acting out someone else's scenario.
During the second Chechen war such methods were well tested by military intelligence. The leaders of the so-called "squadrons of death" were the employees of the GRU. Executions of our compatriots without court hearings – it is their work. And neither the FSB and the MVD, nor prosecutors, or the courts can do anything about their bloody leadership. Then again, a common practice of the GRU squadrons is to use the Chechen bandits. And also, - their former victims (widows - who became such after the actions of the "squadrons of death") – since this is very convenient material for reaching the goals of terrifying all people.
So – was it them? Or someone else, unknown to us?
I don't have an answer. But it is very important to get to the bottom of this. And it is also, without doubt, necessary.
- So what did the people die for? What kind of an insane price is 129 lives?
Here is what we saw, when light was shed on a tiny part of the story about an agent provocateur of our days.
People have died, but the agent provocateur is thriving. And it is exactly him, who is a part of the political inner circle. He is well fed, looks well, and, most importantly, he continues⋯ In the next few days he leaves for Chechnya. What will he prepare this time?
"I need 24 hours to meet with Maskhadov," he says.
"Only 24 ours?"
"Well, perhaps two days."
Khanpash is condescending towards the nanve. Towards us.
Anna Politkovskaya, correspondent of "Novaya Gazeta"
04/28/2003
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《附件五》史丹佛大學一位資深研究員對歌劇院事件的詳細報告
THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT (Part 1)
By John B. Dunlop
John B. Dunlop is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution Compiled by Roman Kupchinsky.
http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/2004%20Dunlop-RFERL%20Paper.htm
On 6 November 2002, a meeting was held in Moscow of the Public Committee to Investigate the Circumstances Behind the Explosions of the Apartment Buildings in Moscow and the Ryazan Exercises (all of which occurred in September 1999). The meeting took place at the Andrei Sakharov Center, and among those present were the committee's chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev, its deputy chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov (assassinated on 17 April 2003), lawyer Boris Zolotukhin, writer Aleksandr Tkachenko, journalist Otto Latsis, and human rights activist Valerii Borshchev. After the meeting had concluded, the members of the committee took a formal decision to "broaden its mandate" and to include the Moscow hostage-taking episode of 23-26 October 2002 -- and especially the actions of the Russian special services during that period -- as an additional subject of inquiry coming under the committee's purview.(1)
An Unusual Kind Of 'Joint Venture'?
The following is an attempt to make some sense out of the small torrent of information that exists concerning the October 2002 events at Dubrovka. In my opinion, the original plan for the terrorist action at and around Dubrovka bears a strong similarity to the campaign of terror bombings unleashed upon Moscow and other Russian urban centers (Buinaksk, Volgodonsk) in September of 1999. In both cases there is strong evidence of official involvement in, and manipulation of, key actions; so the question naturally arises as to whether Vladimir Putin in any way sanctioned them. Although there is additional evidence bearing on Putin's possible role, this paper will take an agnostic position on the issue, and will also not review it.
The October 2002 hostage-taking episode in a large theater containing close to 1,000 people was evidently, at least in its original conception, to have been preceded and accompanied by terror bombings claiming the lives of perhaps hundreds of Muscovites, a development that would have terrorized and enraged the populace of the entire country. However, in view of the suspicious connections and motivations of the perpetrators of this incident, as well as the contradictory nature of the actions of the authorities, it would seem appropriate to envisage this operation as representing a kind of "joint venture" (on, for example, the model of the August 1999 incursion into Daghestan) involving elements of the Russian special services and also radical Chechen leaders such as Shamil Basaev and Movladi Udugov.
Only a few individuals among the special services and the Chechen extremist leadership would likely have known of the existence of this implicit deal. Both "partners" had a strong motive to derail the movement occurring in Russia, and being backed by the West, to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Chechen conflict. Both also wanted to blacken the reputation of the leader of the Chechen separatist moderates, Aslan Maskhadov. In addition, the Chechen extremists clearly saw their action as a kind of ambitious fund-raiser aimed at attracting financial support from wealthy donors in the Gulf states and throughout the Muslim world (hence the signs displayed in Arabic, the non-traditional [for Chechens] garb of the female terrorists, and so on). The Russian authorities, for their part, had a propitious chance to depict the conflict in Chechnya as a war against an Al-Qaeda-type Chechen terrorism, a message that could be expected to play well abroad, and especially in the United States.
As in the case of the 1999 terror bombings, meticulous planning -- including the use of "cut-outs," false documents, and the secret transport of weapons and explosives to Moscow from the North Caucasus region -- underlay the preparation for this terrorist assault. In this instance, however, the perpetrators were to be seen as Chechens of a "Wahhabi" orientation whose modus operandi was to recall that of the notorious Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Once the operation had moved into its active stage, however, strange and still not fully explained developments began to occur. An explosion at a McDonald's restaurant in southwest Moscow on 19 October immediately riveted the attention of the Moscow Criminal Investigation (MUR) -- an elite unit of the regular police -- which then moved swiftly to halt the activity of the terrorists. The explosion at the McDonald's restaurant was, fortunately, a small one, and caused the death of only a single person. Two large bombs set to explode before the assault on Dubrovka was launched failed to detonate. Likewise a planned bombing incident at a large restaurant in Pushkin Square in the center of the capital failed to take place.
In my opinion, the most likely explanation for these "technical" failures lies in acts of intentional sabotage committed by some of the terrorists. What remains unclear at this juncture is why certain individuals among the terrorists chose to render the explosive devices incapable of functioning. One key point, however, seems clear: The Chechen extremist leaders felt no pressing need to blow up or shoot hundreds of Russian citizens. They were aware that such actions might so enrage the Russian populace that it would then have supported any military actions whatever, including a possible full- scale extermination of the Chechen people. So what Shamil Basaev, Aslambek Khaskhanov, and their comrades in arms seem to have done is, in a sense, to outplay the special services in a game of chess. Most of the bombs, it turns out, were actually fakes, while the few women's terrorist belts that did actually contain explosives were of danger primarily to the women themselves. As Russian security affairs correspondent Pavel Felgenhauer has rightly suggested, the aim of the extremist leaders seems to have been to force the Russian special services to kill ethnic Russians on a large scale, and that is what happened.(2) Only an adroit cover-up by the Russian authorities prevented the full extent (conceivably more than 200 deaths) of the debacle from becoming known.
A central question to be resolved by future researchers is whether or not the Russian special forces planning an assault on the theater building at Dubrovka were aware that virtually all of the bombs located there -- including all of the powerful and deadly bombs -- were in fact incapable of detonating. If the special forces were aware of this, then there was clearly no need to employ a potentially lethal gas, which, it turned out, caused the deaths of a large number of the hostages. The special forces could have relatively easily and rapidly overwhelmed the lightly armed terrorists. Moreover, if they were in fact aware that the bombs were "dummies," then the special forces obviously had no need to kill all of the terrorists, especially those who were asleep from the effects of the gas. It would, one would think, have made more sense to take some of them alive.
Pressure Builds For A Negotiated Settlement With The Chechen Separatists
In the months preceding the terrorist act at the Dubrovka theater, which was putting on a popular musical, "Nord-Ost," the Kremlin leadership found itself coming under heavy political pressure both within Russia and in the West to enter into high-level negotiations with the moderate wing of the Chechen separatists headed by Aslan Maskhadov, who was elected Chechen president in 1997. Public-opinion polls in Russia showed that a continuation of the Chechen conflict was beginning to erode Putin's generally high approval ratings. With parliamentary elections scheduled for just over a year's time (in December 2003), this represented a worrisome problem for the Kremlin. In a poll taken by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), whose findings were reported on 8 October, respondents were asked "how the situation in Chechnya has changed since V. Putin was elected president."(3) Thirty percent of respondents believed that the situation had "gotten better," but 43 percent opined that it had "not changed," while 21 percent thought that it had "gotten worse." These results were significantly lower than Putin's ratings in other categories. In similar fashion, a September 2002 Russia-wide poll taken by VTsIOM found 56 percent of respondents favoring peace negotiations as a way to end the Chechen conflict while only 34 percent supported the continuing of military actions.(4)
On 16-19 August 2002, key discussions had occurred in the Duchy of Liechtenstein involving two former speakers of the Russian parliament, Ivan Rybkin and Ruslan Khasbulatov, as well as two deputies of the Russian State Duma: journalist and leading "democrat" Yurii Shchekochikhin (died, possibly from the effects of poison, on 3 July 2003) and Aslambek Aslakhanov, a retired Interior Ministry general who had been elected to represent Chechnya in the Duma. Representing separatist leader Maskhadov at the talks was Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Akhmed Zakaev. The talks in Liechtenstein had been organized by the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (executive director, Glen Howard), one of whose leading figures was former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. The meetings in Liechtenstein were intended to restore the momentum that had been created by earlier talks held at Sheremetevo-2 Airport outside of Moscow between Zakaev and Putin's plenipotentiary presidential representative in the Southern Federal District, retired military General Viktor Kazantsev, on 18 November 2001.(5) Efforts to resuscitate the talks had failed to achieve any success because of the strong opposition of the Russian side.
Following the stillborn initiative of November 2001, the Kremlin had apparently jettisoned the idea of holding any negotiations whatsoever with moderate separatists in favor of empowering its handpicked candidate for Chechen leader, former mufti Akhmad Kadyrov. This tactic, said to be backed by Aleksandr Voloshin, the then presidential chief of staff, soon became known as "Chechenization."
Other elements among the top leadership of the presidential administration, such as two deputy chiefs of staff, Viktor Ivanov -- a former deputy director of the FSB -- and Igor Sechin, as well as certain leaders in the so-called power ministries, for example, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev, were reported to be adamantly opposed both to Chechenization and, even more so, to holding talks with moderate separatists; what they wanted was aggressively to pursue the war to a victorious conclusion.(6) If that effort took years more to achieve, then so be it.
In a path-breaking report on the meetings in Liechtenstein, a leading journalist who frequently publishes in the weekly "Moskovskie novosti," Sanobar Shermatova, wrote that the participants had discussed two peace plans: the so-called "Khasbulatov plan" and the so-called "Brzezinski plan."(7) Eventually, she went on, the participants decided to merge the two plans into a "Liechtenstein plan," which included elements of both. Khasbulatov's plan was based on the idea of granting to Chechnya "special status," with international guarantees being provided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and by the Council of Europe. Under Khasbulatov's plan, Chechnya would be free to conduct its own internal and foreign policies, with the exception of those functions that it voluntarily delegated to the Russian Federation. The republic was to remain within Russian borders and was to preserve Russian citizenship and currency.
Under the "Brzezinski plan," Chechens would "acknowledge their respect for the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation," while Russia, for its part, would "acknowledge the right of the Chechens to political, though not national, self-determination." A referendum would be held under which "Chechens would be given the opportunity to approve the constitutional basis for extensive self-government" modeled on what the Republic of Tatarstan currently enjoys. Russian troops would remain stationed on Chechnya's southern borders. "International support," the plan stressed, "must be committed to a substantial program of economic reconstruction, with a direct international presence on the ground in order to promote the rebuilding and stabilization of Chechen society." The authors of this plan underlined that "Maskhadov's endorsement of such an approach would be essential because of the extensive support he enjoys within Chechen society."
On 17 October 2002 -- just six days before the terrorist incident at Dubrovka -- the website grani.ru, citing information that had previously appeared in the newspaper "Kommersant," reported that new meetings of the Liechtenstein group were scheduled to be held in two weeks' time.(8) Duma Deputy Aslakhanov and separatist Deputy Premier Zakaev were planning to meet one-on-one in Switzerland in order "seriously to discuss the conditions which could lead to negotiations." Former speakers Rybkin and Khasbulatov, the website added, would also be taking part in the negotiations. In mid-October, Aslakhanov emphasized in a public statement: "President Putin has not once expressed himself against negotiations with Maskhadov. To the contrary, in a conversation with me, he expressed doubt whether there was a real force behind Maskhadov. Would the people follow after him?" This question put by Putin to Aslakhanov, "Kommersant vlast" reporter Olga Allenova observed, "was perceived in the ranks of the separatists as a veiled agreement [by Putin] to negotiations."(9)
On 10 September 2002, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov had published an essay entitled "Six Points On Chechnya" on the pages of the official Russian government newspaper "Rossiiskaya Gazeta" in which he stressed the urgent need to conduct "negotiations with [separatist] field commanders or at least some of them."(10) "This struggle," Primakov insisted, "can be stopped only through negotiations. Consequently elections in Chechnya cannot be seen as an alternative to negotiations." Primakov also underlined his conviction that "the [Russian] military must not play the dominant role in the settlement." In an interview which appeared in the 4 October 2002 issue of "Nezavisimaya gazeta," Salambek Maigov, co-chairman of the Antiwar Committee of Chechnya, warmly praised Primakov's "Six Points," noting, "Putin and Maskhadov can find compromise decisions. But the problem is that there are groups in the Kremlin which hinder this process."
During September 2002, grani.ru reported that both Maigov and former Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin were supporting a recent suggestion by Primakov that "the status of Finland in the [tsarist] Russian Empire can suit the Chechen Republic."(11) Another possibility, Rybkin pointed out, would be for Chechnya to be accorded "the status of a disputed territory, such as was held by the Aland Islands [of Finland], to which both Sweden and Finland had earlier made claims." A broad spectrum of Russian political leaders -- from "democrats" like Grigorii Yavlinskii, Boris Nemtsov, and Sergei Kovalev to Gennadii Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation -- had, Rybkin said, expressed an interest in such models.
During the course of a lengthy interview -- whose English translation appeared on the separatist website chechenpress.com on 23 October (the day of the seizure of the hostages in Moscow) -- President Maskhadov warmly welcomed the intensive efforts being made to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Chechen conflict: "In Dr. Brzezinski's plan," Maskhadov commented, "we see the concern of influential forces in the United States.... We have a positive experience of collaboration with Ivan Petrovich Rybkin [the reference is to the year 1997, when Rybkin was secretary of the Russian Security
陳真 2004. 9. 6.
維根斯坦常勸他認為優秀的學生放棄哲學，叫他們去工廠工作，最好是去當礦工。那些據說優秀的學生，有些聽從建議，真的棄哲從工，變成工人，從此埋沒。
有一回，他勸一個快畢業的學生，叫他連文憑也不要拿。但這學生說不拿不行啊，不拿娘會罵人。維根斯坦說，「可是，沒有人能為了文憑而從事哲學思考。」
後來，那個學生畢業了。維根斯坦不死心，怕他墮落，於是又找他去喝茶，企圖勸他，希望他千萬不要跑去教哲學；維根斯坦說，「不可能有人能一方面當個正直的人，一方面又在大學教哲學。」
這回，那個學生答應不去教哲學，維根斯坦聽了粉開心。後來兩人說再見時，維根斯坦問他，那麼，你打算將來做什麼？那個學生說，他想去當記者。
幾十年後，這個學生寫起這段回憶。他後來依然成為一名哲學教授，但他說，當他跟維根斯坦說他準備去當記者時，維根斯坦的臉色彷彿是聽到他要去當賊一樣難看。
另外還有一位學生，後來也成為著名哲學家，叫做 Malcolm。當他找到耶魯大學教職時，維根斯坦寫了封信給他，叫他千萬不要去幹這種事，]為他還沒學會安靜，還沒學會老實講話；叫他不要跟記者一樣，只會胡說八道。
除了記者和教授討人厭之外，維根斯坦最討厭的還包括政客。記者、教授、政客三位一體，都是最會胡說八道、最不老實、最言不由衷的一群人。
我看不只記者，很多名人或座談會專家更討人厭。他們總是講一些他們一點也不在乎的話。
===========
以上是剛剛閱報的感想。
看一些人，談到車臣的事，或是談到這個那個，實在很討人厭，因為他們往往只是在做一種文字表演，根本不在乎或甚至不知道自己在說什麼。比方說，「痛罵」恐怖份子，或提出某種「道德教誨」，或「表痛心」等等，可是，他們真的在「痛罵」、真的感到什麼「痛心」嗎？他們真的在乎那些動聽的「道德教誨」嗎？我大多感受不到。文字市場上，往往只感受到一種冷漠和表演，一種「與我無關」、「隨口說說」的態度。
一個人，如果真的對什麼感到「痛心」，那麼，他的人生絕不會像今天那樣；他肯定會有另外一種人生。
===========
看過哈巴狗電台的人，或許記得我曾談過兩件事：
一是發生在去年五月的事，英國情治單位內部狗咬狗，抖出大黑幕：原來英國過去二、三十幾年來 IRA 所幹下的所謂恐怖事件，其中一大半是英國政府自己幹的；而所謂殺人不眨眼的 IRA 恐怖份子首領，竟然是英國情治人員。
這不希奇，因為自導自演恐怖事件，好處多多。第一，有利選情，第二，抹黑對手，第三，提供大力鎮壓的理由；第四，策畫並執行恐怖事件，是滲透過程中取得對方信任，進而在敵營中步步高昇的必要手段。
第二件事就是 911。這我寫過幾個長篇，也提出過無數證據。以我一人調查之力，所得「情報」，都要比美國國會後來裝模作樣的所謂調查，還要早了將近一年，而且內容要更精準確實許多。他們有可能那麼無能嗎？不會吧？！那只是在演戲。
911 的調查結論很簡單。第一種可能，可以說是毫無疑問了，那就是美國政府事先完全知情；他根本就是「樂觀其成」。第二種可能，可能性約八成，那就是自導自演，要不然，不太可能在事件一兩年前就滿心期望來個「珍珠港事件」，以便執行反恐大業，而且老天爺還果真十分配合，馬上就給他一個「珍珠港事件」，讓他大展鴻圖。我不信天底下會有這麼巧的事。
事實上，第一種可能就已經包括了第二種可能。因為，知情之後的一連串袖手旁觀，就是一種促成和參與。
政治裏沒有偶然這回事。我研究過一些所謂恐怖事件或意外事件，到頭來，幾乎都和那些事件的受益者—也就是當權者—脫離不了關係，或者根本就是他自己幹的。
早上跟反戰專家說，我懷疑這次的校園綁架學童事件，恐怕也是俄國當局自己幹的。她不信。我也沒辦法。因為事情才剛發生，我也只能預言，毫無證據。
但是，對此事雖無證據。對之前的所謂恐怖事件，證據倒是一大堆，根本講不完，幾乎都是俄國當局自己幹的。
要講完這一切，恐怕得寫成一本書。所以我就只能長話短說了。1994-1996 年間，車臣一些動亂，常被葉爾欽拿來做為政治和選舉操弄，但這些暴力事件，成因費解，似乎是當局有意造成。1996 年，葉爾欽成功再度當選總統之後，暴亂反而隨之平息，十分詭異。
1999 年，換基旦布丁要選總統時，奇怪，馬上又天下大亂，恐怖份子又來幫布丁助選了。WSWS (節錄一段如下) 說，克里姆林宮裏一群政客(主要是某個媒體大亨 Boris Berezovsky)，組織了一群“車獨份子”，進攻 Dagestan，幹了一連串爆炸，一共奪走三百條人命。
全國於是陷入一片恐慌和氣憤，有魄力的布丁於是成為救星，只有選他，才有辦法打擊車獨這些恐怖份子。於是基旦布丁就高票凍蒜了。
WSWS 說，俄國前前後後用過多次這種手段。詳情略過。我直接講歌劇院人質事件好了。底下英文《附件一》，取自WSWS。懶得看的，可以直接跳過去。後面是講歌劇院事件。但是，跳過去之前，不妨看看底下英文中有關Berezovsky的部份，這是俄羅斯一位一度呼風喚雨的有錢政客。他因為和布丁不合，被迫流亡英國，抖出了這些選舉骯髒步。
他指證歷歷說，1997 年，他策動暴亂，給了車獨領袖之一 Shamil Basaiev 三百萬美元。1999年秋天，在莫斯科和 Volgodonsk的幾次大爆炸，全是由俄國情治單位 FSB 所主導，而他就是這幾次所謂 “恐怖事件” 的策劃者。
在講歌劇院事件前，得先認識一個頗受各方尊崇的女記者，也就是我在黑寡婦那篇文章中所提到的Anna Politkovskaia(以下簡稱安娜)。她很勇敢，在國外曾多次得過新聞獎章，表彰他在俄國高壓統治下的勇氣。她曾被捕，但在國際壓力下，旋即被釋放，經常遭受來自軍方或官方的暴力威脅，甚至威脅要取她的性命。
底下《附件二》和《附件三》是兩篇簡介。講這個只是要說，這個記者的人品和報導水平都無庸置疑，是個很難得一見的好記者。除報導外，並且經常以實際行動救援難民。也因此，不管在車臣或俄羅斯，都受到兩邊人民以及車臣反抗軍的尊敬。
歌劇院事件發生時，她正要前往美國領獎。但綁架者要求她代表俄羅斯出面談判；於是立即從美國趕回俄國。
兩年前的歌劇院事件中，俄國媒體說恐怖份子有 41 人，大多查出姓名，全數死亡。事件後，人質也死了126個，除了一名是被俄軍誤殺之外，其它全部死於俄軍所施放的毒氣。
奇怪的是，恐怖份子的屍體卻只有 40 具。有一個不見了。後來被安娜查出這個漏網之魚，並且找到了他，叫做Khanpash Nurdyevich Terkibayev。這個恐怖份子是個車臣人，卻隸屬俄國情治單位，並且和布丁總統府有直接連繫。他同意接受安娜採訪，並承認自己長年滲透在敵人陣營，負責策畫此次歌劇院事件。
他很得意地出示安娜一些相關文件，以及一個由情治單位 FSB 所發出的刑事豁免令，以證實自己的身份。
安娜把這段採訪，寫成一篇文章，如下《附件四》，叫做《有一名恐怖份子還活著：我們找到了他》，發表在俄國報紙 Novaya Gazeta，日期是去年 4 月 28 日。
這位特務說，歌劇院事件最初是敵人所發起，但卻是由他所鼓動，他跟對方說，“一切都在掌握之中”，“到處都有腐敗的人”，“要收買很容易”。於是，就由他負責策畫和帶路，在俄國情治單位之刻意配合掩護下，把這四十名車獨人士給祕密送進莫斯科，並且賄賂打通關節，進入歌劇院。
在施放毒氣前幾個小時，他在俄國情治人員協助下，偷偷從後門跑了。安娜問他說：你的意思是說所謂拯救行動純粹只是在演一齣愚弄人民的大戲？他說不是。他說，當場只有極少數高階人員知道這只是一齣戲，其他人則完全不知情，他們的確以為自己在拼命。但他拒絕透露他的直屬上司究竟是誰。
這個臥底的情治人員還說，他故意找來很多黑寡婦，原因是「女生比較多愁善感」，很容易煽動她們犧牲生命，而且，他說，找女殺手來，對社會大眾「更有恐怖效果」。
在這篇報導底下，則是一篇更完整的文章《附件五》，是史丹佛大學 Hoover Institution一位資深研究員對歌劇院事件的詳細報告。很長，大約兩萬字，有 145 個footnotes。《附件六》則是一篇車臣本身對此事的報導。接下來《附件七》是車臣外交部公文，抗議俄羅斯之自導自演，嫁禍於車臣。
另外，安娜寫了一本書，Amazon 買得到，叫做《一個骯髒的戰爭—一個俄國記者在車臣》（ADirty War: A Russian Reporter inChechnya），記錄俄國之種種血腥殺戮和違反人權事件，以及一些自導自演的所謂恐怖事件。
2001 年，軍方曾揚言取安娜性命，安娜認為此項威脅極其真實，因此逃到維也納，直到歌劇院事件，才應 “恐怖份子” 要求，回到俄國，做為政府談判代表，此後一直住在莫斯科。
另外，光是在2002年，俄羅斯就有三名記者因為報導言論不當，得罪當局而遇害，全是 “意外”事件，查無犯罪成份。
至於這位自己爆料的情治人員，在爆料後接到死亡警告。安娜說，在她把文章登出後不久，包括車臣和俄羅斯方面，都有人傳話說，這個洩密的臥底人員：「沒有多少日子可活」。幾個月後，他果然死於一宗車禍 “意外” 事件。
另外，一位現居倫敦的前俄國情治高階人員 Aleksandr Litvinenko，對媒體揭露：1999
年幾次住宅區大爆炸，正是俄國情治單位自導自演，目的是嫁禍車獨人士，進而做為發動第二次車臣戰爭的藉口。
故事講完了。人們喜歡談政治，但卻總是被政治玩弄而不自知。政治的複雜和醜陋，似乎每一次都遠遠超出我們的想像。對照起這種國際水平，台灣政治顯然還挺乾淨，至少槍傷是製造在自己身上，而不是以千百萬人性命做為一種選舉籌碼或政治動員藉口。
但台灣似乎正努力迎頭趕上國際水平；我總覺得，大家似乎都有機會親身體會戰爭的滋味；這當然得感謝民進黨囉。
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《附件一》WSWS談俄羅斯對恐怖事件的操弄與製造
What lies behind the recent explosions in Chechnya?
By Vladimir Volkov
29 May 2003
A series of powerful explosions in Chechnya earlier this month gave the lie to claims by the Russian government of Vladimir Putin and by the pro-Russian local administration of Ahmad Kadyrov that the present situation in the republic is leading to peace and the restoration of normality.
Only a few months ago, at the end of December 2002, there occurred another powerful explosion. Two trucks packed with explosives were blown up near a complex of administration buildings in Grozny. Over 80 people died and more than 300 were hurt in that incident.
Just two months ago, at the end of March, the Russian government conducted a referendum aimed at legitimising the structures of neocolonial control established during the second Chechen war. The citizens of Chechnya elected to remain within the Russian Federation in return for nominal autonomy. Not a single one of the regional problems was or could have been solved by this vote. The recent explosions have served as a reminder that the emergency regime, the general mood of hostility, and the generalised chaos within Chechnya have not diminished by comparison with the 1999-2002 period, when “constitutional peace was being reestablished.”
The first of the two explosions occurred on Monday morning, May 12, in the Nadterechny region of Chechnya situated in the north of the republic and long considered a more pro-Russian region. A large truck loaded with tons of trinitrotoluene and masked with sacks of cement approached a group of administrative buildings in the regional center of Znamenskoie. The truck attempted to crash through the metal barrier blocking the roadway, but the shock detonated the explosives. Although more than
30 metres still separated the truck from the buildings, the consequences of the explosion were quite serious. Nine buildings, seven of them inhabited houses, plus buildings housing the local administration and the local security office, were damaged. Fifty-nine people were killed, and at least 200 were hurt.
Three people were in the cab of this truck, which was presumably driven from the neighbouring republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, successfully negotiating a number of roadblocks. There is continuing reconstruction in Chechnya due to its wartime devastation, and many cement trucks drive into the region from neighbouring areas. It is not impossible to either fake travel permits or bribe the soldiers at control posts.
The second explosion occurred two days later, on Wednesday morning local time. A Moslem religious service was taking place in the village of Ilaskhan-Iurt, devoted to the Prophet Muhammad and one of the Moslem preachers active during the 19th century. Over 10,000 people from Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia gathered for the ceremony. The head of the Chechen administration, Ahmad Kadyrov, who is himself a bona fide Moslem cleri,c was leading the prayer. As the service was finishing, a female suicide bomber approached the group of people around Kadyrov and triggered her bomb.
Eighteen people, four of them Kadyrov’s bodyguards, were killed, and more than 150 people were wounded. Kadyrov himself was not hurt.
Actually, there were two women suicide bombers: the 46-year-old Shahidat Baimuradova, who exploded her bomb, and 52-year-old Zulai Abdulzakova. They introduced themselves as journalists, and the bomb was hidden inside their movie camera. Shrapnel from the first explosion fatally wounded the second woman; hence, there was only one explosion.
The first question to arise from such horrible news: What leads an average inhabitant of Chechnya to resort to such desperate actions? It is clear that, as with the situation in Palestine, the answer lies in the profound disappointment with the existing political parties and movements and the absence of any progressive social perspective.
All of this takes place within the context of continuing violence and terror by the Russian military against the civilian population. Since the end of March (i.e., after the conclusion of the referendum), over 70 abductions were committed in Chechnya, all of them attributed to the Russian military. According to one Chechen official, more than 245 Chechen citizens had disappeared since the beginning of this year.
The fact that women took part in the latest terror actions shows the breadth of dissatisfaction and the degree of desperation that pushes such varied elements of Chechen society to acts of suicidal terror.
“Arab connection”
Russian President Putin hurried to connect these Chechen explosions to the recent bombings in Saudi Arabia during Colin Powell’s visit there. Putin proclaimed that both the Chechen and the Saudi attacks were the work of a single Islamic terrorist organization headed by Al-Qaeda. Russian officials simultaneously reported that about $1 million were transferred to Chechnya before the explosions.
The Kremlin’s propaganda machine is trying to suggest that this money was provided by international Islamic organisations to fund the explosions in Znamenskoie and in Ilaskhan-Iurt.
We cannot, of course, exclude this possibility. Connections between the armed Chechen separatists
and various international Islamic institutions have been fairly well established in the past few years.
The problem lies in establishing whether such ties are strong enough to support the sort of long-range
planning and organisation of these widespread operations. On the other hand, there must exist
significant political motives for actions of this nature.
The more significant question is this: Does Al-Qaeda or any other Islamic fundamentalist movement require these Chechen outrages at this time?
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Russian president Putin decided to support the Bush administration’s war on “international terrorism.” The radical Islamic groups, therefore, could justifiably view the Russian regime as one of their enemies.
However, the US war on Iraq has altered the political landscape. This war significantly damaged Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Putin’s administration is very frightened by the outcome of the military campaign in Iraq. Compared to France and Germany, Russia has been more reluctant to accept the American administration’s demand for the complete removal of international sanctions on Iraq, which would legitimise the US neocolonial occupation of this country, and its control of the country’s oil reserves, the second largest in the world.
The recent explosions in Chechnya served to alleviate tensions in the US-Russian relationship. To some extent, Putin has rehabilitated himself in the eyes of Bush Jr. as a strategic partner. If Islamists abroad wanted to take revenge on Putin or harm his interests, they failed miserably and achieved just the reverse.
At the same time, if we take into account the role played by Chechnya in domestic Russian policies throughout the 1990s, the methods of provocations, conspiracies, and criminal combinations utilised by the Kremlin, and the geopolitical significance of Chechnya for the Russian government, then we can reasonably suppose that various influential forces within the ruling Russian elite groupings might have had an interest in seeing a new wave of bloody violence in Chechnya.
Kremlin’s methods and interests
First, a new outbreak of violence in the northern Caucasus could further a long-range strategy to secure Putin’s reelection in the presidential elections next year. Revelations during the last few years have established that the crisis in Chechnya was frequently utilised by the Moscow regime to impose political decisions that could not be forced upon the society in any other way.
The first Chechen campaign was started in late 1994 to organise a “small victorious war” and prop up the shaky authority of the Yeltsin government. As soon as Yeltsin was reelected in the summer of 1996, the war was stopped, even though the generals were loath to admit a military defeat, and although it seemed demeaning to the Great Russian mindset of a section of the population (the peace of Khasaviurt in August 1996).
This scenario was played out in an even more cynical and reckless manner during the opening of the Second Chechen war in the fall of 1999. In order to secure the transfer of power from Yeltsin to Putin, the Kremlin politicians (specifically, the then all-powerful oligarch and media magnate Boris Berezovsky) organised an invasion by groups of Chechen separatists into Dagestan followed by a series of bombings of houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk, costing the lives of 300 people. The atmosphere of fear created by these actions was used to channel popular opinion behind Putin. In March 2000, Vladimir Putin was swept into office as Russia’s president on a wave of nationalist hysteria.
Additionally, suspicions about the “Kremlin’s hand” are aroused by the events of last fall in Moscow, when a group of armed Chechens took about 800 people hostage in a theater. According to the story published by Anna Politkovskaia, a journalist of Novaia Gazeta, an agent of the Russian FSB, the secret police, infiltrated this group headed by Movsar Baraiev. This agent, according to the story, succeeded in escaping the building and surviving the government rescue assault, as a result of which 129 hostages and the whole group of about 50 Chechen militants were killed.
If this report is true (Politkovskaia published an interview with the unnamed agent, who had admitted his role in these events), then Putin’s government is guilty not only of a cruel and merciless overreaction to the hostage crisis, but also of directly organising the greatest armed provocation in contemporary Russian history.
Considering these recent experiences, we cannot but conclude that if such provocations advance its fundamental interests, the Kremlin is quite capable of launching fresh acts of bloody violence and sacrificing tens and hundreds of new lives. The state of acute crisis, which had in the recent past pushed the Russian government into similar ventures, has in no sense dissipated. Any idea that under Putin the level of moral responsibility of those who make such decisions has grown would be highly superficial and naive.
Factors both foreign and domestic
Two crucial factors, one of an international and the second of a domestic nature, have combined recently to sharpen the crisis of the Putin regime. First, the war in Iraq served to further polarise the various political forces in Russia. While one group of politicians and mainstream journalists is advocating a quick restoration of partnership with the US, another group, perhaps more numerous and influential, thinks that the conflict of interests between Russia and the US is bound to grow. This second group calls for a fundamental change in global Russian policy to give it an anti-American character, to strengthen an alliance with Europe and only pay lip service to the idea of partnership with the leader of world imperialism.
Putin is conducting a balancing act between these two forces, utilising methods of Bonapartism to preserve a semblance of consensus within the new Russian ruling elite. A rise in the tensions related to Chechnya, combined with the renewal of friendly relations with the Bush administration, would also place Putin “above” the sharpening conflict of these domestic constituencies, and would dampen the internal opposition to his foreign policy of empirical zigzags and hesitant half measures.
The other important factor has to do with the opening of the electoral campaign for the Russian parliament. The outcome of the December parliamentary election will largely determine whether Putin succeeds in getting reelected president next year. Despite the absence of any open opposition from among the influential political forces inside the country, he has no defined social or political base of support. His main supporters come from within the state bureaucracy itself, from the military and the special and secret services, as well as from sections of big business. However, all these elements are disunited, tied together only by their personal loyalty to Putin, not by any common political program.
According to numerous opinion polls, there is a huge gulf between Putin’s nominally high popularity rating and the actual popular moods of the Russian electorate. For a time, this gulf was bridged by hopes that Putin would be able to overcome the worst legacies of Yeltsin’s social and political regime, and that he might improve the lot of the tens of millions of average citizens. But the absence of any positive changes for the masses and the deepening of the tendencies of social breakdown, which grow organically out of the policy of restoring capitalism, make the connection between the masses of toilers and Putin ever more fragile and ephemeral. The optimistic hopes are dissipating, giving way to a frightening vision of growing social and economic catastrophe and the absence of any perspective for the majority of workers, youth and intellectuals.
Despite Putin’s frequent protestations of opposition to the war in Iraq, in the eyes of Russia’s toilers his regime is increasingly seen as completely dependent upon the leading world powers, and subservient first of all to the US. Putin’s government is unable to stand up to the imperialist and domineering pretensions of the American ruling elite; Putin’s policies objectively lead to a further weakening of the country’s economy and its defence capabilities.
These conditions create the possibility for a new political force to arise quickly and fill the abyss between the ruling regime and popular aspirations. We are not discussing now the question of the political nature of this political force; what we must note is that it might wrest control of events out of the hands of the present cliques in the political oligarchy. It is to prevent such a scenario that the Kremlin strategists may have decided that a new armed outrage in Chechnya is just the thing to consolidate the nation around the existing government and its present leader.
The Kremlin’s political scene, however, consists not merely of a tableau of unified and homogeneous elements supporting Putin. Rather, a number of internally warring combinations compete for influence. If one might suppose that certain groups in the top echelons of Putin’s regime might resort to extensive destabilisation in Chechnya to save the authority of the current president, then other layers of the ruling elite might use the facts of such destabilisation to discredit Putin and promote their own representatives to Moscow’s “throne.”
The “Berezovsky factor”
First and foremost in this regard, there is the “Berezovsky factor.” Everyone is aware that this former oligarch and media magnate rose during Yeltsin’s years to become one of the leading political figures in Russia, although he never occupied any truly influential post himself. Not only did he become one of the main protagonists in the creation of a political entity that was later dubbed the “Yeltsin family”—that is, the assembly of economic and political structures that was most closely tied to Yeltsin and his immediate circle. Berezovsky also holds the title for introducing into the Russian body politic the most odious and dirty political technologies. These dirty tricks secured Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996 and promoted Putin in late 1999-early 2000.
It is well known that Berezovsky maintained contacts with leaders of the armed Chechen separatists, even during the periods of military action by the Russian army. It is a well-established fact that in 1997 he transferred $3 million to Shamil Basaiev, one of the leading Chechen separatist field commanders, supposedly for the building of a hospital. In a recent interview, Berezovsky as much as admitted that he personally thought up the idea of organising the invasion by Basaiev’s and Khattab’s detachments into Dagestan in August 1999.
Lately, having been forced into an exile in England, Berezovsky is conducting a campaign to discredit Putin, and he is asserting that the explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk in the fall of 1999 were organised by the FSB. However, he was at that time very close to these services and to a large extent directed their activities.
Apparently, no one knows as much about the autumn 1999 explosions as Berezovsky. Continuing to exert a great deal of influence in Russia through his agents, he can once again resort to techniques that were developed under his leadership over the course of years with the aim of regaining for himself and his associates the influence that he lost under Putin.
Putin’s entourage has already accused Berezovsky of trying to provoke mass unrest in Russia. A couple of weeks before the recent explosions, Russian newspapers published transcripts of telephone conversations that Berezovsky supposedly conducted with a number of influential leaders. In a supposed talk with the Communist Party leader Ziuganov (an alliance with the CP was proclaimed by Berezovsky as the necessary precondition for the liberals to succeed in the upcoming parliamentary elections), the exiled oligarch called on the “communist” leader to organise anti-Semitic pogroms, so as to accuse the current government of incompetence and failure to protect the citizens and preserve civic order.
Berezovsky denies any such attempts or provocations. However, the very fact that Russia’s mass media airs such scenarios and accuses certain politicians and groups of readiness to organise public riots, and that the “talking heads” on TV view such suggestions as believable, signifies that similar scenarios are indeed being hatched in some brains.
Regardless of who stands behind this latest series of explosions in Chechnya, they serve as a clear warning: Again, as in the days of Stalin, within the Kremlin there are many people ready to prepare “spicy dishes.”
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《附件二》安娜介紹
Anna Politkovskaia
Anna Politkovskaia was born in 1958. After studying at the Moscow State University, she received a diploma in journalism. Anna Politkovskaia has worked for various newspapers and collaborated with TV and radio stations.
While working for Obshchaya Gazeta, she visited Chechnya for the first time in 1998 to conduct an interview with President Maskhadov. Already working for the Novaya Gazeta, the independent democratic newspaper, she concentrated on the second Chechnyan war and has visited Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia over fifty times.
Her works include Russia Under Putin and A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya (2001), a compilation of dispatches written between 1999 and 2000. A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya was published in 2003.
In February 2001 Anna Politkovskaia was arrested while in southern Chechnya. She was formally accused of violating the strict laws controlling media coverage of the conflict and was ordered out of the enclave.
In October 2001, after receiving death threats related to her reporting in Chechnya, Anna Politkovskaia relocated to Vienna for a time. Supported by the Vienna Institute for Human Sciences, she was able to write her new book. During the hostage drama at the Nordost Theatre in 2002, Anna Politkovskaia agreed to the hostagetakers’ request to assist during negotiations.
Anna Politkovskaia was decorated with the Participant in Battles Medal for her work in the field. In addition to other awards, Anna Politkovskaia received the 2000 Golden Pen Award from the Russian Union of Journalists, the Freedom of Expression Award of the Index on Censorship, the IWMF Courage in Journalism Award, and the OSCE Prize for Journalism and Democracy.
Anna Politkovskaia is currently writing her fourth non-fiction book entitled Putin’s Russia. She writes for the Muscovite Novaya Gazeta and holds lectures in Great Britain, France, Holland, Germany and other Western European countries.
Anna Politkovskaia lives with her family in Moscow.
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《附件三》也是安娜介紹
Anna Politkovskaia Honored by the Club of American Journalists
Anna Stepanovna Politkovskaia, Waging member from Russia, was honored for exemplary reporting on events in Russia at the annual awards ceremony held by the Club of American Journalists. She is the first recipient of the "Artem Borovik" award, which was initiated by a number of American media outlets and will be awarded annually to journalists whose work sheds light on events in Russia.
Anna Politkovskaia is a reporter for Novaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper. Over the past two years, she has covered events in refugee camps in Dagestan, as well as reported on events in Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic, which she visited numerous times last year. Anna is also the author of the book Travel to Hell: The Chechen Diary.
In addition to her work as a journalist, Anna has organized the relocation of 89 homes for the elderly from Grozny to Russia to escape the effects of war. Last summer, 22 elderly men were returned to Grozny. However, they were left without water, medicine, food, or clothing. In August 2000, under Anna's leadership, Novaya Gazeta began an initiative entitled "Grozny: a house for the elderly," and collected 5.5 tons of cargo and approximately $5,000.
Aside from her most recent award, Anna was awarded the "Golden Nib of Russia" in January 2000 for a series of reports about the situation in the Chechen Republic. Anna's other awards include the "Kind Act - Kind Heart" award given to her by the Union of Journalists in the Russian Federation, an award for articles exposing corruption, and the "Golden Gong - 2000" certificate for a series of reports about the Chechen Republic.
On February 20, 2001 Anna was arrested in the Chechen Republic. Thanks to public support, she was released in a week. According to her colleagues from Novaya Gazeta, "Anna Politkovskaia works under dangerous conditions connected with transitional borders and overcomes the infinite number of obstacles created by federal armies. In the face of information blockade, Anna Politkovskaia always shows high professionalism and courage."
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《附件四》，安娜揭露此事的報導，叫做《有一名恐怖份子還活著：我們找到了他》，發表在俄國報紙 Novaya Gazeta，日期是去年 4 月 28 日。
One of the terrorists survived. We found him.
http://eng.terror99.ru/publications/096.htm
by Anna Politkovskaya
Novaya Gazeta
April 28, 2003
Six months ago there was a terrorist act on Dubrovka. During these months, we have asked the same questions many times: how could this have happened? How were they allowed to enter Moscow? Who allowed them to do so? And why? As it turns out, there is a witness. He is also a participant.
At first there was only scarce information: one of the terrorists, who took hostage the "Nord Ost" theatre on Dubrovka, is alive.
We checked this information, repeatedly analyzed the list of names of Barayev's group, which was printed in the press. We made many inquiries. And we found him. The man, whose last name was published on an official list of the terrorists' names, those who took hostage the people who attended the musical.
"Were you in Barayev's group when "Nord-Ost" was taken hostage?"
"I was."
"Did you enter with them?"
"Yes."
"-Khanpash Nurdyevich Terkibayev. (Further the name of a government newspaper follows). Special correspondent⋯" – I read the card with the capital letters "PRESS" on a dark margin. Document number 1165. Signed – Yu. Gorbenko. It's true, there is such a director at this newspaper.
"What subjects do you write about? About Chechnya?"
-Silence.
"Do you show up for work? Which department do you work at? Who is your Editor-in-Chief?"
- Silence again. He pretends that he doesn't understand Russian well. But is it possible that a special correspondent of the main government paper of a country does not know Russian?
Khanpash's eyes, Mongoloid-like, not very similar to Chechen eyes, look perplexed. And he does not pretend, he honestly does not understand what I'm talking about – he is very far from journalism.
"Did someone give you this document to serve as a cover for your real work?"
He smiles slyly:
"I wouldn't mind writing⋯ I just haven't had the time to figure things out. I just received this document – on April 7th. Do you see the date? I don't have to go there. I work in the President's Information Office."
"You work under Porshnev? What's your position?" (Ref.: Igor Porshnev is the director of the Information Department of President Putin's Administration. So he is a "direct boss" of 30-year old Khanpash Terkibayev, a native of a Chechen village called Mesker-Yurt.)
But Porshnev's last name puzzles this "special correspondent." Khanpash simply does not know who Porshnev is.
"When I need to, I meet with Yastrzhembsky. I work for him. Here we are in a photograph together."
True, the photograph is of him with Sergei Vladimirovich (Yastrzhembsky). Sergei Vladimirovich is not looking at the camera and seems quite dissatisfied. But it is indeed Khanpash on that photo - the same man who sits in front of me know, in the "Sputnik" hotel on Leninsky Prospekt – Khanpash is looking directly at the camera: here we are, together. The photograph tells a story - it is evident that it was unwelcome by Sergei Vladimirovich, and, evidently, it was Khanpash who insisted on it, and now he tells me of his difficult life journey, accompanying the story with a demonstration of numerous photos that he pulls out of his briefcase.
"Maskhadov and I, Arsanov and I, myself in Kremlin, Saidulayev and I, Gil-Robles and I⋯" (Editor's note: Gil-Robles is the European Commissioner on Human Rights)."
I look closer at the photos – a significant number of them seem to be crude forgeries. (Editor's note: later checked with the specialist- and they confirmed the forgeries.) Why? Khanpash pretends that he doesn't understand, rummages about in his briefcase, and then pulls out a photo of him with Margaret Thatcher and Maskhadov - to prove that he has close connections to London.
The year is 1998, Maskhadov is in a papakha, Thatcher is in the middle, and on the other side of her is Khanpash. Meanwhile, Maskhadov looks like he did before the war, but Khanpash looks the same as he does now- Why? But he is already pulling out another photo. Maskhadov is dressed in camouflage, his beard has a significant amount of gray hair, he looks awful - and Khanpash does not look so well either. This one is genuine.
"Aren't you afraid to walk around Moscow with these photos? In Chechnya you could get shot immediately⋯ For this, here – firearms would be planted on you and you'd be locked up in jail for many years⋯"
This is how he answers:
"I also know Surkov." His tone becomes boastful. "After "Nord-Ost" I've met with Surkov. Twice." (Ref: Vladislav Surkov is an influential Deputy Head of the President's Administration.)
"Why?"
"I helped develop Putin's policy for Chechnya. The post-"Nord-Ost" policy."
"And how did it go? Did you help?"
"We need peace."
"What an original thought."
"I'm currently working on peace negotiations under the orders of Yastrzhembsky and Surkov. The idea is to conduct negotiations with those who are in the mountains.
"Is this idea yours or the Kremlin's?"
"It's mine, but it is supported by the Kremlin."
"These talks- will they be with Maskhadov?"
"No. The Kremlin does not agree with Maskhadov."
"Then with whom?"
"With Vakha Arsanov. I've just met with him."
"Where?"
"In Chechnya."
"Then what's going to happen to Maskhadov?"
"We have to convince him to give up his authority until the Presidential election in Chechnya."
"Are you involved in that, too?"
"Yes, but for this I have no authority. I am acting on my own. Regardless, there can't possibly be an election."
"And if they do take place, who would you, personally, place your bet on?"
"Khasbulatov and Saidulayev. They are the third force. Not Maskhadov, not Kadyrov. That is the way I am. After "Nord-Ost", it was I who organized the negotiations of the Chechen parliament's deputies with the Administration, with Yastrzhembsky."
"Yes, and that surprised many," I say. "When Isa Temirov together with the other deputies openly appeared in Moscow, spoke at the famous press-conference at the Interfax news agency and called for a referendum vote, which means the vote against Maskhadov, even though they had supported him before⋯ So you were behind this?"
"Yes," he says proudly.
"Did you vote at the referendum?"
"Me? No." He laughs. "I come from the "Charto" clan, we are called "Jews" in Chechnya."
"Is it possible to say the outcome of the "Nord Ost" tragedy was going to be the same as for Budennovsk, the end the second Chechen War?"
This question is not accidental. We are at the main point. Khanpash has participated in absolutely everything. He is the man for all occasions of our politics. He knows everyone, he has access to everything, he can handle anything having to do with the North Caucasus. If someone needs to meet with Maskhadov – he will find him. If without Maskhadov – he can organize that too. Or so he tells us, at least⋯ He is an actor by profession, he says; he graduated from Grozny University with a theatre major. It does not matter that there was no theatre department at that university and that he himself cannot remember who his professors where.
More importantly, he claims that "Zakayev and I - we are friends, we worked in the theatre together." During the first war he took a video camera into his hands and worked for television. He accompanied Basayev in the Budennovsk raid, but was not convicted for it, on the contrary- he received amnesty for it in April of 2000.
"Where were the papers about the amnesty given out?"
"In the Chechen Federal Security Service (FSB) department of the city of Argun."
This is a very serious detail. All throughout this war, the Argun FSB have been one of the most brutal. During the time when Khanpash was amnestied, no one came out of the Argun FSB alive. Khanpash is the first to make it out alive, and with an official document of amnesty for Budennovsk.
Between the two wars, Khanpash, as the "hero of Budennovsk", becomes the leading specialist of the press service⋯ of President Maskhadov. He had his own program on Maskhadov's television channel called "The President's Heart", later renamed as "The President's Path". Later, however, before the second war, he was replaced and forced to leave Maskhadov's inner circle; but when the armed conflict started, he returned and again became a "vehement Jihad fighter".
Surprisingly, right under the nose of federal forces and all kinds of special services, in the midst of heavy fighting, when everyone ran for their life, Khanpash still managed to produce his television program, the title of which can be translated from Chechen approximately like this: "My motherland is where there is Jihad."
"Really, I didn't believe in that then, and I don't believe in it now."
"What do you mean? Your motherland is not where there is Jihad?"
"I just had a television program like this."
"It seems that Maskhadov expelled you from his inner circle again recently?"
"Not Maskhadov, his representatives abroad did. But I don't believe them. Rakhman Dushuyev in Turkey told me that he received a videotape from President Maskhadov, who says that he no longer wants me to call myself his representative, but I have not seen this videotape and have not talked with Maskhadov- And recently I've met with Kusama and Anzor in Dubai. They were my hosts. I ate and slept there-" (Editor's note: Kusama is Maskhadov's wife, Anzor is his son.)
"Dubai, Turkey, Jordan, Strasbourg⋯ Do you travel all the time? Do you get visas everywhere?"
"I know all of the Chechens. That is why I travel in many countries and call all Chechens to unite."
"Did you come to Dubai from Baku?"
"Yes."
"And there you appeared after the October terrorist act in Moscow, right? And asked the Chechens
living there to help you, told them that you are one of the surviving hostage takers of the "Nord-Ost",
and that you urgently need contacts in the Arab world, in order to escape the persecution?"
"How do you know this?"
"From the Chechens in Baku. And from the papers. You know, your last name was published in the list of terrorists who seized "Nord Ost". By the way, did you sue this publication?"
"No. Why would I? I just asked Yastrzhembsky: ‘How could this happen?'"
"And what did he say?"
"He said, ‘Don't pay any attention to this.'"
The most recent take-off in Khanpash Terkibayev's political carrier corresponds with our common tragedy – the events on October 23-26, 2002. With the terrorist act, which left behind numerous victims, when a detachment under the leadership of Barayev's nephew⋯ took hostage almost 800 people in the building of the House of Culture on Melnikov street and the whole country did not know how to save them, tossed and turned, wailed, waiting for an explosion at any moment.
"By the way, have you known Barayev Junior long?"
"I've known him for a long time. I know everyone in Chechnya."
"Where there explosives there?"
"No, there weren't. There weren't any."
It is precisely after "Nord Ost" that Khanpash's career took off. He did indeed become "a supporter" of President Putin's Administration. He was given the necessary documents, which guaranteed him freedom to go everywhere he needed to go, maneuvering from Maskhadov to Yastrzhembsky.
He headed the negotiations on the behalf of Putin's Administration with the deputies of the Chechen parliament- they were needed for support of the referendum. He fought for the guarantees of immunity for these deputies, should they come to Moscow. He won.
It was Khanpash, and not anyone else, took those deputies, and acted as the leader of their group, to Strasbourg, to high cabinets of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly, and there the deputies conducted themselves correctly – under the direction of Rogozin, chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs.
Naturally, a question arises: Why? Why ? Khanpash. For what? How did he do to prove his loyalty? It is clear that without such proof nothing of the sort could have happened to him⋯
Now, the most important part. The essential part of our long conversation.
In all likelihood Khanpash is exactly the man who everyone involved in the "Nord Ost" tragedy looked so hard for. The man, who ensured the terrorist act from the inside. According to the information in our newspaper's possession (and himself does not deny it – what a vain man!), Khanpash is an agent planted there by the special forces.
He entered the building with the terrorists.
As one of them.
According to his own words, he secretly arranged for them to get into Moscow, and into "Nord Ost" itself.
It was he who convinced the terrorists that everything is "under control", that there are plenty of corrupt people everywhere", that "the Russians again were bribed", as they were before to allow people to leave the besieged cities of Grozny and Komsomolsk, all they had to do was "make noise", and a "second Budennovsk" would take place, and thus peace would be reached, and later, after the task has been completed, "we would be allowed to leave alive" – though not everyone.
It turns out that he was the only one to leave alive.
He left the building before it was stormed. Furthermore, he had a plan of the theatre building on Dubrovka, the plan which neither Barayev's nephew, the leader of the terrorists, nor, at first, the special services unit, preparing to storm the building, had in their possession.
Why? Because he was a part of those forces, who are much higher in the special services hierarchy then "Vityaz" and "Alfa", who were going in to face death.
Regardless, whether he had the plan or not – in the big picture it does not matter, just a minor detail.
As a matter of fact, Khanpash has no problem lying – remember the fake photographs? And those who could have either confirmed or denied certain details- for example, where his position was – they, it seems, all died. Or just aren't as talkative. Do I allow the idea that he was not the only special forces agent in there? I do. If there was at least one, why couldn't there be two?
The heart of the matter, for us, is in another point – if there was an agent sent by the special forces into "Nord Ost", that means that the authorities knew that the terrorist act was being prepared. The authorities thus participated in its preparation, and it doesn't even matter with what purpose.
The most important thing – the authorities (which ones?) knew what was going on long before all of us knew about it, and therefore have put their people under the heaviest blow, while knowing that the blow is coming, knowing, that thousands will not be able to recover, and that hundreds will die. The authorities were going to pull off another Kursk. (Do you remember the signals given by those poor people in the seized theater? "We are the second Kursk⋯ Our country forgot about us⋯ Our country does not need us⋯ Our country wants for us to die⋯" Many outside the theatre then became indignant – the hostages have gone too far⋯ However, that is exactly how it turned out...)
And then, it means, the question remains: What for? Six months ago, what did the people die for?
And here, before we attempt to answer this question, we have to figure out: who are these authorities, who knew? The Kremlin? Putin? The FSB? The usual suspects?
Our authorities are not a monolith. Neither are the special forces. And it is not true that the majority of officers, who worked in those days in the headquarters near the building on Dubrovka only pretended to fight the tragedy, knowing that it is a hoax. Most of their struggle was genuine. As was "Alfa's" and "Vityaz". As was ours-
But! If there was a Khanpash – that means, we have no choice, and some part of the authorities, which knew, which only pretended to sympathize during our 72 hour insanity, our tears, heart attacks, screams, heroic deeds, deaths?
And this- this changes the entire chain of events six months ago.
Who are the special forces who knew?
Of course, it is not the special forces teams who stormed the building. If those fighters understood the complexity of the hoax, then, possibly, there would be a repetition of the events in 1993 with their refusal to storm, and the story today would be different.
And it was not the officers of the FSB and the MVD (the Ministry of Internal Affairs), who in all seriousness planned the operation to free the hostages. They did not infiltrate Khanpash. And then give him a job. But who was it?
Terkibayev himself did not answer that question.
So it seems, the FSB and the MVD just trying to solve and acting out someone else's scenario.
During the second Chechen war such methods were well tested by military intelligence. The leaders of the so-called "squadrons of death" were the employees of the GRU. Executions of our compatriots without court hearings – it is their work. And neither the FSB and the MVD, nor prosecutors, or the courts can do anything about their bloody leadership. Then again, a common practice of the GRU squadrons is to use the Chechen bandits. And also, - their former victims (widows - who became such after the actions of the "squadrons of death") – since this is very convenient material for reaching the goals of terrifying all people.
So – was it them? Or someone else, unknown to us?
I don't have an answer. But it is very important to get to the bottom of this. And it is also, without doubt, necessary.
- So what did the people die for? What kind of an insane price is 129 lives?
Here is what we saw, when light was shed on a tiny part of the story about an agent provocateur of our days.
People have died, but the agent provocateur is thriving. And it is exactly him, who is a part of the political inner circle. He is well fed, looks well, and, most importantly, he continues⋯ In the next few days he leaves for Chechnya. What will he prepare this time?
"I need 24 hours to meet with Maskhadov," he says.
"Only 24 ours?"
"Well, perhaps two days."
Khanpash is condescending towards the nanve. Towards us.
Anna Politkovskaya, correspondent of "Novaya Gazeta"
04/28/2003
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《附件五》史丹佛大學一位資深研究員對歌劇院事件的詳細報告
THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT (Part 1)
By John B. Dunlop
John B. Dunlop is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution Compiled by Roman Kupchinsky.
http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/2004%20Dunlop-RFERL%20Paper.htm
On 6 November 2002, a meeting was held in Moscow of the Public Committee to Investigate the Circumstances Behind the Explosions of the Apartment Buildings in Moscow and the Ryazan Exercises (all of which occurred in September 1999). The meeting took place at the Andrei Sakharov Center, and among those present were the committee's chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev, its deputy chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov (assassinated on 17 April 2003), lawyer Boris Zolotukhin, writer Aleksandr Tkachenko, journalist Otto Latsis, and human rights activist Valerii Borshchev. After the meeting had concluded, the members of the committee took a formal decision to "broaden its mandate" and to include the Moscow hostage-taking episode of 23-26 October 2002 -- and especially the actions of the Russian special services during that period -- as an additional subject of inquiry coming under the committee's purview.(1)
An Unusual Kind Of 'Joint Venture'?
The following is an attempt to make some sense out of the small torrent of information that exists concerning the October 2002 events at Dubrovka. In my opinion, the original plan for the terrorist action at and around Dubrovka bears a strong similarity to the campaign of terror bombings unleashed upon Moscow and other Russian urban centers (Buinaksk, Volgodonsk) in September of 1999. In both cases there is strong evidence of official involvement in, and manipulation of, key actions; so the question naturally arises as to whether Vladimir Putin in any way sanctioned them. Although there is additional evidence bearing on Putin's possible role, this paper will take an agnostic position on the issue, and will also not review it.
The October 2002 hostage-taking episode in a large theater containing close to 1,000 people was evidently, at least in its original conception, to have been preceded and accompanied by terror bombings claiming the lives of perhaps hundreds of Muscovites, a development that would have terrorized and enraged the populace of the entire country. However, in view of the suspicious connections and motivations of the perpetrators of this incident, as well as the contradictory nature of the actions of the authorities, it would seem appropriate to envisage this operation as representing a kind of "joint venture" (on, for example, the model of the August 1999 incursion into Daghestan) involving elements of the Russian special services and also radical Chechen leaders such as Shamil Basaev and Movladi Udugov.
Only a few individuals among the special services and the Chechen extremist leadership would likely have known of the existence of this implicit deal. Both "partners" had a strong motive to derail the movement occurring in Russia, and being backed by the West, to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Chechen conflict. Both also wanted to blacken the reputation of the leader of the Chechen separatist moderates, Aslan Maskhadov. In addition, the Chechen extremists clearly saw their action as a kind of ambitious fund-raiser aimed at attracting financial support from wealthy donors in the Gulf states and throughout the Muslim world (hence the signs displayed in Arabic, the non-traditional [for Chechens] garb of the female terrorists, and so on). The Russian authorities, for their part, had a propitious chance to depict the conflict in Chechnya as a war against an Al-Qaeda-type Chechen terrorism, a message that could be expected to play well abroad, and especially in the United States.
As in the case of the 1999 terror bombings, meticulous planning -- including the use of "cut-outs," false documents, and the secret transport of weapons and explosives to Moscow from the North Caucasus region -- underlay the preparation for this terrorist assault. In this instance, however, the perpetrators were to be seen as Chechens of a "Wahhabi" orientation whose modus operandi was to recall that of the notorious Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Once the operation had moved into its active stage, however, strange and still not fully explained developments began to occur. An explosion at a McDonald's restaurant in southwest Moscow on 19 October immediately riveted the attention of the Moscow Criminal Investigation (MUR) -- an elite unit of the regular police -- which then moved swiftly to halt the activity of the terrorists. The explosion at the McDonald's restaurant was, fortunately, a small one, and caused the death of only a single person. Two large bombs set to explode before the assault on Dubrovka was launched failed to detonate. Likewise a planned bombing incident at a large restaurant in Pushkin Square in the center of the capital failed to take place.
In my opinion, the most likely explanation for these "technical" failures lies in acts of intentional sabotage committed by some of the terrorists. What remains unclear at this juncture is why certain individuals among the terrorists chose to render the explosive devices incapable of functioning. One key point, however, seems clear: The Chechen extremist leaders felt no pressing need to blow up or shoot hundreds of Russian citizens. They were aware that such actions might so enrage the Russian populace that it would then have supported any military actions whatever, including a possible full- scale extermination of the Chechen people. So what Shamil Basaev, Aslambek Khaskhanov, and their comrades in arms seem to have done is, in a sense, to outplay the special services in a game of chess. Most of the bombs, it turns out, were actually fakes, while the few women's terrorist belts that did actually contain explosives were of danger primarily to the women themselves. As Russian security affairs correspondent Pavel Felgenhauer has rightly suggested, the aim of the extremist leaders seems to have been to force the Russian special services to kill ethnic Russians on a large scale, and that is what happened.(2) Only an adroit cover-up by the Russian authorities prevented the full extent (conceivably more than 200 deaths) of the debacle from becoming known.
A central question to be resolved by future researchers is whether or not the Russian special forces planning an assault on the theater building at Dubrovka were aware that virtually all of the bombs located there -- including all of the powerful and deadly bombs -- were in fact incapable of detonating. If the special forces were aware of this, then there was clearly no need to employ a potentially lethal gas, which, it turned out, caused the deaths of a large number of the hostages. The special forces could have relatively easily and rapidly overwhelmed the lightly armed terrorists. Moreover, if they were in fact aware that the bombs were "dummies," then the special forces obviously had no need to kill all of the terrorists, especially those who were asleep from the effects of the gas. It would, one would think, have made more sense to take some of them alive.
Pressure Builds For A Negotiated Settlement With The Chechen Separatists
In the months preceding the terrorist act at the Dubrovka theater, which was putting on a popular musical, "Nord-Ost," the Kremlin leadership found itself coming under heavy political pressure both within Russia and in the West to enter into high-level negotiations with the moderate wing of the Chechen separatists headed by Aslan Maskhadov, who was elected Chechen president in 1997. Public-opinion polls in Russia showed that a continuation of the Chechen conflict was beginning to erode Putin's generally high approval ratings. With parliamentary elections scheduled for just over a year's time (in December 2003), this represented a worrisome problem for the Kremlin. In a poll taken by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), whose findings were reported on 8 October, respondents were asked "how the situation in Chechnya has changed since V. Putin was elected president."(3) Thirty percent of respondents believed that the situation had "gotten better," but 43 percent opined that it had "not changed," while 21 percent thought that it had "gotten worse." These results were significantly lower than Putin's ratings in other categories. In similar fashion, a September 2002 Russia-wide poll taken by VTsIOM found 56 percent of respondents favoring peace negotiations as a way to end the Chechen conflict while only 34 percent supported the continuing of military actions.(4)
On 16-19 August 2002, key discussions had occurred in the Duchy of Liechtenstein involving two former speakers of the Russian parliament, Ivan Rybkin and Ruslan Khasbulatov, as well as two deputies of the Russian State Duma: journalist and leading "democrat" Yurii Shchekochikhin (died, possibly from the effects of poison, on 3 July 2003) and Aslambek Aslakhanov, a retired Interior Ministry general who had been elected to represent Chechnya in the Duma. Representing separatist leader Maskhadov at the talks was Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Akhmed Zakaev. The talks in Liechtenstein had been organized by the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (executive director, Glen Howard), one of whose leading figures was former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. The meetings in Liechtenstein were intended to restore the momentum that had been created by earlier talks held at Sheremetevo-2 Airport outside of Moscow between Zakaev and Putin's plenipotentiary presidential representative in the Southern Federal District, retired military General Viktor Kazantsev, on 18 November 2001.(5) Efforts to resuscitate the talks had failed to achieve any success because of the strong opposition of the Russian side.
Following the stillborn initiative of November 2001, the Kremlin had apparently jettisoned the idea of holding any negotiations whatsoever with moderate separatists in favor of empowering its handpicked candidate for Chechen leader, former mufti Akhmad Kadyrov. This tactic, said to be backed by Aleksandr Voloshin, the then presidential chief of staff, soon became known as "Chechenization."
Other elements among the top leadership of the presidential administration, such as two deputy chiefs of staff, Viktor Ivanov -- a former deputy director of the FSB -- and Igor Sechin, as well as certain leaders in the so-called power ministries, for example, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev, were reported to be adamantly opposed both to Chechenization and, even more so, to holding talks with moderate separatists; what they wanted was aggressively to pursue the war to a victorious conclusion.(6) If that effort took years more to achieve, then so be it.
In a path-breaking report on the meetings in Liechtenstein, a leading journalist who frequently publishes in the weekly "Moskovskie novosti," Sanobar Shermatova, wrote that the participants had discussed two peace plans: the so-called "Khasbulatov plan" and the so-called "Brzezinski plan."(7) Eventually, she went on, the participants decided to merge the two plans into a "Liechtenstein plan," which included elements of both. Khasbulatov's plan was based on the idea of granting to Chechnya "special status," with international guarantees being provided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and by the Council of Europe. Under Khasbulatov's plan, Chechnya would be free to conduct its own internal and foreign policies, with the exception of those functions that it voluntarily delegated to the Russian Federation. The republic was to remain within Russian borders and was to preserve Russian citizenship and currency.
Under the "Brzezinski plan," Chechens would "acknowledge their respect for the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation," while Russia, for its part, would "acknowledge the right of the Chechens to political, though not national, self-determination." A referendum would be held under which "Chechens would be given the opportunity to approve the constitutional basis for extensive self-government" modeled on what the Republic of Tatarstan currently enjoys. Russian troops would remain stationed on Chechnya's southern borders. "International support," the plan stressed, "must be committed to a substantial program of economic reconstruction, with a direct international presence on the ground in order to promote the rebuilding and stabilization of Chechen society." The authors of this plan underlined that "Maskhadov's endorsement of such an approach would be essential because of the extensive support he enjoys within Chechen society."
On 17 October 2002 -- just six days before the terrorist incident at Dubrovka -- the website grani.ru, citing information that had previously appeared in the newspaper "Kommersant," reported that new meetings of the Liechtenstein group were scheduled to be held in two weeks' time.(8) Duma Deputy Aslakhanov and separatist Deputy Premier Zakaev were planning to meet one-on-one in Switzerland in order "seriously to discuss the conditions which could lead to negotiations." Former speakers Rybkin and Khasbulatov, the website added, would also be taking part in the negotiations. In mid-October, Aslakhanov emphasized in a public statement: "President Putin has not once expressed himself against negotiations with Maskhadov. To the contrary, in a conversation with me, he expressed doubt whether there was a real force behind Maskhadov. Would the people follow after him?" This question put by Putin to Aslakhanov, "Kommersant vlast" reporter Olga Allenova observed, "was perceived in the ranks of the separatists as a veiled agreement [by Putin] to negotiations."(9)
On 10 September 2002, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov had published an essay entitled "Six Points On Chechnya" on the pages of the official Russian government newspaper "Rossiiskaya Gazeta" in which he stressed the urgent need to conduct "negotiations with [separatist] field commanders or at least some of them."(10) "This struggle," Primakov insisted, "can be stopped only through negotiations. Consequently elections in Chechnya cannot be seen as an alternative to negotiations." Primakov also underlined his conviction that "the [Russian] military must not play the dominant role in the settlement." In an interview which appeared in the 4 October 2002 issue of "Nezavisimaya gazeta," Salambek Maigov, co-chairman of the Antiwar Committee of Chechnya, warmly praised Primakov's "Six Points," noting, "Putin and Maskhadov can find compromise decisions. But the problem is that there are groups in the Kremlin which hinder this process."
During September 2002, grani.ru reported that both Maigov and former Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin were supporting a recent suggestion by Primakov that "the status of Finland in the [tsarist] Russian Empire can suit the Chechen Republic."(11) Another possibility, Rybkin pointed out, would be for Chechnya to be accorded "the status of a disputed territory, such as was held by the Aland Islands [of Finland], to which both Sweden and Finland had earlier made claims." A broad spectrum of Russian political leaders -- from "democrats" like Grigorii Yavlinskii, Boris Nemtsov, and Sergei Kovalev to Gennadii Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation -- had, Rybkin said, expressed an interest in such models.
During the course of a lengthy interview -- whose English translation appeared on the separatist website chechenpress.com on 23 October (the day of the seizure of the hostages in Moscow) -- President Maskhadov warmly welcomed the intensive efforts being made to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Chechen conflict: "In Dr. Brzezinski's plan," Maskhadov commented, "we see the concern of influential forces in the United States.... We have a positive experience of collaboration with Ivan Petrovich Rybkin [the reference is to the year 1997, when Rybkin was secretary of the Russian Security
一則骯髒的報導
陳真 2004. 9. 6.
最恐怖的不是帝國主義，不是法西斯，不是資本主義，不是恐怖份子，而是一般人的心：吊兒郎當無所謂、看笑話、說八卦、鄙視別人靈魂深處的東西、拿來討論、拿來糟蹋、見不得別人好。好的故意要說成壞，壞的就故意說得彷彿變態，以便取樂。正是這樣的心，打造世上一切痛苦。
恨畢竟仍是一種感情，但 “無所謂” 則什麼也不是。你只要聽聽台灣人私下怎麼談論他的朋友或敵人，就能明白這種恐怖。或是看看媒體也能明白。你的悲劇和痛苦，卻變成眾人歡樂的泉源和興奮題材，甚至變成某些人撈錢的工具。他表面上說痛心，但他其實覺得很刺激、很爽，恨不得你更悲慘更怪異一些，或出盡更多洋相。
你就算有天大痛苦，也絕不會對他產生一絲影響—雖然他看連續劇比誰還會哭，雖然他比誰都喜歡講愛心、講溫馨、講做人的種種智慧和道理。但他根本不會去想到自己的作為將帶給別人什麼樣的痛苦和傷害以及根本不必要的災難。
看看底下這樣的報導；不但毫無常識，把受害者變成加害者（不信到google打個rape、Russian、Chechnya、humanrights等等關鍵字，看看是誰在強暴誰。）而且還瞎掰一堆謊言和故事。你想想，在那種三十人控制一千兩百個人質，且毫無水源和食物的狀況下，怎麼可能還會有「一群武裝份子」有那個心情「將幾個少女拖進房間強姦，並將過程拍攝下來」？拍攝下來準備以後欣賞？有可能嗎？為什麼要這樣胡說八道呢？
記者只想寫得聳動，讓你看了覺得很刺激很生氣，而根本不會考慮這樣的瞎掰和寫作文式的、想像式的「報導」，對別人特別是對弱勢者造成的傷害。這樣的傷害，只會造成更多惡性循環，對誰都沒好處。
做為一個國際新聞的記者，難道可以不必有一點點國際常識？難道他不知道俄軍過去光是兩次入侵車臣就殺害至少十萬車臣人民，其中四萬個是小孩。而且一些人權團體說，實際數字肯定遠遠超過這個數目；甚至有高達兩成（即二十萬人）人口被屠殺。
車臣總人口，本來也不過一百萬，幾年來，更是迅速銳減。因此有人估計，在車臣可能找不到一個沒有受難者的家庭。存活者，至少三十萬人失去家園，流離失所，其中許多是失去男伴的寡婦或失去雙親的孤兒。七成的村落遭受嚴重戰火破壞。
做為一個國際新聞的記者，難道連長年來那麼多的人權報告都一無所知？難道他不知道俄軍長年來「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」。
除了強暴無日無之、無法無天外，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，根本不把車臣人當人看。
這樣的人權報告，到處都是。做為一個記者，難道連基本的查資料或搜尋能力也沒有？難道我們每次都要辛苦地找來一大堆資料，以便證實一些根本是「普通常識」、但媒體卻根本不報或顛倒報導的事？
他馬的我也不想講了，在台灣這種社會，講這些實在很怪異，讓自己變成怪物。而且，幾個人會當真？只是看了更興奮罷了。陳真這個怪人，又在講怪話做怪事了，讓你看了興奮有趣對不對？然後再用力轉寄一通，惹來更多精采是非和背後口舌。
可是，如果你認同我講的話，為什麼不亮出自己的真實身份，像個正直的老實人那樣，出面和社會上這些鳥人鳥事明明白白地直接對幹？何必總是讓我成為某種萬箭穿心、有口難言的擋箭牌？
若不想出面，那也沒關係，人各有志，但也別把我抬出來，因為每個人都該為自己的價值觀或感情思維來奮戰，不該總是假手他人。你必須自己去打仗，方才成為一個像樣的人，而不是光靠別人來替你打仗。
有時真懷疑，人這種生物，如果心眼這麼壞、這麼吊兒郎當、信口開河、這麼沒骨氣、沒出息，到底還有沒有存在價值？
我不想去告狀，因為這肯定會害這個記者挨罵，但希望各位佔據媒體版面的「名家」或記者們，如果你剛好看到則留言，請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！
大家都是爹娘生的，不要蔑視別人的痛苦，不要顛倒是非黑白，不要漠視、糟蹋、侮辱別人的感情，不要肆無忌憚地胡說八道，憑添他人的痛苦。你不一定要善待弱勢者或受害者，但你也不要反倒給他製造更多根本莫須有的誤解和痛苦。
一點牢騷如上，就當成陳真奇人奇事看吧，不然還能怎麼樣。
==========
這就是那則骯髒的報導:
蘋果日報 2004. 9. 6.
【綜合外電報導】俄羅斯人質事件造成千人死傷，血腥的結局留給北奧塞地亞自治共和國別斯蘭市居民磨滅不去的傷痛。昨天，別蘭斯舉行首批二十二個葬禮，親友在哭泣聲中，送走情感上難以割捨的死者。但殯儀館中，還陳列了大大小小燒得焦黑的屍體，正等待家人認屍。此外，生還人質也難以忘記武裝份子殘害人質的慘況：有的嬰兒被他們用刀捅死，更有少女被姦，令人髮指。
俄羅斯全國哀悼
俄國官方公布的死亡數字不斷上升，到昨天為止，連同三十名武裝份子在內，已有三百八十人死亡、五百四十人受傷。而殯儀館表示，至少收到三百九十四具屍體，醫療人員則指，昨天院裡還有四百二十三名劫後餘生的傷患。另外，官方也指出，這次共有三十二名武裝份子涉案。
暴徒刀刺一歲幼兒
多名還在醫院的生還人質表示，一些武裝份子將少女拖進體育館旁的房間，予以強姦，並將過程拍攝下來。十二歲女人質澤斯克洛娃的媽媽說：「她告訴我，幾個十五歲大的女孩遭恐怖份子強姦，她們被那些禽獸拖走時，她聽到可怕的哭聲及尖叫。」
人質受到的肉體創傷一樣慘不忍睹，醫療人員說：「許多生還者將變成傷殘，有的連眼睛也沒有了。」其中六名重傷者要轉往俄羅斯首都莫斯科就醫，包括一名受到多處刀傷的一歲半幼兒，由於武裝份子用盡彈藥，便拿刀刺他。
這次經歷在七歲女孩胡達諾娃心中留下磨滅不去的陰影，她說：「我很勇敢，但我以後都不要上學了，我不要回那間學校，我要留在家和媽媽一起。」胡達諾娃還說得出自己的感受，有些驚嚇過度、受傷太重或年幼的傷者，已說不出自己的姓名了，醫院將他們的照片貼在牆上，供親友辨認，照片旁邊註明著「說不出話的男孩」或「昏迷的女孩」等。
別斯蘭市昨天舉行了二十二起喪禮，很多住宅或大樓的入口，都停放著出殯用的棺材蓋，街上來往行人神情木然，大家都感受到相同的哀戚。第一場喪禮在森嚴的戒備下展開，幾百名送葬者隨著四副棺材緩緩前往墓地。總統普丁昨天宣布，今、明兩天為全國哀悼日。
這次慘劇死者眾多，六十名義工主動在墓地旁一塊足球場大的地上挖掘墳墓。二十五歲的庫茲耶夫說：「我想盡一分力，我們每個人都很悲傷。」
部分居民矢言報復
哀傷之餘，部分居民也矢言報復。二十歲的大學生卡吉耶夫上周六說：「現在父親們將孩子埋葬，四十天（東正教的哀悼期）後，他們就會拿起武器復仇。」
別斯蘭市在哭泣
【綜合外電報導】「他們殺了這裡的人，不只大人，還有小孩！小孩！他們殺了我們的小孩！我無法思考，只是很震驚，很震驚。」二十九歲的維塔利激動地哭罵車臣武裝份子，和全市三萬五千居民陷入前所未有的悲痛中。發生學校挾持人質事件的北奧塞地亞共和國別斯蘭市，全市都在哭泣。
體育館開放憑弔
周六晚上，當地政府終於開放數百名人質慘死其中的學校體育館，讓居民入內憑弔。對於這場他們不能理解的橫禍，人們的悲痛已演變成憤怒。采洛耶夫一名鄰居的兒子不幸成為罹難人質之一，他說：「太恐怖了。做出這種事的真不是人。」近三天的非人生活，一千二百名人質擠在這裡，一起挨餓、受怕，連坐的空間都不夠，籃球架上還吊著炸藥。現在這所體育館中剩下的，是令人聞之欲嘔的燒焦、硫磺和腐爛的氣味。籃球架炸得焦黑飛到牆邊，地上滿是瓦礫碎片，窗戶打破，牆上是數不清的彈孔，屋頂被炸得只剩骨架。
在體育館的正中央，一張課桌椅上放了一束鮮花，還有兩個火柴盒大小的東正教聖像，成了一個臨時祭壇。桌子下面有一本藍色課本，屬於讀第九班的祖巴耶夫所有，科目是奧塞地亞語，只是他已沒有機會再讀。
半瞎姊姊回頭救幼弟
十七歲人質貝加耶娃在武裝份子攻入學校時，原本有機會逃跑，但為了照顧不良於行的弟弟，她跑回體育館和弟弟生死與共。在體育館第一次發生爆炸時，她的腳被碎片擊中、眼睛被強光射成半瞎，仍奮力抓著弟弟的手逃出現場。她的媽媽直說：「這是奇蹟⋯⋯她愛弟弟勝過自己的性命。」
陳真 2004. 9. 6.
最恐怖的不是帝國主義，不是法西斯，不是資本主義，不是恐怖份子，而是一般人的心：吊兒郎當無所謂、看笑話、說八卦、鄙視別人靈魂深處的東西、拿來討論、拿來糟蹋、見不得別人好。好的故意要說成壞，壞的就故意說得彷彿變態，以便取樂。正是這樣的心，打造世上一切痛苦。
恨畢竟仍是一種感情，但 “無所謂” 則什麼也不是。你只要聽聽台灣人私下怎麼談論他的朋友或敵人，就能明白這種恐怖。或是看看媒體也能明白。你的悲劇和痛苦，卻變成眾人歡樂的泉源和興奮題材，甚至變成某些人撈錢的工具。他表面上說痛心，但他其實覺得很刺激、很爽，恨不得你更悲慘更怪異一些，或出盡更多洋相。
你就算有天大痛苦，也絕不會對他產生一絲影響—雖然他看連續劇比誰還會哭，雖然他比誰都喜歡講愛心、講溫馨、講做人的種種智慧和道理。但他根本不會去想到自己的作為將帶給別人什麼樣的痛苦和傷害以及根本不必要的災難。
看看底下這樣的報導；不但毫無常識，把受害者變成加害者（不信到google打個rape、Russian、Chechnya、humanrights等等關鍵字，看看是誰在強暴誰。）而且還瞎掰一堆謊言和故事。你想想，在那種三十人控制一千兩百個人質，且毫無水源和食物的狀況下，怎麼可能還會有「一群武裝份子」有那個心情「將幾個少女拖進房間強姦，並將過程拍攝下來」？拍攝下來準備以後欣賞？有可能嗎？為什麼要這樣胡說八道呢？
記者只想寫得聳動，讓你看了覺得很刺激很生氣，而根本不會考慮這樣的瞎掰和寫作文式的、想像式的「報導」，對別人特別是對弱勢者造成的傷害。這樣的傷害，只會造成更多惡性循環，對誰都沒好處。
做為一個國際新聞的記者，難道可以不必有一點點國際常識？難道他不知道俄軍過去光是兩次入侵車臣就殺害至少十萬車臣人民，其中四萬個是小孩。而且一些人權團體說，實際數字肯定遠遠超過這個數目；甚至有高達兩成（即二十萬人）人口被屠殺。
車臣總人口，本來也不過一百萬，幾年來，更是迅速銳減。因此有人估計，在車臣可能找不到一個沒有受難者的家庭。存活者，至少三十萬人失去家園，流離失所，其中許多是失去男伴的寡婦或失去雙親的孤兒。七成的村落遭受嚴重戰火破壞。
做為一個國際新聞的記者，難道連長年來那麼多的人權報告都一無所知？難道他不知道俄軍長年來「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」「以強暴婦女做為一種例行性、系統性的軍事手段」。
除了強暴無日無之、無法無天外，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，更動用刑求和非法處決及抄家屠戮及砍斷手腳或強迫家屬觀看刑求及強暴等極端恐怖手段，對付平民和婦孺，根本不把車臣人當人看。
這樣的人權報告，到處都是。做為一個記者，難道連基本的查資料或搜尋能力也沒有？難道我們每次都要辛苦地找來一大堆資料，以便證實一些根本是「普通常識」、但媒體卻根本不報或顛倒報導的事？
他馬的我也不想講了，在台灣這種社會，講這些實在很怪異，讓自己變成怪物。而且，幾個人會當真？只是看了更興奮罷了。陳真這個怪人，又在講怪話做怪事了，讓你看了興奮有趣對不對？然後再用力轉寄一通，惹來更多精采是非和背後口舌。
可是，如果你認同我講的話，為什麼不亮出自己的真實身份，像個正直的老實人那樣，出面和社會上這些鳥人鳥事明明白白地直接對幹？何必總是讓我成為某種萬箭穿心、有口難言的擋箭牌？
若不想出面，那也沒關係，人各有志，但也別把我抬出來，因為每個人都該為自己的價值觀或感情思維來奮戰，不該總是假手他人。你必須自己去打仗，方才成為一個像樣的人，而不是光靠別人來替你打仗。
有時真懷疑，人這種生物，如果心眼這麼壞、這麼吊兒郎當、信口開河、這麼沒骨氣、沒出息，到底還有沒有存在價值？
我不想去告狀，因為這肯定會害這個記者挨罵，但希望各位佔據媒體版面的「名家」或記者們，如果你剛好看到則留言，請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！請你下回寫東西時，憑點最起碼的常識和良心吧！
大家都是爹娘生的，不要蔑視別人的痛苦，不要顛倒是非黑白，不要漠視、糟蹋、侮辱別人的感情，不要肆無忌憚地胡說八道，憑添他人的痛苦。你不一定要善待弱勢者或受害者，但你也不要反倒給他製造更多根本莫須有的誤解和痛苦。
一點牢騷如上，就當成陳真奇人奇事看吧，不然還能怎麼樣。
==========
這就是那則骯髒的報導:
蘋果日報 2004. 9. 6.
【綜合外電報導】俄羅斯人質事件造成千人死傷，血腥的結局留給北奧塞地亞自治共和國別斯蘭市居民磨滅不去的傷痛。昨天，別蘭斯舉行首批二十二個葬禮，親友在哭泣聲中，送走情感上難以割捨的死者。但殯儀館中，還陳列了大大小小燒得焦黑的屍體，正等待家人認屍。此外，生還人質也難以忘記武裝份子殘害人質的慘況：有的嬰兒被他們用刀捅死，更有少女被姦，令人髮指。
俄羅斯全國哀悼
俄國官方公布的死亡數字不斷上升，到昨天為止，連同三十名武裝份子在內，已有三百八十人死亡、五百四十人受傷。而殯儀館表示，至少收到三百九十四具屍體，醫療人員則指，昨天院裡還有四百二十三名劫後餘生的傷患。另外，官方也指出，這次共有三十二名武裝份子涉案。
暴徒刀刺一歲幼兒
多名還在醫院的生還人質表示，一些武裝份子將少女拖進體育館旁的房間，予以強姦，並將過程拍攝下來。十二歲女人質澤斯克洛娃的媽媽說：「她告訴我，幾個十五歲大的女孩遭恐怖份子強姦，她們被那些禽獸拖走時，她聽到可怕的哭聲及尖叫。」
人質受到的肉體創傷一樣慘不忍睹，醫療人員說：「許多生還者將變成傷殘，有的連眼睛也沒有了。」其中六名重傷者要轉往俄羅斯首都莫斯科就醫，包括一名受到多處刀傷的一歲半幼兒，由於武裝份子用盡彈藥，便拿刀刺他。
這次經歷在七歲女孩胡達諾娃心中留下磨滅不去的陰影，她說：「我很勇敢，但我以後都不要上學了，我不要回那間學校，我要留在家和媽媽一起。」胡達諾娃還說得出自己的感受，有些驚嚇過度、受傷太重或年幼的傷者，已說不出自己的姓名了，醫院將他們的照片貼在牆上，供親友辨認，照片旁邊註明著「說不出話的男孩」或「昏迷的女孩」等。
別斯蘭市昨天舉行了二十二起喪禮，很多住宅或大樓的入口，都停放著出殯用的棺材蓋，街上來往行人神情木然，大家都感受到相同的哀戚。第一場喪禮在森嚴的戒備下展開，幾百名送葬者隨著四副棺材緩緩前往墓地。總統普丁昨天宣布，今、明兩天為全國哀悼日。
這次慘劇死者眾多，六十名義工主動在墓地旁一塊足球場大的地上挖掘墳墓。二十五歲的庫茲耶夫說：「我想盡一分力，我們每個人都很悲傷。」
部分居民矢言報復
哀傷之餘，部分居民也矢言報復。二十歲的大學生卡吉耶夫上周六說：「現在父親們將孩子埋葬，四十天（東正教的哀悼期）後，他們就會拿起武器復仇。」
別斯蘭市在哭泣
【綜合外電報導】「他們殺了這裡的人，不只大人，還有小孩！小孩！他們殺了我們的小孩！我無法思考，只是很震驚，很震驚。」二十九歲的維塔利激動地哭罵車臣武裝份子，和全市三萬五千居民陷入前所未有的悲痛中。發生學校挾持人質事件的北奧塞地亞共和國別斯蘭市，全市都在哭泣。
體育館開放憑弔
周六晚上，當地政府終於開放數百名人質慘死其中的學校體育館，讓居民入內憑弔。對於這場他們不能理解的橫禍，人們的悲痛已演變成憤怒。采洛耶夫一名鄰居的兒子不幸成為罹難人質之一，他說：「太恐怖了。做出這種事的真不是人。」近三天的非人生活，一千二百名人質擠在這裡，一起挨餓、受怕，連坐的空間都不夠，籃球架上還吊著炸藥。現在這所體育館中剩下的，是令人聞之欲嘔的燒焦、硫磺和腐爛的氣味。籃球架炸得焦黑飛到牆邊，地上滿是瓦礫碎片，窗戶打破，牆上是數不清的彈孔，屋頂被炸得只剩骨架。
在體育館的正中央，一張課桌椅上放了一束鮮花，還有兩個火柴盒大小的東正教聖像，成了一個臨時祭壇。桌子下面有一本藍色課本，屬於讀第九班的祖巴耶夫所有，科目是奧塞地亞語，只是他已沒有機會再讀。
半瞎姊姊回頭救幼弟
十七歲人質貝加耶娃在武裝份子攻入學校時，原本有機會逃跑，但為了照顧不良於行的弟弟，她跑回體育館和弟弟生死與共。在體育館第一次發生爆炸時，她的腳被碎片擊中、眼睛被強光射成半瞎，仍奮力抓著弟弟的手逃出現場。她的媽媽直說：「這是奇蹟⋯⋯她愛弟弟勝過自己的性命。」
像這兩篇社論, 顯然就是憑空想像.
不如乾脆來找我去當記者.
陳真
===========
聯合報黑白集
冷血的聖戰
北奧塞梯亞的人質事件如果不算最血腥的集體屠殺，也是最冷血的恐怖行動了。絕大多數人質都是幼弱的學童，綁匪在他們四周布滿炸彈，冷笑著向他們開槍。車臣游擊隊的恐怖行動震驚全球，他們為了追求獨立，跨越了一切人道界線。
九一一恐怖攻擊是以不特定的無辜群眾為對象，那是「凱達」跨越的界線；這次人質事件是刻意找尋天真的學童下手，車臣游擊隊把恐怖行動推到極限。車游在根本不該攻擊的地方找到最容易的下手對象，目的只是為了向莫斯科施壓；然而，腰纏炸彈的恐怖分子其實連談判能力都沒有，他們只知道開槍。民族的獨立聖戰演變至人性如此扭曲，真是讓人無言以對。
車游的冷血，反射了俄羅斯早幾年鎮壓車臣的殘酷；而俄羅斯的鐵腕壓制，又可回溯到更早年車臣協助希特勒反俄的心結。雙方仇恨越結越深，報復手段也愈形激烈，近兩周來俄境一連串的爆炸案，就是車臣仇恨大爆發的結果。夾在視死如歸的車游和強硬鎮壓的俄軍之間，無辜的孩童和民眾還有多少保命的餘地？
奪取無辜者的性命和鮮血來書寫自己的獨立史，這是車臣的孤注一擲。它能贏得更多獨立籌碼，或只會讓世人喪失對它的同情？在另一方面，不惜犧牲人質但求維護強硬立場的普亭，是要拿政治聲譽繼續與恐怖分子瘋狂對賭，或者他能拿出智慧化解車臣人的心結？
看到這幕民族仇恨的發酵、膨脹和變形，遠在台灣的我們不該沒有一點感觸吧！
【2004/09/06 聯合報】
=========
【中晚社評】化解仇恨
社評 俄羅斯南部北奧塞堤亞學校人質遭挾持事件，經過特種部隊攻堅後，事件於腥風血雨中落幕，人質死亡超過三百二十人。在電視畫面上看到稚童光著身子灌水的場景，他們多半三天未進食，甚至以尿液解渴。至於死亡的場景就更慘不忍睹，父親抱著稚子痛哭的淚眼，母親撫屍哀戚的面容。誰能不一掬同情淚？
事件的發動者是車臣游擊隊，背後則是基地組織，表面上是向俄羅斯要求車臣獨立，是繼歌劇院挾持人質事件之後的再次要脅。事實上是國際恐怖組織的結合，已經師承了恐怖主義的精神，不斷製造恐怖事件，可以說是基地組織繼九一一之後的又一惡作。
恐怖主義起於政治利益衝突，早期的巴游組織為爭取獨立並取回迦薩走廊等土地採取恐怖手段對抗以色列，現在巴解組織終因採取協商方式，在國際的支持下漸漸獲得認同。近年來由於美國積極介入中東地區的紛爭，引發了阿拉伯世界的仇美情緒，基地組織和九一一事件也因此而起。
恐怖主義的目的在達成政治目標，卻以殺戮為手段，並且對付的多半是無辜的平民百姓。像車游這兩次的綁架事件，對象都是還涉世不深的稚童和手無寸鐵的婦孺，因為恐怖氣氛越濃烈，他們的目的越容易達成。
然而，政治的目的何在呢？不是在保障人民生命財產的安全，不是為人類謀求更高的福祉嗎？任何以殺戮換取的政治，其實都已經背離了人性，違反了政治原則。可是人類有從一次又一次的恐怖事件中覺醒嗎？仇恨如果不以理性化解，恐怖事件不會在人類社會銷聲匿跡！
Copyright 2004 China Times Inc.
不如乾脆來找我去當記者.
陳真
===========
聯合報黑白集
冷血的聖戰
北奧塞梯亞的人質事件如果不算最血腥的集體屠殺，也是最冷血的恐怖行動了。絕大多數人質都是幼弱的學童，綁匪在他們四周布滿炸彈，冷笑著向他們開槍。車臣游擊隊的恐怖行動震驚全球，他們為了追求獨立，跨越了一切人道界線。
九一一恐怖攻擊是以不特定的無辜群眾為對象，那是「凱達」跨越的界線；這次人質事件是刻意找尋天真的學童下手，車臣游擊隊把恐怖行動推到極限。車游在根本不該攻擊的地方找到最容易的下手對象，目的只是為了向莫斯科施壓；然而，腰纏炸彈的恐怖分子其實連談判能力都沒有，他們只知道開槍。民族的獨立聖戰演變至人性如此扭曲，真是讓人無言以對。
車游的冷血，反射了俄羅斯早幾年鎮壓車臣的殘酷；而俄羅斯的鐵腕壓制，又可回溯到更早年車臣協助希特勒反俄的心結。雙方仇恨越結越深，報復手段也愈形激烈，近兩周來俄境一連串的爆炸案，就是車臣仇恨大爆發的結果。夾在視死如歸的車游和強硬鎮壓的俄軍之間，無辜的孩童和民眾還有多少保命的餘地？
奪取無辜者的性命和鮮血來書寫自己的獨立史，這是車臣的孤注一擲。它能贏得更多獨立籌碼，或只會讓世人喪失對它的同情？在另一方面，不惜犧牲人質但求維護強硬立場的普亭，是要拿政治聲譽繼續與恐怖分子瘋狂對賭，或者他能拿出智慧化解車臣人的心結？
看到這幕民族仇恨的發酵、膨脹和變形，遠在台灣的我們不該沒有一點感觸吧！
【2004/09/06 聯合報】
=========
【中晚社評】化解仇恨
社評 俄羅斯南部北奧塞堤亞學校人質遭挾持事件，經過特種部隊攻堅後，事件於腥風血雨中落幕，人質死亡超過三百二十人。在電視畫面上看到稚童光著身子灌水的場景，他們多半三天未進食，甚至以尿液解渴。至於死亡的場景就更慘不忍睹，父親抱著稚子痛哭的淚眼，母親撫屍哀戚的面容。誰能不一掬同情淚？
事件的發動者是車臣游擊隊，背後則是基地組織，表面上是向俄羅斯要求車臣獨立，是繼歌劇院挾持人質事件之後的再次要脅。事實上是國際恐怖組織的結合，已經師承了恐怖主義的精神，不斷製造恐怖事件，可以說是基地組織繼九一一之後的又一惡作。
恐怖主義起於政治利益衝突，早期的巴游組織為爭取獨立並取回迦薩走廊等土地採取恐怖手段對抗以色列，現在巴解組織終因採取協商方式，在國際的支持下漸漸獲得認同。近年來由於美國積極介入中東地區的紛爭，引發了阿拉伯世界的仇美情緒，基地組織和九一一事件也因此而起。
恐怖主義的目的在達成政治目標，卻以殺戮為手段，並且對付的多半是無辜的平民百姓。像車游這兩次的綁架事件，對象都是還涉世不深的稚童和手無寸鐵的婦孺，因為恐怖氣氛越濃烈，他們的目的越容易達成。
然而，政治的目的何在呢？不是在保障人民生命財產的安全，不是為人類謀求更高的福祉嗎？任何以殺戮換取的政治，其實都已經背離了人性，違反了政治原則。可是人類有從一次又一次的恐怖事件中覺醒嗎？仇恨如果不以理性化解，恐怖事件不會在人類社會銷聲匿跡！
Copyright 2004 China Times Inc.
竟然要分四次貼才貼得完.
=======
《附件六》車臣本身對此事的報導
Anna Politkovskaya:
"Nobody is interested in the matter of what is going on in the country"
Tuesday, 27 May 2003
Chechenpress
http://www.chechenpress.info/english/news/05_2003/11_27_05.shtml
On 28 April 2003, in issue30 of "The Novaya Gazeta" the article "Who Remains Alive" by Anna Politkovskaya was published. It says that the Theater Center hijacking committed by terrorists must have been at least controlled by the secret service of Russia. Anna Politkovskaya managed to meet Khanpash Terkibaev who claimed to have been a member of the terrorist group. He also claimed to have followed orders of some special service.
In April 2003 Terkibaev was a member of the Russian delegation at the European Council as a "representative of the Chechen public". At present Terkibaev is a special correspondent of "The Russian newspaper". Terkibaev's name was in the list of the members of Baraev's group that had been published by "The Izvestia" not long before the Theater Center assault held by the special police forces. According to Anna Politkovskaya, "The Novaya Gazeta" has got some other evidence that Terkibaev was among terrorists. Terkibaev also claims to be working in the Information Office of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.
In our opinion, the facts tackled in this publication are of the enormous public significance. Has there been any reaction to the investigation carried by "The Novaya Gazeta" from the authorities, society and their colleagues? The author of this sensational article Anna Politkovskaya, an observer of "The Novaya Gazeta" answers the questions of the editor-in-chief of the Informational Center of the Society for the Russian-Chechen Friendship Stanislav Dmitrievsky.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Quite a lot of time has come since your first publication about Terkibaev. Do you know anything about any reaction of the authorities to your article? Is there any reaction from the Procurator Office, the administration of the President or the State Duma?
Anna Politkovskaya: Nothing at all. I have not even been asked any questions.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: You mean to say that you have not been asked to come anywhere, that there have not been any official interrogations or at least contacts with law-enforcement structures.
Anna Politkovskaya: Absolutely no official respond. It made us publish our second article in which we reminded that there is the General Procurator Office in the country and we not only asked the same questions but also put some more.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: I regard your article sensational. I personally think that in any country with the stable democracy such an article and its impact are sure to cause the governmental crisis, at least. Nevertheless, there is no reaction not only from official structures but also from other sources of mass media. There are too few responds and the majority of them are absolutely passive and spiritless. You are either contradicted at a very low level of "you are a fool yourself", "it was made up by Berezovsky" or just mentioned as if your article had tackled upon a trifle matter. There is neither any serious discussion, nor, moreover, any social resonance. What do you think about the reasons for such an attitude both by the mass media and by the society?
Anna Politkovskaya: You know, to be frank, we expected a different reaction. And we supposed - we didn't want it but we supposed that the reaction would be serious. So it is very difficult for me to comment on the fact that there is no reaction at all. It means that it's of no interest to anybody. I mean to say that nobody is interested in the matter of what is going on in the country. What is interesting is the PR: some people are for the president, some others are against him⋯But the facts and the matter of what is going on in the country are of no concern to anybody. I personally can't comprehend all that.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Apparently, it's a problem not only of the mass media but of the whole Russian society.
Anna Politkovskaya: Certainly. Mass media just reflect social interests, opinions and needs. You know, what shocked me most of all was the human rights activists' position. I am honest here. None of the human rights activists have made any attempt to put any questions in front of the official power. There was the only example - the appeal of the social movement "For Human Rights" headed by Lev Ponomaryov.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Yes, as far as I know, it was also signed by the manager of the museum and The Social Center named after A.D.Sakhsrov Yury Samodurov and the writer Alexander Tkachenko.
Anna Politkovskaya: I haven't seen the final wording of this document but the variant they showed to me the next day after the publication made me feel indignation. As I expressed these feelings to the authors of the appeal openly I am telling you about it now. The matter was that social appeal was called "The authorities should refute⋯" From my point of view, it is awful of them. The authorities must investigate such cases. To investigate means to interrogate Terkibaev and me, at least, by members of that big investigating group that is working now to investigate "The Nord-Ost" events under the control of the General Prosecutor Office. I understand the "The authorities should refute-"-position of human rights leaders as a desire to be acceptable by the official power. I can only wish them much success on their way. I was promised, though, that my comments would be certainly taken into account. [Indeed, Anna Politkovskaya's comments must have been taken into account. In the! final wording of the Public Appeal that was published the people who signed it demand investigating into the facts reported in the article and in case they are true - starting a criminal suite. There is no demand to refute in this document. - the editor.]
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Yesterday there appeared an article on Viktor Popkov site by Andrew Smirnov who doesn't agree to you and your supposition about "the controlled terrorist act".
Anna Politkovskaya: Sorry to say, I haven't read this article yet.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Then it wouldn't be right to discuss this topic. It might be possible to comment on the main idea of this publication - the author accuses you of being subject to explain everything by making up schemes of conspiracy. As an example of one of such-like schemes common of the modern Russian mythology Andrew Smirnov tells about the theory of global plot between the two fighting sides. He also considers the supposition of the involvement of the Russian intelligence service into the terrorist act at Dubrovka to be one of these myths. How can you comment on it?
Anna Politkovskaya: Nothing of the kind, I am not for any plot-theories. I can tell honestly - after "The Nord-Ost" a lot of western journalists and employees of foreign embassies used to come to our editorial office with the same question, "What do you think about the involvement of the Russian intelligence service into this terrorist act? Haven't you noticed anything suspicious?" Whenever I was asked this question, I answered that I refused to admit such possibility. I couldn't believe it just because it would have become very difficult to go on living if I had let myself assume it. But later, from January, we began to get some bits of information. It evidenced that there had been some involvement all the same. I started checking it mainly to prove myself that the information wasn't true. This article came from attempts to persuade myself that it wasn't true. I personally think that the reality we are living in now is horrible. It is horrible that the intelligence!
e service controls both the president and the whole system of power, that the intelligence service makes all the people jump as they wish. I started my article from the opposite thought: I wanted to make myself sure that the society was much stronger, that we were living in the democracy. And then- It took a long time to get all the information to write the article. And at last I told the editor that I could write the article. And at the same time my Chechen friends who are living in Moscow told me that they had seen that person - Terkibaev - in Moscow and if I wanted they would be able to get in touch with him. I told that I would certainly meet him. I thought such meeting would be very important. Besides, it was just interesting for me what kind of person was he and what was his life like. At first he refused but then accepted my offer to meet. It was his right.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: So if I've caught you right, you mean to say that you had the information concerning the fact that Terkibaev had really been among the terrorists in the Theater Center long before the interview with him, don't you?
Anna Politkovskaya: Exactly. I could have written the article without meeting him. The next bit of the information will be revealed later as the authorities take some measures.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: I have some more questions connected with, so to say, technical points. First, don't you know where Khanpash Terkibaev is now?
Anna Politkovskaya: No information at all. He has disappeared somewhere but I was sure that it would be so.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Have any other representatives of mass media tried to find him?
Anna Politkovskaya: Yes, they have. Many of them have tried but it was possible to get through to him only once.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: In your interview to the TVS channel that took place on April 28 you told that the members of special military unit who were assaulting the building couldn't have been aware of the "controlled terrorist act". But there appears one more question: the fact that Terkibaev could leave the building of the Theater Center means that he had accomplices among those representatives of the enforcement structures who were in the cordon. The plan of the Theater Center building that Terkibaev had couldn't guarantee that he would manage to leave the blocked building.
Anna Politkovskaya: It was not so. The building wasn't blocked that hard. There was a possibility to escape. If we want to go deeper into that point, I can tell you that too many absolutely inexplicable stories happened there. I can give you some examples. Yes, there was a cordon. And it was rather difficult for me to get into the Theater Center as one special structure said "yes" whereas the other said "no", the Home Affairs Ministry allowed but representatives of the FSB didn't as they didn't have Patrushev's allowance. On having at last received the permission to go, I approach the last circle of the cordon and -see a woman. I ask her, "Who are you? What are you doing here?" And she tells me, "I am this and that". An absolutely incidental person. Then a strange man turned up from somewhere and joined me. I ask him, "And what are you?" The matter is that I was afraid to enter the area that wasn't observable together with him where it was easy to shoot me dead. He answers, !
"I am from the Red Cross". I inquire him, "Well, but do you have any documents to prove it?" The white armband with the red cross that he was wearing couldn't be regarded as a proof. And one more strange occasion happened inside the cordon where the terrorists were nearby, where it was supposed to be dangerous as the Alfa-men were lying there under the cars and when in spite of all that a woman threw herself at me. She tells me, "I am the wife of -tell Baraev this and that." I was completely astonished. I don't know whether she really was the person she gave herself out to be but the fact remains. She managed to get there. There were a lot of similar situations there: some people went inside the cordon, some other went out of it - none of them was known to the public. And if I witnessed what was going on at that time it means that somebody else could leave the building through some other exit, from the back one, for example.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: You mean to say that it was possible to pass the cordon, don't you?
Anna Politkovskaya: Yes! I can say when it became impossible to go through it. It happened an hour and a half or two hours before the assault. But it hadn't been so before that time. That is why I am not suspicious of this very detail that Terkibaev had managed to leave the building before the assault.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: How can you explain that Terkibaev was let to survive? He could have been put away, at least, couldn't he?
Anna Politkovskaya: I don't have the unequivocal answer to this question. I just think that he is a very convenient person for our authorities. He can contact both this and that sides, he can represent the Chechen public in the Russian delegation in Strasbourg, he can wriggle out of any situation. The world has known such people in all times. They just needed him.
Actually he made a big mistake when he made an appointment with me.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Sure.
Anna Politkovskaya: And I think that he has already been explained that.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: And the motif of the meeting? Vanity?
Anna Politkovskaya: He is absolutely vain. But there is one more explanation that, I think, has some grounds. He might have had some problems. He might have dared to accept my offer to meet not to be killed. And now who would dare to commit it!
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Exactly, as there would be a scandal then for sure.
Anna Politkovskaya: That's it. It would be absolutely clear why it was done.
Editor in chief Stanislav Dmitriyevsky.
Editor of this edition Oksana Chelysheva.
This edition has been put out with the support of The National Endowment for Democracy, as part of their "Russian-Chechen Information Partnership".
==========
《附件七》是車臣外交部公文，抗議俄羅斯之自導自演，嫁禍於車臣。
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Official Statement
09/12/2003
http://www.chechnya-mfa.info/print_news.php?func=detail&par=101
PRESS-RELEASE: TERRORISM IN RUSSIA IS ORGANIZED AND MANAGED BY THE RUSSIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES FOR PROPAGANDA AND SCAPEGOATING PURPOSES
Terrorism in Russia is organized and managed by the Russian security and military intelligence services for propaganda and scapegoating purposes. We do not think that the latest bombing in Moscow is an exception to this rule.
The fact that Russian security services in committing terrorist acts in Russia and elsewhere occasionally use their agents of Chechen origin does not make the Chechen people and the Chechen government responsible for the Kremlin's dreadful crimes. The Chechen government will not, under any circumstances, accept violence against civilians and civilian objects. We repeat that we condemn terrorism in all its forms.
We regret that the western governments fail to see that it is Russian governmental structures that organize these terrorist acts and that it is Russian agents that carry out these terrorist acts. There is a plenty of evidence to this.
For instance, Mr. Khanpasha Terkibaev, an ethnic Chechen serving for the Russian Secret Service and who is one of the main organizers and direct participant of the hostage taking in the Moscow Theater Center at Dubrovka in October 2002, is a clear proof that terror in Russia comes from the Russian government.
Mr. Khanpasha Terkibaev even after the hostage taking has continued to work for the Russian state structures, including the deputy head of President Putin's administration Mr. Vladislav Yuryevich Surkov and Putin's aide Mr. Sergei Vladimirovich Yastrzhembsky. As the hostage taking ended in killing not only Russian but also western nationals, we believe that western governments should no longer close eyes to Kremlin’s role in terrorism. [1]"
Press Office
See, for instance, Anna Politkovskaya’s article in Novaya Gazeta, issue # 30, 28 April 2003.
=======
《附件六》車臣本身對此事的報導
Anna Politkovskaya:
"Nobody is interested in the matter of what is going on in the country"
Tuesday, 27 May 2003
Chechenpress
http://www.chechenpress.info/english/news/05_2003/11_27_05.shtml
On 28 April 2003, in issue30 of "The Novaya Gazeta" the article "Who Remains Alive" by Anna Politkovskaya was published. It says that the Theater Center hijacking committed by terrorists must have been at least controlled by the secret service of Russia. Anna Politkovskaya managed to meet Khanpash Terkibaev who claimed to have been a member of the terrorist group. He also claimed to have followed orders of some special service.
In April 2003 Terkibaev was a member of the Russian delegation at the European Council as a "representative of the Chechen public". At present Terkibaev is a special correspondent of "The Russian newspaper". Terkibaev's name was in the list of the members of Baraev's group that had been published by "The Izvestia" not long before the Theater Center assault held by the special police forces. According to Anna Politkovskaya, "The Novaya Gazeta" has got some other evidence that Terkibaev was among terrorists. Terkibaev also claims to be working in the Information Office of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.
In our opinion, the facts tackled in this publication are of the enormous public significance. Has there been any reaction to the investigation carried by "The Novaya Gazeta" from the authorities, society and their colleagues? The author of this sensational article Anna Politkovskaya, an observer of "The Novaya Gazeta" answers the questions of the editor-in-chief of the Informational Center of the Society for the Russian-Chechen Friendship Stanislav Dmitrievsky.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Quite a lot of time has come since your first publication about Terkibaev. Do you know anything about any reaction of the authorities to your article? Is there any reaction from the Procurator Office, the administration of the President or the State Duma?
Anna Politkovskaya: Nothing at all. I have not even been asked any questions.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: You mean to say that you have not been asked to come anywhere, that there have not been any official interrogations or at least contacts with law-enforcement structures.
Anna Politkovskaya: Absolutely no official respond. It made us publish our second article in which we reminded that there is the General Procurator Office in the country and we not only asked the same questions but also put some more.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: I regard your article sensational. I personally think that in any country with the stable democracy such an article and its impact are sure to cause the governmental crisis, at least. Nevertheless, there is no reaction not only from official structures but also from other sources of mass media. There are too few responds and the majority of them are absolutely passive and spiritless. You are either contradicted at a very low level of "you are a fool yourself", "it was made up by Berezovsky" or just mentioned as if your article had tackled upon a trifle matter. There is neither any serious discussion, nor, moreover, any social resonance. What do you think about the reasons for such an attitude both by the mass media and by the society?
Anna Politkovskaya: You know, to be frank, we expected a different reaction. And we supposed - we didn't want it but we supposed that the reaction would be serious. So it is very difficult for me to comment on the fact that there is no reaction at all. It means that it's of no interest to anybody. I mean to say that nobody is interested in the matter of what is going on in the country. What is interesting is the PR: some people are for the president, some others are against him⋯But the facts and the matter of what is going on in the country are of no concern to anybody. I personally can't comprehend all that.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Apparently, it's a problem not only of the mass media but of the whole Russian society.
Anna Politkovskaya: Certainly. Mass media just reflect social interests, opinions and needs. You know, what shocked me most of all was the human rights activists' position. I am honest here. None of the human rights activists have made any attempt to put any questions in front of the official power. There was the only example - the appeal of the social movement "For Human Rights" headed by Lev Ponomaryov.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Yes, as far as I know, it was also signed by the manager of the museum and The Social Center named after A.D.Sakhsrov Yury Samodurov and the writer Alexander Tkachenko.
Anna Politkovskaya: I haven't seen the final wording of this document but the variant they showed to me the next day after the publication made me feel indignation. As I expressed these feelings to the authors of the appeal openly I am telling you about it now. The matter was that social appeal was called "The authorities should refute⋯" From my point of view, it is awful of them. The authorities must investigate such cases. To investigate means to interrogate Terkibaev and me, at least, by members of that big investigating group that is working now to investigate "The Nord-Ost" events under the control of the General Prosecutor Office. I understand the "The authorities should refute-"-position of human rights leaders as a desire to be acceptable by the official power. I can only wish them much success on their way. I was promised, though, that my comments would be certainly taken into account. [Indeed, Anna Politkovskaya's comments must have been taken into account. In the! final wording of the Public Appeal that was published the people who signed it demand investigating into the facts reported in the article and in case they are true - starting a criminal suite. There is no demand to refute in this document. - the editor.]
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Yesterday there appeared an article on Viktor Popkov site by Andrew Smirnov who doesn't agree to you and your supposition about "the controlled terrorist act".
Anna Politkovskaya: Sorry to say, I haven't read this article yet.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Then it wouldn't be right to discuss this topic. It might be possible to comment on the main idea of this publication - the author accuses you of being subject to explain everything by making up schemes of conspiracy. As an example of one of such-like schemes common of the modern Russian mythology Andrew Smirnov tells about the theory of global plot between the two fighting sides. He also considers the supposition of the involvement of the Russian intelligence service into the terrorist act at Dubrovka to be one of these myths. How can you comment on it?
Anna Politkovskaya: Nothing of the kind, I am not for any plot-theories. I can tell honestly - after "The Nord-Ost" a lot of western journalists and employees of foreign embassies used to come to our editorial office with the same question, "What do you think about the involvement of the Russian intelligence service into this terrorist act? Haven't you noticed anything suspicious?" Whenever I was asked this question, I answered that I refused to admit such possibility. I couldn't believe it just because it would have become very difficult to go on living if I had let myself assume it. But later, from January, we began to get some bits of information. It evidenced that there had been some involvement all the same. I started checking it mainly to prove myself that the information wasn't true. This article came from attempts to persuade myself that it wasn't true. I personally think that the reality we are living in now is horrible. It is horrible that the intelligence!
e service controls both the president and the whole system of power, that the intelligence service makes all the people jump as they wish. I started my article from the opposite thought: I wanted to make myself sure that the society was much stronger, that we were living in the democracy. And then- It took a long time to get all the information to write the article. And at last I told the editor that I could write the article. And at the same time my Chechen friends who are living in Moscow told me that they had seen that person - Terkibaev - in Moscow and if I wanted they would be able to get in touch with him. I told that I would certainly meet him. I thought such meeting would be very important. Besides, it was just interesting for me what kind of person was he and what was his life like. At first he refused but then accepted my offer to meet. It was his right.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: So if I've caught you right, you mean to say that you had the information concerning the fact that Terkibaev had really been among the terrorists in the Theater Center long before the interview with him, don't you?
Anna Politkovskaya: Exactly. I could have written the article without meeting him. The next bit of the information will be revealed later as the authorities take some measures.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: I have some more questions connected with, so to say, technical points. First, don't you know where Khanpash Terkibaev is now?
Anna Politkovskaya: No information at all. He has disappeared somewhere but I was sure that it would be so.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Have any other representatives of mass media tried to find him?
Anna Politkovskaya: Yes, they have. Many of them have tried but it was possible to get through to him only once.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: In your interview to the TVS channel that took place on April 28 you told that the members of special military unit who were assaulting the building couldn't have been aware of the "controlled terrorist act". But there appears one more question: the fact that Terkibaev could leave the building of the Theater Center means that he had accomplices among those representatives of the enforcement structures who were in the cordon. The plan of the Theater Center building that Terkibaev had couldn't guarantee that he would manage to leave the blocked building.
Anna Politkovskaya: It was not so. The building wasn't blocked that hard. There was a possibility to escape. If we want to go deeper into that point, I can tell you that too many absolutely inexplicable stories happened there. I can give you some examples. Yes, there was a cordon. And it was rather difficult for me to get into the Theater Center as one special structure said "yes" whereas the other said "no", the Home Affairs Ministry allowed but representatives of the FSB didn't as they didn't have Patrushev's allowance. On having at last received the permission to go, I approach the last circle of the cordon and -see a woman. I ask her, "Who are you? What are you doing here?" And she tells me, "I am this and that". An absolutely incidental person. Then a strange man turned up from somewhere and joined me. I ask him, "And what are you?" The matter is that I was afraid to enter the area that wasn't observable together with him where it was easy to shoot me dead. He answers, !
"I am from the Red Cross". I inquire him, "Well, but do you have any documents to prove it?" The white armband with the red cross that he was wearing couldn't be regarded as a proof. And one more strange occasion happened inside the cordon where the terrorists were nearby, where it was supposed to be dangerous as the Alfa-men were lying there under the cars and when in spite of all that a woman threw herself at me. She tells me, "I am the wife of -tell Baraev this and that." I was completely astonished. I don't know whether she really was the person she gave herself out to be but the fact remains. She managed to get there. There were a lot of similar situations there: some people went inside the cordon, some other went out of it - none of them was known to the public. And if I witnessed what was going on at that time it means that somebody else could leave the building through some other exit, from the back one, for example.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: You mean to say that it was possible to pass the cordon, don't you?
Anna Politkovskaya: Yes! I can say when it became impossible to go through it. It happened an hour and a half or two hours before the assault. But it hadn't been so before that time. That is why I am not suspicious of this very detail that Terkibaev had managed to leave the building before the assault.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: How can you explain that Terkibaev was let to survive? He could have been put away, at least, couldn't he?
Anna Politkovskaya: I don't have the unequivocal answer to this question. I just think that he is a very convenient person for our authorities. He can contact both this and that sides, he can represent the Chechen public in the Russian delegation in Strasbourg, he can wriggle out of any situation. The world has known such people in all times. They just needed him.
Actually he made a big mistake when he made an appointment with me.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Sure.
Anna Politkovskaya: And I think that he has already been explained that.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: And the motif of the meeting? Vanity?
Anna Politkovskaya: He is absolutely vain. But there is one more explanation that, I think, has some grounds. He might have had some problems. He might have dared to accept my offer to meet not to be killed. And now who would dare to commit it!
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Exactly, as there would be a scandal then for sure.
Anna Politkovskaya: That's it. It would be absolutely clear why it was done.
Editor in chief Stanislav Dmitriyevsky.
Editor of this edition Oksana Chelysheva.
This edition has been put out with the support of The National Endowment for Democracy, as part of their "Russian-Chechen Information Partnership".
==========
《附件七》是車臣外交部公文，抗議俄羅斯之自導自演，嫁禍於車臣。
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Official Statement
09/12/2003
http://www.chechnya-mfa.info/print_news.php?func=detail&par=101
PRESS-RELEASE: TERRORISM IN RUSSIA IS ORGANIZED AND MANAGED BY THE RUSSIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES FOR PROPAGANDA AND SCAPEGOATING PURPOSES
Terrorism in Russia is organized and managed by the Russian security and military intelligence services for propaganda and scapegoating purposes. We do not think that the latest bombing in Moscow is an exception to this rule.
The fact that Russian security services in committing terrorist acts in Russia and elsewhere occasionally use their agents of Chechen origin does not make the Chechen people and the Chechen government responsible for the Kremlin's dreadful crimes. The Chechen government will not, under any circumstances, accept violence against civilians and civilian objects. We repeat that we condemn terrorism in all its forms.
We regret that the western governments fail to see that it is Russian governmental structures that organize these terrorist acts and that it is Russian agents that carry out these terrorist acts. There is a plenty of evidence to this.
For instance, Mr. Khanpasha Terkibaev, an ethnic Chechen serving for the Russian Secret Service and who is one of the main organizers and direct participant of the hostage taking in the Moscow Theater Center at Dubrovka in October 2002, is a clear proof that terror in Russia comes from the Russian government.
Mr. Khanpasha Terkibaev even after the hostage taking has continued to work for the Russian state structures, including the deputy head of President Putin's administration Mr. Vladislav Yuryevich Surkov and Putin's aide Mr. Sergei Vladimirovich Yastrzhembsky. As the hostage taking ended in killing not only Russian but also western nationals, we believe that western governments should no longer close eyes to Kremlin’s role in terrorism. [1]"
Press Office
See, for instance, Anna Politkovskaya’s article in Novaya Gazeta, issue # 30, 28 April 2003.
天啊! 分兩次還貼不下. 不過才三萬多字而已.
In an interview with journalist Mark Franchetti of London's "The Sunday Times," Abubakar isquoted as saying: "We are a suicide group. Here we have bombs and rockets and mines. Our women suicide bombers have their fingers on the detonator at all times. Time is running out.... Let the Russians just try to storm the building. That's all we are waiting for. We cherish death more than you do life." When he was finally allowed to interview Baraev, Franchetti witnessed this scene: "Baraev and his men paraded three Chechen women dressed in black with headscarves covering all but their eyes. In one hand each held a pistol, in the other a detonator linked to a short wire attached to 5 kilograms of explosive strapped to her stomach. Except for a beam of light from inside the auditorium, the foyer was dark. One of Baraev's men used a torch to show off the explosives belts. 'They work in shifts,' explained Baraev. 'Those on duty have their finger on the detonator at all times. One push of the button and they will explode. The auditorium is mined, all wired up with heavy explosives. Just let the Russians try to break in and the whole place will explode.'"(79) (These statements, as we have seen, were an apparent bluff by the terrorist leaders -- the explosives were not in reality in a condition in which they could be detonated.)
Putin and his team, manifestly, now had an 11 September 2001 of their own, though it remains unclear whether or not they had been surprised by this development. Signs in Arabic, the brandishing of the Koran, veiled women suicide bombers dressed all in black -- what more could the Russian leadership need? Moreover, as distinct from 1999, the terrorists on this occasion were unquestionably Chechens, except, perhaps, for a sprinkling of Arabs such as the fictional "Yasir." The seizing of the theater building, it was heavy-handedly suggested, constituted a link in a chain leading back to the infamous Al-Qaeda.
Blackening Maskhadov
In addition to seeking to depict the hostage-taking incident as a second 9/11, a second aim behind the regime's response to the crisis appeared to be to fully discredit Aslan Maskhadov, and thus render the possibility of negotiations with him or other moderate Chechen separatists unthinkable. Early on the morning of 25 October, the website newsru.com (affiliated with NTV) reported: "There has come information that the order to seize the hostages was given by Aslan Maskhadov. One of the Chechen terrorists stated this. A tape of [Maskhadov's] declaration was shown by the channel Al-Jazeera. In it Maskhadov says, 'In the very near future, we will conduct an operation which will overturn the history of the Chechen war.'"(80)
This statement by Maskhadov was cited later on the same day by official spokesmen for both the FSB and the Interior Ministry as self-evident proof of his responsibility for the raid. On 31 October, Putin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembskii emphasized at a news conference that there could be no question of holding future talks with Maskhadov. "Maskhadov can no longer be considered a legitimate representative of this resistance," Yastrzhembskii told reporters. "We have to wipe out the commanders of the movement," including Maskhadov, he stressed.(81)
This aggressive campaign by the Russian leadership seems to have borne significant diplomatic fruit. On 30 October, the "Los Angeles Times" reported that "a senior U.S. official" in Moscow had termed Maskhadov "damaged goods" with links to terrorism. The senior official went on to assert that "the Chechen leader should be excluded from peace talks."(82) In more judicious fashion, one influential Russian democrat and parliamentary faction leader, Grigorii Yavlinskii, confided on 27 October "his view of Maskhadov has changed. If Maskhadov commanded the rebels in the theater, he said, he could never participate in a political settlement."(83)
But how strong was the evidence linking Maskhadov to the terrorist action? Journalist Mikhail Falkov looked into the issue of the tape of Maskhadov's statement that had been shown over Al-Jazeera and learned that: "Russian television viewers had been presented only with a fragment of the original tape. On the tape it was distinctly evident that the filming had been conducted not in October but toward the end of the summer." This discovery appeared to back up the claim of Maskhadov's official spokesman in Europe, Akhmed Zakaev, that "the question [in Maskhadov's taped statement] concerned not the seizure of hostages but a military operation against federal forces."(84) It should also be noted that, on 24 October, the day following the hostage taking at Dubrovka, Zakaev had written to Lord Judd of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and unambiguously declared: "The Chechen leadership headed by President A. Maskhadov decisively condemns all actions against the civilian population. We don't accept the terrorist method for the solution of any kind of problems.... We call on both sides, both the armed people in the theater and the government of Russia, to find an un-bloody exit from this difficult situation."(85)
In an article appearing in "Moskovskie novosti," journalists Shermatova and Teit reported that a careful analysis of a hushed conversation that had been conducted in Chechen between Abubakar and Movsar Baraev and had been accidentally captured by NTV on 25 October showed the following: "Here is Movsar Baraev answering the questions of NTV correspondents before a television camera. Next to him stands a rebel, known as Abubakar: he in an undertone in Chechen corrects Movsar. When Baraev declares that they had been sent by Shamil Basaev, Abubakar quietly suggests, 'Pacha ch'ogo al,' 'point to the president.' After that, Movsar obediently adds: 'Aslan Maskhadov.'"(86) Abubakar thus sought publicly to tie Maskhadov directly to the hostage-taking incident.
ThatAbubakar andnot MovsarBaraevwasthe de factoleaderof the terroristsalso becomes clear fromFranchetti'sreport: "Atone pointhe[Baraev] loweredhis guard. Perhaps succumbing to the lure of fame,heoffered to let mefilm the hostages in the auditorium. Hisright-hand man [Abubakar] fiercelydisagreed.... They brieflyleft the storageroom to confer inthe dark foyer.... Baraev came back. Therewouldbe no morefilming."(87)Abubakar had prevailed overBaraevin a test of wills.
It seems that Abubakar may also in a subtle way have been involved in helping the federal forces to prepare the storming of the theater. "Several sources in the special services," the newspaper "Moskovskii komsomolets" reported on 28 October, "have informed us that in the juice which the negotiators took to the hostages, without their knowledge, there was admixed a substance which was to soften the toxic action of the gas."(88) Abubakar himself raised this topic. Summing up one of her discussion/negotiations with Abubakar, journalist Politkovskaya has recalled: "We agree that I will start bringing water into the building. Bakar suddenly throws in, on his own initiative, 'And you can bring juice.' I ask him if I can also bring food for the children being held inside, but he refuses."(89)
A leading journalist writing on the pages of "Moskovskie novosti," Valerii Vyzhutovich, looked into the issue of Maskhadov's supposed responsibility for the raid and concluded: "There are no direct proofs convicting Maskhadov of the preparation of the terrorist act in Moscow." He added that "not a single court, not even ours, the most humane and just," would uphold the admissibility in a trial of the edited and highly selective footage shown over Al-Jazeera television -- "a propagandistic soporific" -- in Vyzhutovich's words.(90)
When Politkovskaya, in a one-on-one private conversation with Abubakar, directly asked him, "Do you submit to Maskhadov?" he replied, "Yes, Maskhadov is our president, but we are making war by ourselves." "But you are aware," she pressed him, "that Ilyas Akhmadov [a separatist spokesman loyal to Maskhadov] is conducting peace negotiations in America and Akhmed Zakaev in Europe, and that they are representatives of Maskhadov. Perhaps you would like to be connected with them right now? Or let me dial them for you." "What is this about?" Abubakar retorted angrily. "They don't suit us. They are conducting those negotiations slowly...while we are dying in the forests. We are sick of them."(91) Abubakar's feelings concerning Maskhadov and other Chechen separatist moderates are revealed in these words.
The regime, for its part, seems to have concluded that it now possessed ample, indeed overwhelming, evidence to prove to both Russian citizens and to Western leaders two key points: first, that the hostage takers were dangerous and repugnant international terrorists in the Al-Qaeda mold; and, second, that the leader of the separatist Chechens, Aslan Maskhadov, had been irretrievably discredited by the raid, rendering the possibility of any future negotiations with him unthinkable.
FOOTNOTES (28) Vadim Rechkalov, "Vdovii bunt," izvestia.ru, 25 October 2002; and Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit za Nord-Ost," "Komsomolskaya pravda," 22 April 2003. See also "Passport terrorista," izvestia.ru, 24 October 2003.
(29)In "Krasnaya zvezda," 26 June 2001.
(30)Sanobar Shermatova, "Glavnyi rabototorgovets," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 October 2002.
(31)In "Novaya gazeta," 28 June 2001.
(32)Sanobar Shermatova, "Tainaya voina spetssluzhb," "Moskovskie novosti," 8 August 2000.
(33)Anne Nivat, "Chechnya: Brutality and Indifference," crimesofwar.org, 6 January 2003.
(34)Sanobar Shermatova, "Glavnyi rabototorgovets," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 October 2002.
(35)Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency, 26 April 2003.
(36)"Tainyi sovetnik VPK," "Zavtra," 1 June 2001. At the time of this interview, Surikov was serving as head of the State Duma's Department on Industry. On Surikov, see also: Maksim Kalashnikov, "Chelovek, kotoryi verboval Basaeva," stringer-news.ru, 10 July 2002.
(37)See Petr Pryanshnikov, "Voloshin i Basaev na lazurnom beregu: foto na pamyat," "Versiya," 4 July 2000. This article can be found at: http:www.compromat.ru/main/voloshin/basaev.htm. See also: Andrei Batumskii, "Sgovor," "Versiya," 3 August 1999.
(38)"Doslovno," "Novaya gazeta," No. 37, 4-10 October 1999, p. 3. Lebed''s statement originally appeared in the French newspaper "Le Figaro" on 29 September 1999.
(39)Yurii Shchekochikhin, "Nezamechennye novosti nedeli kotorye menya udivili," "Novaya gazeta,"
(40)Aleksandr Khinshtein, "Chernye vdovy pod 'kryshei' Petrovki," "Moskovskii komsomolets," 23 July 2003.
(41)Statement of Moscow's chief procurator Mikhail Avdyukov in "V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003.
(42)"V Moskve gotovilos..."
(43)Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..."
(44)Otdel prestupnosti, "U terroristov problemy so vzryvchatkoi," "Kommersant," 7 July 2003. The same claim is made in Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
(45)"U terroristov...," "Kommersant," 7 July 2003.
(46)Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..." Khinshtein's source for this information was officers of the MUR.
(47)Statement of Colonel Taratorin over Russian central television: Leonid Berres, "MUR opravdalsya za 'Nord-Ost,'" izvestia.ru, 7 February 2003.
(48)Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit..."
(49)Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..."
(50)On this episode, see Chapter 5, "Proval FSB v Ryazani," in Aleksandr Litvinenko, Yurii Feltshtinskii, "FSB vzryvaet Rossiyu" (Internet Edition, 2002). English translation: "Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within" (New York: S.P.I. Books, 2002), pp. 62-104. See also Aleksandr Litvinenko, "Ryazanskii sled," Chapter 10 in his "LPG (Lubyanskaya prestupnaya gruppirovka)" (Internet Edition, 2003).
(51)Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..."
(52)Ibid. Khinshtein identified Abubakar as being Ruslan Elmurzaev, 30 years old, a native of Urus-Martan in Chechnya, and a former Russian police employee. Subsequently the procurator of Moscow confirmed most of this information, noting also that Elmurzaev's patronymic is Abu-Khasanovich: "V Moskve gotovilos..."
(53)Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit..."
(54)Ibid.
(55)Ibid.
(56)Kavkaz Tsentr News Agency, 26 April 2003.
(57)Sergei Dyupin, Aleksei Gerasimov, Leonid Berres, "Zakhvat zalozhnikov v Moskve," "Kommersant,"
(58)Sergei Dyupin, "Peredozirovka," "Kommersant," 28 October 2002.
(59)Sanobar Shermatova, Aleksandr Teit, "Shestero iz baraevskikh," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 April 2003.
(60)Sanobar Shermatova, "'Nord-Ost' ne planirovalsya?" "Moskovskie novosti," 24 June 2003.
(61)Yurii Shchekochikhin, "TsRU predupredilo," "Novaya gazeta," 28 October 2002.
(62)See "Litvinenko: Yushenkova ubili za rassledovanie terakta v 'Nord-Oste,'" lenta.ru, 25 April 2003; and Anna Politkovskaya, "Odin iz grupppy terroristov utselil. My ego nashli," "Novaya gazeta," 28 April 2003.
(63)Sanobar Shermatova, Aleksandr Teit, "Antivakhkhabitskii emissar," "Moskvovskie novosti," 13 May 2003. Terkibaev was killed on 15 December 2003 in an automobile crash that some commentators found to be suspicious. "The double agent Terkibaev was removed as a dangerous witness," the website newsru.com observed on 16 December 2003.
(64)"Posobnik terroristov ne uspel spasti zalozhnikov," "Kommersant," 11 June 2003.
(65)grani.ru, 28 November 2002. The website provided a list of the names of 979 individuals taken captive on 23 October. As of 25 October, 58 of the captives had been released. ("The Moscow Times," 26 October 2002).
(66)"V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003. A 41st terrorist, the procurator noted, turned out to be an ethnic Russian, the father of one of the hostages, who had foolishly entered the theater on 25 October and had then been shot by the terrorists.
(67)"Genprokuratura ustanovila imena 33-kh terroristov, zakhvativshikh zalozhnikov v Moskve," newsru.com, 6 November 2002. Seven remained unidentified as of October 2003.
(68)Oleg Petrovksii, "V bande Baraeva byl terrorist iz 'Al-Kaedy,'" utro.ru, 30 October 2002.
(69)"Moskva, zalozhniki," vesti7.ru, 2 November 2002. This program was broadcast on 26 October.
(70)"Polnyi spisok opoznannykh terroristov," gzt.ru, 23 October 2003.
(71)Vladimir Demchenko, "Passport terrorista," izvestia.ru, 24 October 2003.
(72)In newsru.com, 24 October 2002.
(73)gzt.ru, 25 October 2002. Item posted in English.
(74)newsru.com, 24 October 2002. The item was reported at 00:04 a.m. on 24 October.
(75)In gazeta.ru, 24 October 2002.
(76)"Jazeera Shows Taped Chechen Rebel Statements," Reuters, 24 October 2002.
(77)Associated Press, 26 October 2002.
(78)"Russian NTV Shows Previously Filmed Interview with Hostage Takers' Leader," BBC Monitoring
(79)Mark Franchetti, "Dream of Martyrdom," "The Sunday Times," 27 October 2002.
(80)In newsru.com, 27 October.
(81)"Russia Seeks to 'Wipe Out' Chechen Leaders," Reuters, 31 October 2002.
(82)Robyn Dixon and David Holley, "U.S. Rejects Chechen Separatist Chief," "Los Angeles Times," 30 October 2002.
(83)Sharon LaFraniere, "Setback Seen for Rebel Cause," "The Washington Post," 28 October 2002.
(84)Mikhail Falkov, "Kto i gde gotovil moskovskii terakt?" utro.ru, 31 October 2002.
(85)"Chechen Press Release on Moscow Hostage Crisis," chechenpress.com, 24 October 2002.
(86)Sanobar Shermatova, Aleksandr Teit, "Shestero iz baraevskikh," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 April 2003. The transcript reads: "[Movsar Baraev]: 'We are acting on orders from the supreme military emir. Our supreme military emir there is Shamil Basaev. You know him very well. And Maskhadov is our president.'" ("Russian NTV shows...," BBC Monitoring Service, 26 October 2002.
(87)Mark Franchetti, "Dream of Martyrdom," "The Sunday Times," 27 October 2002.
(88)"Gibel zalozhnikov -- rezultat oshibki spetsluzhb?" "Moskovskii komsomolets," 28 October 2002.
(89)Anna Politkovskaya, "My Hours Inside the Moscow Theater," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, No. 153, 31 October 2002.
(90)Valerii Vyzhutovich, "Usyplayuyushchii gaz," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 October 2002.
(91)Anna Politkovskaya, "Tsena razgovorov," "Novaya Gazeta," No. 80, 28 October 2002.
THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT (Part 3)
Negotiations Leading Nowhere
The failure of three of the four bombs to detonate confronted both the terrorists and the Russian authorities with an exceedingly slippery situation. How was the crisis to be resolved? Abubakar reluctantly consented to conducting a series of negotiations with various Duma deputies, journalists, and at least one doctor, while the Russian power ministries for their part set about practicing a raid on the theater building. Duma deputies who, at great personal risk, visited the building in order to negotiate with the terrorists were: Yabloko faction leader Grigorii Yavlinskii; Aslambek Aslakhanov, the parliamentary deputy representing Chechnya; Irina Khadamada; Iosif Kobzon; and Vyacheslav Igrunov. (Another Duma faction leader, Boris Nemtsov of the Union of Rightist Forces, negotiated with the terrorists by telephone.) Also visiting the building were former Russian Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov and the former president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev. A key role was, as we have seen, played in the negotiations by journalist Anna Politkovskaya. Doctor Leonid Roshal, who treated the hostages, and Sergei Govorukhin, the son of a famous Russian filmmaker and himself a Chechen war veteran, also attempted to facilitate the negotiations.(92)
Yavlinskii's experience with the negotiations has been summarized thus: "The hostage takers were said to have asked specifically for Yavlinskii.... He said he met with the hostage takers for an hour and a half on the night of 24 October. They said they wanted an end to the war in Chechnya and the withdrawal of federal troops, but Yavlinskii said when he tried to get them to formulate their demands, they were unable to come up with any kind of a coherent negotiating position. 'Let's go step by step. You want a cease-fire, OK, let's go for a cease-fire,' Yavlinskii said he told the hostage takers. 'Tell me which regions to pull troops out of. Tell me something I can use.'"(93)
"I insisted," Nemtsov confided to "Nezavisimaya gazeta," "that we had maximally to move the negotiation process forward with a single goal -- to free the children and women. And my logic -- about which both Patrushev and Voloshin knew -- and I stated it also to Abubakar, the politruk [political officer] of the terrorists responsible for the negotiations, was the following: for each peaceful day in Chechnya they would release hostages. One peaceful day -- the children; another one -- the women, and so on. The rebels liked that idea. And the day before yesterday was indeed a peaceful day. But when I reminded Abubakar about our agreements, he sent me to the devil and said that one should talk with either Basaev or Maskhadov."(94)
"There are five requests," Politkovskaya has recalled, "on my list. Food for the hostages, personal hygiene for the women, water and blankets. Jumping ahead a little, we will only manage to agree on water and juice.... I begin to ask what they want, but, in political terms, Bakar isn't on firm ground. He's 'just a soldier' and nothing more. He explains what it all means to him, at length and precisely, and four points can be identified from what he says. First, [President Vladimir] Putin should 'give the word' and declare the end of the war. Secondly, in the course of a day, he should demonstrate that his words aren't empty by, for example, taking the armed forces out of one region.... Then I ask, 'Whom do you trust? Whose word on the withdrawal of the armed forces would you believe?' It turns out that it's (Council of Europe rapporteur) Lord Judd. And we return to their third point. It's very simple -- if the first two points are met, the hostages will be released. And as for the extremists themselves? 'We'll stay to fight. We'll die in battle.'"(95)
While letting volunteer negotiators such as Politkovskaya buy some time, the regime limited itself to delivering only a few public messages to the terrorists. On 25 October, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Patrushev, "declared that the terrorists would be guaranteed their lives if the hostages...were released. He made this declaration after meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin." Also on 25 October, at 8:30 in the evening, "the chair of the Federation Council, Sergei Mironov, addressed the hostages and terrorists on direct open air on a radio program of Ekho Moskvy. Addressing the terrorists, he [Mironov] declared: 'Advance your real conditions, free our people, and you will be ensured safety and security to leave the boundaries of Russia. You have de facto already achieved your goal of attracting attention. The entire world is talking about it.'"(96) Presented one day before the launching of the storm, these statements appear to have been another attempt to buy time.
Late in the evening of that same day, 25 October, the regime offered to begin serious negotiations on the following day (26 October), with retired General Viktor Kazantsev, Putin's official representative in the Southern Federal District, meeting with the hostage takers. This gesture came at a time when preparations for the storm were moving ahead full tilt. The rebels, for their part, reacted positively to this development, "announcing to the hostages that they had 'good news.'... Tomorrow [Saturday, 26 October] at 10:00 a.m., Kazantsev will come. Everything will be normal. They have come to an agreement. This suits us. Behave peacefully. We are not beasts. We will not kill you if you sit quietly and peacefully.'"(97) Political and security affairs correspondent Pavel Felgenhauer has reported that Kazantsev made no preparations to actually fly from southern Russia to Moscow.(98)
According to Duma faction leader Yavlinskii, he came to understand "by 5 p.m. on 25 October" that Putin had adopted an irrevocable decision to storm the building.(99) The gazeta.ru website has reported that, "The first information that a decision concerning a storm had been taken and that it had been set for the morning of 26 October was gained by journalists working in the area of the theater center at about 11:00 p.m. on 25 October."(100) Felgenhauer observed over Ekho Moskvy radio on 26 October: "Our forces...stormed the 'Nord-Ost' building after two days of preparations, without even so much as a prior attempt to negotiate with the captors in any meaningful way to secure a peaceful solution to the affair.... This week, first there was reconnaissance. By every conceivable means of electronic and acoustic surveillance, the terrorists' exchanges and movements were monitored. On Friday [25 October], the plans were reported to Vladimir Putin, who gave the go-ahead for the operation to start on Saturday."(101)
A member of the special forces units which took the building provided support for Felgenhauer's interpretation in remarks made to gzt.ru: "We put bugs everywhere, even in the concert hall. We accompanied every negotiator; in the beginning we did it openly, but then the Chechens became indignant.... When the journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, made the agreement with them to deliver water, food, and medicine, headquarters had already prepared everything.... Everybody knew about the storm. Only nobody knew when it would happen."(102)
It was the special forces and not the terrorists who appear to have precipitated the final denouement. "At 5:20 a.m. [on 26 October]," journalist Valerii Yakov has written, "the operation suffered its first setback. The terrorists noticed in the building a movement of a group of 'Alfa' [special forces] and opened fire. They were instantly destroyed, but it was necessary immediately to correct the plan [of attack].... At this time, a representative of the FSB, Pavel Kudryavtsev, came out to the journalists and reported that the terrorists had shot two men and that another man and a woman had been wounded. Later it emerged that this information was false."(103) The above-cited correspondent Felgenhauer has, for his part, commented: "There are no serious grounds for these heroic fairy tales [about an execution of the hostages by the terrorists] to be believed. Long before the building was stormed, it had become obvious in many ways that everything would be decided precisely on Saturday morning."(104) The producer of the Nord-Ost musical, Georgii Vasilev, who was the de facto leader and chief spokesman for the hostages, declared: "I have heard that they began the storm supposedly because they [the terrorists] began to execute the hostages. That is the official point of view of the authorities. I want to say that there were no executions -- only threats."(105)
As is well known, a decision was taken by the Russian authorities to employ a powerful gas in the retaking of the building. As one military affairs specialist, Viktor Baranets, has reported, "The idea of using gas during the operation to liberate the hostages was in the heads of many members of the operational headquarters already during the second day of the emergency situation when it became clear that they would hardly come to agreement with the terrorists.... It was decided to use the most powerful poison [available] -- a psycho-chemical gas (PChG). According to some sources, it has the name 'Kolokol [i.e., Bell]-1.'"(106) What was in this gas? "We are never going to know exactly what chemical it was," Lev Fedorov, an environmental activist who is the head of the Russian Union for Chemical Safety, has aptly commented, "because in this country the state is more important than the people."(107)
According to the website gazeta.ru, the special forces began pumping gas into the hall through the ventilation system at 4:30 a.m., "a half an hour before the storm."(108) Other sources contend, however, that it may have been significantly earlier, perhaps shortly after 1:00 a.m.(109) One possibility is that a decision was taken to strengthen the dosage of the gas after the initial infusion did not seem to be having the desired effect. The chief anesthesiologist of Moscow, Yevgenii Evdokimov, has speculated: "The death of those people was possibly caused by an overdose of the substance [in the gas]."(110) The website gzt.ru wrote on 28 October: "It has become known to 'Gazeta' that the first attempt to neutralize the bandits located among the hostages did not succeed -- the concentration of the poisonous substance turned out to be insufficient."(111)
According to an October 2003 statement by the press department of the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office, 125 hostages died from the effects of the gas, some of them following the storm while they were in hospital, while five were killed by the terrorists.(112) The actual death toll from the effects of the gas might, according to some estimates, have in fact exceeded 200.(113) In addition, scores of other hostages were reported at the time to be seriously ill from the effects of the gas.(114) In April 2003, a lawyer representing some of the former hostages asserted that approximately 40 more of the hostages had died since 26 October 2002.(115) In October 2003, the newspaper "Versiya," summing up the results of an investigation conducted by its journalists, stipulated that "about 300" of the former hostages were now dead.(116) The incompetence and the disorganization of the medical and emergency teams called in to treat the ill and the dying were unquestionably a cause of many of the deaths. The medical teams, in their defense, had not been informed about what was in the gas. When the Russian State Duma declined to carry out an inquiry into the actions of the medical teams, the Union of Rightist Forces conducted its own investigation and then published its scathing findings.(117)
At 8:00 a.m. on 26 October, one hour after the building had been declared liberated, Russian state television (RTR) showed the following mendacious tableau: "The gang leader [Movsar Baraev] met his death with a bottle of brandy in his hand. According to special-purpose-unit men, they found an enormous number of used syringes and empty alcohol bottles on the premises. The criminals, who described themselves as champions of Islam and freedom fighters, must have spent the last hours in the theater bar. Even the women, officers say, smelt strongly of alcohol. Probably because of that,... [the women terrorists] did not have time to set in motion the explosive devices attached to their waists. According to specialists, each device contains at least 800 grams of TNT. Besides, in order to increase the impact, the devices were filled with ball bearings and nails. Another explosive device was planted in the center of the hall, which, to all appearances, was intended to make the ceiling collapse. And there is a whole arsenal on the stage: assault rifles, TNT, cartridges. And the most interesting are these homemade grenades. Despite their small size, they are extremely powerful."(118) (By this time, if not earlier, the Russian authorities must have become fully aware that the explosives placed in the hall had been incapable of detonating.)
On 27 October, President Putin invited the special forces commandos from the "Alfa" and "Vympel" units who had taken back the theater to a special reception at the Kremlin. In his remarks, Putin praised the professionalism of the two units of the FSB, and he then joined with them in a silent standing toast.(119) In early January 2003, shortly after New Year's Eve, "Putin signed a secret decree to award six people with Hero of Russia stars, including three FSB officials and two soldiers from the special units 'Alfa' and 'Vympel.' The fifth 'hero' is the chemist who gassed the theater center."(120)
Following the storming of the theater building, the president's approval ratings for his conduct of the war in Chechnya shot up in the polls: "If in September, 34 percent of Russian citizens had been in favor of continuing military actions, while 56 percent had favored peace negotiations, at the end of October -- for the first time since the beginning of 2001 -- the opinions divided almost half and half: 46 percent were for military actions, while 45 percent were for negotiations."(121)
Questions
From the testimony of former hostages interviewed by the Russian media, it seems virtually certain that the terrorists did have ample time to destroy many of the hostages before they themselves had been overcome by the gas or shot by the attacking special forces. Why did they not do so? As we have seen, most of the explosives in the building were "fakes" or very weak bombs presenting a danger principally to the women terrorists wearing them. Even without detonating the bombs, however, the terrorists carried real automatic weapons and could easily have raked the hostages with automatic-weapon fire. They clearly chose, however, to let the hostages live. Even an Interior Ministry general who had been identified by the terrorists and had been separated from the other hostages was not killed (though his daughter died from the effects of the gas).(122) Theater producer Vasilev has recalled: "When the shooting began, they [the terrorists] told us to lean forward in the theater seats and cover our heads behind the seats."(123)
How many of the terrorists were killed in the raid? In June 2003, Moscow City Prosecutor Mikhail Avdyukov stipulated that a total of 40 terrorists had been killed and that none had managed to escape.(124) The same figure was given by Avdyukov's successors in October 2003.(125) At 9:44 a.m. on 26 October 2002, however -- that is, almost three hours after the building had been declared liberated -- it was reported by Interfax that only 32 terrorists had been killed. The same day, the director of the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, affirmed that "34 gunmen were killed and an unspecified number arrested."(126) By contrast, on 28 October, gzt.ru, a "centrist" publication, reported that "50 terrorists -- 32 men and 18 women" had been killed and "three others taken into custody."(127) The compromise figure of 40 dead terrorists was arrived at later.
A number of questions have been asked by analysts and journalists about whether or not the de facto leader of the terrorists, Abubakar, had in fact been killed. In June 2003, Moscow Prosecutor Avdyukov insisted that Ruslan Abu-Khasanovich Elmurzaev's body had been found and identified.(128) In March 2003, however, retired FSB Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Trepashkin had written that, following the events at Dubrovka, "I proposed to the investigators that they try to identify 'Abubakar' in the first days after the event. However, later an investigator telephoned and said that he could not find the corpses of a number of people, including that of 'Abubakar,' and therefore there would be no identification."(129) And journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein has reported: "At first there existed a version that Abubakar died during the storming of the House of Culture.... But a series of examinations showed that there was no Abubakar in the hall."(130) Despite Prosecutor Avdyukov's statement, it appears thus to be an open question as to whether or not Abubakar was killed.
In October 2003, film director Sergei Govoroukhin, one of the volunteer negotiators who had spoken at length with Abubakar at Dubrovka, stated his belief that Abubakar was still alive. Despite his persistent requests, he said, Russian prosecutors had proved unable to show him Abubakar's body. "Moreover," Govorukhin continued, "two weeks ago, during a trip to Chechnya, I asked intelligence [officers] of the Combined Group of Forces of the Northern Caucasus whether it was true that Abubakar was in Chechnya. I was uniformly given the same answer: 'Of course he is here. He has shown himself rather actively in recent times, and only for the past month has nothing been heard of him.' Therefore I can maintain absolutely accurately that he is alive."(131)
Similarly, also in October 2003, an investigative report appearing in the newspaper "Kommersant" noted that "until the summer of this year [2003], when the case concerning the explosion at McDonald's restaurant was being investigated by the procuracy of the western district [okrug] of Moscow, Ruslan Elmurzaev was still on the wanted list. He was removed from the wanted list only when the case was taken over by the Moscow [City] Prosecutor's Office."(132) The same report also added this key detail: "As sources in the FSB and [Interior Ministry] have made clear, the terrorists themselves ordered that the bombs [in the Dubrovka theater] be rendered harmless before the seizing of the hostages. Abubakar was supposedly afraid of accidental explosions."(133)
Aftermath Of The Hostage-Taking Incident
On the evening of 6 February 2003, a sensation of sorts was created when "the head of the operational-investigative department of the MUR [Moscow Criminal Investigations Office], Yevgenii Taratorin, made an unexpected announcement on the television program 'Man and the Law.'" In Taratorin's words, "In October-November of last year, in addition to seizing the theater center at Dubrovka, the band of Movsar Baraev planned explosions in the Moscow underground, at a popular restaurant, and at the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall. In the words of the policeman, the operatives of the capital's criminal-investigation unit were able to avert all of these terrorist acts." Following the explosion of the "Tavriya" car bomb at McDonald's restaurant on Porkryshkin Street in Moscow on 19 October, Taratorin related, the MUR discovered "in the center of Moscow at the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall in direct proximity to the GAI [traffic police] post an automobile of silver color containing explosives." Quick action by the MUR and the arrest of certain of the terrorists, Taratorin claimed, forced the hostage takers to move up the date of their assault on the theater at Dubrovka from 7 November to 23 October.
According to Taratorin, "on 24 October, the operatives averted two other terrorist acts: the explosion of an automobile at the Pyramid [Restaurant] in Pushkin Square and the self-detonation of a female suicide bomber at one of the stations of the capital's underground." The terrorists, sensing the danger of a rapid unmasking, then fled to the North Caucasus region. (Taratorin appears here to be exaggerating the achievements of the MUR: the bombings failed to occur, as we have seen, most likely either because the terrorists "exhibited cowardice" or because the bombs themselves were faulty in design or construction.)
In the course of his televised statement, Taratorin added that, in November 2002, in the village of Chernoe in Moscow Oblast, the police had "discovered a house in which, among apples, there was found ammunition and, next to the cottage, a hiding place in which explosives brought from Ingushetia had first been concealed."(134) (The explosives, he said, had later been transferred to two garages located on Leninskii Prospekt and Ogorodnyi Proezd in Moscow.) In January 2003, Taratorin added, two of the intended car bombs had been found in a parking lot off Zvenigorod Highway.
Most sensationally of all, Taratorin claimed that "five people" in all had been arrested for participating in the terrorist act. Queried about this statement, the Russian Prosecutor-General's Office insisted heatedly that only two persons had so far been arrested, one of them the walk-on Chechen volunteer Zaurbek Talikhigov. Journalists soon discovered, however, that "three more Chechens whom they had connected to Dubrovka had been released last November [2002]."(135)
Following this televised statement by the MUR colonel, "the procuracy opened against Yevgenii Taratorin a [criminal] case for his having revealed a secret of the investigation. But this did not stop the colonel -- in particular, he intended to meet with journalists...in order to relate to them the details of the investigation in the course of which the MUR officers did not succeed in finding understanding on the part of the 'neighbors' from the FSB."(136) Taratorin was placed under arrest by the FSB on 23 June 2003, as part of a putative "campaign against werewolves" in the Russian Interior Ministry.(137) This lengthy campaign and media reactions to it strongly suggested that the arrest of Taratorin, like that of Trepashkin, was a selective one triggered solely by the need to silence an official who had begun to expose the fabric of lies that constituted the official version of events.
Taratorin's revelations were embarrassing to the FSB and the Prosecutor-General's Office because they drew attention to the fact that two major suspects who had been seized by police at Chernoe on 22 November 2002 had been released: a recently retired GRU major, Arman Menkeev; and a Chechen originally from Vedeno, Khampash Sobraliev, the man who had collected the suicide belts from the women terrorists on 24 October after they had apparently failed to work. "For a long time," however, "Kh. Sobraliev was not charged under Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (terrorism). This led to his refusal to cooperate with the investigators."(138) In an article appearing in April 2003, journalist Zinaida Lobanova noted that Khampash Sobraliev, Arman Menkeev, and
Alikhan Mezhiev "were not charged and were then set free."(139) Only Akhyad Mezhiev, Alikhan's brother, who had been arrested on 28 October 2002, was still being kept in custody.
When the police raided the terrorist base at Chernoe in November 2002, another of the terrorists, Aslambek Khaskhanov, reportedly managed to escape from the premises. In late April 2003, however, Khaskhanov was located and then arrested in Ingushetia. "The Chechen had made his way [from Moscow] to Grozny and concealed himself for almost half a year. At the end of April [2003], he was taken into custody and brought to Moscow. During interrogations he related that in one of the homes on Nosovikhinskii Highway [in Chernoe] were concealed plastic explosives. The operatives arrived with dogs trained to sniff out explosives at House No. 100."(140) Under interrogation, Khaskhanov reportedly told the police about a huge cache of explosives hidden near the house: 400 kilograms of plastic explosives in total. "'Four hundred kilos of plastic explosives,' whistled one expert. 'That is enough to blow the Kremlin and Red Square to the devil."(141)
In an interview appearing in the government newspaper "Rossiiskaya gazeta" in June 2003, then Moscow City Prosecutor Avdyukov reported that, in addition to Khaskhanov, "Aslan Murdalov, the brothers Alikhan and Akhyad Mezhiev, Khampash Sobraliev, and Arman Menkeev are all now under arrest."(142)
Once Avdyukov and other Moscow prosecutors had been purged from their posts, a "cleansed" Moscow Prosecutor's Office began to surface a new and radically altered version of events. The press office of the procuracy informed "Kommersant" on 22 October 2003 that five individuals -- Aslambek
Khaskhanov, Aslan Murdalov, the brothers Alikhan and Akhyad Mezhiev, and Khampash Sobraliev -- were now being charged with "belonging to a group which as far back as 2001 had been sent by Shamil Basaev to commit terrorist acts in Moscow."(143) Significantly, retired GRU Major Menkeev was no longer being charged by the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office. Menkeev confirmed this fact to the newspaper "Versiya," noting that he had been released from prison on 20 October 2003. "I want to say that all charges concerning my participation in a terrorist act have been dropped," Menkeev emphasized.(144)
The version of events being related by the press department of the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office in October 2003 differed in major ways from the former account of the now-purged Mikhail Avdyukov-led procuracy.(145) According to the new version, "the Urus-Martan Wahhabi [Aslambek] Khaskhanov" had, in the fall of 2001, sent a team consisting of seven rebels to Moscow. Once there, they had purchased three vehicles, one of them a "Tavriya," "which they intended to mine and blow up in parking lots at the buildings of the State Duma [!] and at the McDonald's restaurant at Pushkin Square." The rebels had received plastic explosives "from persons who have not been identified by investigators." It emerged, however, that the plastic explosive employed by the rebels was in fact "imitation plastic explosive" which originally had "a Ministry of Defense origin." "It is fully possible," the account continued, "that the imitation plastic explosive was provided to the terrorists of Khaskhanov by the former employee of the GRU, Major Arman Menkeev, a specialist in explosive substances." Not surprisingly, the account noted, the bombs placed at the building of the State Duma and in Pushkin Square had failed to work. Did this whole operation of 2001 -- if it in fact occurred -- escape official notice completely? This would be quite extraordinary, especially in the wake of 11 September 2001.
"The group of Aslambek Khaskhanov," the revised Moscow City Prosecutor's Office account continued, "came to Moscow a second time, already in the fall of 2002. This time the terrorists also planned to commit a series of explosions after which, making use of the panic and confusion, one other group of rebels under the command of Movsar Baraev and Ruslan Elmurzaev (Abubakar) was to perform a mass seizure of hostages." On 19 October, the group, using a land mine (fugas), set off a car bomb in a "Tavriya" vehicle parked at the McDonald's on Pokryshkin Street. Once the Baraevites had seized the theater building, the Khaskhanov group then chose to go underground.
The new and quite drastically revised version of events currently being put out by the post-purge Moscow City Prosecutor's Office strikes one as, in essence, a complete fabrication. Most of the key discoveries made by the MUR and by the now-"cleansed" former Moscow procuracy have been adroitly swept under a rug, while Arman Menkeev's role in the events of October 2002 is now passed over in total silence.
Conclusion
Elements among both the Russian leadership and the power ministries and among the Chechen extremists obtained their principal goals in the assault on the theater at Dubrovka: namely, an end was put to the negotiation process while Aslan Maskhadov's reputation was besmirched, and the terrorists, for their part, had an opportunity to stage a grandiose fund-raiser. The Russian authorities, moreover, were now able to demonstrate to the entire world that Moscow, too, had been a victim of an Al-Qaeda-style Chechen terrorist act. As in 1999, the chief victims of these terrorist acts were the average citizens of Moscow. The bulk of the evidence, as we have seen, points to significant collusion having occurred on the part of the Chechen extremists and elements of the Russian leadership in the carrying out of the Dubrovka events.
FOOTNOTES (92) For a list of the negotiators, see "Te, kto ne strelyal," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 October 2002. The presence of the name of Sergei Dedukh here is incorrect; he visited the theater in the capacity of a correspondent for NTV. The information concerning Igrunov's visit appeared in "Gazeta Wyborcza" (Poland), 24 October 2002, posted at chechnya-sl@yahoogroups.com, 24 October 2002. Politkovksaya paid tribute to Aslakhanov's role in "Posle 57 chasov," "Novaya gazeta," No. 82, 4 November 2002.
(93)Alex Nicholson, "Yavlinsky Describes His Role in Crisis," "The Moscow Times," 5 November 2002.
(94)Olga Tropkina, "Vvedenie tsenzury dopustimo," "Nezavisamaya gazeta," 28 October 2002.
(95)Anna Politkovskaya, "My Hours Inside the Moscow Theater."
(96)newsru.com, 27 October.
(97)"Gazeta.ru reskonstruirovala shturm,'" gazeta.ru, 28 October 2002.
(98)Pavel Felgengauer, "'Nord Ost': reputatsiya ili gaz?" "Novaya gazeta," 27 October 2003.
(99)"Yavlinsky Describes his Role in the Crisis."
(100)"Gazeta.ru rekonstruirovala shturm," gazeta.ru, 28 October 2002.
(101)"Russian pundit critical of hostage rescue operation, policy on Chechnya," Ekho Moskvy Radio, BBC Monitoring Service, 26 October 2002.
(102)"Feat of Arms," gzt.ru, 31 October 2002. In English.
(103)Valerii Yakov, "My vse zalozhniki Kremlya," "Novye izvestiya," 29 October 2002. See also: "Two Hostages Killed in Moscow Theater," AP, 26 October 2002, posted at 4:52 a.m.
(104)"Russian pundit critical..."
(105)"Tri dnya v adu," "Komsomolskaya pravda," 29 October 2002.
(106)Viktor Baranets in "Komanda-shturm!" Komsomolskaya pravda, 29 October 2002.
(107)Cited in Susan B. Glasser and Peter Baker, "Gas in Raid Killed 115 Hostages," "The Washington Post," 28 October 2002.
(108)"Gazeta.ru rekonstruirovala shturm," gazeta.ru, 28 October 2002.
(109)gazeta.ru, 31 October 2002. Testimony of hostage Aleksandr Zeltserman, a resident of Latvia. The accounts of special forces personnel who participated in the storming suggest that they began letting in the gas at about 1:15 a.m. See "Ofitsery 'Alfy' i 'Vympela' o shturme," gzt.ru, 30 October 2002. The article "Kreml nameren skryt pravdu o terakte na Dubrovke," apn.ru, 1 November 2002 states that they began pouring in the gas "at about 2:30 a.m. on 26 October -- that is, approximately three hours (!!) before the storm."
(110)Sergei Dyupin, "Peredozirovka," "Kommersant," 28 October 2002.
(111)"Osvobozhdenie: neizvestnye podrobnosti," gzt.ru, 28 October 2002.
(112)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003. A year previously, Andrei Seltsovskii, chair of the Moscow Committee on Health, had stated that "only two [hostages] died of gunshot wounds." ("Peredozirovka," "Kommersant," 28 October 2002)
(113)I stipulated the number 204 in my "Taking a New Look at the Hostage-Taking Incident," "Chechnya Weekly," 17 December 2002. Julius Strauss, who had been in an apartment building with a clear view of the main entrance to the theater, wrote in "Kremlin Keeping Siege Deaths Secret to Avoid Criticism," "The Daily Telegraph," 31 October 2002: "There are now fears that the final death figure, if it is ever published, may be above 200." The website utro.ru reported on 28 October 2002 that 160 hostages had already died and that 40 were in the hospital in such a grave condition and that they could not be saved.
(114)Judith Ingram, "Moscow Theater Hostages Face Poor Health," Associated Press, 6 December 2002.
(115)Margarita Kondrateva, "Zhertvy 'Nord-Osta' provodyat nezavisimoe rassledovanie," gzt.ru, 28 April 2003.
(116)In "Versiya," 21 October 2003.
(117)See "Duma says no to theater terrorism inquiry," gazeta.ru, 1 November 2002. For the text of the Union of Rightist Forces' report, see "Kak eto bylo? Spasenie zalozhnikov ili unichtozhenie terroristov?" "Novaya Gazeta," No. 86, 21 November 2002.
(118)"Empty alcohol bottles, syringes found inside Moscow siege building," RTR, BBC Monitoring Service, 8:00 a.m., 26 October 2002.
(119)"Putin priglasil v Kreml 'Alfu' i 'Vympel,'" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 1 November 2002.
(120)Vladimir Kovalev, "Russia: Heroes and Lawyers," Transitions Online, http://www.tol.cz, 10 March 2003. See also Yurii Shchekochikhin, "Sekretnye geroi," "Novaya gazeta," No. 16, 3 March 2003.
(121)Yurii Levada, "Reiting voiny," "Novoe vremya," 5 November 2002.
(122)Testimony of hostage Ilya Lysak, in "Novaya gazeta," 14 November 2002.
(123)Reuters, 27 October 2002.
(124)"V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003.
(125)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
(126)"Russian Security Service Says No Gunmen Escape," AP, 26 October 2002.
(127)"Osvobozhdenie: neizvestnye podrobnosti," gzt.ru, 28 October 2002.
(128)"V Moskve gotovilos..."
(129)Mikhail Trepashkin, "Spravka," 23 March 2003. Lengthy excerpts from this document were published in "Tainstvennyi 'Abubakar,'" chechenpress.com, 31 July 2003. On 27 December 2003, the website grani.ru published a statement by Mikhail Trepashkin, which had been smuggled out of prison, in which he asserted that he was being physically tortured by the authorities.
(130)In "Moskovskii komsomolets," 23 May 2003.
(131)Zoya Svetova, "Ya uveren, chto Abubakar zhiv..." ruskur.ru, 23 October 2003.
(132)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
(133)Ibid.
(134)Leonid Berres, "MUR opravdalsya za 'Nord-Ost,'" izvestia.ru, 7 February 2003. See, too, Andrei Skrobot, "V 'Lefortovo' doprashivayut geroev 'Nord-Osta,'" "Nezavsimaya gazeta," 25 June 2003.
(135)"MUR opravdalsya..."
(136)Andrei Salnikov, "Peredel vnutrennikh del," "Kommersant-Dengi," 7 July 2003.
(137)gzt.ru, 24 June 2003.
(138)Aleksandr Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist 'Nord-Osta,'" "Moskovskii komsomolets," 23 May 2003.
(139)Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit za 'Nord-Ost,'" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 22 April 2003.
(140)Andrei Skrobot, "Vzryvy v Moskve gotovyat v Podmoskove," "Nezavisimaya gazeta," 6 June 2003.
(141)Zinaida Lobanova et al., "Naiden ment, pustivshii terroristov v 'Nord-Ost,'" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 9 June 2003.
(142)"V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003.
(143)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
(144)In Irina Borogan, "Obvinyaemogo v tragedii 'Nord-Osta' vypustili na svobodu," "Versiya," No. 41, October 2003. On Menkeev, see also Aleksandr Elisov, "Zov krovi," mk.ru, 24 October 2003.
(145)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
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《附件六》車臣本身對此事的報導
Anna Politkovskaya:
"Nobody is interested in the matter of what is going on in the country"
Tuesday, 27 May 2003
Chechenpress
http://www.chechenpress.info/english/news/05_2003/11_27_05.shtml
On 28 April 2003, in issue 30 of "The Novaya Gazeta" the article "Who Remains Alive" by Anna Politkovskaya was published. It says that the Theater Center hijacking committed by terrorists must have been at least controlled by the secret service of Russia. Anna Politkovskaya managed to meet Khanpash Terkibaev who claimed to have been a member of the terrorist group. He also claimed to have followed orders of some special service.
In April 2003 Terkibaev was a member of the Russian delegation at the European Council as a "representative of the Chechen public". At present Terkibaev is a special correspondent of "The Russian newspaper". Terkibaev's name was in the list of the members of Baraev's group that had been published by "The Izvestia" not long before the Theater Center assault held by the special police forces. According to Anna Politkovskaya, "The Novaya Gazeta" has got some other evidence that Terkibaev was among terrorists. Terkibaev also claims to be working in the Information Office of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.
In our opinion, the facts tackled in this publication are of the enormous public significance. Has there been any reaction to the investigation carried by "The Novaya Gazeta" from the authorities, society and their colleagues? The author of this sensational article Anna Politkovskaya, an observer of "The Novaya Gazeta" answers the questions of the editor-in-chief of the Informational Center of the Society for the Russian-Chechen Friendship Stanislav Dmitrievsky.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Quite a lot of time has come since your first publication about Terkibaev. Do you know anything about any reaction of the authorities to your article? Is there any reaction from the Procurator Office, the administration of the President or the State Duma?
Anna Politkovskaya: Nothing at all. I have not even been asked any questions.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: You mean to say that you have not been asked to come anywhere, that there have not been any official interrogations or at least contacts with law-enforcement structures.
Anna Politkovskaya: Absolutely no official respond. It made us publish our second article in which we reminded that there is the General Procurator Office in the country and we not only asked the same questions but also put some more.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: I regard your article sensational. I personally think that in any country with the stable democracy such an article and its impact are sure to cause the governmental crisis, at least. Nevertheless, there is no reaction not only from official structures but also from other sources of mass media. There are too few responds and the majority of them are absolutely passive and spiritless. You are either contradicted at a very low level of "you are a fool yourself", "it was made up by Berezovsky" or just mentioned as if your article had tackled upon a trifle matter. There is neither any serious discussion, nor, moreover, any social resonance. What do you think about the reasons for such an attitude both by the mass media and by the society?
Anna Politkovskaya: You know, to be frank, we expected a different reaction. And we supposed - we didn't want it but we supposed that the reaction would be serious. So it is very difficult for me to comment on the fact that there is no reaction at all. It means that it's of no interest to anybody. I mean to say that nobody is interested in the matter of what is going on in the country. What is interesting is the PR: some people are for the president, some others are against him⋯But the facts and the matter of what is going on in the country are of no concern to anybody. I personally can't comprehend all that.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Apparently, it's a problem not only of the mass media but of the whole Russian society.
Anna Politkovskaya: Certainly. Mass media just reflect social interests, opinions and needs. You know, what shocked me most of all was the human rights activists' position. I am honest here. None of the human rights activists have made any attempt to put any questions in front of the official power. There was the only example - the appeal of the social movement "For Human Rights" headed by Lev Ponomaryov.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Yes, as far as I know, it was also signed by the manager of the museum and The Social Center named after A.D.Sakhsrov Yury Samodurov and the writer Alexander Tkachenko.
Anna Politkovskaya: I haven't seen the final wording of this document but the variant they showed to me the next day after the publication made me feel indignation. As I expressed these feelings to the authors of the appeal openly I am telling you about it now. The matter was that social appeal was called "The authorities should refute⋯" From my point of view, it is awful of them. The authorities must investigate such cases. To investigate means to interrogate Terkibaev and me, at least, by members of that big investigating group that is working now to investigate "The Nord-Ost" events under the control of the General Prosecutor Office. I understand the "The authorities should refute⋯"- position of human rights leaders as a desire to be acceptable by the official power. I can only wish them much success on their way. I was promised, though, that my comments would be certainly taken into account. [Indeed, Anna Politkovskaya's comments must have been taken into account. In the! final wording of the Public Appeal that was published the people who signed it demand investigating into the facts reported in the article and in case they are true - starting a criminal suite. There is no demand to refute in this document. - the editor.]
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Yesterday there appeared an article on Viktor Popkov site by Andrew Smirnov who doesn't agree to you and your supposition about "the controlled terrorist act".
Anna Politkovskaya: Sorry to say, I haven't read this article yet.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Then it wouldn't be right to discuss this topic. It might be possible to comment on the main idea of this publication - the author accuses you of being subject to explain everything by making up schemes of conspiracy. As an example of one of such-like schemes common of the modern Russian mythology Andrew Smirnov tells about the theory of global plot between the two fighting sides. He also considers the supposition of the involvement of the Russian intelligence service into the terrorist act at Dubrovka to be one of these myths. How can you comment on it?
Anna Politkovskaya: Nothing of the kind, I am not for any plot-theories. I can tell honestly - after "The Nord-Ost" a lot of western journalists and employees of foreign embassies used to come to our editorial office with the same question, "What do you think about the involvement of the Russian intelligence service into this terrorist act? Haven't you noticed anything suspicious?" Whenever I was asked this question, I answered that I refused to admit such possibility. I couldn't believe it just because it would have become very difficult to go on living if I had let myself assume it. But later, from January, we began to get some bits of information. It evidenced that there had been some involvement all the same. I started checking it mainly to prove myself that the information wasn't true. This article came from attempts to persuade myself that it wasn't true. I personally think that the reality we are living in now is horrible. It is horrible that the intelligence! e service controls both the president and the whole system of power, that the intelligence service makes all the people jump as they wish. I started my article from the opposite thought: I wanted to make myself sure that the society was much stronger, that we were living in the democracy. And then- It took a long time to get all the information to write the article. And at last I told the editor that I could write the article. And at the same time my Chechen friends who are living in Moscow told me that they had seen that person - Terkibaev - in Moscow and if I wanted they would be able to get in touch with him. I told that I would certainly meet him. I thought such meeting would be very important. Besides, it was just interesting for me what kind of person was he and what was his life like. At first he refused but then accepted my offer to meet. It was his right.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: So if I've caught you right, you mean to say that you had the information concerning the fact that Terkibaev had really been among the terrorists in the Theater Center long before the interview with him, don't you?
Anna Politkovskaya: Exactly. I could have written the article without meeting him. The next bit of the information will be revealed later as the authorities take some measures.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: I have some more questions connected with, so to say, technical points. First, don't you know where Khanpash Terkibaev is now?
Anna Politkovskaya: No information at all. He has disappeared somewhere but I was sure that it would be so.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Have any other representatives of mass media tried to find him?
Anna Politkovskaya: Yes, they have. Many of them have tried but it was possible to get through to him only once.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: In your interview to the TVS channel that took place on April 28 you told that the members of special military unit who were assaulting the building couldn't have been aware of the "controlled terrorist act". But there appears one more question: the fact that Terkibaev could leave the building of the Theater Center means that he had accomplices among those representatives of the enforcement structures who were in the cordon. The plan of the Theater Center building that Terkibaev had couldn't guarantee that he would manage to leave the blocked building.
Anna Politkovskaya: It was not so. The building wasn't blocked that hard. There was a possibility to escape. If we want to go deeper into that point, I can tell you that too many absolutely inexplicable stories happened there. I can give you some examples. Yes, there was a cordon. And it was rather difficult for me to get into the Theater Center as one special structure said "yes" whereas the other said "no", the Home Affairs Ministry allowed but representatives of the FSB didn't as they didn't have Patrushev's allowance. On having at last received the permission to go, I approach the last circle of the cordon and ⋯see a woman. I ask her, "Who are you? What are you doing here?" And she tells me,
"I am this and that". An absolutely incidental person. Then a strange man turned up from somewhere and joined me. I ask him, "And what are you?" The matter is that I was afraid to enter the area that wasn't observable together with him where it was easy to shoot me dead. He answers, !
"I am from the Red Cross". I inquire him, "Well, but do you have any documents to prove it?" The white armband with the red cross that he was wearing couldn't be regarded as a proof. And one more strange occasion happened inside the cordon where the terrorists were nearby, where it was supposed to be dangerous as the Alfa-men were lying there under the cars and when in spite of all that a woman threw herself at me. She tells me, "I am the wife of ⋯tell Baraev this and that." I was completely astonished. I don't know whether she really was the person she gave herself out to be but the fact remains. She managed to get there. There were a lot of similar situations there: some people went inside the cordon, some other went out of it - none of them was known to the public.
And if I witnessed what was going on at that time it means that somebody else could leave the building through some other exit, from the back one, for example.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: You mean to say that it was possible to pass the cordon, don't you?
Anna Politkovskaya: Yes! I can say when it became impossible to go through
In an interview with journalist Mark Franchetti of London's "The Sunday Times," Abubakar isquoted as saying: "We are a suicide group. Here we have bombs and rockets and mines. Our women suicide bombers have their fingers on the detonator at all times. Time is running out.... Let the Russians just try to storm the building. That's all we are waiting for. We cherish death more than you do life." When he was finally allowed to interview Baraev, Franchetti witnessed this scene: "Baraev and his men paraded three Chechen women dressed in black with headscarves covering all but their eyes. In one hand each held a pistol, in the other a detonator linked to a short wire attached to 5 kilograms of explosive strapped to her stomach. Except for a beam of light from inside the auditorium, the foyer was dark. One of Baraev's men used a torch to show off the explosives belts. 'They work in shifts,' explained Baraev. 'Those on duty have their finger on the detonator at all times. One push of the button and they will explode. The auditorium is mined, all wired up with heavy explosives. Just let the Russians try to break in and the whole place will explode.'"(79) (These statements, as we have seen, were an apparent bluff by the terrorist leaders -- the explosives were not in reality in a condition in which they could be detonated.)
Putin and his team, manifestly, now had an 11 September 2001 of their own, though it remains unclear whether or not they had been surprised by this development. Signs in Arabic, the brandishing of the Koran, veiled women suicide bombers dressed all in black -- what more could the Russian leadership need? Moreover, as distinct from 1999, the terrorists on this occasion were unquestionably Chechens, except, perhaps, for a sprinkling of Arabs such as the fictional "Yasir." The seizing of the theater building, it was heavy-handedly suggested, constituted a link in a chain leading back to the infamous Al-Qaeda.
Blackening Maskhadov
In addition to seeking to depict the hostage-taking incident as a second 9/11, a second aim behind the regime's response to the crisis appeared to be to fully discredit Aslan Maskhadov, and thus render the possibility of negotiations with him or other moderate Chechen separatists unthinkable. Early on the morning of 25 October, the website newsru.com (affiliated with NTV) reported: "There has come information that the order to seize the hostages was given by Aslan Maskhadov. One of the Chechen terrorists stated this. A tape of [Maskhadov's] declaration was shown by the channel Al-Jazeera. In it Maskhadov says, 'In the very near future, we will conduct an operation which will overturn the history of the Chechen war.'"(80)
This statement by Maskhadov was cited later on the same day by official spokesmen for both the FSB and the Interior Ministry as self-evident proof of his responsibility for the raid. On 31 October, Putin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembskii emphasized at a news conference that there could be no question of holding future talks with Maskhadov. "Maskhadov can no longer be considered a legitimate representative of this resistance," Yastrzhembskii told reporters. "We have to wipe out the commanders of the movement," including Maskhadov, he stressed.(81)
This aggressive campaign by the Russian leadership seems to have borne significant diplomatic fruit. On 30 October, the "Los Angeles Times" reported that "a senior U.S. official" in Moscow had termed Maskhadov "damaged goods" with links to terrorism. The senior official went on to assert that "the Chechen leader should be excluded from peace talks."(82) In more judicious fashion, one influential Russian democrat and parliamentary faction leader, Grigorii Yavlinskii, confided on 27 October "his view of Maskhadov has changed. If Maskhadov commanded the rebels in the theater, he said, he could never participate in a political settlement."(83)
But how strong was the evidence linking Maskhadov to the terrorist action? Journalist Mikhail Falkov looked into the issue of the tape of Maskhadov's statement that had been shown over Al-Jazeera and learned that: "Russian television viewers had been presented only with a fragment of the original tape. On the tape it was distinctly evident that the filming had been conducted not in October but toward the end of the summer." This discovery appeared to back up the claim of Maskhadov's official spokesman in Europe, Akhmed Zakaev, that "the question [in Maskhadov's taped statement] concerned not the seizure of hostages but a military operation against federal forces."(84) It should also be noted that, on 24 October, the day following the hostage taking at Dubrovka, Zakaev had written to Lord Judd of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and unambiguously declared: "The Chechen leadership headed by President A. Maskhadov decisively condemns all actions against the civilian population. We don't accept the terrorist method for the solution of any kind of problems.... We call on both sides, both the armed people in the theater and the government of Russia, to find an un-bloody exit from this difficult situation."(85)
In an article appearing in "Moskovskie novosti," journalists Shermatova and Teit reported that a careful analysis of a hushed conversation that had been conducted in Chechen between Abubakar and Movsar Baraev and had been accidentally captured by NTV on 25 October showed the following: "Here is Movsar Baraev answering the questions of NTV correspondents before a television camera. Next to him stands a rebel, known as Abubakar: he in an undertone in Chechen corrects Movsar. When Baraev declares that they had been sent by Shamil Basaev, Abubakar quietly suggests, 'Pacha ch'ogo al,' 'point to the president.' After that, Movsar obediently adds: 'Aslan Maskhadov.'"(86) Abubakar thus sought publicly to tie Maskhadov directly to the hostage-taking incident.
ThatAbubakar andnot MovsarBaraevwasthe de factoleaderof the terroristsalso becomes clear fromFranchetti'sreport: "Atone pointhe[Baraev] loweredhis guard. Perhaps succumbing to the lure of fame,heoffered to let mefilm the hostages in the auditorium. Hisright-hand man [Abubakar] fiercelydisagreed.... They brieflyleft the storageroom to confer inthe dark foyer.... Baraev came back. Therewouldbe no morefilming."(87)Abubakar had prevailed overBaraevin a test of wills.
It seems that Abubakar may also in a subtle way have been involved in helping the federal forces to prepare the storming of the theater. "Several sources in the special services," the newspaper "Moskovskii komsomolets" reported on 28 October, "have informed us that in the juice which the negotiators took to the hostages, without their knowledge, there was admixed a substance which was to soften the toxic action of the gas."(88) Abubakar himself raised this topic. Summing up one of her discussion/negotiations with Abubakar, journalist Politkovskaya has recalled: "We agree that I will start bringing water into the building. Bakar suddenly throws in, on his own initiative, 'And you can bring juice.' I ask him if I can also bring food for the children being held inside, but he refuses."(89)
A leading journalist writing on the pages of "Moskovskie novosti," Valerii Vyzhutovich, looked into the issue of Maskhadov's supposed responsibility for the raid and concluded: "There are no direct proofs convicting Maskhadov of the preparation of the terrorist act in Moscow." He added that "not a single court, not even ours, the most humane and just," would uphold the admissibility in a trial of the edited and highly selective footage shown over Al-Jazeera television -- "a propagandistic soporific" -- in Vyzhutovich's words.(90)
When Politkovskaya, in a one-on-one private conversation with Abubakar, directly asked him, "Do you submit to Maskhadov?" he replied, "Yes, Maskhadov is our president, but we are making war by ourselves." "But you are aware," she pressed him, "that Ilyas Akhmadov [a separatist spokesman loyal to Maskhadov] is conducting peace negotiations in America and Akhmed Zakaev in Europe, and that they are representatives of Maskhadov. Perhaps you would like to be connected with them right now? Or let me dial them for you." "What is this about?" Abubakar retorted angrily. "They don't suit us. They are conducting those negotiations slowly...while we are dying in the forests. We are sick of them."(91) Abubakar's feelings concerning Maskhadov and other Chechen separatist moderates are revealed in these words.
The regime, for its part, seems to have concluded that it now possessed ample, indeed overwhelming, evidence to prove to both Russian citizens and to Western leaders two key points: first, that the hostage takers were dangerous and repugnant international terrorists in the Al-Qaeda mold; and, second, that the leader of the separatist Chechens, Aslan Maskhadov, had been irretrievably discredited by the raid, rendering the possibility of any future negotiations with him unthinkable.
FOOTNOTES (28) Vadim Rechkalov, "Vdovii bunt," izvestia.ru, 25 October 2002; and Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit za Nord-Ost," "Komsomolskaya pravda," 22 April 2003. See also "Passport terrorista," izvestia.ru, 24 October 2003.
(29)In "Krasnaya zvezda," 26 June 2001.
(30)Sanobar Shermatova, "Glavnyi rabototorgovets," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 October 2002.
(31)In "Novaya gazeta," 28 June 2001.
(32)Sanobar Shermatova, "Tainaya voina spetssluzhb," "Moskovskie novosti," 8 August 2000.
(33)Anne Nivat, "Chechnya: Brutality and Indifference," crimesofwar.org, 6 January 2003.
(34)Sanobar Shermatova, "Glavnyi rabototorgovets," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 October 2002.
(35)Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency, 26 April 2003.
(36)"Tainyi sovetnik VPK," "Zavtra," 1 June 2001. At the time of this interview, Surikov was serving as head of the State Duma's Department on Industry. On Surikov, see also: Maksim Kalashnikov, "Chelovek, kotoryi verboval Basaeva," stringer-news.ru, 10 July 2002.
(37)See Petr Pryanshnikov, "Voloshin i Basaev na lazurnom beregu: foto na pamyat," "Versiya," 4 July 2000. This article can be found at: http:www.compromat.ru/main/voloshin/basaev.htm. See also: Andrei Batumskii, "Sgovor," "Versiya," 3 August 1999.
(38)"Doslovno," "Novaya gazeta," No. 37, 4-10 October 1999, p. 3. Lebed''s statement originally appeared in the French newspaper "Le Figaro" on 29 September 1999.
(39)Yurii Shchekochikhin, "Nezamechennye novosti nedeli kotorye menya udivili," "Novaya gazeta,"
(40)Aleksandr Khinshtein, "Chernye vdovy pod 'kryshei' Petrovki," "Moskovskii komsomolets," 23 July 2003.
(41)Statement of Moscow's chief procurator Mikhail Avdyukov in "V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003.
(42)"V Moskve gotovilos..."
(43)Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..."
(44)Otdel prestupnosti, "U terroristov problemy so vzryvchatkoi," "Kommersant," 7 July 2003. The same claim is made in Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
(45)"U terroristov...," "Kommersant," 7 July 2003.
(46)Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..." Khinshtein's source for this information was officers of the MUR.
(47)Statement of Colonel Taratorin over Russian central television: Leonid Berres, "MUR opravdalsya za 'Nord-Ost,'" izvestia.ru, 7 February 2003.
(48)Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit..."
(49)Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..."
(50)On this episode, see Chapter 5, "Proval FSB v Ryazani," in Aleksandr Litvinenko, Yurii Feltshtinskii, "FSB vzryvaet Rossiyu" (Internet Edition, 2002). English translation: "Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within" (New York: S.P.I. Books, 2002), pp. 62-104. See also Aleksandr Litvinenko, "Ryazanskii sled," Chapter 10 in his "LPG (Lubyanskaya prestupnaya gruppirovka)" (Internet Edition, 2003).
(51)Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..."
(52)Ibid. Khinshtein identified Abubakar as being Ruslan Elmurzaev, 30 years old, a native of Urus-Martan in Chechnya, and a former Russian police employee. Subsequently the procurator of Moscow confirmed most of this information, noting also that Elmurzaev's patronymic is Abu-Khasanovich: "V Moskve gotovilos..."
(53)Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit..."
(54)Ibid.
(55)Ibid.
(56)Kavkaz Tsentr News Agency, 26 April 2003.
(57)Sergei Dyupin, Aleksei Gerasimov, Leonid Berres, "Zakhvat zalozhnikov v Moskve," "Kommersant,"
(58)Sergei Dyupin, "Peredozirovka," "Kommersant," 28 October 2002.
(59)Sanobar Shermatova, Aleksandr Teit, "Shestero iz baraevskikh," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 April 2003.
(60)Sanobar Shermatova, "'Nord-Ost' ne planirovalsya?" "Moskovskie novosti," 24 June 2003.
(61)Yurii Shchekochikhin, "TsRU predupredilo," "Novaya gazeta," 28 October 2002.
(62)See "Litvinenko: Yushenkova ubili za rassledovanie terakta v 'Nord-Oste,'" lenta.ru, 25 April 2003; and Anna Politkovskaya, "Odin iz grupppy terroristov utselil. My ego nashli," "Novaya gazeta," 28 April 2003.
(63)Sanobar Shermatova, Aleksandr Teit, "Antivakhkhabitskii emissar," "Moskvovskie novosti," 13 May 2003. Terkibaev was killed on 15 December 2003 in an automobile crash that some commentators found to be suspicious. "The double agent Terkibaev was removed as a dangerous witness," the website newsru.com observed on 16 December 2003.
(64)"Posobnik terroristov ne uspel spasti zalozhnikov," "Kommersant," 11 June 2003.
(65)grani.ru, 28 November 2002. The website provided a list of the names of 979 individuals taken captive on 23 October. As of 25 October, 58 of the captives had been released. ("The Moscow Times," 26 October 2002).
(66)"V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003. A 41st terrorist, the procurator noted, turned out to be an ethnic Russian, the father of one of the hostages, who had foolishly entered the theater on 25 October and had then been shot by the terrorists.
(67)"Genprokuratura ustanovila imena 33-kh terroristov, zakhvativshikh zalozhnikov v Moskve," newsru.com, 6 November 2002. Seven remained unidentified as of October 2003.
(68)Oleg Petrovksii, "V bande Baraeva byl terrorist iz 'Al-Kaedy,'" utro.ru, 30 October 2002.
(69)"Moskva, zalozhniki," vesti7.ru, 2 November 2002. This program was broadcast on 26 October.
(70)"Polnyi spisok opoznannykh terroristov," gzt.ru, 23 October 2003.
(71)Vladimir Demchenko, "Passport terrorista," izvestia.ru, 24 October 2003.
(72)In newsru.com, 24 October 2002.
(73)gzt.ru, 25 October 2002. Item posted in English.
(74)newsru.com, 24 October 2002. The item was reported at 00:04 a.m. on 24 October.
(75)In gazeta.ru, 24 October 2002.
(76)"Jazeera Shows Taped Chechen Rebel Statements," Reuters, 24 October 2002.
(77)Associated Press, 26 October 2002.
(78)"Russian NTV Shows Previously Filmed Interview with Hostage Takers' Leader," BBC Monitoring
(79)Mark Franchetti, "Dream of Martyrdom," "The Sunday Times," 27 October 2002.
(80)In newsru.com, 27 October.
(81)"Russia Seeks to 'Wipe Out' Chechen Leaders," Reuters, 31 October 2002.
(82)Robyn Dixon and David Holley, "U.S. Rejects Chechen Separatist Chief," "Los Angeles Times," 30 October 2002.
(83)Sharon LaFraniere, "Setback Seen for Rebel Cause," "The Washington Post," 28 October 2002.
(84)Mikhail Falkov, "Kto i gde gotovil moskovskii terakt?" utro.ru, 31 October 2002.
(85)"Chechen Press Release on Moscow Hostage Crisis," chechenpress.com, 24 October 2002.
(86)Sanobar Shermatova, Aleksandr Teit, "Shestero iz baraevskikh," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 April 2003. The transcript reads: "[Movsar Baraev]: 'We are acting on orders from the supreme military emir. Our supreme military emir there is Shamil Basaev. You know him very well. And Maskhadov is our president.'" ("Russian NTV shows...," BBC Monitoring Service, 26 October 2002.
(87)Mark Franchetti, "Dream of Martyrdom," "The Sunday Times," 27 October 2002.
(88)"Gibel zalozhnikov -- rezultat oshibki spetsluzhb?" "Moskovskii komsomolets," 28 October 2002.
(89)Anna Politkovskaya, "My Hours Inside the Moscow Theater," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, No. 153, 31 October 2002.
(90)Valerii Vyzhutovich, "Usyplayuyushchii gaz," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 October 2002.
(91)Anna Politkovskaya, "Tsena razgovorov," "Novaya Gazeta," No. 80, 28 October 2002.
THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT (Part 3)
Negotiations Leading Nowhere
The failure of three of the four bombs to detonate confronted both the terrorists and the Russian authorities with an exceedingly slippery situation. How was the crisis to be resolved? Abubakar reluctantly consented to conducting a series of negotiations with various Duma deputies, journalists, and at least one doctor, while the Russian power ministries for their part set about practicing a raid on the theater building. Duma deputies who, at great personal risk, visited the building in order to negotiate with the terrorists were: Yabloko faction leader Grigorii Yavlinskii; Aslambek Aslakhanov, the parliamentary deputy representing Chechnya; Irina Khadamada; Iosif Kobzon; and Vyacheslav Igrunov. (Another Duma faction leader, Boris Nemtsov of the Union of Rightist Forces, negotiated with the terrorists by telephone.) Also visiting the building were former Russian Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov and the former president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev. A key role was, as we have seen, played in the negotiations by journalist Anna Politkovskaya. Doctor Leonid Roshal, who treated the hostages, and Sergei Govorukhin, the son of a famous Russian filmmaker and himself a Chechen war veteran, also attempted to facilitate the negotiations.(92)
Yavlinskii's experience with the negotiations has been summarized thus: "The hostage takers were said to have asked specifically for Yavlinskii.... He said he met with the hostage takers for an hour and a half on the night of 24 October. They said they wanted an end to the war in Chechnya and the withdrawal of federal troops, but Yavlinskii said when he tried to get them to formulate their demands, they were unable to come up with any kind of a coherent negotiating position. 'Let's go step by step. You want a cease-fire, OK, let's go for a cease-fire,' Yavlinskii said he told the hostage takers. 'Tell me which regions to pull troops out of. Tell me something I can use.'"(93)
"I insisted," Nemtsov confided to "Nezavisimaya gazeta," "that we had maximally to move the negotiation process forward with a single goal -- to free the children and women. And my logic -- about which both Patrushev and Voloshin knew -- and I stated it also to Abubakar, the politruk [political officer] of the terrorists responsible for the negotiations, was the following: for each peaceful day in Chechnya they would release hostages. One peaceful day -- the children; another one -- the women, and so on. The rebels liked that idea. And the day before yesterday was indeed a peaceful day. But when I reminded Abubakar about our agreements, he sent me to the devil and said that one should talk with either Basaev or Maskhadov."(94)
"There are five requests," Politkovskaya has recalled, "on my list. Food for the hostages, personal hygiene for the women, water and blankets. Jumping ahead a little, we will only manage to agree on water and juice.... I begin to ask what they want, but, in political terms, Bakar isn't on firm ground. He's 'just a soldier' and nothing more. He explains what it all means to him, at length and precisely, and four points can be identified from what he says. First, [President Vladimir] Putin should 'give the word' and declare the end of the war. Secondly, in the course of a day, he should demonstrate that his words aren't empty by, for example, taking the armed forces out of one region.... Then I ask, 'Whom do you trust? Whose word on the withdrawal of the armed forces would you believe?' It turns out that it's (Council of Europe rapporteur) Lord Judd. And we return to their third point. It's very simple -- if the first two points are met, the hostages will be released. And as for the extremists themselves? 'We'll stay to fight. We'll die in battle.'"(95)
While letting volunteer negotiators such as Politkovskaya buy some time, the regime limited itself to delivering only a few public messages to the terrorists. On 25 October, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Patrushev, "declared that the terrorists would be guaranteed their lives if the hostages...were released. He made this declaration after meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin." Also on 25 October, at 8:30 in the evening, "the chair of the Federation Council, Sergei Mironov, addressed the hostages and terrorists on direct open air on a radio program of Ekho Moskvy. Addressing the terrorists, he [Mironov] declared: 'Advance your real conditions, free our people, and you will be ensured safety and security to leave the boundaries of Russia. You have de facto already achieved your goal of attracting attention. The entire world is talking about it.'"(96) Presented one day before the launching of the storm, these statements appear to have been another attempt to buy time.
Late in the evening of that same day, 25 October, the regime offered to begin serious negotiations on the following day (26 October), with retired General Viktor Kazantsev, Putin's official representative in the Southern Federal District, meeting with the hostage takers. This gesture came at a time when preparations for the storm were moving ahead full tilt. The rebels, for their part, reacted positively to this development, "announcing to the hostages that they had 'good news.'... Tomorrow [Saturday, 26 October] at 10:00 a.m., Kazantsev will come. Everything will be normal. They have come to an agreement. This suits us. Behave peacefully. We are not beasts. We will not kill you if you sit quietly and peacefully.'"(97) Political and security affairs correspondent Pavel Felgenhauer has reported that Kazantsev made no preparations to actually fly from southern Russia to Moscow.(98)
According to Duma faction leader Yavlinskii, he came to understand "by 5 p.m. on 25 October" that Putin had adopted an irrevocable decision to storm the building.(99) The gazeta.ru website has reported that, "The first information that a decision concerning a storm had been taken and that it had been set for the morning of 26 October was gained by journalists working in the area of the theater center at about 11:00 p.m. on 25 October."(100) Felgenhauer observed over Ekho Moskvy radio on 26 October: "Our forces...stormed the 'Nord-Ost' building after two days of preparations, without even so much as a prior attempt to negotiate with the captors in any meaningful way to secure a peaceful solution to the affair.... This week, first there was reconnaissance. By every conceivable means of electronic and acoustic surveillance, the terrorists' exchanges and movements were monitored. On Friday [25 October], the plans were reported to Vladimir Putin, who gave the go-ahead for the operation to start on Saturday."(101)
A member of the special forces units which took the building provided support for Felgenhauer's interpretation in remarks made to gzt.ru: "We put bugs everywhere, even in the concert hall. We accompanied every negotiator; in the beginning we did it openly, but then the Chechens became indignant.... When the journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, made the agreement with them to deliver water, food, and medicine, headquarters had already prepared everything.... Everybody knew about the storm. Only nobody knew when it would happen."(102)
It was the special forces and not the terrorists who appear to have precipitated the final denouement. "At 5:20 a.m. [on 26 October]," journalist Valerii Yakov has written, "the operation suffered its first setback. The terrorists noticed in the building a movement of a group of 'Alfa' [special forces] and opened fire. They were instantly destroyed, but it was necessary immediately to correct the plan [of attack].... At this time, a representative of the FSB, Pavel Kudryavtsev, came out to the journalists and reported that the terrorists had shot two men and that another man and a woman had been wounded. Later it emerged that this information was false."(103) The above-cited correspondent Felgenhauer has, for his part, commented: "There are no serious grounds for these heroic fairy tales [about an execution of the hostages by the terrorists] to be believed. Long before the building was stormed, it had become obvious in many ways that everything would be decided precisely on Saturday morning."(104) The producer of the Nord-Ost musical, Georgii Vasilev, who was the de facto leader and chief spokesman for the hostages, declared: "I have heard that they began the storm supposedly because they [the terrorists] began to execute the hostages. That is the official point of view of the authorities. I want to say that there were no executions -- only threats."(105)
As is well known, a decision was taken by the Russian authorities to employ a powerful gas in the retaking of the building. As one military affairs specialist, Viktor Baranets, has reported, "The idea of using gas during the operation to liberate the hostages was in the heads of many members of the operational headquarters already during the second day of the emergency situation when it became clear that they would hardly come to agreement with the terrorists.... It was decided to use the most powerful poison [available] -- a psycho-chemical gas (PChG). According to some sources, it has the name 'Kolokol [i.e., Bell]-1.'"(106) What was in this gas? "We are never going to know exactly what chemical it was," Lev Fedorov, an environmental activist who is the head of the Russian Union for Chemical Safety, has aptly commented, "because in this country the state is more important than the people."(107)
According to the website gazeta.ru, the special forces began pumping gas into the hall through the ventilation system at 4:30 a.m., "a half an hour before the storm."(108) Other sources contend, however, that it may have been significantly earlier, perhaps shortly after 1:00 a.m.(109) One possibility is that a decision was taken to strengthen the dosage of the gas after the initial infusion did not seem to be having the desired effect. The chief anesthesiologist of Moscow, Yevgenii Evdokimov, has speculated: "The death of those people was possibly caused by an overdose of the substance [in the gas]."(110) The website gzt.ru wrote on 28 October: "It has become known to 'Gazeta' that the first attempt to neutralize the bandits located among the hostages did not succeed -- the concentration of the poisonous substance turned out to be insufficient."(111)
According to an October 2003 statement by the press department of the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office, 125 hostages died from the effects of the gas, some of them following the storm while they were in hospital, while five were killed by the terrorists.(112) The actual death toll from the effects of the gas might, according to some estimates, have in fact exceeded 200.(113) In addition, scores of other hostages were reported at the time to be seriously ill from the effects of the gas.(114) In April 2003, a lawyer representing some of the former hostages asserted that approximately 40 more of the hostages had died since 26 October 2002.(115) In October 2003, the newspaper "Versiya," summing up the results of an investigation conducted by its journalists, stipulated that "about 300" of the former hostages were now dead.(116) The incompetence and the disorganization of the medical and emergency teams called in to treat the ill and the dying were unquestionably a cause of many of the deaths. The medical teams, in their defense, had not been informed about what was in the gas. When the Russian State Duma declined to carry out an inquiry into the actions of the medical teams, the Union of Rightist Forces conducted its own investigation and then published its scathing findings.(117)
At 8:00 a.m. on 26 October, one hour after the building had been declared liberated, Russian state television (RTR) showed the following mendacious tableau: "The gang leader [Movsar Baraev] met his death with a bottle of brandy in his hand. According to special-purpose-unit men, they found an enormous number of used syringes and empty alcohol bottles on the premises. The criminals, who described themselves as champions of Islam and freedom fighters, must have spent the last hours in the theater bar. Even the women, officers say, smelt strongly of alcohol. Probably because of that,... [the women terrorists] did not have time to set in motion the explosive devices attached to their waists. According to specialists, each device contains at least 800 grams of TNT. Besides, in order to increase the impact, the devices were filled with ball bearings and nails. Another explosive device was planted in the center of the hall, which, to all appearances, was intended to make the ceiling collapse. And there is a whole arsenal on the stage: assault rifles, TNT, cartridges. And the most interesting are these homemade grenades. Despite their small size, they are extremely powerful."(118) (By this time, if not earlier, the Russian authorities must have become fully aware that the explosives placed in the hall had been incapable of detonating.)
On 27 October, President Putin invited the special forces commandos from the "Alfa" and "Vympel" units who had taken back the theater to a special reception at the Kremlin. In his remarks, Putin praised the professionalism of the two units of the FSB, and he then joined with them in a silent standing toast.(119) In early January 2003, shortly after New Year's Eve, "Putin signed a secret decree to award six people with Hero of Russia stars, including three FSB officials and two soldiers from the special units 'Alfa' and 'Vympel.' The fifth 'hero' is the chemist who gassed the theater center."(120)
Following the storming of the theater building, the president's approval ratings for his conduct of the war in Chechnya shot up in the polls: "If in September, 34 percent of Russian citizens had been in favor of continuing military actions, while 56 percent had favored peace negotiations, at the end of October -- for the first time since the beginning of 2001 -- the opinions divided almost half and half: 46 percent were for military actions, while 45 percent were for negotiations."(121)
Questions
From the testimony of former hostages interviewed by the Russian media, it seems virtually certain that the terrorists did have ample time to destroy many of the hostages before they themselves had been overcome by the gas or shot by the attacking special forces. Why did they not do so? As we have seen, most of the explosives in the building were "fakes" or very weak bombs presenting a danger principally to the women terrorists wearing them. Even without detonating the bombs, however, the terrorists carried real automatic weapons and could easily have raked the hostages with automatic-weapon fire. They clearly chose, however, to let the hostages live. Even an Interior Ministry general who had been identified by the terrorists and had been separated from the other hostages was not killed (though his daughter died from the effects of the gas).(122) Theater producer Vasilev has recalled: "When the shooting began, they [the terrorists] told us to lean forward in the theater seats and cover our heads behind the seats."(123)
How many of the terrorists were killed in the raid? In June 2003, Moscow City Prosecutor Mikhail Avdyukov stipulated that a total of 40 terrorists had been killed and that none had managed to escape.(124) The same figure was given by Avdyukov's successors in October 2003.(125) At 9:44 a.m. on 26 October 2002, however -- that is, almost three hours after the building had been declared liberated -- it was reported by Interfax that only 32 terrorists had been killed. The same day, the director of the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, affirmed that "34 gunmen were killed and an unspecified number arrested."(126) By contrast, on 28 October, gzt.ru, a "centrist" publication, reported that "50 terrorists -- 32 men and 18 women" had been killed and "three others taken into custody."(127) The compromise figure of 40 dead terrorists was arrived at later.
A number of questions have been asked by analysts and journalists about whether or not the de facto leader of the terrorists, Abubakar, had in fact been killed. In June 2003, Moscow Prosecutor Avdyukov insisted that Ruslan Abu-Khasanovich Elmurzaev's body had been found and identified.(128) In March 2003, however, retired FSB Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Trepashkin had written that, following the events at Dubrovka, "I proposed to the investigators that they try to identify 'Abubakar' in the first days after the event. However, later an investigator telephoned and said that he could not find the corpses of a number of people, including that of 'Abubakar,' and therefore there would be no identification."(129) And journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein has reported: "At first there existed a version that Abubakar died during the storming of the House of Culture.... But a series of examinations showed that there was no Abubakar in the hall."(130) Despite Prosecutor Avdyukov's statement, it appears thus to be an open question as to whether or not Abubakar was killed.
In October 2003, film director Sergei Govoroukhin, one of the volunteer negotiators who had spoken at length with Abubakar at Dubrovka, stated his belief that Abubakar was still alive. Despite his persistent requests, he said, Russian prosecutors had proved unable to show him Abubakar's body. "Moreover," Govorukhin continued, "two weeks ago, during a trip to Chechnya, I asked intelligence [officers] of the Combined Group of Forces of the Northern Caucasus whether it was true that Abubakar was in Chechnya. I was uniformly given the same answer: 'Of course he is here. He has shown himself rather actively in recent times, and only for the past month has nothing been heard of him.' Therefore I can maintain absolutely accurately that he is alive."(131)
Similarly, also in October 2003, an investigative report appearing in the newspaper "Kommersant" noted that "until the summer of this year [2003], when the case concerning the explosion at McDonald's restaurant was being investigated by the procuracy of the western district [okrug] of Moscow, Ruslan Elmurzaev was still on the wanted list. He was removed from the wanted list only when the case was taken over by the Moscow [City] Prosecutor's Office."(132) The same report also added this key detail: "As sources in the FSB and [Interior Ministry] have made clear, the terrorists themselves ordered that the bombs [in the Dubrovka theater] be rendered harmless before the seizing of the hostages. Abubakar was supposedly afraid of accidental explosions."(133)
Aftermath Of The Hostage-Taking Incident
On the evening of 6 February 2003, a sensation of sorts was created when "the head of the operational-investigative department of the MUR [Moscow Criminal Investigations Office], Yevgenii Taratorin, made an unexpected announcement on the television program 'Man and the Law.'" In Taratorin's words, "In October-November of last year, in addition to seizing the theater center at Dubrovka, the band of Movsar Baraev planned explosions in the Moscow underground, at a popular restaurant, and at the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall. In the words of the policeman, the operatives of the capital's criminal-investigation unit were able to avert all of these terrorist acts." Following the explosion of the "Tavriya" car bomb at McDonald's restaurant on Porkryshkin Street in Moscow on 19 October, Taratorin related, the MUR discovered "in the center of Moscow at the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall in direct proximity to the GAI [traffic police] post an automobile of silver color containing explosives." Quick action by the MUR and the arrest of certain of the terrorists, Taratorin claimed, forced the hostage takers to move up the date of their assault on the theater at Dubrovka from 7 November to 23 October.
According to Taratorin, "on 24 October, the operatives averted two other terrorist acts: the explosion of an automobile at the Pyramid [Restaurant] in Pushkin Square and the self-detonation of a female suicide bomber at one of the stations of the capital's underground." The terrorists, sensing the danger of a rapid unmasking, then fled to the North Caucasus region. (Taratorin appears here to be exaggerating the achievements of the MUR: the bombings failed to occur, as we have seen, most likely either because the terrorists "exhibited cowardice" or because the bombs themselves were faulty in design or construction.)
In the course of his televised statement, Taratorin added that, in November 2002, in the village of Chernoe in Moscow Oblast, the police had "discovered a house in which, among apples, there was found ammunition and, next to the cottage, a hiding place in which explosives brought from Ingushetia had first been concealed."(134) (The explosives, he said, had later been transferred to two garages located on Leninskii Prospekt and Ogorodnyi Proezd in Moscow.) In January 2003, Taratorin added, two of the intended car bombs had been found in a parking lot off Zvenigorod Highway.
Most sensationally of all, Taratorin claimed that "five people" in all had been arrested for participating in the terrorist act. Queried about this statement, the Russian Prosecutor-General's Office insisted heatedly that only two persons had so far been arrested, one of them the walk-on Chechen volunteer Zaurbek Talikhigov. Journalists soon discovered, however, that "three more Chechens whom they had connected to Dubrovka had been released last November [2002]."(135)
Following this televised statement by the MUR colonel, "the procuracy opened against Yevgenii Taratorin a [criminal] case for his having revealed a secret of the investigation. But this did not stop the colonel -- in particular, he intended to meet with journalists...in order to relate to them the details of the investigation in the course of which the MUR officers did not succeed in finding understanding on the part of the 'neighbors' from the FSB."(136) Taratorin was placed under arrest by the FSB on 23 June 2003, as part of a putative "campaign against werewolves" in the Russian Interior Ministry.(137) This lengthy campaign and media reactions to it strongly suggested that the arrest of Taratorin, like that of Trepashkin, was a selective one triggered solely by the need to silence an official who had begun to expose the fabric of lies that constituted the official version of events.
Taratorin's revelations were embarrassing to the FSB and the Prosecutor-General's Office because they drew attention to the fact that two major suspects who had been seized by police at Chernoe on 22 November 2002 had been released: a recently retired GRU major, Arman Menkeev; and a Chechen originally from Vedeno, Khampash Sobraliev, the man who had collected the suicide belts from the women terrorists on 24 October after they had apparently failed to work. "For a long time," however, "Kh. Sobraliev was not charged under Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (terrorism). This led to his refusal to cooperate with the investigators."(138) In an article appearing in April 2003, journalist Zinaida Lobanova noted that Khampash Sobraliev, Arman Menkeev, and
Alikhan Mezhiev "were not charged and were then set free."(139) Only Akhyad Mezhiev, Alikhan's brother, who had been arrested on 28 October 2002, was still being kept in custody.
When the police raided the terrorist base at Chernoe in November 2002, another of the terrorists, Aslambek Khaskhanov, reportedly managed to escape from the premises. In late April 2003, however, Khaskhanov was located and then arrested in Ingushetia. "The Chechen had made his way [from Moscow] to Grozny and concealed himself for almost half a year. At the end of April [2003], he was taken into custody and brought to Moscow. During interrogations he related that in one of the homes on Nosovikhinskii Highway [in Chernoe] were concealed plastic explosives. The operatives arrived with dogs trained to sniff out explosives at House No. 100."(140) Under interrogation, Khaskhanov reportedly told the police about a huge cache of explosives hidden near the house: 400 kilograms of plastic explosives in total. "'Four hundred kilos of plastic explosives,' whistled one expert. 'That is enough to blow the Kremlin and Red Square to the devil."(141)
In an interview appearing in the government newspaper "Rossiiskaya gazeta" in June 2003, then Moscow City Prosecutor Avdyukov reported that, in addition to Khaskhanov, "Aslan Murdalov, the brothers Alikhan and Akhyad Mezhiev, Khampash Sobraliev, and Arman Menkeev are all now under arrest."(142)
Once Avdyukov and other Moscow prosecutors had been purged from their posts, a "cleansed" Moscow Prosecutor's Office began to surface a new and radically altered version of events. The press office of the procuracy informed "Kommersant" on 22 October 2003 that five individuals -- Aslambek
Khaskhanov, Aslan Murdalov, the brothers Alikhan and Akhyad Mezhiev, and Khampash Sobraliev -- were now being charged with "belonging to a group which as far back as 2001 had been sent by Shamil Basaev to commit terrorist acts in Moscow."(143) Significantly, retired GRU Major Menkeev was no longer being charged by the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office. Menkeev confirmed this fact to the newspaper "Versiya," noting that he had been released from prison on 20 October 2003. "I want to say that all charges concerning my participation in a terrorist act have been dropped," Menkeev emphasized.(144)
The version of events being related by the press department of the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office in October 2003 differed in major ways from the former account of the now-purged Mikhail Avdyukov-led procuracy.(145) According to the new version, "the Urus-Martan Wahhabi [Aslambek] Khaskhanov" had, in the fall of 2001, sent a team consisting of seven rebels to Moscow. Once there, they had purchased three vehicles, one of them a "Tavriya," "which they intended to mine and blow up in parking lots at the buildings of the State Duma [!] and at the McDonald's restaurant at Pushkin Square." The rebels had received plastic explosives "from persons who have not been identified by investigators." It emerged, however, that the plastic explosive employed by the rebels was in fact "imitation plastic explosive" which originally had "a Ministry of Defense origin." "It is fully possible," the account continued, "that the imitation plastic explosive was provided to the terrorists of Khaskhanov by the former employee of the GRU, Major Arman Menkeev, a specialist in explosive substances." Not surprisingly, the account noted, the bombs placed at the building of the State Duma and in Pushkin Square had failed to work. Did this whole operation of 2001 -- if it in fact occurred -- escape official notice completely? This would be quite extraordinary, especially in the wake of 11 September 2001.
"The group of Aslambek Khaskhanov," the revised Moscow City Prosecutor's Office account continued, "came to Moscow a second time, already in the fall of 2002. This time the terrorists also planned to commit a series of explosions after which, making use of the panic and confusion, one other group of rebels under the command of Movsar Baraev and Ruslan Elmurzaev (Abubakar) was to perform a mass seizure of hostages." On 19 October, the group, using a land mine (fugas), set off a car bomb in a "Tavriya" vehicle parked at the McDonald's on Pokryshkin Street. Once the Baraevites had seized the theater building, the Khaskhanov group then chose to go underground.
The new and quite drastically revised version of events currently being put out by the post-purge Moscow City Prosecutor's Office strikes one as, in essence, a complete fabrication. Most of the key discoveries made by the MUR and by the now-"cleansed" former Moscow procuracy have been adroitly swept under a rug, while Arman Menkeev's role in the events of October 2002 is now passed over in total silence.
Conclusion
Elements among both the Russian leadership and the power ministries and among the Chechen extremists obtained their principal goals in the assault on the theater at Dubrovka: namely, an end was put to the negotiation process while Aslan Maskhadov's reputation was besmirched, and the terrorists, for their part, had an opportunity to stage a grandiose fund-raiser. The Russian authorities, moreover, were now able to demonstrate to the entire world that Moscow, too, had been a victim of an Al-Qaeda-style Chechen terrorist act. As in 1999, the chief victims of these terrorist acts were the average citizens of Moscow. The bulk of the evidence, as we have seen, points to significant collusion having occurred on the part of the Chechen extremists and elements of the Russian leadership in the carrying out of the Dubrovka events.
FOOTNOTES (92) For a list of the negotiators, see "Te, kto ne strelyal," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 October 2002. The presence of the name of Sergei Dedukh here is incorrect; he visited the theater in the capacity of a correspondent for NTV. The information concerning Igrunov's visit appeared in "Gazeta Wyborcza" (Poland), 24 October 2002, posted at chechnya-sl@yahoogroups.com, 24 October 2002. Politkovksaya paid tribute to Aslakhanov's role in "Posle 57 chasov," "Novaya gazeta," No. 82, 4 November 2002.
(93)Alex Nicholson, "Yavlinsky Describes His Role in Crisis," "The Moscow Times," 5 November 2002.
(94)Olga Tropkina, "Vvedenie tsenzury dopustimo," "Nezavisamaya gazeta," 28 October 2002.
(95)Anna Politkovskaya, "My Hours Inside the Moscow Theater."
(96)newsru.com, 27 October.
(97)"Gazeta.ru reskonstruirovala shturm,'" gazeta.ru, 28 October 2002.
(98)Pavel Felgengauer, "'Nord Ost': reputatsiya ili gaz?" "Novaya gazeta," 27 October 2003.
(99)"Yavlinsky Describes his Role in the Crisis."
(100)"Gazeta.ru rekonstruirovala shturm," gazeta.ru, 28 October 2002.
(101)"Russian pundit critical of hostage rescue operation, policy on Chechnya," Ekho Moskvy Radio, BBC Monitoring Service, 26 October 2002.
(102)"Feat of Arms," gzt.ru, 31 October 2002. In English.
(103)Valerii Yakov, "My vse zalozhniki Kremlya," "Novye izvestiya," 29 October 2002. See also: "Two Hostages Killed in Moscow Theater," AP, 26 October 2002, posted at 4:52 a.m.
(104)"Russian pundit critical..."
(105)"Tri dnya v adu," "Komsomolskaya pravda," 29 October 2002.
(106)Viktor Baranets in "Komanda-shturm!" Komsomolskaya pravda, 29 October 2002.
(107)Cited in Susan B. Glasser and Peter Baker, "Gas in Raid Killed 115 Hostages," "The Washington Post," 28 October 2002.
(108)"Gazeta.ru rekonstruirovala shturm," gazeta.ru, 28 October 2002.
(109)gazeta.ru, 31 October 2002. Testimony of hostage Aleksandr Zeltserman, a resident of Latvia. The accounts of special forces personnel who participated in the storming suggest that they began letting in the gas at about 1:15 a.m. See "Ofitsery 'Alfy' i 'Vympela' o shturme," gzt.ru, 30 October 2002. The article "Kreml nameren skryt pravdu o terakte na Dubrovke," apn.ru, 1 November 2002 states that they began pouring in the gas "at about 2:30 a.m. on 26 October -- that is, approximately three hours (!!) before the storm."
(110)Sergei Dyupin, "Peredozirovka," "Kommersant," 28 October 2002.
(111)"Osvobozhdenie: neizvestnye podrobnosti," gzt.ru, 28 October 2002.
(112)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003. A year previously, Andrei Seltsovskii, chair of the Moscow Committee on Health, had stated that "only two [hostages] died of gunshot wounds." ("Peredozirovka," "Kommersant," 28 October 2002)
(113)I stipulated the number 204 in my "Taking a New Look at the Hostage-Taking Incident," "Chechnya Weekly," 17 December 2002. Julius Strauss, who had been in an apartment building with a clear view of the main entrance to the theater, wrote in "Kremlin Keeping Siege Deaths Secret to Avoid Criticism," "The Daily Telegraph," 31 October 2002: "There are now fears that the final death figure, if it is ever published, may be above 200." The website utro.ru reported on 28 October 2002 that 160 hostages had already died and that 40 were in the hospital in such a grave condition and that they could not be saved.
(114)Judith Ingram, "Moscow Theater Hostages Face Poor Health," Associated Press, 6 December 2002.
(115)Margarita Kondrateva, "Zhertvy 'Nord-Osta' provodyat nezavisimoe rassledovanie," gzt.ru, 28 April 2003.
(116)In "Versiya," 21 October 2003.
(117)See "Duma says no to theater terrorism inquiry," gazeta.ru, 1 November 2002. For the text of the Union of Rightist Forces' report, see "Kak eto bylo? Spasenie zalozhnikov ili unichtozhenie terroristov?" "Novaya Gazeta," No. 86, 21 November 2002.
(118)"Empty alcohol bottles, syringes found inside Moscow siege building," RTR, BBC Monitoring Service, 8:00 a.m., 26 October 2002.
(119)"Putin priglasil v Kreml 'Alfu' i 'Vympel,'" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 1 November 2002.
(120)Vladimir Kovalev, "Russia: Heroes and Lawyers," Transitions Online, http://www.tol.cz, 10 March 2003. See also Yurii Shchekochikhin, "Sekretnye geroi," "Novaya gazeta," No. 16, 3 March 2003.
(121)Yurii Levada, "Reiting voiny," "Novoe vremya," 5 November 2002.
(122)Testimony of hostage Ilya Lysak, in "Novaya gazeta," 14 November 2002.
(123)Reuters, 27 October 2002.
(124)"V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003.
(125)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
(126)"Russian Security Service Says No Gunmen Escape," AP, 26 October 2002.
(127)"Osvobozhdenie: neizvestnye podrobnosti," gzt.ru, 28 October 2002.
(128)"V Moskve gotovilos..."
(129)Mikhail Trepashkin, "Spravka," 23 March 2003. Lengthy excerpts from this document were published in "Tainstvennyi 'Abubakar,'" chechenpress.com, 31 July 2003. On 27 December 2003, the website grani.ru published a statement by Mikhail Trepashkin, which had been smuggled out of prison, in which he asserted that he was being physically tortured by the authorities.
(130)In "Moskovskii komsomolets," 23 May 2003.
(131)Zoya Svetova, "Ya uveren, chto Abubakar zhiv..." ruskur.ru, 23 October 2003.
(132)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
(133)Ibid.
(134)Leonid Berres, "MUR opravdalsya za 'Nord-Ost,'" izvestia.ru, 7 February 2003. See, too, Andrei Skrobot, "V 'Lefortovo' doprashivayut geroev 'Nord-Osta,'" "Nezavsimaya gazeta," 25 June 2003.
(135)"MUR opravdalsya..."
(136)Andrei Salnikov, "Peredel vnutrennikh del," "Kommersant-Dengi," 7 July 2003.
(137)gzt.ru, 24 June 2003.
(138)Aleksandr Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist 'Nord-Osta,'" "Moskovskii komsomolets," 23 May 2003.
(139)Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit za 'Nord-Ost,'" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 22 April 2003.
(140)Andrei Skrobot, "Vzryvy v Moskve gotovyat v Podmoskove," "Nezavisimaya gazeta," 6 June 2003.
(141)Zinaida Lobanova et al., "Naiden ment, pustivshii terroristov v 'Nord-Ost,'" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 9 June 2003.
(142)"V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003.
(143)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
(144)In Irina Borogan, "Obvinyaemogo v tragedii 'Nord-Osta' vypustili na svobodu," "Versiya," No. 41, October 2003. On Menkeev, see also Aleksandr Elisov, "Zov krovi," mk.ru, 24 October 2003.
(145)Sergei Topol, Aleksandr Zheglov, Olga Allenova, "Antrakt posle terakta," "Kommersant," 23 October 2003.
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《附件六》車臣本身對此事的報導
Anna Politkovskaya:
"Nobody is interested in the matter of what is going on in the country"
Tuesday, 27 May 2003
Chechenpress
http://www.chechenpress.info/english/news/05_2003/11_27_05.shtml
On 28 April 2003, in issue 30 of "The Novaya Gazeta" the article "Who Remains Alive" by Anna Politkovskaya was published. It says that the Theater Center hijacking committed by terrorists must have been at least controlled by the secret service of Russia. Anna Politkovskaya managed to meet Khanpash Terkibaev who claimed to have been a member of the terrorist group. He also claimed to have followed orders of some special service.
In April 2003 Terkibaev was a member of the Russian delegation at the European Council as a "representative of the Chechen public". At present Terkibaev is a special correspondent of "The Russian newspaper". Terkibaev's name was in the list of the members of Baraev's group that had been published by "The Izvestia" not long before the Theater Center assault held by the special police forces. According to Anna Politkovskaya, "The Novaya Gazeta" has got some other evidence that Terkibaev was among terrorists. Terkibaev also claims to be working in the Information Office of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.
In our opinion, the facts tackled in this publication are of the enormous public significance. Has there been any reaction to the investigation carried by "The Novaya Gazeta" from the authorities, society and their colleagues? The author of this sensational article Anna Politkovskaya, an observer of "The Novaya Gazeta" answers the questions of the editor-in-chief of the Informational Center of the Society for the Russian-Chechen Friendship Stanislav Dmitrievsky.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Quite a lot of time has come since your first publication about Terkibaev. Do you know anything about any reaction of the authorities to your article? Is there any reaction from the Procurator Office, the administration of the President or the State Duma?
Anna Politkovskaya: Nothing at all. I have not even been asked any questions.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: You mean to say that you have not been asked to come anywhere, that there have not been any official interrogations or at least contacts with law-enforcement structures.
Anna Politkovskaya: Absolutely no official respond. It made us publish our second article in which we reminded that there is the General Procurator Office in the country and we not only asked the same questions but also put some more.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: I regard your article sensational. I personally think that in any country with the stable democracy such an article and its impact are sure to cause the governmental crisis, at least. Nevertheless, there is no reaction not only from official structures but also from other sources of mass media. There are too few responds and the majority of them are absolutely passive and spiritless. You are either contradicted at a very low level of "you are a fool yourself", "it was made up by Berezovsky" or just mentioned as if your article had tackled upon a trifle matter. There is neither any serious discussion, nor, moreover, any social resonance. What do you think about the reasons for such an attitude both by the mass media and by the society?
Anna Politkovskaya: You know, to be frank, we expected a different reaction. And we supposed - we didn't want it but we supposed that the reaction would be serious. So it is very difficult for me to comment on the fact that there is no reaction at all. It means that it's of no interest to anybody. I mean to say that nobody is interested in the matter of what is going on in the country. What is interesting is the PR: some people are for the president, some others are against him⋯But the facts and the matter of what is going on in the country are of no concern to anybody. I personally can't comprehend all that.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Apparently, it's a problem not only of the mass media but of the whole Russian society.
Anna Politkovskaya: Certainly. Mass media just reflect social interests, opinions and needs. You know, what shocked me most of all was the human rights activists' position. I am honest here. None of the human rights activists have made any attempt to put any questions in front of the official power. There was the only example - the appeal of the social movement "For Human Rights" headed by Lev Ponomaryov.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Yes, as far as I know, it was also signed by the manager of the museum and The Social Center named after A.D.Sakhsrov Yury Samodurov and the writer Alexander Tkachenko.
Anna Politkovskaya: I haven't seen the final wording of this document but the variant they showed to me the next day after the publication made me feel indignation. As I expressed these feelings to the authors of the appeal openly I am telling you about it now. The matter was that social appeal was called "The authorities should refute⋯" From my point of view, it is awful of them. The authorities must investigate such cases. To investigate means to interrogate Terkibaev and me, at least, by members of that big investigating group that is working now to investigate "The Nord-Ost" events under the control of the General Prosecutor Office. I understand the "The authorities should refute⋯"- position of human rights leaders as a desire to be acceptable by the official power. I can only wish them much success on their way. I was promised, though, that my comments would be certainly taken into account. [Indeed, Anna Politkovskaya's comments must have been taken into account. In the! final wording of the Public Appeal that was published the people who signed it demand investigating into the facts reported in the article and in case they are true - starting a criminal suite. There is no demand to refute in this document. - the editor.]
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Yesterday there appeared an article on Viktor Popkov site by Andrew Smirnov who doesn't agree to you and your supposition about "the controlled terrorist act".
Anna Politkovskaya: Sorry to say, I haven't read this article yet.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Then it wouldn't be right to discuss this topic. It might be possible to comment on the main idea of this publication - the author accuses you of being subject to explain everything by making up schemes of conspiracy. As an example of one of such-like schemes common of the modern Russian mythology Andrew Smirnov tells about the theory of global plot between the two fighting sides. He also considers the supposition of the involvement of the Russian intelligence service into the terrorist act at Dubrovka to be one of these myths. How can you comment on it?
Anna Politkovskaya: Nothing of the kind, I am not for any plot-theories. I can tell honestly - after "The Nord-Ost" a lot of western journalists and employees of foreign embassies used to come to our editorial office with the same question, "What do you think about the involvement of the Russian intelligence service into this terrorist act? Haven't you noticed anything suspicious?" Whenever I was asked this question, I answered that I refused to admit such possibility. I couldn't believe it just because it would have become very difficult to go on living if I had let myself assume it. But later, from January, we began to get some bits of information. It evidenced that there had been some involvement all the same. I started checking it mainly to prove myself that the information wasn't true. This article came from attempts to persuade myself that it wasn't true. I personally think that the reality we are living in now is horrible. It is horrible that the intelligence! e service controls both the president and the whole system of power, that the intelligence service makes all the people jump as they wish. I started my article from the opposite thought: I wanted to make myself sure that the society was much stronger, that we were living in the democracy. And then- It took a long time to get all the information to write the article. And at last I told the editor that I could write the article. And at the same time my Chechen friends who are living in Moscow told me that they had seen that person - Terkibaev - in Moscow and if I wanted they would be able to get in touch with him. I told that I would certainly meet him. I thought such meeting would be very important. Besides, it was just interesting for me what kind of person was he and what was his life like. At first he refused but then accepted my offer to meet. It was his right.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: So if I've caught you right, you mean to say that you had the information concerning the fact that Terkibaev had really been among the terrorists in the Theater Center long before the interview with him, don't you?
Anna Politkovskaya: Exactly. I could have written the article without meeting him. The next bit of the information will be revealed later as the authorities take some measures.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: I have some more questions connected with, so to say, technical points. First, don't you know where Khanpash Terkibaev is now?
Anna Politkovskaya: No information at all. He has disappeared somewhere but I was sure that it would be so.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: Have any other representatives of mass media tried to find him?
Anna Politkovskaya: Yes, they have. Many of them have tried but it was possible to get through to him only once.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: In your interview to the TVS channel that took place on April 28 you told that the members of special military unit who were assaulting the building couldn't have been aware of the "controlled terrorist act". But there appears one more question: the fact that Terkibaev could leave the building of the Theater Center means that he had accomplices among those representatives of the enforcement structures who were in the cordon. The plan of the Theater Center building that Terkibaev had couldn't guarantee that he would manage to leave the blocked building.
Anna Politkovskaya: It was not so. The building wasn't blocked that hard. There was a possibility to escape. If we want to go deeper into that point, I can tell you that too many absolutely inexplicable stories happened there. I can give you some examples. Yes, there was a cordon. And it was rather difficult for me to get into the Theater Center as one special structure said "yes" whereas the other said "no", the Home Affairs Ministry allowed but representatives of the FSB didn't as they didn't have Patrushev's allowance. On having at last received the permission to go, I approach the last circle of the cordon and ⋯see a woman. I ask her, "Who are you? What are you doing here?" And she tells me,
"I am this and that". An absolutely incidental person. Then a strange man turned up from somewhere and joined me. I ask him, "And what are you?" The matter is that I was afraid to enter the area that wasn't observable together with him where it was easy to shoot me dead. He answers, !
"I am from the Red Cross". I inquire him, "Well, but do you have any documents to prove it?" The white armband with the red cross that he was wearing couldn't be regarded as a proof. And one more strange occasion happened inside the cordon where the terrorists were nearby, where it was supposed to be dangerous as the Alfa-men were lying there under the cars and when in spite of all that a woman threw herself at me. She tells me, "I am the wife of ⋯tell Baraev this and that." I was completely astonished. I don't know whether she really was the person she gave herself out to be but the fact remains. She managed to get there. There were a lot of similar situations there: some people went inside the cordon, some other went out of it - none of them was known to the public.
And if I witnessed what was going on at that time it means that somebody else could leave the building through some other exit, from the back one, for example.
Stanislav Dmitrievsky: You mean to say that it was possible to pass the cordon, don't you?
Anna Politkovskaya: Yes! I can say when it became impossible to go through
奇怪, 張貼似乎有字數限制. 我分兩次貼好了.
===========
《附件五》史丹佛大學一位資深研究員對歌劇院事件的詳細報告
THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT (Part 1)
By John B. Dunlop
John B. Dunlop is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution Compiled by Roman Kupchinsky.
http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/2004%20Dunlop-RFERL%20Paper.htm
On 6 November 2002, a meeting was held in Moscow of the Public Committee to Investigate the Circumstances Behind the Explosions of the Apartment Buildings in Moscow and the Ryazan Exercises (all of which occurred in September 1999). The meeting took place at the Andrei Sakharov Center, and among those present were the committee's chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev, its deputy chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov (assassinated on 17 April 2003), lawyer Boris Zolotukhin, writer Aleksandr Tkachenko, journalist Otto Latsis, and human rights activist Valerii Borshchev. After the meeting had concluded, the members of the committee took a formal decision to "broaden its mandate" and to include the Moscow hostage-taking episode of 23-26 October 2002 -- and especially the actions of the Russian special services during that period -- as an additional subject of inquiry coming under the committee's purview.(1)
An Unusual Kind Of 'Joint Venture'?
The following is an attempt to make some sense out of the small torrent of information that exists concerning the October 2002 events at Dubrovka. In my opinion, the original plan for the terrorist action at and around Dubrovka bears a strong similarity to the campaign of terror bombings unleashed upon Moscow and other Russian urban centers (Buinaksk, Volgodonsk) in September of 1999. In both cases there is strong evidence of official involvement in, and manipulation of, key actions; so the question naturally arises as to whether Vladimir Putin in any way sanctioned them. Although there is additional evidence bearing on Putin's possible role, this paper will take an agnostic position on the issue, and will also not review it.
The October 2002 hostage-taking episode in a large theater containing close to 1,000 people was evidently, at least in its original conception, to have been preceded and accompanied by terror bombings claiming the lives of perhaps hundreds of Muscovites, a development that would have terrorized and enraged the populace of the entire country. However, in view of the suspicious connections and motivations of the perpetrators of this incident, as well as the contradictory nature of the actions of the authorities, it would seem appropriate to envisage this operation as representing a kind of "joint venture" (on, for example, the model of the August 1999 incursion into Daghestan) involving elements of the Russian special services and also radical Chechen leaders such as Shamil Basaev and Movladi Udugov.
Only a few individuals among the special services and the Chechen extremist leadership would likely have known of the existence of this implicit deal. Both "partners" had a strong motive to derail the movement occurring in Russia, and being backed by the West, to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Chechen conflict. Both also wanted to blacken the reputation of the leader of the Chechen separatist moderates, Aslan Maskhadov. In addition, the Chechen extremists clearly saw their action as a kind of ambitious fund-raiser aimed at attracting financial support from wealthy donors in the Gulf states and throughout the Muslim world (hence the signs displayed in Arabic, the non-traditional [for Chechens] garb of the female terrorists, and so on). The Russian authorities, for their part, had a propitious chance to depict the conflict in Chechnya as a war against an Al-Qaeda-type Chechen terrorism, a message that could be expected to play well abroad, and especially in the United States.
As in the case of the 1999 terror bombings, meticulous planning -- including the use of "cut-outs," false documents, and the secret transport of weapons and explosives to Moscow from the North Caucasus region -- underlay the preparation for this terrorist assault. In this instance, however, the perpetrators were to be seen as Chechens of a "Wahhabi" orientation whose modus operandi was to recall that of the notorious Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Once the operation had moved into its active stage, however, strange and still not fully explained developments began to occur. An explosion at a McDonald's restaurant in southwest Moscow on 19 October immediately riveted the attention of the Moscow Criminal Investigation (MUR) -- an elite unit of the regular police -- which then moved swiftly to halt the activity of the terrorists. The explosion at the McDonald's restaurant was, fortunately, a small one, and caused the death of only a single person. Two large bombs set to explode before the assault on Dubrovka was launched failed to detonate. Likewise a planned bombing incident at a large restaurant in Pushkin Square in the center of the capital failed to take place.
In my opinion, the most likely explanation for these "technical" failures lies in acts of intentional sabotage committed by some of the terrorists. What remains unclear at this juncture is why certain individuals among the terrorists chose to render the explosive devices incapable of functioning. One key point, however, seems clear: The Chechen extremist leaders felt no pressing need to blow up or shoot hundreds of Russian citizens. They were aware that such actions might so enrage the Russian populace that it would then have supported any military actions whatever, including a possible full-scale extermination of the Chechen people. So what Shamil Basaev, Aslambek Khaskhanov, and their comrades in arms seem to have done is, in a sense, to outplay the special services in a game of chess. Most of the bombs, it turns out, were actually fakes, while the few women's terrorist belts that did actually contain explosives were of danger primarily to the women themselves. As Russian security affairs correspondent Pavel Felgenhauer has rightly suggested, the aim of the extremist leaders seems to have been to force the Russian special services to kill ethnic Russians on a large scale, and that is what happened.(2) Only an adroit cover-up by the Russian authorities prevented the full extent (conceivably more than 200 deaths) of the debacle from becoming known.
A central question to be resolved by future researchers is whether or not the Russian special forces planning an assault on the theater building at Dubrovka were aware that virtually all of the bombs located there -- including all of the powerful and deadly bombs -- were in fact incapable of detonating. If the special forces were aware of this, then there was clearly no need to employ a potentially lethal gas, which, it turned out, caused the deaths of a large number of the hostages. The special forces could have relatively easily and rapidly overwhelmed the lightly armed terrorists. Moreover, if they were in fact aware that the bombs were "dummies," then the special forces obviously had no need to kill all of the terrorists, especially those who were asleep from the effects of the gas. It would, one would think, have made more sense to take some of them alive.
Pressure Builds For A Negotiated Settlement With The Chechen Separatists
In the months preceding the terrorist act at the Dubrovka theater, which was putting on a popular musical, "Nord-Ost," the Kremlin leadership found itself coming under heavy political pressure both within Russia and in the West to enter into high-level negotiations with the moderate wing of the Chechen separatists headed by Aslan Maskhadov, who was elected Chechen president in 1997. Public-opinion polls in Russia showed that a continuation of the Chechen conflict was beginning to erode Putin's generally high approval ratings. With parliamentary elections scheduled for just over a year's time (in December 2003), this represented a worrisome problem for the Kremlin. In a poll taken by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), whose findings were reported on 8 October, respondents were asked "how the situation in Chechnya has changed since V. Putin was elected president."(3) Thirty percent of respondents believed that the situation had "gotten better," but 43 percent opined that it had "not changed," while 21 percent thought that it had "gotten worse." These results were significantly lower than Putin's ratings in other categories. In similar fashion, a September 2002 Russia-wide poll taken by VTsIOM found 56 percent of respondents favoring peace negotiations as a way to end the Chechen conflict while only 34 percent supported the continuing of military actions.(4)
On 16-19 August 2002, key discussions had occurred in the Duchy of Liechtenstein involving two former speakers of the Russian parliament, Ivan Rybkin and Ruslan Khasbulatov, as well as two deputies of the Russian State Duma: journalist and leading "democrat" Yurii Shchekochikhin (died, possibly from the effects of poison, on 3 July 2003) and Aslambek Aslakhanov, a retired Interior Ministry general who had been elected to represent Chechnya in the Duma. Representing separatist leader Maskhadov at the talks was Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Akhmed Zakaev. The talks in Liechtenstein had been organized by the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (executive director, Glen Howard), one of whose leading figures was former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. The meetings in Liechtenstein were intended to restore the momentum that had been created by earlier talks held at Sheremetevo-2 Airport outside of Moscow between Zakaev and Putin's plenipotentiary presidential representative in the Southern Federal District, retired military General Viktor Kazantsev, on 18 November 2001.(5) Efforts to resuscitate the talks had failed to achieve any success because of the strong opposition of the Russian side.
Following the stillborn initiative of November 2001, the Kremlin had apparently jettisoned the idea of holding any negotiations whatsoever with moderate separatists in favor of empowering its handpicked candidate for Chechen leader, former mufti Akhmad Kadyrov. This tactic, said to be backed by Aleksandr Voloshin, the then presidential chief of staff, soon became known as "Chechenization."
Other elements among the top leadership of the presidential administration, such as two deputy chiefs of staff, Viktor Ivanov -- a former deputy director of the FSB -- and Igor Sechin, as well as certain leaders in the so-called power ministries, for example, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev, were reported to be adamantly opposed both to Chechenization and, even more so, to holding talks with moderate separatists; what they wanted was aggressively to pursue the war to a victorious conclusion.(6) If that effort took years more to achieve, then so be it.
In a path-breaking report on the meetings in Liechtenstein, a leading journalist who frequently publishes in the weekly "Moskovskie novosti," Sanobar Shermatova, wrote that the participants had discussed two peace plans: the so-called "Khasbulatov plan" and the so-called "Brzezinski plan."(7) Eventually, she went on, the participants decided to merge the two plans into a "Liechtenstein plan," which included elements of both. Khasbulatov's plan was based on the idea of granting to Chechnya "special status," with international guarantees being provided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and by the Council of Europe. Under Khasbulatov's plan, Chechnya would be free to conduct its own internal and foreign policies, with the exception of those functions that it voluntarily delegated to the Russian Federation. The republic was to remain within Russian borders and was to preserve Russian citizenship and currency.
Under the "Brzezinski plan," Chechens would "acknowledge their respect for the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation," while Russia, for its part, would "acknowledge the right of the Chechens to political, though not national, self-determination." A referendum would be held under which "Chechens would be given the opportunity to approve the constitutional basis for extensive self-government" modeled on what the Republic of Tatarstan currently enjoys. Russian troops would remain stationed on Chechnya's southern borders. "International support," the plan stressed, "must be committed to a substantial program of economic reconstruction, with a direct international presence on the ground in order to promote the rebuilding and stabilization of Chechen society." The authors of this plan underlined that "Maskhadov's endorsement of such an approach would be essential because of the extensive support he enjoys within Chechen society."
On 17 October 2002 -- just six days before the terrorist incident at Dubrovka -- the website grani.ru, citing information that had previously appeared in the newspaper "Kommersant," reported that new meetings of the Liechtenstein group were scheduled to be held in two weeks' time.(8) Duma Deputy Aslakhanov and separatist Deputy Premier Zakaev were planning to meet one-on-one in Switzerland in order "seriously to discuss the conditions which could lead to negotiations." Former speakers Rybkin and Khasbulatov, the website added, would also be taking part in the negotiations. In mid-October, Aslakhanov emphasized in a public statement: "President Putin has not once expressed himself against negotiations with Maskhadov. To the contrary, in a conversation with me, he expressed doubt whether there was a real force behind Maskhadov. Would the people follow after him?" This question put by Putin to Aslakhanov, "Kommersant vlast" reporter Olga Allenova observed, "was perceived in the ranks of the separatists as a veiled agreement [by Putin] to negotiations."(9)
On 10 September 2002, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov had published an essay entitled "Six Points On Chechnya" on the pages of the official Russian government newspaper "Rossiiskaya Gazeta" in which he stressed the urgent need to conduct "negotiations with [separatist] field commanders or at least some of them."(10) "This struggle," Primakov insisted, "can be stopped only through negotiations. Consequently elections in Chechnya cannot be seen as an alternative to negotiations." Primakov also underlined his conviction that "the [Russian] military must not play the dominant role in the settlement." In an interview which appeared in the 4 October 2002 issue of "Nezavisimaya gazeta," Salambek Maigov, co-chairman of the Antiwar Committee of Chechnya, warmly praised Primakov's "Six Points," noting, "Putin and Maskhadov can find compromise decisions. But the problem is that there are groups in the Kremlin which hinder this process."
During September 2002, grani.ru reported that both Maigov and former Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin were supporting a recent suggestion by Primakov that "the status of Finland in the [tsarist] Russian Empire can suit the Chechen Republic."(11) Another possibility, Rybkin pointed out, would be for Chechnya to be accorded "the status of a disputed territory, such as was held by the Aland Islands [of Finland], to which both Sweden and Finland had earlier made claims." A broad spectrum of Russian political leaders -- from "democrats" like Grigorii Yavlinskii, Boris Nemtsov, and Sergei Kovalev to Gennadii Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation -- had, Rybkin said, expressed an interest in such models.
During the course of a lengthy interview -- whose English translation appeared on the separatist website chechenpress.com on 23 October (the day of the seizure of the hostages in Moscow) -- President Maskhadov warmly welcomed the intensive efforts being made to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Chechen conflict: "In Dr. Brzezinski's plan," Maskhadov commented, "we see the concern of influential forces in the United States.... We have a positive experience of collaboration with Ivan Petrovich Rybkin [the reference is to the year 1997, when Rybkin was secretary of the Russian Security Council].... If Yevgenii Primakov speaks of the possibility of a peace resolution, it is a good sign.... The Chechen party would willingly collaborate with the academician [Primakov]. And, finally, with respect to Ruslan Khasbulatov's plan,... we welcome the actions of Khasbulatov.... This plan can be the subject for negotiations."
It appears that Maskhadov was at this time also engaging in secret talks with a high-ranking representative of President Putin. "Into contact with the president of [the Chechen Republic of] Ichkeria, who was on the wanted list," journalist Sanobar Shermatova reported in February of 2003, "there entered such a high-ranking [Russian] official that he was threatened by no unpleasantness whatsoever by the law-enforcement organs for communicating with the Chechen leader."(12)
The FSB Suppresses A Promising Peacemaking Effort
It emerged at this time that Putin had also permitted his special representative for human rights in Chechnya, Abdul-Khakim Sultygov, an ethnic Chechen, to meet with Chechen deputies who had been elected to the separatist parliament in 1997. On 13 October, 10 days before the hostage-taking incident at Dubrovka, Sultygov met in Znamenskoe, the district center of Nadterechnyi District in northern Chechnya, with 14 such deputies. Observers from the OSCE's mission in Znamenskoe were said to have been involved in preparing the meeting. At the meeting, Sultygov and the Chechen deputies discussed ways of bringing about a political regulation of the crisis and also the need to observe human rights in Chechnya.
According to a website associated with the leading Russian human rights organization Memorial (http://www.hro.org), the FSB of Chechnya headed by General Sergei Babkin (an organization in strict subordination to the FSB of Russia) moved aggressively to quash this nascent peacemaking effort.(13) A mere 100 meters away from Sultygov's office in Znamenskoe, hro.org reported, the separatist parliamentarians were taken into custody by armed masked men, who then escorted them to the central FSB office in Nadterechnoe. Each separatist deputy was then interrogated by the FSB department head, Mairbek Khusuev, who subjected them, inter alia, to "insulting remarks." Sultygov, Memorial concluded, came to understand "the decisiveness of his [FSB] opponents who were not deterred by the presence of international observers [from the OSCE]. The breaking off of negotiations...is evidently profitable for the adherents of the force variant."
As this incident demonstrates, key elements among the "siloviki," or power ministries, were adamantly opposed to conducting peace negotiations with separatists and, moreover, to bringing an end to a war that was serving as a source of promotions in rank and of lucrative "financial flows." It seems likely that President Putin's intention was to project the appearance of a willingness to acquiesce to the peacemaking activities of Aslakhanov, Sultygov and others, as a largely symbolic sop to the Europeans. On 21 October, two days before the Dubrovka incident, the president's official spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembskii, announced that there could be no negotiations on the conditions set by the rebels and that "only the official representative of Russia, Viktor Kazantsev, is to conduct negotiations with the separatists, while the remaining initiatives [such as those of Aslakhanov and Sultygov] are deemed to be personal ones."(14)
The involvement of the OSCE in the events in Znamenskoe was an indication that some Western European governments (as well as the United States) were becoming involved in the quest for a solution to a seemingly intractable conflict. At the time of the Dubrovka episode, Denmark was serving as host for a two-day conference on Chechnya attended by some 100 separatists, human rights activists, and parliamentarians. Maskhadov's spokesman, Zakaev, was one of the event's featured speakers.(15)
At this time, other pressures, too, were being brought to bear on the Kremlin to enter into peace negotiations. To cite one example, on 18 October, five days before the Dubrovka incident, a conference entitled "Chechen Dead End: Where To Seek The Peace?" was held at the centrally located Hotel Rossiya in Moscow.(16) The conference had been organized by the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia. Among those who addressed the congress were Duma faction leader Nemtsov, former Duma Speaker Rybkin, Maigov, and Akhmed-Khadzhi Shamaev, the (pro-Moscow) mufti of the Chechen Republic.
It should be underscored that there also existed a significant group of Chechens who complemented the influential and retrograde elements of the FSB and other power structures on the Russian side adamantly opposed to a peace settlement with Maskhadov. These elements consisted of extremist or "Wahhabi" elements among the separatists. The central figure of this group within Chechnya was, of course, the legendary field commander Shamil Basaev, and, abroad, said to be living in the Gulf states, Basaev's partners, the former Chechen First Deputy Premier and Minister of Information Movladi Udugov and former acting President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev. On 4 October, a website affiliated with this group, Kavkaz Center (http://www.kavkaz.org), lambasted the involvement of Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aslambek Aslakhanov in the peace process. Khasbulatov, the website remarked scathingly, "wants to be the Kremlin's only 'man' in Chechnya and to have a full mandate for talks with rebel president Aslan Maskhadov," while Aslakhanov, in the website's view, was serving as Khasbulatov's "power-wielding" assistant seeking to gain control of all the Russian forces in Chechnya.(17)
Setting The Stage
One of the key questions confronting any examination of the Dubrovka events remains how it was possible that such a collection of suspicious individuals could gather and furtive activities occur in and around Moscow over a period of months. Moreover, the provenance of some of the players -- coupled with reports that several of the participants among the hostage takers had already been in the custody of the Russian authorities -- only serves to sharpen this issue.
The Terrorist Action Takes Shape
The activities that culminated in the hostage seizure took place over a period of more than half a year. In February of 2002, eight months before the hostage-taking incident, two Chechen terrorists, "Zaurbek" (real name: Aslambek Khaskhanov) and "Abubakar," also known as "Yasir" (real name: Ruslan Elmurzaev), set the future terrorist act at Dubrovka in motion when they approached a third Chechen, Akhyad Mezhiev, in Ingushetia, where Mezhiev was wont to make regular visits to a cousin living in that republic.(18) Mezhiev had been born in the village of Makhkety, in the Vedeno District of Chechnya, but had managed to acquire legal residency in Moscow even before the first Chechen war. "In terms of an ultimatum, they demanded that Mezhiev assist them, threatening otherwise to take revenge against his relatives living in Chechnya." Mezhiev was provided with a false internal passport, and his brother, Alikhan, was also drawn into the plot. Later Khaskhanov was to provide Alikhan with $2,500 with which to buy two vehicles intended to be used as car bombs. (These vehicles were said to have been purchased during the period August-September 2002.)
According to a June 2003 statement made by the then chief procurator of the city of Moscow, Mikhail Avdyukov, Aslambek Khaskhanov had been closely acquainted with terrorist leader Shamil Basaev. "Still in 2001, in the village of Starye Atagi," Avdyukov related, "he [Khaskhanov] received an assignment from Basaev, through a certain Edaev, to commit a series of terrorist acts in Moscow. Later when Edaev had been killed... Shamil Basaev himself directly confirmed the assignment to Khaskhanov. The terrorist acts were to consist of a series of 'actions of intimidation.'"(19) Avdyukov's statement continued: "He [Khaskhanov] was commanded to head a group and carry out in Moscow four large terrorist acts with the use of explosives in crowded places. In addition to himself, the group also consisted of Aslan Murdalov, the brothers Alikhan and Akhyad Mezhiev, Khampasha Sobraliev, and Arman Menkeev. All of them are now under arrest."
In April 2002, another member of the Chechen terrorist group, the already-mentioned Khampash Sobraliev, purchased a substantial property at House No. 100 on Nosovikhinskii Highway in the village of Chernoe, Balashikhinskii District, Moscow Oblast. The asking price for the property was said to have been $20,000. A family of Chechens then moved in: "Pavel [i.e., Khampash]...and two young women." The two women appear to have been Sobraliev's wife and sister. The family then erected a high fence around the property and began to receive visitors driving expensive foreign cars and large jeeps. Sobraliev's home soon became a hub of activity with the arrival of a former military- intelligence (GRU) operative. Arman Menkeev, a retired (December 1999) major in the GRU and a specialist, inter alia, in the making of explosives, moved in as a guest in the summerhouse on the property. (Khampash and the women were living in the main house.) The neighbors knew Menkeev as "Roma" and Sobraliev as "Pasha."(20)
Menkeev's background and questions concerning his ultimate loyalties serve to highlight many of the problems connected with analyzing the Dubrovka events. According to an article posted in June of 2003 on the website agentura.ru, Arman Menkeev is "a Russian officer, a major, and a former deputy commander of a [GRU] special-forces detachment." Menkeev, who had been born in 1963 to a Kazakh father and Chechen mother, had previously served as a member of "the famous Chuchkovskaya Brigade of the GRU special forces." During the 18 years in which he was in the GRU, Menkeev had served abroad and was said to speak Farsi. He had also fought with the Russian military during the first Chechen war (1994-96), during which he had received a military decoration for valor, had been wounded, and had "received the classification of an invalid." Menkeev is also reported by agentura.ru to have prepared the "women martyrs' belts," the homemade grenades, and other explosive devices used by the Dubrovka hostage takers in October of 2002.(21) The weapons and explosives employed during October had been "transported to this house [in the village of Chernoe] straight from Chechnya in trucks containing boxes of apples."(22) (Other sources assert that they had been transported by vehicle from Ingushetia, not Chechnya.)
The article in agentura.ru directly raised the question of whether Menkeev was a traitor to Russia who was heeding the "voice of the blood" (of his Chechen mother) or whether he represented, instead, a loyal servant of Russia. The author noted that after Menkeev had been arrested in Chernoe by Russian police on 22 November 2002, FSB officers interrogating him at the Lefortovo Prison in Moscow had come to a decision to classify him as "loyal to the [Russian] government," adding mysteriously, "He knows how to keep a military and state secret."
By the summer of 2002, the terrorist conspiracy had begun to move into high gear. "For a certain time, the rebels tested [Akhyad] Mezhiev. Then, in the summer of 2002, they introduced him to his contact, Aslambek [Khaskhanov], and to the demolition specialist, Yasir,... who arrived specially in Ingushetia from Chechnya to become acquainted with him. Yasir was introduced to the neophyte under the pseudonym of Abubakar." (Both names, we now know, were pseudonyms used by Ruslan Elmurzaev, who was at that time a resident of Moscow and not of Chechnya.) In August 2002, both Khaskhanov and Elmurzaev paid a visit to Mezhiev in Moscow. Responding to adds that he had read in a newspaper, "Mezhiev then purchased two unremarkable vehicles and passed the keys to them -- as well as cell phones he had been instructed to purchase -- to Aslambek, who arrived specially from Nazran [Ingushetia]" to receive them.(23)
The activities of these Chechen terrorists in Moscow had not, it turned out, passed unnoticed. In fact, according to attorney Mikhail Trepashkin, not only were certain of these activities observed but the authorities were informed about them. However, the authorities then chose to take no action. Trepashkin, a former lieutenant colonel in the FSB turned dissident lawyer, was a controversial individual in his own right. In 1998, he had sued then FSB Director Nikolai Kovalev over his dismissal from the service and had participated in a November 1998 press conference together with another former FSB officer, Aleksandr Litvinenko, devoted to the subject of criminal activities occurring within the FSB. In 1999, Trepashkin had begun assisting the Sergei Kovalev commission in its investigation of the 1999 Moscow and Volgodonsk terror bombings.
According to Trepashkin's testimony, Elmurzaev ("Abubakar") and his associates operated in a gray zone where criminal activity routinely intersected with elements of Russian officialdom. In his "Statement" (Spravka), dated 23 March 2003, Trepashkin recalled: "Beginning in May of 2002, from people in the 'criminal world' there came information about a concentration of Chechens in the city of Moscow...such as had not been observed over the past two years."(24) From a retired secret-police officer who was working as a lawyer for several Chechen firms, Trepashkin learned that "Abdul" (a former field commander of Chechen terrorist leader Salman Raduev and of late separatist President Djokhar Dudaev) had appeared in the capital. "I also," Trepashkin continued, "received information on 'Abubakar,' who, for an extensive period of time, had been living in the city of Moscow and had been earning a profit from firms based at the Hotel Salyut in the southwest of Moscow that no one was laying a hand on. Information had come even earlier that the Hotel Salyut was sending part of the funds to support the Chechen rebels. However, no one was carrying out any checking, since the shadowy funds were also being disseminated to several leaders of the [Russian] power structures. The Hotel Salyut was headed by two Chechens,... but their deputy was [retired] Lieutenant General of the USSR KGB Bogantsev. For this reason, no one [among the authorities] was laying a hand on 'Abubakar' in the hotel." Following the Dubrovka incident, Trepashkin voluntarily turned over the information he had collected concerning "Abubakar" to the FSB, but the FSB reacted to this gesture by "trying to fabricate a criminal case against me."
In a later statement, dated 20 July 2003, Trespashkin added: "At the end of July-August 2002,... I received information about a concentration in the city of Moscow of armed Chechen extremists....They were especially concentrated in the Southwest and Central districts of the city of Moscow." Trepashkin recalled that he had earlier taken "Abdul" into custody in Chechnya in 1995 but that a senior secret police official, Nikolai Patrushev [now head of the FSB], and the then director of the FSK, Mikhail Barsukov, had "ordered me to leave him in peace.(25)
In a conversation with a retired FSB colonel, V.V. Shebalin, Trepashkin " pointed out to him that in Moscow they [Trepashkin's sources] had seen the field commander from the brigade of Raduev 'Abdul'.... I also acquainted him with materials relating to 'Abubakar,' who was serving as a 'roof' for a number of sites in the district of the metro 'Yugo-Zapadnaya.'" "Running ahead," Trepashkin added, "I will say that presently I am being accused of, at the end of July and the beginning of August 2002, providing Shebalin with information concerning agents of the FSB of the Russian Federation." Trepashkin's conclusion: "Either the concentration of extremists took place under the control of the Russian FSB and they therefore decided to turn my citing of such information into the revealing of a state secret of Russia, or Shebalin did not transmit the information to the Russian FSB." But Shebalin, it emerged, had indeed transmitted the information. According to the same July statement by Trepashkin: "He [Shebalin] said that the Russian FSB was aware of the information, but as to why they did not undertake any measures, and why, in relation to me, on the contrary, they opened a criminal case and seized the data base I had been collecting for years, including data about terrorists, he did not know."
Moreover, once Trepashkin learned that "Abubakar" was among the hostage takers at Dubrovka, "I again proposed to Shebalin to call up the materials on my computer which had been seized." But "the experts from the Russian FSB deemed the information I possessed about the events at the 'Nord-Ost' to be a state secret of Russia, and I was charged with having revealed a state secret."
On 22 October 2003, Trepashkin was arrested by the Interior Ministry on a highway in Moscow Oblast and charged with transporting a concealed and unregistered pistol in his car. Trepashkin was able to get out the information that the pistol (supposedly stolen in Chechnya) had been planted in his car and that the regular police had admitted to him that they had acted at the behest of the FSB. Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev commented concerning this incident: "I do not believe that Mikhail Ivanovich [Trepashkin] had a pistol with him. He is an experienced man, a former officer of the KGB. He is not a bandit, and he is not a fool."(26) On the day preceding his arrest, it might be noted, Trepashkin had granted a major interview to a correspondent for "Moskovskie novosti."(27)
FOOTNOTES
(1) In grani.ru, 6 November 2002. The author would like to thank Robert Otto for his exceptionally generous bibliographical assistance and for his most useful comments on a draft of this essay. Peter Reddaway also made a number of remarkably incisive comments on the manuscript. Lawrence Uzzell, too, provided constructive and helpful criticism. The author is, of course, solely responsible for the final version of this essay.
(2) In sovsekretno.ru, November 2002.
(3) Posted on polit.ru, 8 October 2002, by VTsIOM polling specialist L. A. Sedov.
(4) Yurii Levada, "Reiting voiny," "Novoe vremya," 5 November 2002.
(5) See Yevgenia Borisova, "Kazantsev's Ball Now in Rebels' Court," "The Moscow Times," 20 November 2001. For an informative account by Shchekochikhin of a long conversation he had with Zakaev in Liechtenstein, see Yurii Shchekochikhin, "Zabytaya Chechnya," (Moscow: "Olimp," 2003), pp. 248-259. Zakaev describes, inter alia, details of the peace agreement he had largely come to with retired general Kazantsev.
(6) On this group, see "Chekisty vo vlasti," "Novaya gazeta," 14 July 2003.
(7) Sanobar Shermatova, "Chechen Plan Hammered Out," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 30 August 2002. The "Khasbulatov plan" appeared as a prefix entitled "Plan mira dlya Chechenskoi respubliki" in Ruslan Khasbulatov, "Vzorvannaya zhizn" (Moscow: "Graal," 2002). The so-called "Brzezinski plan" appeared as: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alexander Haig, and Max Kampelman, "The Way to Chechen Peace," "The Washington Post," 21 June 2002.
(8) In grani.ru, 17 October 2002.
(9) Olga Allenova, "Terrorizm i zakhvat posle antrakta," "Kommersant vlast," 28 October 2002.
(10) Yevgenii Primakov, "Shest punktov po Chechne," "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 10 September 2002.
(11) In grani.ru 17 September 2002.
(12) Sanobar Shermatova, "Mirotvortsy pod kovrom," "Moskovskie novosti," no. 6, 18 February 2003. Subsequently Shermatova reported that the high-level talks had been conducted "in one of the republics of the North Caucasus." ("Shestero iz baraevskikh," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 April 2003). Writing in "Po-amerikanski no poluchaetsya?" in the 5 August 2003 issue of "Moskovskie novosti," Shermatova added: "At the very time when Moscow was accusing Maskhadov of having organized the terrorist act at Dubrovka, he, according to our information, was located in a secure place in one of the republics of the North Caucaus."
(13) hro.org, 19 October 2002.
(14) Olga Allenova, "Terrorizm i zakhvat posle antrakta," "Kommersant vlast," 28 October 2002.
(15) In "The Moscow Times," 31 October 2002.
(16) In grani.ru, 18 October.
(17) Kavkaz-Tsentr, translated by BBC Monitoring, 4 October 2002.
(18) Aleksandr Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist 'Nord-Osta,'" "Moskovskii komsomolets," 23 May 2003; and Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit za 'Nord-Ost'?" "Komsomol'skaya pravda," 22 April 2003.
(19) "V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003. Avdyukov was removed from his post in July 2003: "Prokuror Moskvy podal v otstavku," grani.ru, 31 July 2003.
(20) See Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..."; Andrei Skrobot, "Vzryvy v Moskve gotovyat v Podmoskove," "Nezavisimaya gazeta," 6 June 2003; and Zinaida Lobanova, Andrei Redkin, "Ne vinovny my! Baraev sam prishel," "Komsomolskaya pravda," 23 June 2003.
(21) Aleksandr Zheglov, "Pravitelstvu veren," agentura.ru, 30 June 2003. This article is said by agentura.ru to have first appeared in the newspaper "Den," 3 December 2003.
(22) Zinaida Lobanova et al., "Naiden ment, pustivshii terroristov v 'Nord-Ost,'" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 9 June 2003. An earlier report by Lobanova that appeared in the 22 April 2003 issue of the same newspaper had stated that the weapons and explosives had been transported to the capital from Ingushetia in a truck loaded with watermelons and had then been kept in two rented garages in Moscow, one on Leninskii Prospekt and one on Ogorodnyi Proezd. It appears that the explosives were originally housed at the base in the village of Chernoe.
(23) Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit za 'Nord-Ost'?" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 22 April 2003.
(24) For the text of Trepashkin's "Spravka," see "Tainstvennyi 'Abubakar,'" chechenpress.com, 31 July 2003.
(25) In "Ekho 'Nord-Osta' i vzryvov domov v Rossii," Kavkazkii vestnik (editor@kvestnik.org), 22 July 2003. The text also appeared in: "'Nord-Ost': provokatsiya FSB," chechenpress.com, 21 July 2003.
(26) In Polina Shershneva, "On poidet do kontsa," newizv.ru, 24 October 2003.
(27) Igor Korolkov, "Fotorobot na pervoi svezhesti," "Moskovskie novosti," 11 November 2003. In the 4 December 2003 issue of "Novaya gazeta," journalist Anna Politkovskaya reported that Trepashkin was being tried in a closed trial conducted by the Moscow District Military Court and that Amnesty International was in process of according him the status of political prisoner.
THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT (Part 2)
The Nominal Leader Of The Terrorists
A young man who called himself Movsar Baraev served as the titular leader of the group of terrorists that took control of the Moscow theater. Movsar Baraev -- who also went by the names Mansur Salamov and Movsar Suleimenov(28) -- had but a single claim to fame: He was the nephew of the late Chechen Wahhabi kidnapper and murderer Arbi Baraev. According to a report appearing in the military newspaper "Krasnaya zvezda," Arbi Baraev "had personally participated in the murder of 170 persons."(29) Nonetheless, Baraev, Movsar's uncle, "had moved freely about the [Chechen] republic showing at federal checkpoints the documents of an officer of the Russian MVD [Interior Ministry]."(30) "On the windshield of [Arbi] Baraev's vehicle," journalist Anna Politkovskaya has noted, "there was a pass, regularly renewed, which stated that the driver was free 'to go everywhere' -- the most cherished and respected pass in the Combined Group of [Russian] Forces."(31) Arbi Baraev also had reported shadowy ties to both the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU).(32)
In January 2003, a well-known French journalist, Anne Nivat, author of the book "Chienne de Guerre: A Woman Reporter Behind the Lines of the War in Chechnya" (2001), who had conducted a number of incognito visits to Chechnya, reported: "Two months before the hostage taking, the GRU, the secret service of the Russian army, had announced [Movsar] Baraev's arrest. The implication is that he would have been held until his 'arrest' to lead the hostage taking at the Dubrovka theater."(33)
Good reasons exist to doubt that Movsar was the actual leader of the group. "Under his [Movsar
Baraev's] control," Sanobar Shermatova has stipulated, "were [only] five to six rebels, and he never
demonstrated either the military or organizational abilities necessary for a commander.... The
Chechens [sources of "Moskovskie novosti"] say that Baraev himself was not fully initiated into the
plan [to seize the theater]. He was supposed to play his role and then burn up like a rocket booster."
The former pro-Moscow head of the Chechen Interior Ministry, also a former FSB officer, Said-Selim
Peshkhoev "proposed that this group of terrorists was led not by Movsar Baraev but by another
person."(34)
Further testimony that Movsar was not the real leader comes from Shamil Basaev. In late April 2003, Basaev recalled: "I included [Movsar] Baraev in this group only in late September [2002]. I had only two hours to talk to him and give instructions."(35) If Movsar Baraev was at this time in the custody of the GRU (as Nivat's sources claim), then Basaev could only have met with Baraev through the good offices of that elite organization. Such a scenario is not unimaginable. It is known that Basaev himself worked closely with a purported GRU officer named Anton Surikov when Basaev was serving as deputy defense minister of the separatist (from Georgia) republic of Abkhazia in 1992-93. During the course of a 2001 interview, Surikov assessed "extremely positively" Basaev's role in that conflict.(36) "In the beginning of the 1990s," Surikov affirmed, "he [Basaev] was materially supported by us."
A number of Russian journalists and political analysts have expressed their belief that Basaev and Surikov met together once again some years later -- this time together with the chief of the Russian presidential administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, at the estate of a Saudi international arms dealer in southern France in July 1999, in order to seal an agreement which led to Basaev's invasion of Daghestan the following month.(37) In the summer of 2000, when the newspaper "Versiya" published an article about the alleged meeting complete with a group photograph of Voloshin, Basaev, and Surikov, the paper approached Surikov and he "rather severely" told its correspondents to leave him alone. However, Surikov did not deny that the meeting took place. Moreover, almost a year later, when asked about the possible role of the security forces in organizing the invasion of Daghestan, Surikov replied somewhat mysteriously: "A positive answer to your question would sound unproven, although, in my view, such a perspective on events in part has a right to existence, but only in part." Among the more prominent individuals who have voiced this perspective was the former secretary of the Russian Security Council, retired General Aleksandr Lebed. He affirmed his belief in October of 1999 that "Basaev and the Kremlin had concluded an agreement," which had led to the August 1999 invasion of Daghestan.(38)
Among the suicide bombers who were present in the Moscow theater, Nivat has also reported, there were two women, who, like Movsar Baraev, had already been placed under arrest by the federal authorities: "At Assinovskaya, a village close to the border with Ingushetia, which is where two of the [Baraev] unit's women came from, their mothers say they had been arrested [by the Russian authorities] and taken to an unknown destination at the end of September [2002]. Secretive in the presence of the outsider that I am, and still considerably shocked, they won't say more."
In a similar vein, in January 2003, the late Duma Deputy and journalist Yurii Shchekochikhin wrote in the newspaper "Novaya Gazeta": "Unexpectedly, last week I learned that one of the female terrorists in the Nord-Ost building was not just anyone but a woman who had been imprisoned for a long time in one of the Russian [penal] colonies. She was recognized on television by her mother, a resident of Shelkovskii Raion in Chechnya. She cannot understand how her daughter reached Moscow as a terrorist from a prison cell."(39)
In addition, the well-connected investigative journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein has reported that some eight of the women suicide bombers were able to take up residence in a former "military city [gorodok]" in Moscow, located on Ilovaiskaya Street, not far from the Dubrovka theater. This complex, which housed a large number of illegal residents prepared to pay bribes to the authorities, was apparently under the protection of corrupt elements among the Moscow police.(40)
The Active Phase of the Operation Begins
By mid-October 2002, the terrorists had shifted over to the active phase of their operation. During a face-to-face meeting with "Abubakar," Aslambek Khaskhanov learned that "Shamil Basaev had ordered him [Abubakar] to prepare 'a very large action' with a seizure of hostages."(41) The action referred to was, of course, the taking of the theater at Dubrovka.
A series of powerful explosions had been set to go off, beginning on 19 October 2002, with the hostage-taking episode itself having originally been planned for 7 November, the former anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Several vehicles were fitted with explosive devices, most likely at the terrorist base at Chernoe in Moscow Oblast, and then moved to a garage at 95 Leninskii Prospekt. "An explosion [at a McDonald's restaurant in southwest Moscow] took place on 19 October, at approximately 1:05 p.m., that is not during rush hour and not in the most crowded area of the city." This account by the former chief procurator of Moscow, Mikhail Avdyukov, continues: "Two other vehicles [fitted with explosives] were also parked: one next to the Tchaikovsky Theater Hall on Triumfalnaya Square, the other near a busy subway transit point in the center. But the more powerful explosives [contained in these two vehicles] did not work."(42) According to one version, the watch mechanism failed to work in the vehicle that had been parked at the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall.
On 20 October, Aslambek Khaskhanov, who had placed the explosives in the three vehicles, flew from Moscow to Nazran, Ingushetia, using false documents. His decision to leave town has been assessed by one journalist as being due to "banal cowardice." On that same day, his confederate, "Abubakar," according to one report, removed the large bomb from the vehicle at the Tchaikovsky Theater." On 23 October, that bomb was then "placed in the house of culture at Dubrovka."(43)
This powerful bomb placed in the theater, it was later revealed, was in fact incapable of detonating: "The power [ministries] have admitted," "Kommersant" reported in July 2003, "that the most powerful of the homemade bombs which were placed by the Baraevites in the seized theater center at Dubrovka were not in a condition in which they could be detonated. They lacked such important elements as batteries, which made the bombs harmless bolvanki [dummies]. And it was precisely this circumstance that permitted the conducting of a completely successful storm of the theater center."(44)
According to one press report, the powerful bombs placed by Khaskhanov did not go off because of a key design failure. Two of the vehicles that had failed to explode were later located by the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department (MUR) (in January 2003 in a parking lot located off the Zvenigorod Highway), who determined the reason for the failure of the bombs: "The gas tanks of the vehicles were divided hermetically into two parts: in one half was gasoline while the other was filled with a substance similar to plastic explosive together with nails and fragments of steel barbed wire. However, an examination showed that the amount of plastic explosive was so small that even if an explosion had happened, the explosive force would have been insignificant."(45) (As we have seen, other reports mention a faulty timing mechanism in the bombs.)
The explosion of the small bomb contained in the "Tavriya" vehicle that had been parked next to McDonald's restaurant on Porkryshkin Street and had resulted in the death of one person attracted the attention of a unit of MUR, an elite police body designed to combat organized crime and terrorism, commanded by Colonel Yevgenii Taratorin. "The police learned that the 'Tavriya' vehicle that had been blown up had been sold by proxy to a certain Artur Kashinskii...whose real name turned out to be Aslan Murdalov, a native of Urus-Martan in Chechnya, who had been living in Moscow for 10 years."(46) Working quickly, the MUR identified Murdalov and took him into custody on 22 October.
It was the arrest of Murdalov that forced the terrorists "to accelerate their activities and the seizure of the hostages at Dubrovka, which had first been planned for 7 November."(47) As journalist Zinaida Lobanova has noted: "The original seizure of the musical 'Nord-Ost' was planned for 7 November, the day of Accord and Reconciliation [the postcommunist name for the holiday], and that seizure was to have been preceded by the explosion of cars in the center of the capital, in order to sow panic."(48) On 22 October, "A.S. Mezhiev informed Abubakar about the taking into custody of A.M. Murdalov.... [Abubakar] told him that in the next few days a powerful operation would take place."(49)
The failure of the two car bombs to explode in crowded locations in the center of the capital required the terrorists to speed up and to alter their plans. The hostage-taking operation at Dubrovka had been intended (at least, apparently, by certain of its planners) to be the culmination of a terror bombing campaign directly reminiscent of the one visited on the capital in September of 1999. Deprived of this sanguinary "introduction," the October 23 hostage-taking action commenced shorn of its spectacular first act. The MUR had gotten on the trail of the terrorists and their associates sooner than had been expected. (In this sense, the entire episode bears a certain resemblance to the "Ryazan incident" of September 1999, in which the local police interfered with an operation that was under way.[50]). Once the theater had been taken over by the terrorists on 23 October, the officers of the MUR realized that "the terror act at McDonald's and the seizure of the Nord-Ost had been prepared by one and the same people." On 28 October, just two days after the theater had been stormed by Russian special forces units, the MUR took the two Mezhiev brothers into custody.(51)
To return to 23 October -- the day on which the Moscow theater was seized by the terrorists -- shortly before the raid occurred: "Abubakar designated a meeting with [Akhyad] Mezhiev near the Crystal Casino. Abubakar was at the wheel of a Ford Transit [minibus]. He handed over to Mezhiev two Chechen girls on whom suicide belts with explosives had been attached. Abubakar ordered that the girls be taken to a populated place where they could blow themselves up and thus draw the attention of the law-enforcement organs away from the seizure of the House of Culture [at Dubrovka]."(52) "At first," the account continues, "Mezhiev decided to let the suicide women off at the Pyramid Cafe, but, having learned by radio of the seizure of the House of Culture, he exhibited cowardice."
A bomb blast at this normally crowded cafe located in the very center of Moscow would have been a catastrophic event. In his taped confession to the police, Akhyad Mezhiev related that, on the night of 23-24 October, Abubakar called him on his mobile phone and demanded angrily: "Why has there been no wedding?" Wedding was "the code word for the designated stage of the terrorist act. Women-bombs was what they had in mind." "Abubakar wanted me," Mezhiev continued, "to send the girls that same night. They had everything ready. Everything depended on me." Mezhiev drove the suicide bombers to the Pyramid Cafe on Pushkin Square. "Here there were always a lot of people. The 'brides of Allah' were to blow themselves up in the crowd." Mezhiev, however, "did not let the women out of the vehicle. Why? We don't know."(53)
Mezhiev then relates (on the police videotape) how he took the belts away from the would-be suicide bombers and then drove them to a train station where he bought them tickets to Nazran, Ingushetia, and bade them farewell. He then gave the "martyrs' belts" to his brother Alikhan, who, at the command of Abubakar, handed them over to Khampash Sobraliev, one of the two terrorists based in the village of Chernoe in Moscow Oblast.(54) "In a telephone conversation with Abubakar, he [Mezhiev] said that he was afraid and wanted to leave town." This he proved unable to do, and on 28 October he was placed under arrest by the MUR. "He was 'caught out' because of his telephone conversations with Abubakar."(55)
An alternative explanation to the version Mezhiev recounted to the police would be that the women terrorists in fact had been let out of the vehicle but their "martyr-belts" had failed to detonate. Shamil Basaev seemed to allude to such a development in his already-cited statement posted on Kavkaz Tsentr on 26 April 2003: "The detonators of our martyrs had not worked: this occurred with those who were inside [the theater at Dubrovka] and four female martyrs who were outside. They returned here. I personally talked to three and they claimed that their detonators had not worked."(56) It is entirely possible, however, that Basaev was aware that the belts would not work and was merely embellishing his tale for the sake of potential donors in the Gulf states and the Muslim world.
"According to the information of the FSB," the newspaper "Kommersant" reported on 29 October, "the entire building [at Dubrovka] was mined, and the explosion of only a part of the bombs could have brought about the collapse of the theater building. But only a pair of the bombs that were contained in the belts of women-kamikaze exploded. At the moment of the explosion, they [the women] were outside the hall guarding the approach to it. It turns out that all the other bombs were either fakes or they had not been readied for use. For example, they lacked batteries or a detonator."(57)
One of the Russian emergency workers who entered the building after it was stormed by the special forces, Yurii Pugachev, has recalled: "Personally I saw the bodies of several women in black clothing whose stomachs had literally been blown apart. Evidently the explosive was not very strong."(58) "If one is to believe the sources of 'Moskovskie novosti,'" Sanobar Shermatova and Aleksandr Teit wrote in an article appearing in April 2003, "several of the women suicide fighters, having understood that gas had been let into the hall, tried to connect the lead wires on their suicide belts. They didn't work, because, instead of explosives, there was a fake there. Was that really the way it really was?"(59)
Shamil Basaev has claimed that the original targets of the terrorists were the buildings of the Russian State Duma and the Federation Council. In an article appearing in an underground rebel newspaper, "Ichkeriya," Basaev even "provides the measurements of the vestibules of the two buildings."(60)
Since, however, Basaev is a habitual distorter of the truth, one must at this point must remain agnostic about what precise building(s) the terrorists intended to target first.
The Russian authorities, it has also been reported, had been forewarned of the impending terrorist attack by none other than the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to Duma Deputy Yurii Shchekochikhin, he was telephoned on 25 October 2002 by "a high-ranking individual in Washington," who told him that, during the first half of October, the CIA had alerted the Russian government that "a new Budennovsk [a reference to the southern Russian town attacked in June of 1995 by a force headed by Shamil Basaev] was being prepared in Moscow."(61)
In April 2003, there occurred a brief flap when a dissident former FSB officer, Aleksandr Litvinenko, living in London, and a leading Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, reported that an FSB agent of Chechen nationality, Khampash Terkibaev, had been present inside the theater building but had left it before the storming of 26 October.(62) Politkovskaya went on to publish the text of an interview with Terkibaev in which he confirmed that he had indeed been in the building. It emerged, however, that both Litvinenko and Politkovskaya had fallen into an extremely intricate and clever trap, evidently laid by for them by the FSB. Terkibaev, a murky adventurer with almost certain links to the secret police, had boasted during a visit to Baku that he had been in the building at Dubrovka, but he had evidently been lying. Sanobar Shermatova and a co-author pointed out on the pages of "Moskovskie novosti" that Terkibaev, "who in 2000 even found a way to receive a document of amnesty in the FSB office in the city of Argun," had for a number of years been engaging in anti-Wahhabi activities and would not therefore have been acceptable to the Movsar Baraev/Abubakar group. "Terkibaev," they noted, "does not deny that after the events around 'Nord-Ost,' he introduced himself in Baku as a participant in the seizure of the hostages."(63)
Another Chechen, Zaurbek Talikhigov, was arrested by the police following the storming of the theater building. He was apparently a walk-on volunteer who, using a borrowed cell phone, attempted to inform the terrorists from outside the building where the Russian forces were positioned. His phone conversations were, of course, monitored and taped by Russian law-enforcement authorities.(64)
The Terrorist Assault On 23 October
On 23 October, shortly after 9:00 p.m., 40 Chechen terrorists whose titular leader was Movsar Baraev -- but whose de facto leader was the shadowy "Abubakar" (Ruslan El'murzaev) -- stormed (there were no armed guards present so the task was not overly difficult) and took control of the House of Culture at Dubrovka in Moscow, which was putting on the popular musical "Nord-Ost." A total of 979 people were taken captive (there were slightly more than 900 present in the building at the time that it was taken back on 26 October).(65) According to a statement made by the former procurator of Moscow, the terrorists were carrying 17 automatic weapons and 20 pistols, as well as various homemade bombs, suicide belts, and grenades.(66) Twenty-one of the terrorists were men and 19 women.(67) As opposed to the "terror bombings" in Moscow in 1999 -- when the announced suspects had been ethnic Karachai --on this occasion there could be little doubt that the perpetrators were ethnic Chechens, though elements among the hostage takers, with the likely support of the special services involved in the operation, sought to convey the impression that there were Arab terrorists among them.
One website, utro.ru, which on occasion elects to convey the views of the Russian secret services, focused attention upon one of the terrorists, the mysterious "Yasir" (another name, as we have seen, used by "Abubakar"): "As 'Utro' has learned from sources in the Russian special services," the website wrote, "there were several rebels who were non-Chechens, including an Arab called (his code-name) Yasir. About him the following is known: this international terrorist is a subject of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and is on the international wanted list. Yasir entered into the leading link of the cells of 'Al-Qaeda'.... The Wahhabi Movsar Baraev...was in fact a marionette in the hands of experienced puppeteers."(68) When a deputy minister of the interior, Vladimir Vasilev, was asked by RTR television on 26 October: "Abubakar is an Arabic name, isn't it?" he replied misleadingly: "Naturally, it is."(69) Even one year after the Dubrovka episode, some Russian security officials were continuing to push the fictional "Yasir's" involvement in the hostage-taking events: "The investigation," gzt.ru reported on 23 October 2003, "has not yet established the identity of a mercenary, an Arab who called himself Yasir. He was using a Russian Federation [internal] passport in the name of Alkhazurov, Idris Makhmudovich, born 1974."(70) One day after the publishing of this information, however, the newspaper "Izvestiya" reported that it had been the titular leader of the terrorists, Movsar Baraev, who in fact had been carrying "a passport in the name of Idris Alkhazurov."(71)
On 24 October 2002, the day following the seizure of the theater at Dubrovka, it was reported by the media that President Vladimir Putin "sees the seizure of the hostages in Moscow as one of the links in a chain of the manifestations of international terrorism, in one row with the [recent] terrorist acts in Indonesia and the Philippines. 'These same people also planned the terrorist act in Moscow,' said Putin."(72)
These "Arab" and "radical Islamic" themes were also heavily accented by the hostage takers themselves. At 10:00 p.m. on 23 October, just 50 minutes after the taking of the building: "The [former] minister of propaganda of the Ichkerian republic [i.e., Chechnya], Movladi Udugov, speaks to the BBC Service of Central Asia and the Caucasus. He confirms that the group of field commander [Movsar] Baraev organized the hostage taking. According to Udugov, the group consists of kamikaze terrorists and about 40 [sic] widows of Chechen rebels who are not going to surrender. The building is mined."(73) Udugov was at the time widely believed to be living in Qatar or another of the Gulf states. Two hours later, a website associated with Udugov, Kavkaz-Tsentr (kavkaz.org), reported the same information, adding: "The terrorists are demanding the withdrawal of [Russian] troops from Chechnya."(74)
The following day, 24 October, it was reported by the website gazeta.ru, as well as by other media, that: "The Qatar television company Al-Jazeera broadcast a tape of the Chechen rebels in which they state that they are prepared to die for the independence of their homeland and to deprive of life the hostages located in the building in the theater center." "For us," the hostage takers affirmed on the tape, "it is a matter if indifference where we die." "We have chosen to die here, in Moscow, and we will take with us the souls of the unfaithful," added one of the five women in masks standing in the frame under the sign, 'Allah akbar!' written in Arabic." In another fragment, one of the rebels is shown declaring, "Each of us is prepared for self-sacrifice, for the sake of Allah and the independence of Chechnya."(75) The veiled women were shown dressed entirely in black. Al-Jazeera television also showed one of the male rebels "seated in front of a laptop with the holy Muslim book the Koran by his side." "We seek death more than you seek life," said the man, who was also dressed in black. "We came to the Russian capital to stop the war or die for the sake of Allah," he asserted.(76) Al Jazeera reported subsequently that the interview had been taped on 23 October in Moscow shortly before the Chechens had assaulted the theater.(77)
The rebels also exhibited a militant radical Muslim stance over the course of the few interviews that they granted to Russian and Western media. As NTV correspondent Sergei Dedukh reported on 25 October (the footage was shown the following day): "The two girls in black whom the rebels called their sisters have explosives on their belts with wires sticking out of them. Could you please tell us what your clothes and the explosives in your belt mean?" An unidentified woman hostage taker replied: "They mean that we shall not stop at anything or anywhere. We are on Allah's way. If we die here, that won't be the end of it. There are many of us, and it will go on."(78) Movsar Baraev is then quoted by Dedukh as asserting that "the terrorists' only and final goal is the end of the military operation in Chechnya and the withdrawal of [Russian] federal troops."
In an interview with journalist
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《附件五》史丹佛大學一位資深研究員對歌劇院事件的詳細報告
THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT (Part 1)
By John B. Dunlop
John B. Dunlop is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution Compiled by Roman Kupchinsky.
http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/2004%20Dunlop-RFERL%20Paper.htm
On 6 November 2002, a meeting was held in Moscow of the Public Committee to Investigate the Circumstances Behind the Explosions of the Apartment Buildings in Moscow and the Ryazan Exercises (all of which occurred in September 1999). The meeting took place at the Andrei Sakharov Center, and among those present were the committee's chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev, its deputy chairman, Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov (assassinated on 17 April 2003), lawyer Boris Zolotukhin, writer Aleksandr Tkachenko, journalist Otto Latsis, and human rights activist Valerii Borshchev. After the meeting had concluded, the members of the committee took a formal decision to "broaden its mandate" and to include the Moscow hostage-taking episode of 23-26 October 2002 -- and especially the actions of the Russian special services during that period -- as an additional subject of inquiry coming under the committee's purview.(1)
An Unusual Kind Of 'Joint Venture'?
The following is an attempt to make some sense out of the small torrent of information that exists concerning the October 2002 events at Dubrovka. In my opinion, the original plan for the terrorist action at and around Dubrovka bears a strong similarity to the campaign of terror bombings unleashed upon Moscow and other Russian urban centers (Buinaksk, Volgodonsk) in September of 1999. In both cases there is strong evidence of official involvement in, and manipulation of, key actions; so the question naturally arises as to whether Vladimir Putin in any way sanctioned them. Although there is additional evidence bearing on Putin's possible role, this paper will take an agnostic position on the issue, and will also not review it.
The October 2002 hostage-taking episode in a large theater containing close to 1,000 people was evidently, at least in its original conception, to have been preceded and accompanied by terror bombings claiming the lives of perhaps hundreds of Muscovites, a development that would have terrorized and enraged the populace of the entire country. However, in view of the suspicious connections and motivations of the perpetrators of this incident, as well as the contradictory nature of the actions of the authorities, it would seem appropriate to envisage this operation as representing a kind of "joint venture" (on, for example, the model of the August 1999 incursion into Daghestan) involving elements of the Russian special services and also radical Chechen leaders such as Shamil Basaev and Movladi Udugov.
Only a few individuals among the special services and the Chechen extremist leadership would likely have known of the existence of this implicit deal. Both "partners" had a strong motive to derail the movement occurring in Russia, and being backed by the West, to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Chechen conflict. Both also wanted to blacken the reputation of the leader of the Chechen separatist moderates, Aslan Maskhadov. In addition, the Chechen extremists clearly saw their action as a kind of ambitious fund-raiser aimed at attracting financial support from wealthy donors in the Gulf states and throughout the Muslim world (hence the signs displayed in Arabic, the non-traditional [for Chechens] garb of the female terrorists, and so on). The Russian authorities, for their part, had a propitious chance to depict the conflict in Chechnya as a war against an Al-Qaeda-type Chechen terrorism, a message that could be expected to play well abroad, and especially in the United States.
As in the case of the 1999 terror bombings, meticulous planning -- including the use of "cut-outs," false documents, and the secret transport of weapons and explosives to Moscow from the North Caucasus region -- underlay the preparation for this terrorist assault. In this instance, however, the perpetrators were to be seen as Chechens of a "Wahhabi" orientation whose modus operandi was to recall that of the notorious Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Once the operation had moved into its active stage, however, strange and still not fully explained developments began to occur. An explosion at a McDonald's restaurant in southwest Moscow on 19 October immediately riveted the attention of the Moscow Criminal Investigation (MUR) -- an elite unit of the regular police -- which then moved swiftly to halt the activity of the terrorists. The explosion at the McDonald's restaurant was, fortunately, a small one, and caused the death of only a single person. Two large bombs set to explode before the assault on Dubrovka was launched failed to detonate. Likewise a planned bombing incident at a large restaurant in Pushkin Square in the center of the capital failed to take place.
In my opinion, the most likely explanation for these "technical" failures lies in acts of intentional sabotage committed by some of the terrorists. What remains unclear at this juncture is why certain individuals among the terrorists chose to render the explosive devices incapable of functioning. One key point, however, seems clear: The Chechen extremist leaders felt no pressing need to blow up or shoot hundreds of Russian citizens. They were aware that such actions might so enrage the Russian populace that it would then have supported any military actions whatever, including a possible full-scale extermination of the Chechen people. So what Shamil Basaev, Aslambek Khaskhanov, and their comrades in arms seem to have done is, in a sense, to outplay the special services in a game of chess. Most of the bombs, it turns out, were actually fakes, while the few women's terrorist belts that did actually contain explosives were of danger primarily to the women themselves. As Russian security affairs correspondent Pavel Felgenhauer has rightly suggested, the aim of the extremist leaders seems to have been to force the Russian special services to kill ethnic Russians on a large scale, and that is what happened.(2) Only an adroit cover-up by the Russian authorities prevented the full extent (conceivably more than 200 deaths) of the debacle from becoming known.
A central question to be resolved by future researchers is whether or not the Russian special forces planning an assault on the theater building at Dubrovka were aware that virtually all of the bombs located there -- including all of the powerful and deadly bombs -- were in fact incapable of detonating. If the special forces were aware of this, then there was clearly no need to employ a potentially lethal gas, which, it turned out, caused the deaths of a large number of the hostages. The special forces could have relatively easily and rapidly overwhelmed the lightly armed terrorists. Moreover, if they were in fact aware that the bombs were "dummies," then the special forces obviously had no need to kill all of the terrorists, especially those who were asleep from the effects of the gas. It would, one would think, have made more sense to take some of them alive.
Pressure Builds For A Negotiated Settlement With The Chechen Separatists
In the months preceding the terrorist act at the Dubrovka theater, which was putting on a popular musical, "Nord-Ost," the Kremlin leadership found itself coming under heavy political pressure both within Russia and in the West to enter into high-level negotiations with the moderate wing of the Chechen separatists headed by Aslan Maskhadov, who was elected Chechen president in 1997. Public-opinion polls in Russia showed that a continuation of the Chechen conflict was beginning to erode Putin's generally high approval ratings. With parliamentary elections scheduled for just over a year's time (in December 2003), this represented a worrisome problem for the Kremlin. In a poll taken by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), whose findings were reported on 8 October, respondents were asked "how the situation in Chechnya has changed since V. Putin was elected president."(3) Thirty percent of respondents believed that the situation had "gotten better," but 43 percent opined that it had "not changed," while 21 percent thought that it had "gotten worse." These results were significantly lower than Putin's ratings in other categories. In similar fashion, a September 2002 Russia-wide poll taken by VTsIOM found 56 percent of respondents favoring peace negotiations as a way to end the Chechen conflict while only 34 percent supported the continuing of military actions.(4)
On 16-19 August 2002, key discussions had occurred in the Duchy of Liechtenstein involving two former speakers of the Russian parliament, Ivan Rybkin and Ruslan Khasbulatov, as well as two deputies of the Russian State Duma: journalist and leading "democrat" Yurii Shchekochikhin (died, possibly from the effects of poison, on 3 July 2003) and Aslambek Aslakhanov, a retired Interior Ministry general who had been elected to represent Chechnya in the Duma. Representing separatist leader Maskhadov at the talks was Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Akhmed Zakaev. The talks in Liechtenstein had been organized by the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (executive director, Glen Howard), one of whose leading figures was former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. The meetings in Liechtenstein were intended to restore the momentum that had been created by earlier talks held at Sheremetevo-2 Airport outside of Moscow between Zakaev and Putin's plenipotentiary presidential representative in the Southern Federal District, retired military General Viktor Kazantsev, on 18 November 2001.(5) Efforts to resuscitate the talks had failed to achieve any success because of the strong opposition of the Russian side.
Following the stillborn initiative of November 2001, the Kremlin had apparently jettisoned the idea of holding any negotiations whatsoever with moderate separatists in favor of empowering its handpicked candidate for Chechen leader, former mufti Akhmad Kadyrov. This tactic, said to be backed by Aleksandr Voloshin, the then presidential chief of staff, soon became known as "Chechenization."
Other elements among the top leadership of the presidential administration, such as two deputy chiefs of staff, Viktor Ivanov -- a former deputy director of the FSB -- and Igor Sechin, as well as certain leaders in the so-called power ministries, for example, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev, were reported to be adamantly opposed both to Chechenization and, even more so, to holding talks with moderate separatists; what they wanted was aggressively to pursue the war to a victorious conclusion.(6) If that effort took years more to achieve, then so be it.
In a path-breaking report on the meetings in Liechtenstein, a leading journalist who frequently publishes in the weekly "Moskovskie novosti," Sanobar Shermatova, wrote that the participants had discussed two peace plans: the so-called "Khasbulatov plan" and the so-called "Brzezinski plan."(7) Eventually, she went on, the participants decided to merge the two plans into a "Liechtenstein plan," which included elements of both. Khasbulatov's plan was based on the idea of granting to Chechnya "special status," with international guarantees being provided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and by the Council of Europe. Under Khasbulatov's plan, Chechnya would be free to conduct its own internal and foreign policies, with the exception of those functions that it voluntarily delegated to the Russian Federation. The republic was to remain within Russian borders and was to preserve Russian citizenship and currency.
Under the "Brzezinski plan," Chechens would "acknowledge their respect for the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation," while Russia, for its part, would "acknowledge the right of the Chechens to political, though not national, self-determination." A referendum would be held under which "Chechens would be given the opportunity to approve the constitutional basis for extensive self-government" modeled on what the Republic of Tatarstan currently enjoys. Russian troops would remain stationed on Chechnya's southern borders. "International support," the plan stressed, "must be committed to a substantial program of economic reconstruction, with a direct international presence on the ground in order to promote the rebuilding and stabilization of Chechen society." The authors of this plan underlined that "Maskhadov's endorsement of such an approach would be essential because of the extensive support he enjoys within Chechen society."
On 17 October 2002 -- just six days before the terrorist incident at Dubrovka -- the website grani.ru, citing information that had previously appeared in the newspaper "Kommersant," reported that new meetings of the Liechtenstein group were scheduled to be held in two weeks' time.(8) Duma Deputy Aslakhanov and separatist Deputy Premier Zakaev were planning to meet one-on-one in Switzerland in order "seriously to discuss the conditions which could lead to negotiations." Former speakers Rybkin and Khasbulatov, the website added, would also be taking part in the negotiations. In mid-October, Aslakhanov emphasized in a public statement: "President Putin has not once expressed himself against negotiations with Maskhadov. To the contrary, in a conversation with me, he expressed doubt whether there was a real force behind Maskhadov. Would the people follow after him?" This question put by Putin to Aslakhanov, "Kommersant vlast" reporter Olga Allenova observed, "was perceived in the ranks of the separatists as a veiled agreement [by Putin] to negotiations."(9)
On 10 September 2002, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov had published an essay entitled "Six Points On Chechnya" on the pages of the official Russian government newspaper "Rossiiskaya Gazeta" in which he stressed the urgent need to conduct "negotiations with [separatist] field commanders or at least some of them."(10) "This struggle," Primakov insisted, "can be stopped only through negotiations. Consequently elections in Chechnya cannot be seen as an alternative to negotiations." Primakov also underlined his conviction that "the [Russian] military must not play the dominant role in the settlement." In an interview which appeared in the 4 October 2002 issue of "Nezavisimaya gazeta," Salambek Maigov, co-chairman of the Antiwar Committee of Chechnya, warmly praised Primakov's "Six Points," noting, "Putin and Maskhadov can find compromise decisions. But the problem is that there are groups in the Kremlin which hinder this process."
During September 2002, grani.ru reported that both Maigov and former Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin were supporting a recent suggestion by Primakov that "the status of Finland in the [tsarist] Russian Empire can suit the Chechen Republic."(11) Another possibility, Rybkin pointed out, would be for Chechnya to be accorded "the status of a disputed territory, such as was held by the Aland Islands [of Finland], to which both Sweden and Finland had earlier made claims." A broad spectrum of Russian political leaders -- from "democrats" like Grigorii Yavlinskii, Boris Nemtsov, and Sergei Kovalev to Gennadii Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation -- had, Rybkin said, expressed an interest in such models.
During the course of a lengthy interview -- whose English translation appeared on the separatist website chechenpress.com on 23 October (the day of the seizure of the hostages in Moscow) -- President Maskhadov warmly welcomed the intensive efforts being made to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Chechen conflict: "In Dr. Brzezinski's plan," Maskhadov commented, "we see the concern of influential forces in the United States.... We have a positive experience of collaboration with Ivan Petrovich Rybkin [the reference is to the year 1997, when Rybkin was secretary of the Russian Security Council].... If Yevgenii Primakov speaks of the possibility of a peace resolution, it is a good sign.... The Chechen party would willingly collaborate with the academician [Primakov]. And, finally, with respect to Ruslan Khasbulatov's plan,... we welcome the actions of Khasbulatov.... This plan can be the subject for negotiations."
It appears that Maskhadov was at this time also engaging in secret talks with a high-ranking representative of President Putin. "Into contact with the president of [the Chechen Republic of] Ichkeria, who was on the wanted list," journalist Sanobar Shermatova reported in February of 2003, "there entered such a high-ranking [Russian] official that he was threatened by no unpleasantness whatsoever by the law-enforcement organs for communicating with the Chechen leader."(12)
The FSB Suppresses A Promising Peacemaking Effort
It emerged at this time that Putin had also permitted his special representative for human rights in Chechnya, Abdul-Khakim Sultygov, an ethnic Chechen, to meet with Chechen deputies who had been elected to the separatist parliament in 1997. On 13 October, 10 days before the hostage-taking incident at Dubrovka, Sultygov met in Znamenskoe, the district center of Nadterechnyi District in northern Chechnya, with 14 such deputies. Observers from the OSCE's mission in Znamenskoe were said to have been involved in preparing the meeting. At the meeting, Sultygov and the Chechen deputies discussed ways of bringing about a political regulation of the crisis and also the need to observe human rights in Chechnya.
According to a website associated with the leading Russian human rights organization Memorial (http://www.hro.org), the FSB of Chechnya headed by General Sergei Babkin (an organization in strict subordination to the FSB of Russia) moved aggressively to quash this nascent peacemaking effort.(13) A mere 100 meters away from Sultygov's office in Znamenskoe, hro.org reported, the separatist parliamentarians were taken into custody by armed masked men, who then escorted them to the central FSB office in Nadterechnoe. Each separatist deputy was then interrogated by the FSB department head, Mairbek Khusuev, who subjected them, inter alia, to "insulting remarks." Sultygov, Memorial concluded, came to understand "the decisiveness of his [FSB] opponents who were not deterred by the presence of international observers [from the OSCE]. The breaking off of negotiations...is evidently profitable for the adherents of the force variant."
As this incident demonstrates, key elements among the "siloviki," or power ministries, were adamantly opposed to conducting peace negotiations with separatists and, moreover, to bringing an end to a war that was serving as a source of promotions in rank and of lucrative "financial flows." It seems likely that President Putin's intention was to project the appearance of a willingness to acquiesce to the peacemaking activities of Aslakhanov, Sultygov and others, as a largely symbolic sop to the Europeans. On 21 October, two days before the Dubrovka incident, the president's official spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembskii, announced that there could be no negotiations on the conditions set by the rebels and that "only the official representative of Russia, Viktor Kazantsev, is to conduct negotiations with the separatists, while the remaining initiatives [such as those of Aslakhanov and Sultygov] are deemed to be personal ones."(14)
The involvement of the OSCE in the events in Znamenskoe was an indication that some Western European governments (as well as the United States) were becoming involved in the quest for a solution to a seemingly intractable conflict. At the time of the Dubrovka episode, Denmark was serving as host for a two-day conference on Chechnya attended by some 100 separatists, human rights activists, and parliamentarians. Maskhadov's spokesman, Zakaev, was one of the event's featured speakers.(15)
At this time, other pressures, too, were being brought to bear on the Kremlin to enter into peace negotiations. To cite one example, on 18 October, five days before the Dubrovka incident, a conference entitled "Chechen Dead End: Where To Seek The Peace?" was held at the centrally located Hotel Rossiya in Moscow.(16) The conference had been organized by the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia. Among those who addressed the congress were Duma faction leader Nemtsov, former Duma Speaker Rybkin, Maigov, and Akhmed-Khadzhi Shamaev, the (pro-Moscow) mufti of the Chechen Republic.
It should be underscored that there also existed a significant group of Chechens who complemented the influential and retrograde elements of the FSB and other power structures on the Russian side adamantly opposed to a peace settlement with Maskhadov. These elements consisted of extremist or "Wahhabi" elements among the separatists. The central figure of this group within Chechnya was, of course, the legendary field commander Shamil Basaev, and, abroad, said to be living in the Gulf states, Basaev's partners, the former Chechen First Deputy Premier and Minister of Information Movladi Udugov and former acting President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev. On 4 October, a website affiliated with this group, Kavkaz Center (http://www.kavkaz.org), lambasted the involvement of Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aslambek Aslakhanov in the peace process. Khasbulatov, the website remarked scathingly, "wants to be the Kremlin's only 'man' in Chechnya and to have a full mandate for talks with rebel president Aslan Maskhadov," while Aslakhanov, in the website's view, was serving as Khasbulatov's "power-wielding" assistant seeking to gain control of all the Russian forces in Chechnya.(17)
Setting The Stage
One of the key questions confronting any examination of the Dubrovka events remains how it was possible that such a collection of suspicious individuals could gather and furtive activities occur in and around Moscow over a period of months. Moreover, the provenance of some of the players -- coupled with reports that several of the participants among the hostage takers had already been in the custody of the Russian authorities -- only serves to sharpen this issue.
The Terrorist Action Takes Shape
The activities that culminated in the hostage seizure took place over a period of more than half a year. In February of 2002, eight months before the hostage-taking incident, two Chechen terrorists, "Zaurbek" (real name: Aslambek Khaskhanov) and "Abubakar," also known as "Yasir" (real name: Ruslan Elmurzaev), set the future terrorist act at Dubrovka in motion when they approached a third Chechen, Akhyad Mezhiev, in Ingushetia, where Mezhiev was wont to make regular visits to a cousin living in that republic.(18) Mezhiev had been born in the village of Makhkety, in the Vedeno District of Chechnya, but had managed to acquire legal residency in Moscow even before the first Chechen war. "In terms of an ultimatum, they demanded that Mezhiev assist them, threatening otherwise to take revenge against his relatives living in Chechnya." Mezhiev was provided with a false internal passport, and his brother, Alikhan, was also drawn into the plot. Later Khaskhanov was to provide Alikhan with $2,500 with which to buy two vehicles intended to be used as car bombs. (These vehicles were said to have been purchased during the period August-September 2002.)
According to a June 2003 statement made by the then chief procurator of the city of Moscow, Mikhail Avdyukov, Aslambek Khaskhanov had been closely acquainted with terrorist leader Shamil Basaev. "Still in 2001, in the village of Starye Atagi," Avdyukov related, "he [Khaskhanov] received an assignment from Basaev, through a certain Edaev, to commit a series of terrorist acts in Moscow. Later when Edaev had been killed... Shamil Basaev himself directly confirmed the assignment to Khaskhanov. The terrorist acts were to consist of a series of 'actions of intimidation.'"(19) Avdyukov's statement continued: "He [Khaskhanov] was commanded to head a group and carry out in Moscow four large terrorist acts with the use of explosives in crowded places. In addition to himself, the group also consisted of Aslan Murdalov, the brothers Alikhan and Akhyad Mezhiev, Khampasha Sobraliev, and Arman Menkeev. All of them are now under arrest."
In April 2002, another member of the Chechen terrorist group, the already-mentioned Khampash Sobraliev, purchased a substantial property at House No. 100 on Nosovikhinskii Highway in the village of Chernoe, Balashikhinskii District, Moscow Oblast. The asking price for the property was said to have been $20,000. A family of Chechens then moved in: "Pavel [i.e., Khampash]...and two young women." The two women appear to have been Sobraliev's wife and sister. The family then erected a high fence around the property and began to receive visitors driving expensive foreign cars and large jeeps. Sobraliev's home soon became a hub of activity with the arrival of a former military- intelligence (GRU) operative. Arman Menkeev, a retired (December 1999) major in the GRU and a specialist, inter alia, in the making of explosives, moved in as a guest in the summerhouse on the property. (Khampash and the women were living in the main house.) The neighbors knew Menkeev as "Roma" and Sobraliev as "Pasha."(20)
Menkeev's background and questions concerning his ultimate loyalties serve to highlight many of the problems connected with analyzing the Dubrovka events. According to an article posted in June of 2003 on the website agentura.ru, Arman Menkeev is "a Russian officer, a major, and a former deputy commander of a [GRU] special-forces detachment." Menkeev, who had been born in 1963 to a Kazakh father and Chechen mother, had previously served as a member of "the famous Chuchkovskaya Brigade of the GRU special forces." During the 18 years in which he was in the GRU, Menkeev had served abroad and was said to speak Farsi. He had also fought with the Russian military during the first Chechen war (1994-96), during which he had received a military decoration for valor, had been wounded, and had "received the classification of an invalid." Menkeev is also reported by agentura.ru to have prepared the "women martyrs' belts," the homemade grenades, and other explosive devices used by the Dubrovka hostage takers in October of 2002.(21) The weapons and explosives employed during October had been "transported to this house [in the village of Chernoe] straight from Chechnya in trucks containing boxes of apples."(22) (Other sources assert that they had been transported by vehicle from Ingushetia, not Chechnya.)
The article in agentura.ru directly raised the question of whether Menkeev was a traitor to Russia who was heeding the "voice of the blood" (of his Chechen mother) or whether he represented, instead, a loyal servant of Russia. The author noted that after Menkeev had been arrested in Chernoe by Russian police on 22 November 2002, FSB officers interrogating him at the Lefortovo Prison in Moscow had come to a decision to classify him as "loyal to the [Russian] government," adding mysteriously, "He knows how to keep a military and state secret."
By the summer of 2002, the terrorist conspiracy had begun to move into high gear. "For a certain time, the rebels tested [Akhyad] Mezhiev. Then, in the summer of 2002, they introduced him to his contact, Aslambek [Khaskhanov], and to the demolition specialist, Yasir,... who arrived specially in Ingushetia from Chechnya to become acquainted with him. Yasir was introduced to the neophyte under the pseudonym of Abubakar." (Both names, we now know, were pseudonyms used by Ruslan Elmurzaev, who was at that time a resident of Moscow and not of Chechnya.) In August 2002, both Khaskhanov and Elmurzaev paid a visit to Mezhiev in Moscow. Responding to adds that he had read in a newspaper, "Mezhiev then purchased two unremarkable vehicles and passed the keys to them -- as well as cell phones he had been instructed to purchase -- to Aslambek, who arrived specially from Nazran [Ingushetia]" to receive them.(23)
The activities of these Chechen terrorists in Moscow had not, it turned out, passed unnoticed. In fact, according to attorney Mikhail Trepashkin, not only were certain of these activities observed but the authorities were informed about them. However, the authorities then chose to take no action. Trepashkin, a former lieutenant colonel in the FSB turned dissident lawyer, was a controversial individual in his own right. In 1998, he had sued then FSB Director Nikolai Kovalev over his dismissal from the service and had participated in a November 1998 press conference together with another former FSB officer, Aleksandr Litvinenko, devoted to the subject of criminal activities occurring within the FSB. In 1999, Trepashkin had begun assisting the Sergei Kovalev commission in its investigation of the 1999 Moscow and Volgodonsk terror bombings.
According to Trepashkin's testimony, Elmurzaev ("Abubakar") and his associates operated in a gray zone where criminal activity routinely intersected with elements of Russian officialdom. In his "Statement" (Spravka), dated 23 March 2003, Trepashkin recalled: "Beginning in May of 2002, from people in the 'criminal world' there came information about a concentration of Chechens in the city of Moscow...such as had not been observed over the past two years."(24) From a retired secret-police officer who was working as a lawyer for several Chechen firms, Trepashkin learned that "Abdul" (a former field commander of Chechen terrorist leader Salman Raduev and of late separatist President Djokhar Dudaev) had appeared in the capital. "I also," Trepashkin continued, "received information on 'Abubakar,' who, for an extensive period of time, had been living in the city of Moscow and had been earning a profit from firms based at the Hotel Salyut in the southwest of Moscow that no one was laying a hand on. Information had come even earlier that the Hotel Salyut was sending part of the funds to support the Chechen rebels. However, no one was carrying out any checking, since the shadowy funds were also being disseminated to several leaders of the [Russian] power structures. The Hotel Salyut was headed by two Chechens,... but their deputy was [retired] Lieutenant General of the USSR KGB Bogantsev. For this reason, no one [among the authorities] was laying a hand on 'Abubakar' in the hotel." Following the Dubrovka incident, Trepashkin voluntarily turned over the information he had collected concerning "Abubakar" to the FSB, but the FSB reacted to this gesture by "trying to fabricate a criminal case against me."
In a later statement, dated 20 July 2003, Trespashkin added: "At the end of July-August 2002,... I received information about a concentration in the city of Moscow of armed Chechen extremists....They were especially concentrated in the Southwest and Central districts of the city of Moscow." Trepashkin recalled that he had earlier taken "Abdul" into custody in Chechnya in 1995 but that a senior secret police official, Nikolai Patrushev [now head of the FSB], and the then director of the FSK, Mikhail Barsukov, had "ordered me to leave him in peace.(25)
In a conversation with a retired FSB colonel, V.V. Shebalin, Trepashkin " pointed out to him that in Moscow they [Trepashkin's sources] had seen the field commander from the brigade of Raduev 'Abdul'.... I also acquainted him with materials relating to 'Abubakar,' who was serving as a 'roof' for a number of sites in the district of the metro 'Yugo-Zapadnaya.'" "Running ahead," Trepashkin added, "I will say that presently I am being accused of, at the end of July and the beginning of August 2002, providing Shebalin with information concerning agents of the FSB of the Russian Federation." Trepashkin's conclusion: "Either the concentration of extremists took place under the control of the Russian FSB and they therefore decided to turn my citing of such information into the revealing of a state secret of Russia, or Shebalin did not transmit the information to the Russian FSB." But Shebalin, it emerged, had indeed transmitted the information. According to the same July statement by Trepashkin: "He [Shebalin] said that the Russian FSB was aware of the information, but as to why they did not undertake any measures, and why, in relation to me, on the contrary, they opened a criminal case and seized the data base I had been collecting for years, including data about terrorists, he did not know."
Moreover, once Trepashkin learned that "Abubakar" was among the hostage takers at Dubrovka, "I again proposed to Shebalin to call up the materials on my computer which had been seized." But "the experts from the Russian FSB deemed the information I possessed about the events at the 'Nord-Ost' to be a state secret of Russia, and I was charged with having revealed a state secret."
On 22 October 2003, Trepashkin was arrested by the Interior Ministry on a highway in Moscow Oblast and charged with transporting a concealed and unregistered pistol in his car. Trepashkin was able to get out the information that the pistol (supposedly stolen in Chechnya) had been planted in his car and that the regular police had admitted to him that they had acted at the behest of the FSB. Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev commented concerning this incident: "I do not believe that Mikhail Ivanovich [Trepashkin] had a pistol with him. He is an experienced man, a former officer of the KGB. He is not a bandit, and he is not a fool."(26) On the day preceding his arrest, it might be noted, Trepashkin had granted a major interview to a correspondent for "Moskovskie novosti."(27)
FOOTNOTES
(1) In grani.ru, 6 November 2002. The author would like to thank Robert Otto for his exceptionally generous bibliographical assistance and for his most useful comments on a draft of this essay. Peter Reddaway also made a number of remarkably incisive comments on the manuscript. Lawrence Uzzell, too, provided constructive and helpful criticism. The author is, of course, solely responsible for the final version of this essay.
(2) In sovsekretno.ru, November 2002.
(3) Posted on polit.ru, 8 October 2002, by VTsIOM polling specialist L. A. Sedov.
(4) Yurii Levada, "Reiting voiny," "Novoe vremya," 5 November 2002.
(5) See Yevgenia Borisova, "Kazantsev's Ball Now in Rebels' Court," "The Moscow Times," 20 November 2001. For an informative account by Shchekochikhin of a long conversation he had with Zakaev in Liechtenstein, see Yurii Shchekochikhin, "Zabytaya Chechnya," (Moscow: "Olimp," 2003), pp. 248-259. Zakaev describes, inter alia, details of the peace agreement he had largely come to with retired general Kazantsev.
(6) On this group, see "Chekisty vo vlasti," "Novaya gazeta," 14 July 2003.
(7) Sanobar Shermatova, "Chechen Plan Hammered Out," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 30 August 2002. The "Khasbulatov plan" appeared as a prefix entitled "Plan mira dlya Chechenskoi respubliki" in Ruslan Khasbulatov, "Vzorvannaya zhizn" (Moscow: "Graal," 2002). The so-called "Brzezinski plan" appeared as: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alexander Haig, and Max Kampelman, "The Way to Chechen Peace," "The Washington Post," 21 June 2002.
(8) In grani.ru, 17 October 2002.
(9) Olga Allenova, "Terrorizm i zakhvat posle antrakta," "Kommersant vlast," 28 October 2002.
(10) Yevgenii Primakov, "Shest punktov po Chechne," "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 10 September 2002.
(11) In grani.ru 17 September 2002.
(12) Sanobar Shermatova, "Mirotvortsy pod kovrom," "Moskovskie novosti," no. 6, 18 February 2003. Subsequently Shermatova reported that the high-level talks had been conducted "in one of the republics of the North Caucasus." ("Shestero iz baraevskikh," "Moskovskie novosti," 29 April 2003). Writing in "Po-amerikanski no poluchaetsya?" in the 5 August 2003 issue of "Moskovskie novosti," Shermatova added: "At the very time when Moscow was accusing Maskhadov of having organized the terrorist act at Dubrovka, he, according to our information, was located in a secure place in one of the republics of the North Caucaus."
(13) hro.org, 19 October 2002.
(14) Olga Allenova, "Terrorizm i zakhvat posle antrakta," "Kommersant vlast," 28 October 2002.
(15) In "The Moscow Times," 31 October 2002.
(16) In grani.ru, 18 October.
(17) Kavkaz-Tsentr, translated by BBC Monitoring, 4 October 2002.
(18) Aleksandr Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist 'Nord-Osta,'" "Moskovskii komsomolets," 23 May 2003; and Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit za 'Nord-Ost'?" "Komsomol'skaya pravda," 22 April 2003.
(19) "V Moskve gotovilos chetyre 'Nord-Osta,'" "Rossiiskaya gazeta," 20 June 2003. Avdyukov was removed from his post in July 2003: "Prokuror Moskvy podal v otstavku," grani.ru, 31 July 2003.
(20) See Khinshtein, "Glavnyi terrorist..."; Andrei Skrobot, "Vzryvy v Moskve gotovyat v Podmoskove," "Nezavisimaya gazeta," 6 June 2003; and Zinaida Lobanova, Andrei Redkin, "Ne vinovny my! Baraev sam prishel," "Komsomolskaya pravda," 23 June 2003.
(21) Aleksandr Zheglov, "Pravitelstvu veren," agentura.ru, 30 June 2003. This article is said by agentura.ru to have first appeared in the newspaper "Den," 3 December 2003.
(22) Zinaida Lobanova et al., "Naiden ment, pustivshii terroristov v 'Nord-Ost,'" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 9 June 2003. An earlier report by Lobanova that appeared in the 22 April 2003 issue of the same newspaper had stated that the weapons and explosives had been transported to the capital from Ingushetia in a truck loaded with watermelons and had then been kept in two rented garages in Moscow, one on Leninskii Prospekt and one on Ogorodnyi Proezd. It appears that the explosives were originally housed at the base in the village of Chernoe.
(23) Zinaida Lobanova, "Tolko on otvetit za 'Nord-Ost'?" "Komsomolskaya pravda," 22 April 2003.
(24) For the text of Trepashkin's "Spravka," see "Tainstvennyi 'Abubakar,'" chechenpress.com, 31 July 2003.
(25) In "Ekho 'Nord-Osta' i vzryvov domov v Rossii," Kavkazkii vestnik (editor@kvestnik.org), 22 July 2003. The text also appeared in: "'Nord-Ost': provokatsiya FSB," chechenpress.com, 21 July 2003.
(26) In Polina Shershneva, "On poidet do kontsa," newizv.ru, 24 October 2003.
(27) Igor Korolkov, "Fotorobot na pervoi svezhesti," "Moskovskie novosti," 11 November 2003. In the 4 December 2003 issue of "Novaya gazeta," journalist Anna Politkovskaya reported that Trepashkin was being tried in a closed trial conducted by the Moscow District Military Court and that Amnesty International was in process of according him the status of political prisoner.
THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT (Part 2)
The Nominal Leader Of The Terrorists
A young man who called himself Movsar Baraev served as the titular leader of the group of terrorists that took control of the Moscow theater. Movsar Baraev -- who also went by the names Mansur Salamov and Movsar Suleimenov(28) -- had but a single claim to fame: He was the nephew of the late Chechen Wahhabi kidnapper and murderer Arbi Baraev. According to a report appearing in the military newspaper "Krasnaya zvezda," Arbi Baraev "had personally participated in the murder of 170 persons."(29) Nonetheless, Baraev, Movsar's uncle, "had moved freely about the [Chechen] republic showing at federal checkpoints the documents of an officer of the Russian MVD [Interior Ministry]."(30) "On the windshield of [Arbi] Baraev's vehicle," journalist Anna Politkovskaya has noted, "there was a pass, regularly renewed, which stated that the driver was free 'to go everywhere' -- the most cherished and respected pass in the Combined Group of [Russian] Forces."(31) Arbi Baraev also had reported shadowy ties to both the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU).(32)
In January 2003, a well-known French journalist, Anne Nivat, author of the book "Chienne de Guerre: A Woman Reporter Behind the Lines of the War in Chechnya" (2001), who had conducted a number of incognito visits to Chechnya, reported: "Two months before the hostage taking, the GRU, the secret service of the Russian army, had announced [Movsar] Baraev's arrest. The implication is that he would have been held until his 'arrest' to lead the hostage taking at the Dubrovka theater."(33)
Good reasons exist to doubt that Movsar was the actual leader of the group. "Under his [Movsar
Baraev's] control," Sanobar Shermatova has stipulated, "were [only] five to six rebels, and he never
demonstrated either the military or organizational abilities necessary for a commander.... The
Chechens [sources of "Moskovskie novosti"] say that Baraev himself was not fully initiated into the
plan [to seize the theater]. He was supposed to play his role and then burn up like a rocket booster."
The former pro-Moscow head of the Chechen Interior Ministry, also a former FSB officer, Said-Selim
Peshkhoev "proposed that this group of terrorists was led not by Movsar Baraev but by another
person."(34)
Further testimony that Movsar was not the real leader comes from Shamil Basaev. In late April 2003, Basaev recalled: "I included [Movsar] Baraev in this group only in late September [2002]. I had only two hours to talk to him and give instructions."(35) If Movsar Baraev was at this time in the custody of the GRU (as Nivat's sources claim), then Basaev could only have met with Baraev through the good offices of that elite organization. Such a scenario is not unimaginable. It is known that Basaev himself worked closely with a purported GRU officer named Anton Surikov when Basaev was serving as deputy defense minister of the separatist (from Georgia) republic of Abkhazia in 1992-93. During the course of a 2001 interview, Surikov assessed "extremely positively" Basaev's role in that conflict.(36) "In the beginning of the 1990s," Surikov affirmed, "he [Basaev] was materially supported by us."
A number of Russian journalists and political analysts have expressed their belief that Basaev and Surikov met together once again some years later -- this time together with the chief of the Russian presidential administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, at the estate of a Saudi international arms dealer in southern France in July 1999, in order to seal an agreement which led to Basaev's invasion of Daghestan the following month.(37) In the summer of 2000, when the newspaper "Versiya" published an article about the alleged meeting complete with a group photograph of Voloshin, Basaev, and Surikov, the paper approached Surikov and he "rather severely" told its correspondents to leave him alone. However, Surikov did not deny that the meeting took place. Moreover, almost a year later, when asked about the possible role of the security forces in organizing the invasion of Daghestan, Surikov replied somewhat mysteriously: "A positive answer to your question would sound unproven, although, in my view, such a perspective on events in part has a right to existence, but only in part." Among the more prominent individuals who have voiced this perspective was the former secretary of the Russian Security Council, retired General Aleksandr Lebed. He affirmed his belief in October of 1999 that "Basaev and the Kremlin had concluded an agreement," which had led to the August 1999 invasion of Daghestan.(38)
Among the suicide bombers who were present in the Moscow theater, Nivat has also reported, there were two women, who, like Movsar Baraev, had already been placed under arrest by the federal authorities: "At Assinovskaya, a village close to the border with Ingushetia, which is where two of the [Baraev] unit's women came from, their mothers say they had been arrested [by the Russian authorities] and taken to an unknown destination at the end of September [2002]. Secretive in the presence of the outsider that I am, and still considerably shocked, they won't say more."
In a similar vein, in January 2003, the late Duma Deputy and journalist Yurii Shchekochikhin wrote in the newspaper "Novaya Gazeta": "Unexpectedly, last week I learned that one of the female terrorists in the Nord-Ost building was not just anyone but a woman who had been imprisoned for a long time in one of the Russian [penal] colonies. She was recognized on television by her mother, a resident of Shelkovskii Raion in Chechnya. She cannot understand how her daughter reached Moscow as a terrorist from a prison cell."(39)
In addition, the well-connected investigative journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein has reported that some eight of the women suicide bombers were able to take up residence in a former "military city [gorodok]" in Moscow, located on Ilovaiskaya Street, not far from the Dubrovka theater. This complex, which housed a large number of illegal residents prepared to pay bribes to the authorities, was apparently under the protection of corrupt elements among the Moscow police.(40)
The Active Phase of the Operation Begins
By mid-October 2002, the terrorists had shifted over to the active phase of their operation. During a face-to-face meeting with "Abubakar," Aslambek Khaskhanov learned that "Shamil Basaev had ordered him [Abubakar] to prepare 'a very large action' with a seizure of hostages."(41) The action referred to was, of course, the taking of the theater at Dubrovka.
A series of powerful explosions had been set to go off, beginning on 19 October 2002, with the hostage-taking episode itself having originally been planned for 7 November, the former anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Several vehicles were fitted with explosive devices, most likely at the terrorist base at Chernoe in Moscow Oblast, and then moved to a garage at 95 Leninskii Prospekt. "An explosion [at a McDonald's restaurant in southwest Moscow] took place on 19 October, at approximately 1:05 p.m., that is not during rush hour and not in the most crowded area of the city." This account by the former chief procurator of Moscow, Mikhail Avdyukov, continues: "Two other vehicles [fitted with explosives] were also parked: one next to the Tchaikovsky Theater Hall on Triumfalnaya Square, the other near a busy subway transit point in the center. But the more powerful explosives [contained in these two vehicles] did not work."(42) According to one version, the watch mechanism failed to work in the vehicle that had been parked at the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall.
On 20 October, Aslambek Khaskhanov, who had placed the explosives in the three vehicles, flew from Moscow to Nazran, Ingushetia, using false documents. His decision to leave town has been assessed by one journalist as being due to "banal cowardice." On that same day, his confederate, "Abubakar," according to one report, removed the large bomb from the vehicle at the Tchaikovsky Theater." On 23 October, that bomb was then "placed in the house of culture at Dubrovka."(43)
This powerful bomb placed in the theater, it was later revealed, was in fact incapable of detonating: "The power [ministries] have admitted," "Kommersant" reported in July 2003, "that the most powerful of the homemade bombs which were placed by the Baraevites in the seized theater center at Dubrovka were not in a condition in which they could be detonated. They lacked such important elements as batteries, which made the bombs harmless bolvanki [dummies]. And it was precisely this circumstance that permitted the conducting of a completely successful storm of the theater center."(44)
According to one press report, the powerful bombs placed by Khaskhanov did not go off because of a key design failure. Two of the vehicles that had failed to explode were later located by the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department (MUR) (in January 2003 in a parking lot located off the Zvenigorod Highway), who determined the reason for the failure of the bombs: "The gas tanks of the vehicles were divided hermetically into two parts: in one half was gasoline while the other was filled with a substance similar to plastic explosive together with nails and fragments of steel barbed wire. However, an examination showed that the amount of plastic explosive was so small that even if an explosion had happened, the explosive force would have been insignificant."(45) (As we have seen, other reports mention a faulty timing mechanism in the bombs.)
The explosion of the small bomb contained in the "Tavriya" vehicle that had been parked next to McDonald's restaurant on Porkryshkin Street and had resulted in the death of one person attracted the attention of a unit of MUR, an elite police body designed to combat organized crime and terrorism, commanded by Colonel Yevgenii Taratorin. "The police learned that the 'Tavriya' vehicle that had been blown up had been sold by proxy to a certain Artur Kashinskii...whose real name turned out to be Aslan Murdalov, a native of Urus-Martan in Chechnya, who had been living in Moscow for 10 years."(46) Working quickly, the MUR identified Murdalov and took him into custody on 22 October.
It was the arrest of Murdalov that forced the terrorists "to accelerate their activities and the seizure of the hostages at Dubrovka, which had first been planned for 7 November."(47) As journalist Zinaida Lobanova has noted: "The original seizure of the musical 'Nord-Ost' was planned for 7 November, the day of Accord and Reconciliation [the postcommunist name for the holiday], and that seizure was to have been preceded by the explosion of cars in the center of the capital, in order to sow panic."(48) On 22 October, "A.S. Mezhiev informed Abubakar about the taking into custody of A.M. Murdalov.... [Abubakar] told him that in the next few days a powerful operation would take place."(49)
The failure of the two car bombs to explode in crowded locations in the center of the capital required the terrorists to speed up and to alter their plans. The hostage-taking operation at Dubrovka had been intended (at least, apparently, by certain of its planners) to be the culmination of a terror bombing campaign directly reminiscent of the one visited on the capital in September of 1999. Deprived of this sanguinary "introduction," the October 23 hostage-taking action commenced shorn of its spectacular first act. The MUR had gotten on the trail of the terrorists and their associates sooner than had been expected. (In this sense, the entire episode bears a certain resemblance to the "Ryazan incident" of September 1999, in which the local police interfered with an operation that was under way.[50]). Once the theater had been taken over by the terrorists on 23 October, the officers of the MUR realized that "the terror act at McDonald's and the seizure of the Nord-Ost had been prepared by one and the same people." On 28 October, just two days after the theater had been stormed by Russian special forces units, the MUR took the two Mezhiev brothers into custody.(51)
To return to 23 October -- the day on which the Moscow theater was seized by the terrorists -- shortly before the raid occurred: "Abubakar designated a meeting with [Akhyad] Mezhiev near the Crystal Casino. Abubakar was at the wheel of a Ford Transit [minibus]. He handed over to Mezhiev two Chechen girls on whom suicide belts with explosives had been attached. Abubakar ordered that the girls be taken to a populated place where they could blow themselves up and thus draw the attention of the law-enforcement organs away from the seizure of the House of Culture [at Dubrovka]."(52) "At first," the account continues, "Mezhiev decided to let the suicide women off at the Pyramid Cafe, but, having learned by radio of the seizure of the House of Culture, he exhibited cowardice."
A bomb blast at this normally crowded cafe located in the very center of Moscow would have been a catastrophic event. In his taped confession to the police, Akhyad Mezhiev related that, on the night of 23-24 October, Abubakar called him on his mobile phone and demanded angrily: "Why has there been no wedding?" Wedding was "the code word for the designated stage of the terrorist act. Women-bombs was what they had in mind." "Abubakar wanted me," Mezhiev continued, "to send the girls that same night. They had everything ready. Everything depended on me." Mezhiev drove the suicide bombers to the Pyramid Cafe on Pushkin Square. "Here there were always a lot of people. The 'brides of Allah' were to blow themselves up in the crowd." Mezhiev, however, "did not let the women out of the vehicle. Why? We don't know."(53)
Mezhiev then relates (on the police videotape) how he took the belts away from the would-be suicide bombers and then drove them to a train station where he bought them tickets to Nazran, Ingushetia, and bade them farewell. He then gave the "martyrs' belts" to his brother Alikhan, who, at the command of Abubakar, handed them over to Khampash Sobraliev, one of the two terrorists based in the village of Chernoe in Moscow Oblast.(54) "In a telephone conversation with Abubakar, he [Mezhiev] said that he was afraid and wanted to leave town." This he proved unable to do, and on 28 October he was placed under arrest by the MUR. "He was 'caught out' because of his telephone conversations with Abubakar."(55)
An alternative explanation to the version Mezhiev recounted to the police would be that the women terrorists in fact had been let out of the vehicle but their "martyr-belts" had failed to detonate. Shamil Basaev seemed to allude to such a development in his already-cited statement posted on Kavkaz Tsentr on 26 April 2003: "The detonators of our martyrs had not worked: this occurred with those who were inside [the theater at Dubrovka] and four female martyrs who were outside. They returned here. I personally talked to three and they claimed that their detonators had not worked."(56) It is entirely possible, however, that Basaev was aware that the belts would not work and was merely embellishing his tale for the sake of potential donors in the Gulf states and the Muslim world.
"According to the information of the FSB," the newspaper "Kommersant" reported on 29 October, "the entire building [at Dubrovka] was mined, and the explosion of only a part of the bombs could have brought about the collapse of the theater building. But only a pair of the bombs that were contained in the belts of women-kamikaze exploded. At the moment of the explosion, they [the women] were outside the hall guarding the approach to it. It turns out that all the other bombs were either fakes or they had not been readied for use. For example, they lacked batteries or a detonator."(57)
One of the Russian emergency workers who entered the building after it was stormed by the special forces, Yurii Pugachev, has recalled: "Personally I saw the bodies of several women in black clothing whose stomachs had literally been blown apart. Evidently the explosive was not very strong."(58) "If one is to believe the sources of 'Moskovskie novosti,'" Sanobar Shermatova and Aleksandr Teit wrote in an article appearing in April 2003, "several of the women suicide fighters, having understood that gas had been let into the hall, tried to connect the lead wires on their suicide belts. They didn't work, because, instead of explosives, there was a fake there. Was that really the way it really was?"(59)
Shamil Basaev has claimed that the original targets of the terrorists were the buildings of the Russian State Duma and the Federation Council. In an article appearing in an underground rebel newspaper, "Ichkeriya," Basaev even "provides the measurements of the vestibules of the two buildings."(60)
Since, however, Basaev is a habitual distorter of the truth, one must at this point must remain agnostic about what precise building(s) the terrorists intended to target first.
The Russian authorities, it has also been reported, had been forewarned of the impending terrorist attack by none other than the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to Duma Deputy Yurii Shchekochikhin, he was telephoned on 25 October 2002 by "a high-ranking individual in Washington," who told him that, during the first half of October, the CIA had alerted the Russian government that "a new Budennovsk [a reference to the southern Russian town attacked in June of 1995 by a force headed by Shamil Basaev] was being prepared in Moscow."(61)
In April 2003, there occurred a brief flap when a dissident former FSB officer, Aleksandr Litvinenko, living in London, and a leading Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, reported that an FSB agent of Chechen nationality, Khampash Terkibaev, had been present inside the theater building but had left it before the storming of 26 October.(62) Politkovskaya went on to publish the text of an interview with Terkibaev in which he confirmed that he had indeed been in the building. It emerged, however, that both Litvinenko and Politkovskaya had fallen into an extremely intricate and clever trap, evidently laid by for them by the FSB. Terkibaev, a murky adventurer with almost certain links to the secret police, had boasted during a visit to Baku that he had been in the building at Dubrovka, but he had evidently been lying. Sanobar Shermatova and a co-author pointed out on the pages of "Moskovskie novosti" that Terkibaev, "who in 2000 even found a way to receive a document of amnesty in the FSB office in the city of Argun," had for a number of years been engaging in anti-Wahhabi activities and would not therefore have been acceptable to the Movsar Baraev/Abubakar group. "Terkibaev," they noted, "does not deny that after the events around 'Nord-Ost,' he introduced himself in Baku as a participant in the seizure of the hostages."(63)
Another Chechen, Zaurbek Talikhigov, was arrested by the police following the storming of the theater building. He was apparently a walk-on volunteer who, using a borrowed cell phone, attempted to inform the terrorists from outside the building where the Russian forces were positioned. His phone conversations were, of course, monitored and taped by Russian law-enforcement authorities.(64)
The Terrorist Assault On 23 October
On 23 October, shortly after 9:00 p.m., 40 Chechen terrorists whose titular leader was Movsar Baraev -- but whose de facto leader was the shadowy "Abubakar" (Ruslan El'murzaev) -- stormed (there were no armed guards present so the task was not overly difficult) and took control of the House of Culture at Dubrovka in Moscow, which was putting on the popular musical "Nord-Ost." A total of 979 people were taken captive (there were slightly more than 900 present in the building at the time that it was taken back on 26 October).(65) According to a statement made by the former procurator of Moscow, the terrorists were carrying 17 automatic weapons and 20 pistols, as well as various homemade bombs, suicide belts, and grenades.(66) Twenty-one of the terrorists were men and 19 women.(67) As opposed to the "terror bombings" in Moscow in 1999 -- when the announced suspects had been ethnic Karachai --on this occasion there could be little doubt that the perpetrators were ethnic Chechens, though elements among the hostage takers, with the likely support of the special services involved in the operation, sought to convey the impression that there were Arab terrorists among them.
One website, utro.ru, which on occasion elects to convey the views of the Russian secret services, focused attention upon one of the terrorists, the mysterious "Yasir" (another name, as we have seen, used by "Abubakar"): "As 'Utro' has learned from sources in the Russian special services," the website wrote, "there were several rebels who were non-Chechens, including an Arab called (his code-name) Yasir. About him the following is known: this international terrorist is a subject of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and is on the international wanted list. Yasir entered into the leading link of the cells of 'Al-Qaeda'.... The Wahhabi Movsar Baraev...was in fact a marionette in the hands of experienced puppeteers."(68) When a deputy minister of the interior, Vladimir Vasilev, was asked by RTR television on 26 October: "Abubakar is an Arabic name, isn't it?" he replied misleadingly: "Naturally, it is."(69) Even one year after the Dubrovka episode, some Russian security officials were continuing to push the fictional "Yasir's" involvement in the hostage-taking events: "The investigation," gzt.ru reported on 23 October 2003, "has not yet established the identity of a mercenary, an Arab who called himself Yasir. He was using a Russian Federation [internal] passport in the name of Alkhazurov, Idris Makhmudovich, born 1974."(70) One day after the publishing of this information, however, the newspaper "Izvestiya" reported that it had been the titular leader of the terrorists, Movsar Baraev, who in fact had been carrying "a passport in the name of Idris Alkhazurov."(71)
On 24 October 2002, the day following the seizure of the theater at Dubrovka, it was reported by the media that President Vladimir Putin "sees the seizure of the hostages in Moscow as one of the links in a chain of the manifestations of international terrorism, in one row with the [recent] terrorist acts in Indonesia and the Philippines. 'These same people also planned the terrorist act in Moscow,' said Putin."(72)
These "Arab" and "radical Islamic" themes were also heavily accented by the hostage takers themselves. At 10:00 p.m. on 23 October, just 50 minutes after the taking of the building: "The [former] minister of propaganda of the Ichkerian republic [i.e., Chechnya], Movladi Udugov, speaks to the BBC Service of Central Asia and the Caucasus. He confirms that the group of field commander [Movsar] Baraev organized the hostage taking. According to Udugov, the group consists of kamikaze terrorists and about 40 [sic] widows of Chechen rebels who are not going to surrender. The building is mined."(73) Udugov was at the time widely believed to be living in Qatar or another of the Gulf states. Two hours later, a website associated with Udugov, Kavkaz-Tsentr (kavkaz.org), reported the same information, adding: "The terrorists are demanding the withdrawal of [Russian] troops from Chechnya."(74)
The following day, 24 October, it was reported by the website gazeta.ru, as well as by other media, that: "The Qatar television company Al-Jazeera broadcast a tape of the Chechen rebels in which they state that they are prepared to die for the independence of their homeland and to deprive of life the hostages located in the building in the theater center." "For us," the hostage takers affirmed on the tape, "it is a matter if indifference where we die." "We have chosen to die here, in Moscow, and we will take with us the souls of the unfaithful," added one of the five women in masks standing in the frame under the sign, 'Allah akbar!' written in Arabic." In another fragment, one of the rebels is shown declaring, "Each of us is prepared for self-sacrifice, for the sake of Allah and the independence of Chechnya."(75) The veiled women were shown dressed entirely in black. Al-Jazeera television also showed one of the male rebels "seated in front of a laptop with the holy Muslim book the Koran by his side." "We seek death more than you seek life," said the man, who was also dressed in black. "We came to the Russian capital to stop the war or die for the sake of Allah," he asserted.(76) Al Jazeera reported subsequently that the interview had been taped on 23 October in Moscow shortly before the Chechens had assaulted the theater.(77)
The rebels also exhibited a militant radical Muslim stance over the course of the few interviews that they granted to Russian and Western media. As NTV correspondent Sergei Dedukh reported on 25 October (the footage was shown the following day): "The two girls in black whom the rebels called their sisters have explosives on their belts with wires sticking out of them. Could you please tell us what your clothes and the explosives in your belt mean?" An unidentified woman hostage taker replied: "They mean that we shall not stop at anything or anywhere. We are on Allah's way. If we die here, that won't be the end of it. There are many of us, and it will go on."(78) Movsar Baraev is then quoted by Dedukh as asserting that "the terrorists' only and final goal is the end of the military operation in Chechnya and the withdrawal of [Russian] federal troops."
In an interview with journalist
李丹 救助愛滋經不起等待
2004-08-25 來源：人物周刊
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/rwzk/20040825/tbbd/200409020003.asp
愛滋病等不起啊，我不能先掙十年錢然後再來搞慈善。愛滋病毒攜帶者的大面積發病，也就是幾年內的事，很多工作，現在不做就來不及了
本刊記者 蒯樂昊 發自河南商丘
到河南商丘尋找李丹，是因為他和他的愛滋病救助組織“東珍學校”。
這個民間力量創辦的學校收養了20名父母雙亡或單方死亡的愛滋孤兒。
輾轉找到東珍學校所在的清真寺，已然人去樓空，“東珍學校”的牌子被摘掉了，門上掛著一把大鎖。牆上，黃色的粉筆字，孩子稚嫩而工整的筆跡：“再見”。
正在進退維穀時，一個好心的知情人偷偷把記者拉到一個無人的小巷，說，“一個月前，政府突然來人把學校查封了，把人帶走了。小孩現在都回家了。”
“李丹呢？”
“李丹在北京，他的手機被警察收走了，你可以這樣找到他⋯⋯”
一個月前的那場風波，逐漸浮出水面。
由於關注的領域過於敏感，“東珍學校”成了國內NGO中命途多舛的典型。
創立以來一直得不到合法的身份，成員數次被當地政府跟蹤、警告、直到驅逐。學校一名志願者杜秀雨告訴記者，李丹在 8 月 9 日最後一次衝突中還莫名其妙地受到跟蹤、軟禁，收了手機，挨了打。
商丘柘城派出所表示，李丹 8 月 9 日被打是因在網吧跟幾名青年起了衝突，“擾亂社會治安”，跟當地政府無關。
東珍學校的志願者，把從 7 月 7 日起開始的長達一個月的“磨難”，戲稱為東珍學校的“七七事變”。
志願者們就此相繼離開商丘“暫避”，孩子們在大門旁寫下“再見”。卻不知何時才能與學校再見。
人物周刊 ：學校被解散以後，你們今後的工作怎做？
李丹：現在主要是繼續做一些愛滋病方面的基礎性調查工作，繼續走訪和尋找河南的愛滋村，統計數位。中央政府對河南的愛滋病狀況並不完全知情。有一個衛生部的官員就曾跟我說過，他們下來瞭解情況都是通過當地政府的，即使到村裏去也是當地官員領著去，很難看到全面的、一手的情況。
人物周刊：學校還有希望恢復嗎？
李丹：有希望，考慮在外省尋找一個合適的地方來繼續這個工作。雖然對愛滋孤兒的心理健康來說，最好給他們一種有根的感覺，不要讓他們背井離鄉，但重新回河南商丘辦學校可能性不大了，我們已經被“盯”上了。
人物周刊：當地政府也辦了收養愛滋孤兒的“陽光家園”，從硬體條件上來看，似乎比東珍學校要強很多，為什麼你們還要辦這個學校呢？
李丹：現在河南大概有 20 家由政府辦的愛滋孤兒院，最多也只能容納2000人左右，遠遠滿足不了需要，像我們收養的這些孩子，在學校被關閉以後，也是進不了“陽光家園”的，當時現場一個官員就對孩子的家長說，“只要在家餓不死就行”。
另外，對愛滋兒童的教育，最主要的是在心理方面，這些孩子或多或少都會有一些心理問題，在東珍我們找了很多心理專家、兒童教育專家來關注這個事情，但政府辦的孤兒院在這方面比較欠缺，跟孩子沒有溝通。商丘柘城縣的民政局長居然說過這樣一句話：“辦陽光家園是為了幫助解決當地的就業問題。”
人物周刊：孩子的心理問題表現在什麼地方？
李丹：過去當地政府一直在掩蓋這個事情，對愛滋病也沒有宣傳，造成社會對愛滋知識的不瞭解，和對愛滋病人的歧視。孩子在這樣的環境中長大，心理一定有很深的陰影。我就看過一個愛滋家庭的孩子，拿小刀刻字，都是刻的“仇、殺、恨”。愛滋病對孩子的影響可以是毀滅性的，如果不用合理的方法關照他們的身心成長，他們也許終生無法過上正常人的生活 。
人物周刊：你是從什麼時候開始關注愛滋病群體的？
李丹 ：最早的時候是在 1998 年，當時我結識了宋鵬飛，他是國內首個公開承認自己感染愛滋病的，很多媒體都報導過。當時我們在一起做愛滋滋病的反歧視工作。
後來我到了河南，親眼看到了許多愛滋病人的痛苦。當時媒體首先報導了一個愛滋村，我們通過走訪，到 2000 年，一共發現了十幾家愛滋村，情況讓人震驚。這些愛滋病人大多會在 5-10 年後發病身亡，到時候會留下大量的遺孤。我們走訪的許多愛滋病人最擔心的並不是自己的就醫，他們也知道這種病是絕症，他們最放心不下的是自己死了以後，孩子怎麼辦。
人物周刊：所以你們想到要辦一所這樣的學校。
李丹：其實我們摸索了很多辦法，比如“一幫一”、分散撫養，但是這樣的方法往往很難監督，把愛滋孤兒送到普通的學校去又屢遭拒絕，後來我們就決定自己辦這樣一所學校。
人物周刊：作為一個 NGO 組織，你們最大的困難在於何處？
李丹：其實資金不是最大的困難，最難的是我們如何取得政府的支援。現在跟我們聯繫的有捐款意向的機構已經有 20 多家，但是沒有一家真正給錢的，很多境外的機構，不願意跟當地的政府作對。有的時候，當地政府知道了哪個機構願意給我們投錢，就會去跟他們說，李丹的學校是不合法的，你們應該把捐款投給政府的民政部門。
人物周刊：東珍學校一直沒有取得註冊，是嗎？
李丹：是啊，我們以前去註冊，找商丘市教育局、找社會力量辦學辦公室，對方說，只要我們學校有 100 萬的註冊資金，就可以敞開註冊。後來 6 月中旬我們聯繫到了美國的華人基金會的捐款，對方答應只要這裏同意我們辦學，就馬上把錢打到我們在美國的賬戶。結果再去找教育局，他們又變卦了。
人物周刊：學校開辦以來募集了多少資金？
李丹：一共有18萬元捐贈的善款，這個在我們的網站上，每筆捐款都有登記，可以查到。
人物周刊：這個錢是怎麼用的？
李丹：到學校停辦的時候，花在孩子身上的錢有 6 萬左右，這些支出，我們在網上都有公開，可以查到。我們支付志願者的工資和因公往來車費等，也花了約6萬。
人物周刊：現在學校解散了，孩子回家了，剩餘部分的錢如何處理？
李丹：剩餘部分目前還是由學校掌管，因為我們下面的工作還將繼續。
人物周刊：你現在從中科院天文臺碩士畢業了嗎？
李丹：本來是去年畢業的，但畢業前我在美國做愛滋的訪問，就推遲了一年，今年 5 月，我已經向天文臺遞交了退學申請。
人物周刊：為什麼？
李丹：一來是覺得我以後不會再搞天文了，二來，我現在確實沒有精力去完成畢業論文。完成碩士畢業論文最起碼要花費幾個月到半年的時間。我在將來的一兩年中都不會有這樣的時間。
人物周刊：天文臺知道你在做愛滋病援助的工作嗎？
李丹：知道，我已經做了好幾年，老師們都很支援我。但我覺得特別對不起他們，讀碩士期間沒有給導師、給台裏做出過任何成績，還老是給他們添麻煩。每次我在河南惹了事，河南省有關部門都會派人找到學校，問他們怎麼不好好管教學生（笑）。
人物周刊：最後幾個月放棄學業，不覺得可惜嗎？
李丹：其實學校老師和父母都勸過我，我父母常說，先把自己的事業搞好了，比如說當了官、掙了錢，然後才有實力去更好地幫助別人。但是愛滋病等不起啊，我不能先掙十年錢然後再來搞慈善。愛滋病毒攜帶者的大面積發病，也就是幾年內的事，很多工作，現在不做就來不及了。政府的介入是一個漫長而複雜的過程，民間力量既然已經注意到了事情的緊迫性，就要先做起來。
人物周刊：聽說你現在沒有經濟來源，是你的女朋友在“養著你”，是嗎？她也是你們的志願者之一嗎？
李丹：不是，我們的價值觀不太一樣。她覺得我們做的事情是“胡鬧”，覺得個人的力量太過渺小，不會對事情起什麼改變作用。而且她很擔心我的安全，我在河南，如果什麼時候手機沒電了，她就怕我出事。確實，那裏不是個很安全的地方。
人物周刊：對這種觀念上的差異，你們有過溝通嗎？
李丹：有過，但是沒有用。現在她還常勸我。
人物周刊：怎麼勸？
李丹：威脅分手。不過她已經威脅了四年了，到現在我們還是在一起。
人物周刊：她的收入夠供養你們兩個人嗎？
李丹：她每月底薪 3000元，女孩子嘛，總希望生活能穩定一點，她想買房子，可房子多貴呀！
人物周刊：那你怎麼跟她說？
李丹：我總是說，一切都是暫時的，會很快好起來。
人物周刊：她信嗎？
李丹：她不信。
人物周刊：你信嗎？
李丹：我信
2004-08-25 來源：人物周刊
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/rwzk/20040825/tbbd/200409020003.asp
愛滋病等不起啊，我不能先掙十年錢然後再來搞慈善。愛滋病毒攜帶者的大面積發病，也就是幾年內的事，很多工作，現在不做就來不及了
本刊記者 蒯樂昊 發自河南商丘
到河南商丘尋找李丹，是因為他和他的愛滋病救助組織“東珍學校”。
這個民間力量創辦的學校收養了20名父母雙亡或單方死亡的愛滋孤兒。
輾轉找到東珍學校所在的清真寺，已然人去樓空，“東珍學校”的牌子被摘掉了，門上掛著一把大鎖。牆上，黃色的粉筆字，孩子稚嫩而工整的筆跡：“再見”。
正在進退維穀時，一個好心的知情人偷偷把記者拉到一個無人的小巷，說，“一個月前，政府突然來人把學校查封了，把人帶走了。小孩現在都回家了。”
“李丹呢？”
“李丹在北京，他的手機被警察收走了，你可以這樣找到他⋯⋯”
一個月前的那場風波，逐漸浮出水面。
由於關注的領域過於敏感，“東珍學校”成了國內NGO中命途多舛的典型。
創立以來一直得不到合法的身份，成員數次被當地政府跟蹤、警告、直到驅逐。學校一名志願者杜秀雨告訴記者，李丹在 8 月 9 日最後一次衝突中還莫名其妙地受到跟蹤、軟禁，收了手機，挨了打。
商丘柘城派出所表示，李丹 8 月 9 日被打是因在網吧跟幾名青年起了衝突，“擾亂社會治安”，跟當地政府無關。
東珍學校的志願者，把從 7 月 7 日起開始的長達一個月的“磨難”，戲稱為東珍學校的“七七事變”。
志願者們就此相繼離開商丘“暫避”，孩子們在大門旁寫下“再見”。卻不知何時才能與學校再見。
人物周刊 ：學校被解散以後，你們今後的工作怎做？
李丹：現在主要是繼續做一些愛滋病方面的基礎性調查工作，繼續走訪和尋找河南的愛滋村，統計數位。中央政府對河南的愛滋病狀況並不完全知情。有一個衛生部的官員就曾跟我說過，他們下來瞭解情況都是通過當地政府的，即使到村裏去也是當地官員領著去，很難看到全面的、一手的情況。
人物周刊：學校還有希望恢復嗎？
李丹：有希望，考慮在外省尋找一個合適的地方來繼續這個工作。雖然對愛滋孤兒的心理健康來說，最好給他們一種有根的感覺，不要讓他們背井離鄉，但重新回河南商丘辦學校可能性不大了，我們已經被“盯”上了。
人物周刊：當地政府也辦了收養愛滋孤兒的“陽光家園”，從硬體條件上來看，似乎比東珍學校要強很多，為什麼你們還要辦這個學校呢？
李丹：現在河南大概有 20 家由政府辦的愛滋孤兒院，最多也只能容納2000人左右，遠遠滿足不了需要，像我們收養的這些孩子，在學校被關閉以後，也是進不了“陽光家園”的，當時現場一個官員就對孩子的家長說，“只要在家餓不死就行”。
另外，對愛滋兒童的教育，最主要的是在心理方面，這些孩子或多或少都會有一些心理問題，在東珍我們找了很多心理專家、兒童教育專家來關注這個事情，但政府辦的孤兒院在這方面比較欠缺，跟孩子沒有溝通。商丘柘城縣的民政局長居然說過這樣一句話：“辦陽光家園是為了幫助解決當地的就業問題。”
人物周刊：孩子的心理問題表現在什麼地方？
李丹：過去當地政府一直在掩蓋這個事情，對愛滋病也沒有宣傳，造成社會對愛滋知識的不瞭解，和對愛滋病人的歧視。孩子在這樣的環境中長大，心理一定有很深的陰影。我就看過一個愛滋家庭的孩子，拿小刀刻字，都是刻的“仇、殺、恨”。愛滋病對孩子的影響可以是毀滅性的，如果不用合理的方法關照他們的身心成長，他們也許終生無法過上正常人的生活 。
人物周刊：你是從什麼時候開始關注愛滋病群體的？
李丹 ：最早的時候是在 1998 年，當時我結識了宋鵬飛，他是國內首個公開承認自己感染愛滋病的，很多媒體都報導過。當時我們在一起做愛滋滋病的反歧視工作。
後來我到了河南，親眼看到了許多愛滋病人的痛苦。當時媒體首先報導了一個愛滋村，我們通過走訪，到 2000 年，一共發現了十幾家愛滋村，情況讓人震驚。這些愛滋病人大多會在 5-10 年後發病身亡，到時候會留下大量的遺孤。我們走訪的許多愛滋病人最擔心的並不是自己的就醫，他們也知道這種病是絕症，他們最放心不下的是自己死了以後，孩子怎麼辦。
人物周刊：所以你們想到要辦一所這樣的學校。
李丹：其實我們摸索了很多辦法，比如“一幫一”、分散撫養，但是這樣的方法往往很難監督，把愛滋孤兒送到普通的學校去又屢遭拒絕，後來我們就決定自己辦這樣一所學校。
人物周刊：作為一個 NGO 組織，你們最大的困難在於何處？
李丹：其實資金不是最大的困難，最難的是我們如何取得政府的支援。現在跟我們聯繫的有捐款意向的機構已經有 20 多家，但是沒有一家真正給錢的，很多境外的機構，不願意跟當地的政府作對。有的時候，當地政府知道了哪個機構願意給我們投錢，就會去跟他們說，李丹的學校是不合法的，你們應該把捐款投給政府的民政部門。
人物周刊：東珍學校一直沒有取得註冊，是嗎？
李丹：是啊，我們以前去註冊，找商丘市教育局、找社會力量辦學辦公室，對方說，只要我們學校有 100 萬的註冊資金，就可以敞開註冊。後來 6 月中旬我們聯繫到了美國的華人基金會的捐款，對方答應只要這裏同意我們辦學，就馬上把錢打到我們在美國的賬戶。結果再去找教育局，他們又變卦了。
人物周刊：學校開辦以來募集了多少資金？
李丹：一共有18萬元捐贈的善款，這個在我們的網站上，每筆捐款都有登記，可以查到。
人物周刊：這個錢是怎麼用的？
李丹：到學校停辦的時候，花在孩子身上的錢有 6 萬左右，這些支出，我們在網上都有公開，可以查到。我們支付志願者的工資和因公往來車費等，也花了約6萬。
人物周刊：現在學校解散了，孩子回家了，剩餘部分的錢如何處理？
李丹：剩餘部分目前還是由學校掌管，因為我們下面的工作還將繼續。
人物周刊：你現在從中科院天文臺碩士畢業了嗎？
李丹：本來是去年畢業的，但畢業前我在美國做愛滋的訪問，就推遲了一年，今年 5 月，我已經向天文臺遞交了退學申請。
人物周刊：為什麼？
李丹：一來是覺得我以後不會再搞天文了，二來，我現在確實沒有精力去完成畢業論文。完成碩士畢業論文最起碼要花費幾個月到半年的時間。我在將來的一兩年中都不會有這樣的時間。
人物周刊：天文臺知道你在做愛滋病援助的工作嗎？
李丹：知道，我已經做了好幾年，老師們都很支援我。但我覺得特別對不起他們，讀碩士期間沒有給導師、給台裏做出過任何成績，還老是給他們添麻煩。每次我在河南惹了事，河南省有關部門都會派人找到學校，問他們怎麼不好好管教學生（笑）。
人物周刊：最後幾個月放棄學業，不覺得可惜嗎？
李丹：其實學校老師和父母都勸過我，我父母常說，先把自己的事業搞好了，比如說當了官、掙了錢，然後才有實力去更好地幫助別人。但是愛滋病等不起啊，我不能先掙十年錢然後再來搞慈善。愛滋病毒攜帶者的大面積發病，也就是幾年內的事，很多工作，現在不做就來不及了。政府的介入是一個漫長而複雜的過程，民間力量既然已經注意到了事情的緊迫性，就要先做起來。
人物周刊：聽說你現在沒有經濟來源，是你的女朋友在“養著你”，是嗎？她也是你們的志願者之一嗎？
李丹：不是，我們的價值觀不太一樣。她覺得我們做的事情是“胡鬧”，覺得個人的力量太過渺小，不會對事情起什麼改變作用。而且她很擔心我的安全，我在河南，如果什麼時候手機沒電了，她就怕我出事。確實，那裏不是個很安全的地方。
人物周刊：對這種觀念上的差異，你們有過溝通嗎？
李丹：有過，但是沒有用。現在她還常勸我。
人物周刊：怎麼勸？
李丹：威脅分手。不過她已經威脅了四年了，到現在我們還是在一起。
人物周刊：她的收入夠供養你們兩個人嗎？
李丹：她每月底薪 3000元，女孩子嘛，總希望生活能穩定一點，她想買房子，可房子多貴呀！
人物周刊：那你怎麼跟她說？
李丹：我總是說，一切都是暫時的，會很快好起來。
人物周刊：她信嗎？
李丹：她不信。
人物周刊：你信嗎？
李丹：我信
對啊！聽說 WSWS 最近也批評巴勒網精神領袖 Chomsky，大概是因為 Chomsky 的「兩個爛蘋果挑一個比較不爛」的理論。WSWS認為應該直接支持具有充份理想性的左派候選人—即便他這次不可能當選。
對於這一點，我是站在 WSWS這一邊。我不相信以美國而言，會有哪個蘋果比較不爛，那種所謂「比較」，差別太小，不足為論。而且，作惡多端的是美國這個國家機器本身，倒不是因為哪個「人」很邪惡。
不是「人」的問題，是一種長久外交政策的問題。更深入來說，是它背後那套貪婪的「生意經」才是問題根源。簡單說就是某種極端的軍事資本主義，近幾十年來的大小戰爭，恐怕都與它有關。這個主義就是：如果你不讓我的商品通過國界，那麼，通過你的國界的，將會是我的軍隊；非奴役你、非賺你的錢不可。
不過，我不是很關心美國總統選舉，甚至不知道有誰要出來選。有時倒希望選個最爛的，因為這樣的話，美國會衰亡得更快一點。所謂亡秦必秦不是嗎？
剛剛聽說楊渡主持的中時晚報論壇被民進黨施壓而「查封」一部份版面，理由是它「對政府不友善」。這樣其實很好，這意味著民進黨肯定也快 game over了。從來沒有人能因為作惡而東方不敗；越是作惡，越會加速敗亡。
真正不敗的是像若雪、像湯姆亨道爾、像桂希恩、像東珍學校、像 ISM、像 MSF 這樣的一些秉持善意的人或團體。
WSWS 的確蠻不錯，我不當它是個報紙或媒體，幾乎是拿它當教科書了。它講的想法，當然不一定全部都能令人信服，但它絕不信口雌黃。它的記者，對自己談的事，都有一番長期追蹤和了解，不像一般媒體，一看就知道是外行人講外行話，要不就是故意操弄讀者，把讀者當白癡，就像紐約時報那樣。
對於大家吹捧的紐約時報，我只能說，如果他們講的話可以信，大便也能當薯條吃了。我不是說他們每則新聞都有意造謠，而是說他們完全控制不了自己強烈的意識形態之干擾，因此無法前後一致且誠實地播報新聞。只要跟他們的希望或品味或意識形態有所違背或有違所謂「國家利益」的新聞，就算你死幾百萬人，就算喪盡天良，他也不報或盡量淡化處理，彷彿世上沒有這回事似的。
比方說美國以禁運為藉口，蓄意破壞伊拉克公衛淨水能力以及控制基本藥品和各種民生物資，殺了至少一百萬個伊拉克小孩；紐約屎報有沒有報導過一個字？美國其它主流媒體，例如華爾街日報、、華聖頓郵報、時代雜誌以及新聞週刊等，統統有志一同地看不見這一百萬條小生命的喪失。
鄭啟承曾翻譯過一篇文章，談的就是美國根本是故意這麼做，故意要造成這樣的鉅大傷害。文章很長，有註腳，格式上可能無法貼在這裏。哈巴狗電台已經關門，不過，記得南方電子報好像有轉載（不確定），應該可以找到，標題是：「戰犯行為－美國之蓄意造成伊拉克水源危機」。務必一讀，看看主流媒體是怎麼「做」新聞，看看他們故意忽略了些什麼不讓我們知道。
再以此次侵略伊拉克為例，如果連哈巴狗電台小貓兩三隻都能把布希和布萊爾的謊言事先摸得一清二楚，紐約時報有可能那麼無知無能嗎？簡直沒有一點基本國際常識。這有可能嗎？最近還假裝什麼為不當侵略伊拉克進行「反省」、什麼「向讀者致歉」，實在有夠詐欺，簡直把大家當白癡。
Chomsky 有一次牙齒痛，痛得受不了，跑去看牙醫。醫師檢查後，跟他說，你的牙齒很好啊，但上面有些磨痕，你睡覺時可能會磨牙。醫師於是叫 Chomsky 回去之後，請夫人幫忙注意一下，看是否晚上睡覺會磨牙。
結果，沒有發現磨牙跡象。但後來原因還是查出來了。Chomsky說，原來不是磨牙，而是咬牙切齒。Chomsky 說他注意到自己，每次看紐約時報時，都會咬牙切齒。
結論是：我們不可能期待佔盡利益的主流世界能不說謊、不操弄，我們只能期待改善自己的某種“IQ”，學會如何明辨是非而不為人所欺，進而變成他人的政治工具。
台灣現在就是這麼幹的，整天拼命打壓異己，操弄謊言和騙術，進行政治動員，並且努力竄改不過才幾年的「歷史」，顛倒是非黑白，藉著美化自己、妖魔化對岸人民及國內政治異己或異議人士，以遂行私利。
這些政客許多曾是我的朋友或甚至以命相許的好朋友，只差沒有指天立誓，歃血為盟，但是，這樣的朋友實在太沒品，令人輕視。他們私下或許是好人，但做為一個政治人物，卻純粹是個混蛋。他們或許終於贏得了權位和無數利益，但卻失去人們的尊敬和感情。就算得到了全世界，就算後面跟一堆馬屁精，難道就因此而輝煌？
陳真 2004. 9. 5.
對於這一點，我是站在 WSWS這一邊。我不相信以美國而言，會有哪個蘋果比較不爛，那種所謂「比較」，差別太小，不足為論。而且，作惡多端的是美國這個國家機器本身，倒不是因為哪個「人」很邪惡。
不是「人」的問題，是一種長久外交政策的問題。更深入來說，是它背後那套貪婪的「生意經」才是問題根源。簡單說就是某種極端的軍事資本主義，近幾十年來的大小戰爭，恐怕都與它有關。這個主義就是：如果你不讓我的商品通過國界，那麼，通過你的國界的，將會是我的軍隊；非奴役你、非賺你的錢不可。
不過，我不是很關心美國總統選舉，甚至不知道有誰要出來選。有時倒希望選個最爛的，因為這樣的話，美國會衰亡得更快一點。所謂亡秦必秦不是嗎？
剛剛聽說楊渡主持的中時晚報論壇被民進黨施壓而「查封」一部份版面，理由是它「對政府不友善」。這樣其實很好，這意味著民進黨肯定也快 game over了。從來沒有人能因為作惡而東方不敗；越是作惡，越會加速敗亡。
真正不敗的是像若雪、像湯姆亨道爾、像桂希恩、像東珍學校、像 ISM、像 MSF 這樣的一些秉持善意的人或團體。
WSWS 的確蠻不錯，我不當它是個報紙或媒體，幾乎是拿它當教科書了。它講的想法，當然不一定全部都能令人信服，但它絕不信口雌黃。它的記者，對自己談的事，都有一番長期追蹤和了解，不像一般媒體，一看就知道是外行人講外行話，要不就是故意操弄讀者，把讀者當白癡，就像紐約時報那樣。
對於大家吹捧的紐約時報，我只能說，如果他們講的話可以信，大便也能當薯條吃了。我不是說他們每則新聞都有意造謠，而是說他們完全控制不了自己強烈的意識形態之干擾，因此無法前後一致且誠實地播報新聞。只要跟他們的希望或品味或意識形態有所違背或有違所謂「國家利益」的新聞，就算你死幾百萬人，就算喪盡天良，他也不報或盡量淡化處理，彷彿世上沒有這回事似的。
比方說美國以禁運為藉口，蓄意破壞伊拉克公衛淨水能力以及控制基本藥品和各種民生物資，殺了至少一百萬個伊拉克小孩；紐約屎報有沒有報導過一個字？美國其它主流媒體，例如華爾街日報、、華聖頓郵報、時代雜誌以及新聞週刊等，統統有志一同地看不見這一百萬條小生命的喪失。
鄭啟承曾翻譯過一篇文章，談的就是美國根本是故意這麼做，故意要造成這樣的鉅大傷害。文章很長，有註腳，格式上可能無法貼在這裏。哈巴狗電台已經關門，不過，記得南方電子報好像有轉載（不確定），應該可以找到，標題是：「戰犯行為－美國之蓄意造成伊拉克水源危機」。務必一讀，看看主流媒體是怎麼「做」新聞，看看他們故意忽略了些什麼不讓我們知道。
再以此次侵略伊拉克為例，如果連哈巴狗電台小貓兩三隻都能把布希和布萊爾的謊言事先摸得一清二楚，紐約時報有可能那麼無知無能嗎？簡直沒有一點基本國際常識。這有可能嗎？最近還假裝什麼為不當侵略伊拉克進行「反省」、什麼「向讀者致歉」，實在有夠詐欺，簡直把大家當白癡。
Chomsky 有一次牙齒痛，痛得受不了，跑去看牙醫。醫師檢查後，跟他說，你的牙齒很好啊，但上面有些磨痕，你睡覺時可能會磨牙。醫師於是叫 Chomsky 回去之後，請夫人幫忙注意一下，看是否晚上睡覺會磨牙。
結果，沒有發現磨牙跡象。但後來原因還是查出來了。Chomsky說，原來不是磨牙，而是咬牙切齒。Chomsky 說他注意到自己，每次看紐約時報時，都會咬牙切齒。
結論是：我們不可能期待佔盡利益的主流世界能不說謊、不操弄，我們只能期待改善自己的某種“IQ”，學會如何明辨是非而不為人所欺，進而變成他人的政治工具。
台灣現在就是這麼幹的，整天拼命打壓異己，操弄謊言和騙術，進行政治動員，並且努力竄改不過才幾年的「歷史」，顛倒是非黑白，藉著美化自己、妖魔化對岸人民及國內政治異己或異議人士，以遂行私利。
這些政客許多曾是我的朋友或甚至以命相許的好朋友，只差沒有指天立誓，歃血為盟，但是，這樣的朋友實在太沒品，令人輕視。他們私下或許是好人，但做為一個政治人物，卻純粹是個混蛋。他們或許終於贏得了權位和無數利益，但卻失去人們的尊敬和感情。就算得到了全世界，就算後面跟一堆馬屁精，難道就因此而輝煌？
陳真 2004. 9. 5.
其實主流媒體再多麼"主流"，雖然不能說無所謂，但是現在有網路或說是管道比以前非網路時代多，只要我們願意用一點心，很多資料都可以找得到，剩下的就是我們自己對這些資料的判斷而已。當然比較遺憾的是，我們必須懂一些外文才能看懂這些資料。
數月前看到一篇文章，是訪談紐約一位有名的什麼家（我忘了），他說現在的人就算事實擺在眼前，他們可能還是寧願選擇相信電視上的新聞報導。
p.s 我也投WSWS一票，建議想增進英文能力的學子可以多讀讀他們的文章，把Times, News Week 丟一邊吧！當然，你不必接受WSWS的觀點，但最起碼WSWS不會無的放矢。有次一個讀者寫信質疑WSWS文章中批評到英國相當優秀的記者John Pilger，WSWS在答覆時，引了一堆資料來證明他們不是信口開河，令我印象深刻。
怡靜
數月前看到一篇文章，是訪談紐約一位有名的什麼家（我忘了），他說現在的人就算事實擺在眼前，他們可能還是寧願選擇相信電視上的新聞報導。
p.s 我也投WSWS一票，建議想增進英文能力的學子可以多讀讀他們的文章，把Times, News Week 丟一邊吧！當然，你不必接受WSWS的觀點，但最起碼WSWS不會無的放矢。有次一個讀者寫信質疑WSWS文章中批評到英國相當優秀的記者John Pilger，WSWS在答覆時，引了一堆資料來證明他們不是信口開河，令我印象深刻。
怡靜
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